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
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BIBLIOTHECA SACRA

A Religious and Sociological Quarterly

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VOL. LII

OBERLIN, OHIO
BIBLIOTHECA SACRA COMPANY
KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRÜBNER AND CO., LONDON

1895

- 38635 -



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Press of Pearce & Rando'ph

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NEW YORK

CONTENTS OF VOL. LII.

NO. CCV.

Article.		Page.
I. AN IRENICON.....		I
BY PROFESSOR G. FREDERICK WRIGHT, OBERLIN, OHIO. •		
II. HARMONY OF THE PENTATEUCH RESPECTING PRIESTLY DUES.....		18
BY THE REV. HENRY HAYMAN, D. D., ALDINGHAM, ULVERSTON, ENGLAND.		
III. THE DESCENT OF THE NEW JERUSALEM.....		29
BY THE REV. WILLIAM E. BARTON, BOSTON, MASS.		
IV. THE IMPORTANCE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE HISTORICAL ARGUMENT.....		48
BY PROFESSOR ALBERT TEMPLE SWING, OBERLIN, OHIO. .		
V. THE AUTHORITY AND INSPIRATION OF THE SCRIPTURES (I.)		69
BY PROFESSOR FRANK HUGH FOSTER, D. D., OAKLAND, CAL.		
VI. CLOSE COMMUNION.....		97
BY A BAPTIST DIVINE.		
VII. THE ORDER OF THE ASSASSINS.....		113
BY PROFESSOR HARVEY PORTER, D. D., BEIRUT, SYRIA.		
VIII. THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC AND THE DEBS IN- SURRECTION (I.)		135
BY MR. Z. SWIFT HOLBROOK, CHICAGO, ILL.		
IX. RELIGION AND WEALTH.....		153
BY THE REV. WASHINGTON GLADDEN, D. D., COLUMBUS, OHIO.		
X. SEMITIC AND ORIENTAL NOTES.....		168
Early Israelitish Monotheism..... 168		
The Three Religions of China..... 170		
On the Historical Study of Religion..... 173		
XI. GENERAL AND CRITICAL NOTES		176
Greenland Christianity..... 176		

Article.	Page.
XII. SOCIOLOGICAL NOTES.....	180
Pullman's Testimony,—An Object Lesson.....	180
Attorney-General Olney and Labor Organizations.....	185
Oberlin Institute of Christian Sociology.....	186
XIII. NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.....	189
Tischendorf, <i>Novum Testamentum Graece</i>	189
McCurdy, <i>History, Prophecy and the Monuments</i>	192
Eрман, <i>Life in Ancient Egypt</i>	195
Davis, <i>The Egyptian Book of the Dead</i>	196
Strong, <i>Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible</i>	196
Walker, <i>The Comprehensive Concordance to the Holy</i> <i>Scriptures</i>	196
Sabatier, <i>Life of St. Francis of Assisi</i>	198
Kidd, <i>Social Evolution</i>	200
Commons, <i>The Distribution of Wealth</i>	203
Giddings, <i>The Theory of Sociology</i>	204
Ely, <i>Socialism and Social Reform</i>	204
Commons, <i>Social Reform and the Church</i>	204
Small and Vincent, <i>An Introduction to the Study of Society</i> , <i>Books Received</i>	204 208

NO. CCVI.

I. THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC AND THE DEBS IN- SURRECTION (II.)	209
BY MR. Z. SWIFT HOLBROOK, CHICAGO, ILL.	
II. THE AUTHORITY AND INSPIRATION OF THE SCRIPTURES (II.)	232
BY PROFESSOR FRANK HUGH FOSTER, D. D., OAKLAND, CAL.	
III. THE BOOK OF ACTS AND THE HISTORICAL METHOD OF INTERPRETATION.....	259
BY THE REV. JAMES BRAND, D. D., OBERLIN, OHIO.	
IV. THE SOCIAL ETHICS OF JESUS.....	271
BY PROFESSOR JOHN S. SEWALL, D. D., BANGOR, MAINE.	
V. RESTRICTED COMMUNION.....	297
BY THE REV. JAMES W. WILLMARTH, D. D., LL. D., PHILADELPHIA, PA.	

Contents.

v

Article.	Page.
VI. PRESIDENT HARPER'S LECTURES.....	323
BY PROFESSOR HOWARD OSGOOD, ROCHESTER, N. Y.	
VII. SEMITIC AND ORIENTAL NOTES.....	342
The Real Meaning of Semitic Sacrifice.....	342
VIII. GENERAL AND CRITICAL NOTES	347
The Isaiah Controversy. C. Caverno.....	347
"The Ascent of Man." Francis D. Kelsey.....	351
The True Rendering of Romans ix. 3. L. S. Potwin.....	357
IX. SOCIOLOGICAL NOTES.....	359
Strikes.....	359
The Marquette Building Strike.....	362
The Brooklyn Trolley Strike.....	364
X. NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.....	365
Lagarde, Paul de Lagarde.....	365
Candlish, The Biblical Doctrine of Sin.....	367
Brünnow, Chrestomathy of Arabic Prose Pieces.....	368
Dana, Manual of Geology.....	369
Upham, The First Words from God.....	370
Dayis, Genesis and Semitic Tradition	371
Teachers' Bible.....	371
Jacobs, Studies in Biblical Archæology.....	372
Barnes, Canonical and Uncanonical Gospels.....	372
Stalker, The Trial and Death of Jesus Christ.....	372
Iverach, Christianity and Evolution.....	373
Cairns, Christ the Central Evidence of Christianity.....	373
Raymond, Christianity and the Christ.....	373
Reed, Outline of the Fundamental Doctrines of the Bible.	373
Maclaren, Bible Class Expositions.....	374
Expositor's Bible.....	374
Monday Club Sermons for 1895.....	375
Wright, Master and Men.....	376
Love, St. Paul and Woman.....	376
Wordsworth, The One Religion.....	376
Pfleiderer, Philosophy and Development of Religion.....	375
Holland, God's City and the Coming of the Kingdom.....	377
Smith, The Purpose of God.....	378

Article.	Page.
Thompson, Protestant Missions.....	378
Pease, The Christian Ministry.....	378
Trumbull, Studies in Oriental Social Life.....	379
Buckley, Travels in Three Continents.....	379
Papers of the American Society of Church History.....	379
Record Books.....	379
Some Good Books for Sunday-School Libraries.....	381
Larned, History for Ready Reference.....	382
Blümner, The Home Life of the Ancient Greeks.....	383
Preston and Dodge, The Private Life of the Romans.....	383
Chautauqua Books for 1894-95.....	383
Books Received.....	384

NO. CCVII.

I. CALVINISM: THE ORIGIN AND SAFEGUARD OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTIES (I.)	385
BY THE REV. ABRAHAM KUYPER, D. D., AMSTERDAM, HOLLAND. TRANSLATED BY THE REV. J. HENDRIK DE VRIES, BRONXVILLE, N. Y.	
II. THE RELATIONS OF CAPITAL AND LABOR.....	411
BY LUCIEN C. WARNER, M. D., NEW YORK CITY.	
III. IDEAS OF THE FUTURE LIFE IN THE PENTA- TEUCH	423
BY THE REV. THOMAS STOUGHTON POTWIN, HARTFORD, CONN.	
IV. PAUL'S PHRASEOLOGY AND ROMAN LAW.....	439
BY THE REV. GEORGE F. MAGOUN, D. D., GRINNELL, IOWA.	
V. WHAT IS SOCIOLOGY.....	458
BY MR. Z. SWIFT HOLBROOK, CHICAGO, ILL.	
VI. THE PASSING OF AGNOSTICISM.....	505
BY THE REV. A. A. BERLE, D. D., BOSTON, MASS.	
VII. STUDIES IN CHRISTOLOGY.....	531
BY PROFESSOR FRANK HUGH FOSTER, D. D., OAKLAND, CAL.	
VIII. INJUNCTIONS AND STRIKES.....	549
BY HON. WILLIAM H. UPSON, AKRON, OHIO.	
IX. MEMORIAL NOTES	553
John Albert Broadus.....	553

Contents.

vii

Article.	Page.
James Dwight Dana	557
X. CRITICAL NOTES	559
Bad Philosophy Going to Seed.....	559
Professor Herron's Impressionism.....	561
XI. SOCIOLOGICAL NOTES	564
Charity (I.)	564
XII. NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.....	569
Balfour, The Foundations of Belief.....	569
Romanes, Thoughts on Religion.....	572
Smith, The Historical Geography of the Holy Land.....	574
Dorchester, The Problem of Religious Progress.....	575
Farrar, The Book of Daniel.....	576
Briggs, The Messiah of the Apostles.....	578
Kübel, Exegetisch-homiletisches Handbuch zum Evangelium des Matthaus.....	580
Stiſſer, An Introduction to the Study of the Acts of the Apostles.....	582
Jewett, Luther Halsey Gulick.....	583
Griffis, The Religions of Japan.....	584
Walker, Outlines of Christian Theology.....	585
MacLean, An Introduction to the Study of the Gospel of St. John.....	585
Harnack, Monasticism.....	586
Books Received.....	586

NO. CCVIII.

I. THE SOCIOLOGICAL VALUE OF THE OLD TESTAMENT	587
BY PROFESSOR OWEN H. GATES, PH. D., OBERLIN, OHIO.	
II. THE RELATION OF CORPORATIONS TO PUBLIC MORALS.....	607
BY THE REV. WASHINGTON GLADDEN, D. D., COLUMBUS, OHIO.	
III. FORMULATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE MASS AT THE COUNCIL OF TRENT	629
BY THE REV. PROFESSOR C. WALKER, D. D., THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, VIRGINIA.	

Article.	Page.
IV. CALVINISM: THE ORIGIN AND SAFEGUARD OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTIES (II.)	646
BY THE REV. ABRAHAM KUYPER, D. D., AMSTERDAM, HOLLAND. TRANSLATED BY THE REV. HENDRIK DE VRIES, BRONXVILLE, N. Y.	
V. THE HYMNS OF MARTIN LUTHER: THEIR PRE- CESSORS AND THEIR PLACE IN HISTORY	676
BY PROFESSOR EDWARD DICKINSON, OBERLIN, OHIO.	
VI. THE NATURE OF THE RESURRECTION BODY OF CHRIST.....	708
BY THE REV. SAMUEL HUTCHINGS, D. D., ORANGE, NEW JERSEY.	
VII. PROFESSOR PRESTWICH ON SOME SUPPOSED NEW EVIDENCE OF THE DELUGE.....	724
BY PROFESSOR G. FREDERICK WRIGHT, OBERLIN, OHIO.	
VIII. CRITICAL NOTES.....	741
Truth or Pious Fraud.....	741
The Use of Kingdom and Church in the New Testament. W E. C. Wright.....	747
IX. SOCIOLOGICAL NOTES.....	750
Charity (II.)	750
X. SEMITIC AND ORIENTAL NOTES.....	754
The Triumph of Assyriology....	754
The Persistence of Anti-Semitism....	756
XI. NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.....	759
Hyde, Outlines of Social Theology.....	759
Gunkel, Schöpfung und Chaos in Urzeit und Endzeit,....	763
Denney, Studies in Theology.....	766
Phillips, The Teaching of the Vedas.....	767
Thirty Years' Work in the Holy Land.....	769
Lawrence, Modern Missions in the East.....	769
Missions at Home and Abroad.....	771
English, Evolution and the Immanent God.....	771
Conway, The Writings of Thomas Paine.....	772
Old South Leaflets.....	772
OBERLIN SUMMER SCHOOL OF CHRISTIAN SO- CIOLOGY.....	773
INDEX.....	789

THE BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

AN IRENICON.

BY PROFESSOR G. FREDERICK WRIGHT.

IN current discussions concerning the inspiration and inerrancy of Scripture it is evident that many of the disputants are proceeding at cross-purposes. Not only do they see different sides of the same shield; but much of the language employed by them is understood by each in a sense different from that intended by the other. We are confident that more careful attention to the meaning of the terms employed on both sides will largely remove the main grounds of dispute between the mass of those who really revere the sacred word.

On the one hand, many who object to the doctrine of the inerrancy of Scripture do not fully take into account the qualifications introduced, and the explanation of terms given, by its advocates, nor do they make due allowance for the limitations to the doctrine afforded by the processes of interpretation which all employ to some extent and admit to be lawful.

On the other hand, the advocates of inerrancy do not all of them see how nearly their liberal principles of interpretation bring their statement of the doctrine down to the level of that of the moderate members of the opposing party. Neither do all of the so-called liberal party seem to be aware

that, in magnifying the discrepancies of Scripture, as they do, they fall into the same error of extreme literalism which they charge upon the so-called conservatives. To put it concisely: The conservatives are inclined to be too literal in their interpretation of the texts which teach inerrancy, and liberal in their interpretation of the passages containing apparent errors and discrepancies; while the liberals tend towards too great rigidity in their interpretation of the apparent discrepancies, and too great freedom in their treatment of the claims of the Bible to inspiration and infallibility.

For example: Dr. Charles Hodge's full statement of the doctrine of plenary inspiration is by no means so rigid as many seem to suppose it to be. Thus, in his most formal statement of the doctrine he says: "They [the sacred writers] were not imbued with plenary knowledge. *As to all matters, of science, philosophy, and history, they stood on the same level with their contemporaries.* They were infallible only as teachers, and when acting as spokesmen of God. Their inspiration no more made them astronomers than it made them agriculturists. Isaiah was infallible in his predictions, although he shared with his countrymen the views then prevalent as to the mechanism of the universe."¹ (The italics here, and later, are ours to call attention to significant qualifying clauses.) Again, in his treatment of alleged discrepancies and errors, we find him saying, that "the *great majority* of them are only apparent, and yield to careful examination. . . . The marvel and the miracle is that there are so few of any real importance. . . . The *errors in matters of fact* which sceptics search out *bear no proportion* to the whole. . . . No sane man would deny that the Parthenon was built of marble, even if here and there a speck of sandstone should be detected in the structure. . . . *Admitting that the Scriptures do contain, in a few instances, discrepancies* which, with our present means of knowledge, we are unable satisfactorily to

¹ Systematic Theology, Vol. i. p. 165.

explain, they furnish no rational ground for denying their infallibility."¹

Dr. A. A. Hodge, also, when insisting that the Bible is "wholly the word of God," inserts a qualifying clause which has more significance than would be suspected by the casual reader. The books of Scripture, he says, are "wholly the Word of God, conveying, with absolute accuracy and divine authority, *all that God meant them to convey*."² Again, in the joint article upon the subject by Drs. A. A. Hodge and B. B. Warfield,³ it is said, that "all the affirmations of Scripture . . . are without any error when the *ipsissima verba* of the original autographs are ascertained and *interpreted in their natural and intended sense*."

Taking President J. H. Fairchild as a representative of the evangelical wing of the liberal party, it appears that, while he characterizes the theory of plenary inspiration as "that of *absolute* inspiration," he describes his own theory as "that of *essential* inspiration," and maintains "that there is *marvellous accuracy* even in the geographical and historical statements [of the Bible], and *marvellous wisdom* in reference to *all matters of science*—such wisdom as seems to imply *divine guidance*; *securing the use* of popular expressions such as are *always appropriate*, and the *avoidance of all technical terms* which imply a scientific theory."⁴ It should be gratifying to those who insist upon the formal doctrine of plenary inspiration, to see that one who professedly rejects their statement of it still maintains the same high reverence for the Bible, and the same confidence in its details, which is cherished by them.

With equal distinctness, also, do both parties reject the mechanical theory of inspiration. According to Dr. Hodge,

¹ Systematic Theology, Vol. i. pp. 169, 170.

² Commentary on the Confession of Faith, p. 55.

³ The Presbyterian Review, Vol. ii. p. 238.

⁴ Elements of Theology, p. 83.

"The Church has never held what has been stigmatized as the mechanical theory of inspiration. The sacred writers were not machines. . . . It lies in the very nature of inspiration that God spake in the language of men; that He uses men as his organs, each according to his peculiar gifts and endowments. When He ordains praise out of the mouth of babes, they must speak as babes, or the whole power and beauty of the tribute will be lost. . . . The sacred writers were not made unconscious or irrational. The spirits of the prophets were subject to the prophets. They were not like calculating machines which grind out logarithms with infallible correctness."¹ Upon this point President Fairchild's language is strikingly in accord with that of Dr. Hodge, even to that of the principal illustration: "The result then seems to be," he says, "that, in our use and application of Scriptures, whatever theory of inspiration we adopt, we are not saved from the necessity of the exercise of our own judgment, and from the uncertainty thereby involved. The Scriptures are not given us to be used in a mechanical way, like an algebraic formula, or a carpenter's rule; and even absolute inspiration could not secure to us such a use of the Scriptures. The two theories practically bring us to the same result, by somewhat different routes."²

A careful examination of these and other representative statements of prominent writers upon both sides of the question readily reveals the basis of much present misunderstanding. When Dr. A. A. Hodge says, that the Scriptures convey "with absolute accuracy . . . *all that God meant them to convey*," the qualifying clause throws the whole field open for criticism to determine just what information God did mean to convey. Likewise, when Drs. Warfield and A. A. Hodge say, that "all affirmations of Scripture . . . are without error," the sweep of their qualifying clauses should be carefully noted.

¹ Systematic Theology, Vol. i. pp. 157, 156.

² Elements of Theology, p. 85.

The affirmations are to be "interpreted in their natural and *intended* sense." Here, too, the whole field of criticism is thrown open. The definition is not closed. It remains to determine what is the *natural* and *intended* sense.

The difficulty of agreeing upon what is the natural and intended sense has a striking illustration in the recent controversy between Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Huxley over the first chapter of Genesis, in which the scientific man inferred the intention of the document from a narrow literal interpretation of the terms employed, such as would be legitimate only in dealing with a scientific treatise, while the statesman, from his larger familiarity with men and the literature of the world, interpreted the language more liberally. Evidently, the whole contention was largely over the definition of terms, upon which the distinguished writers from the different spheres of action and thought in which they had habitually moved, found it difficult, and we might say impossible, to come to an agreement.

The interests both of truth and Christian fellowship will be promoted if we note more carefully the significance of these limitations to the bald statements of doctrine concerning the inerrancy of Scripture.

1st. *The Doctrine is to be limited to the Autographs.*—In limiting their assertion of inerrancy to the original text, the conservatives have freed themselves from the acknowledgment of one kind of error by the frank acknowledgment of another kind of error in the Bible as we have had it for eighteen centuries, as we have it now, and as we are likely to have it to the end of time, for we are not likely ever to be able to reproduce the original text perfectly in all its particulars. All that the most enthusiastic textual critics can hope to do, is to reduce the textual uncertainty to an *inconsiderable* quantity, so that it may be disregarded without serious loss. It is important, also, for the liberal party to note in this connection that the most prominent leaders in the work of correct-

ing the text of the New Testament, including such scholars as Tischendorf and Tregelles, have held very high views concerning the inerrancy of the original text. Indeed, it has been these views which have emphasized to them the necessity of their work, and which have stimulated them in their arduous efforts to restore the text of the autographs.

The only advantage, in point of authority, which can be claimed by the advocates of the inerrancy of the autographs is that it may be easier to detect the mistakes of scribes than it is to determine the limit of error in any theory of accommodation. But really this contention would seem to relate to a very small difference over a matter which is far more theoretical than practical; for there are all grades of opinion in the world as to the uncertainty of the text both of the Old Testament and of the New; as there are all grades of belief concerning the extent to which, for rhetorical purposes, the truth respecting minor things may with propriety be disregarded in the statement and enforcement of the main point of a discourse. In both cases the extremists are readily recognized, while the main body of well-balanced and broadly educated people who are seriously struggling with the inherent difficulties, are really not far apart. One says there remains in the text a modicum of error which cannot be eliminated, and the other says there was an inconsiderable amount of error in the original documents, respecting subsidiary facts. But nearly all say that the great body both of the text and of the original statements are correct as we have them and that their true interpretation is determined "beyond a reasonable doubt"—a legal phrase with which we cannot conveniently dispense.

2dly. *Some Theory of Accommodation is held by All Interpreters.*—Supposing the text to be established for the most part "beyond reasonable doubt," and for the rest "upon a preponderance of evidence," it remains to determine what is the *natural* and *intended* sense, that is, what truth God

meant the words used to convey. And here, again, we shall find that many of the differences are greatly magnified by an undue rigidity of meaning imposed upon certain words by one party or the other. The theory which excites most alarm among many conservatives is that of "accommodation." And yet it is not difficult to see that, in order to defend the doctrine of inerrancy, conservative scholars themselves have to make large use of this very principle. The only legitimate claim which they can make to superiority in this respect is that they use the principle within more reasonable limits than others do, recognizing that, like a sharp tool, its very value is indicated in the fact that it must be used carefully. A few instances in which this principle is employed by both parties with satisfactory results will suffice.

In Matt. xiii. 32 Christ is made to say that the mustard seed is the least of all seeds. Now, if this is interpreted from a scientific point of view, as it would have to be if it occurred in a scientific book, it is a mistake, and so some would regard it, adducing it as evidence of the limitation of Christ's knowledge while on the earth. But, interpreted from a literary point of view, it is called a figure of speech, in which the superlative is used for the comparative,—a common rhetorical way of enforcing the main idea being to disregard the minute elements in a statement, so that attention shall not be distracted from the main point. In this view such an expression as "the least of all seeds" is in this connection a *breviloquence*, meaning, the least of all known seeds, or the least of all seeds with which we have anything to do or with which we are familiar. In catching the main idea, the mind has no time to pause and weigh the infinitesimal elements in the form of statement. In such a case it would be a serious rhetorical mistake to burden the sentence with the minutiae of exact scientific statement. Such a rhetorical mistake would be the worst kind of error, since it would obscure the main thought. The figure of speech is essential to the proper enforcement of

the divine thought through human language. The enforcement of the main point was what God intended to accomplish, and not our enlightenment as to a scientific fact.

The same principle is illustrated when Moses says that the coney does not part the hoof but chews the cud, which, if taken scientifically and literally, is an error, for the animal is not a ruminant, but belongs to a class (*Hyracidae*) whose teeth, like those of the rodents, have to be worn down and sharpened by constant friction. Otherwise they would grow to such length as to be uncomfortable. In accomplishing this necessary result, the coney moves his jaws as ruminants do in chewing the cud. As the manifest object of the passage is to designate the signs by which the cleanness or uncleanness of the animals is to be determined, nothing but what appears to the eye needs to be stated. Therefore, as, to the ordinary observer, the coney goes through all the motions of chewing the cud, the phrase "chewing the cud" means, in the connection in which Moses uses it, no more than *going through the motions* of chewing the cud; just as, to the astronomer, the phrase "the sun rises" means only that the sun appears to rise. In both cases there is a popular use of language which concerns itself merely with the appearance, and does not touch the question of the ultimate explanation of the phenomena.

There is here no chance for exact definition. Truth or error in the application of the principle is a question of more or less. The final appeal is to the common experience of men in the use of language where, as all must admit, the individual judgment has to be used. If the interests dependent upon determination of the exact meaning are of grave importance, the court would insist that the point must be proved *beyond a reasonable doubt*; while, if the interests dependent upon it are evidently of comparatively small account, a *preponderance of evidence* is all that is necessary.

In this connection it is important frequently to note the

extent to which we all assume the principle that the meaning of words is largely determined by the known nature of the subject. A familiar example appears in the word "bring." To bring a book implies the movement of it by physical force. To bring the prisoner implies, in most cases, only the application of the motives of fear. While to bring a friend to dinner implies the absence of both force and fear. In every case where the command is given, the one who executes the order obtains the true import of the command by reading between the lines. And yet every one sees that there is a "reasonable" limit to the application of this principle, and that great mistakes are frequently made by assuming that more is known about the subject than really is known. Indeed the difficulties of agreement as to the meaning of terms largely arise out of different assumptions as to our amount of present knowledge concerning the subject under discussion.

Due attention to these considerations will also show how it is that different views have arisen concerning the morality of certain things endorsed by inspiration in the Old Testament. In most cases the disputants have different definitions of right and wrong, and different standards for measuring external morality. Was it right for the children of Israel to exterminate the Canaanites? Those who say it was, do not mean thereby to imply that the extermination of rival nations is always proper, but they accept the command of God as an absolute indication of what it is right to do in a particular case where our wisdom is limited and his is infinite. Infinite wisdom is permitted to command us to depart from the ordinary rules of outward morality where finite wisdom would not be. All would unite in saying that various things commanded and permitted in the Old Testament are not the standard of action in a more enlightened age or in cases where man is left to determine his action from the limited range of his own foresight.

The same line of remark is proper concerning the differ-

ent views maintained respecting the imprecatory psalms. One party declares that the imprecations are wrong, and that the writers sinned in giving utterance to such sentiments as are there expressed. This view of the case, however, proceeds upon an interpretation which assumes that the imprecations were uttered in the low plane of personal spite and animosity, which everybody would call wicked. But those who defend the imprecations as worthy of an inspired writer do so from a higher plane of interpretation and from a broader field of ethical judgment. As a representative man whose success or failure is identified with that of the success or failure of the kingdom of God, the Psalmist's enemies are God's enemies, and no language or rhetoric is too strong to express the desire for their discomfiture. We too often obscure the fact that opposition to the kingdom of God is always made by individual men, and is directed against individual representatives of the truth who are fighting its battles. When treason is striking down those who uphold a nation's flag, the discomfiture of the traitors is likely to involve their death and to render their wives widows, and their children fatherless. From this there is no escape: the triumph of one army involves the defeat of the other. It is from this high plane of thought that the conservative party would interpret the imprecatory psalms, and they would maintain that from this point of view the natural and intended meaning is entirely worthy of the occasion. Nor is this view one which can be lightly passed by. It is one with which every broad-minded interpreter is compelled to reckon.

It would, however, be hardly fair to say that, because the principle of accommodation is acknowledged and used by all, therefore there is no reasonable limit to its use. Because there is difficulty in telling exactly when the day ends, and the night begins, it does not follow that we do not know the difference between day and night for all practical purposes. It is evident that this is clearly maintained by most of the

evangelical party who insist that there are some minor errors and discrepancies in the original statements of the sacred writers. In insisting that the errors are minor, and that they relate to matters which are outside the main objects of revelation, they practically bring their alleged discrepancies within the range of the principle of accommodation which even the conservative party freely uses. Clearly, therefore, it is not a matter upon which there can be an exact line of demarcation between the disputants. It is a question of *degrees* of difference. To all there is a border-line of uncertainty in which both are involved to some extent. When it is said that "the affirmations of Scripture of all kinds . . . are without *error* . . . when interpreted in their *natural* and *intended* sense," the determination of what is the "natural and intended sense" is in many cases such a difficult task that the conservative may well have much patience with the liberal if he seems in some cases to stretch the principle of accommodation unwarrantably. Whether or not he is amenable to reason, remains to be determined by a wide consideration of facts.

3dly. *Both Letter and Spirit are to be duly emphasized.*
—The broad principle of accommodation has innumerable specific applications which ordinarily pass under other names, and which might cover the whole process of scientific interpretation in which there is any departure from the bare literal meaning. Without more reflection than is ordinarily given to the subject, few are aware how seldom they interpret language literally. At first this seems to militate against the possibility of conveying any clear impressions of truth through the medium of words. Practically, however, the difficulty disappears when we come to see how thought is woven into the whole context and circumstances surrounding the individual expressions. The margin of error, like the "personal equation" of an observer, can usually be determined with a "reasonable" degree of accuracy.

It is curious, as well as instructive, to note more partic-

ularly under what different circumstances the conservatives and the liberals throw themselves open in both cases to the charge alike of undue literalism and of undue freedom in the interpretation of Scripture. As already indicated, the conservatives maintain their positions by a strict construction of the language of the Bible relating to its authority, and a free construction of passages which seem to contain discrepancies and error; while the liberals who preserve their respect for the Bible as the word of God, maintain their position by treating the discrepancies literally, and the passages which contain apparent endorsement of the doctrine of inerrancy, freely.

Professor William H. Green's treatment of the chronology derived from the genealogical tables in Genesis extending from Adam to Abraham presents one of the most noteworthy instances on the conservative side. The links in this chain seem, at first glance, to be so securely joined together that there is no escape from the conviction that the sacred writer has here committed himself to a definite and short chronology for the human race. So short is this, that it seems impossible to make it coincide with that furnished by the revelations of science and profane history. Yet Professor Green, after a full survey of the subject, thinks himself warranted in giving it a liberal interpretation which few would at first glance think to be possible. From Hebrew literary usage, and from the whole attendant circumstances, this eminent and conservative scholar comes to the conclusion that where we read in Genesis, "Seth was an hundred and five years old, and begat Enos," all that it necessarily means is, that Enos was descended from the heir to Seth who was born in Seth's one hundred and fifth year, so that any number of centuries which science or profane history may have evidence for demanding can be interpolated between these or any other two links in the chain.¹

¹ See *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Vol. xlvii, pp. 285-393.

And so one may take up all the alleged errors and discrepancies of the Bible, and find that they, one by one, yield to treatment, and may be made to disappear under the hands of a skilful interpreter. Some of them, indeed, yield with much difficulty, but the most are readily seen to be classed as errors and discrepancies only upon an interpretation which is by no means certainly shown to be correct.

The usual answer to the apologist who presents his explanations in detail is, that, while each difficulty may be plausibly disposed of singly, it is not probable that he is without error in every instance so that the cases are all explainable. In other words, it is held that the argument against inerrancy is cumulative, and it is not uncommon to hear the process of the apologist described as "treating the Scripture unworthily," or "doing violence to laws of language," or even, in plainer terms, as "wriggling" and "jugglery."

But who art thou, O man, who chargest thy brother with dealing subtly with the Word of God, and dost thyself labor long and hard to explain away the apparently plain letter of the New Testament in its endorsement of the historical character of the Old Testament? In view of the uniform deference paid in the New Testament to the teachings of the Old, and of the many specific statements concerning the historical character of some passages which are rejected from the category of historical writings by many critics, it is difficult for them to maintain their respect for the writers of the New without a process of interpretation which is even more intricate than that of the ordinary apologist for the Old. The readiness, for instance, with which a recent writer, in the face of Matt. xxii. 43, where Christ, in an argument quotes Psalm cx. as spoken "by David in the Spirit," can say that Jesus "*never*, in the proper sense of the words, expressed *any opinion* on these purely literary and historical questions" of the Old Testament, would indicate that, if the conservative scholar has to "wriggle" to explain the seeming discrepancies of the

Bible, the liberal scholar has to do the same in an even higher degree to maintain his respect for the New Testament writers while rejecting their views of the character of the Old Testament.

The truth is, that the charges of wriggling and jugglery which are too freely made upon both sides engaged in present controversies concerning biblical criticism, are most of them out of place. As already remarked, the argument upon each side is largely one of degree. The biblical harmonist succeeds so readily with the vast majority of the cases, that the presumption of success naturally goes before him to the remaining cases which are more doubtful, and he has plausible grounds for thinking himself warranted in believing that with more light and fuller information he could resolve them all. His hypothetical attempts to harmonize the seemingly inconsistent statements of extraordinarily trustworthy and well-informed writers, is not necessarily an instance of wriggling, but of the legitimate use of theory in attempting to arrive at facts; for it is but ordinary respect to the intelligence and integrity of a common historian to explain his seeming inconsistencies provisionally by a charitable hypothesis. Much more does it seem allowable to believe that an apparent mistake of such demonstrably accurate historians as Luke or the writer of the Fourth Gospel is explainable, if only we understood more fully either their language or the circumstances of the case.

Somewhat similar remarks may be properly made about what seems, to most people, the arbitrary efforts put forth to dismember and destroy the historical character of the Pentateuch; for the principles upon which the critics proceed are legitimate enough, and the mode of argument is proper. That some revision of the Pentateuch took place after Moses' death, all admit. The question is, whether the case is as strong as some recent critics think it is, and whether its proper historical character is to be discredited. The work of the

critics is not to be judged by piecemeal, but by its whole effect, and by the general reasonableness of the results as compared with the ordinary view. Neither should the fact, that, in apportioning out the Pentateuch to the several supposed writers of different ages, a great part of the work of the critics is narrow and arbitrary and unsatisfactory, be urged too strongly against their general good faith. The waters are deep, and a pretty long chain may be allowed to their anchor. But need of charity on his own part should bar the critic against too unsparing criticism of the methods of the ordinary apologist; for some of the questions at issue are beset with peculiar difficulties all around, and are not capable of demonstrative settlement, but must be determined by ascertaining upon which side the difficulties are most preponderant and most nearly insuperable.

At the present time, as always in the discussion of a subject so difficult of statement as that of the doctrine of inspiration evidently is, there are extremists on each side who manifestly go unreasonable lengths. On the one hand, there are those, both among the liberals and conservatives, who insist that the Ptolemaic astronomy and the creation of the world in six days of twenty-four hours each are distinctly taught in the Bible, and that absolute immoralities are advised by the Old Testament. The one party insists on the strict letter, in order to bring reproach upon the sacred writers, while the other insists upon it from a mistaken notion of what is real reverence for the Bible. But it is not with extremists that we are chiefly concerned.

We shall be greatly misunderstood if it be supposed that we are here making a plea for universal tolerance, or that we maintain that the truth is usually to be found by splitting the difference between two disputants. The truth is by no means always half-way between two extreme statement of a doctrine. It is usually much nearer one side than the other, and sometimes wholly on one side. We do not deny that there are

heresies respecting the Word of God which are to be rejected with great earnestness and vigor. On the one hand, there are wandering stars in the firmament whose centrifugal tendencies have become predominant, so that they have ceased to be obedient to the central forces of the system, while, on the other hand, there is much dead orthodoxy which knows only the centripetal forces, and has ceased to have motion or efficiency. But, touching the central doctrines of religion, there is much that cannot adequately be stated in single sentences, while the qualifying phrases introduced for explanation are likely to be understood differently by different persons. It is our purpose in a general way to utter and emphasize a caution against harsh judgments of one another for accepting or rejecting certain concise statements of doctrine which it requires a volume to unfold. The Bible is not such a concise statement, but a large book. One's belief is not so well determined by his acceptance or rejection of some creed of another's or even of his own manufacture, as by his larger attitude of mind as revealed in his broader and more general discussions. It is doubtful if assent even to the manifesto of the Presbyterian General Assembly at Portland in 1892 upon the inerrancy of the Bible would determine very definitely some people's views upon the question which is now most troubling the churches. With the definition which different persons might give to the terms used, the folds of that manifesto would seem ample to cover broad divergences of opinion. Of what avail is it for a man to say that he "holds that the inspired word *as it came from God* is without error," when he may reject a good part of the canon, and say that it did not come from God, and regard even that which remains as hopelessly corrupt in text? And what does it avail to say the Word is *without error*, when it is not known upon what principles he interprets the Word to find out its intent and meaning, and judge of its truth or error?

We have been deeply impressed recently with the extent

to which seeming differences of opinion are diminished by careful attention to the qualifying terms of each disputant, in noting the discussions of half a century ago between Dr. Charles Hodge and President Finney concerning the doctrine of original sin. On the one hand, Finney and what were then called the New School party stoutly insisted, that, although children are born without any actual guilt, they are still burdened with a physical depravity which makes it certain that their first moral act will uniformly be sinful; while Dr. Hodge and the Old School party insisted, that, "in virtue of the union, representative and natural, between Adam and his posterity, his sin is the ground of their [man's] condemnation, that is, of their subjection to penal evils,"¹ but, Dr. Hodge makes haste to add, that "the sin of Adam is *no ground to us of remorse*," and that there is *no transfer of the moral turpitude* of this sin to his descendants." To this Old School doctrine as so qualified, it would seem that the other party could have had little reason to object, for a sin which calls for no remorse, and to which no moral turpitude attaches, is scarcely to be distinguished from what the other party calls physical depravity.

The instances in which, as here, the qualifying word changes the meaning of the principal word are frequent. It is like the transformation of a noxious chemical element into an innocuous compound by the addition of another element. *Original* sin is not *ordinary* sin. So numerous are such instances that it is necessary to proceed with much caution before imputing great folly to a conservative's creed or attributing rank heresy to a liberal who declines to sign it. More attention to the infirmities of human reason and to the difficulties of making statements in human language so exact that the meaning cannot be misunderstood will enable the true Israel to draw closer together, and cause Ephraim and Judah to envy and vex each other less than they now do.

¹ Commentary on the Epistles to the Romans (Philadelphia, 1864), p. 279.

ARTICLE II.

HARMONY OF THE PENTATEUCH RESPECTING
PRIESTLY DUES.

BY THE REV. HENRY HAYMAN, D. D.

PERHAPS on no part of Deuteronomy as exhibiting assumed discrepancies with the laws of Leviticus or Numbers, where they touch the same subject-matter, has greater stress been laid than on those relating to the position, functions, and provision directed for the "priest Levites," and the assignment of the tithes in particular which it contains. The principal passages on the subject are chaps. x. 8, 9; xii. 6 foll., 17; xiv. 22-29; xviii. 1-8; xxvi. 12 foll., omitting the specially judicial portion of their duties. There can hardly be a more startling contrast than that between the first superficial sense of discrepancy, and the deeper conviction of harmony and wholeness between the three books Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy, which a closer examination is apt to produce. I limit myself in this article to the subject of priestly dues, including tithes, oblations of all kinds, and their contingent perquisites.

From Deuteronomy, if that were our sole guide, we should never infer that tithes were ranked among such dues. The only precise appointment there seems to allot them to be consumed by the owners of the soil on occasions of festive rejoicing to which "the Levite" is specially to be a party, but only amongst other partakers (see Deut. xii. 6 foll., 17; xiv. 22-29; xxvi. 12 foll.). From Num. xviii. 20, 21 some critics have derived a totally different inference. There Jehovah declares himself the "inheritance" of Levi, represented in the

tithe, but subject (ver. 26) to a deduction of one-tenth—the tithe of the tithe—due “to Aaron” (ver. 28), i. e. to the priestly house *par excellence*. But the seeming conflict vanishes on a closer inspection. In Deut. xviii. 1, 2, the fire-offerings of Jehovah, and *his inheritance* are there made the portion of “the priests the Levites, the whole tribe of Levi,” with a further iterative stress on the latter term in verse 2; and similarly in Deut. x. 9 we read, Jehovah is his (Levi’s) inheritance, as Jehovah Elohim promised. The entire elucidation hinges on this term, which is at once explained by turning, as aforesaid, to Num. xviii. 20–21, where Jehovah says to Aaron: “Thou shalt have no inheritance in their land. . . . I am thy part and thine inheritance among the *b’ne* Israel. And, behold, I have given the *b’ne* Levi *all the tenth in Israel for an inheritance*.” Unless Numbers is here read into Deuteronomy the latter remains an enigma; take this passage of the “Priestly Code” (so-called) with us, and it becomes clear and coherent. Then the obscure word “inheritance,” which we otherwise stumble over in the dark, or regard as merely the encumbrance of an antiquated style of iteration, is seen to be the key-word of the whole sentence. Num. xviii. 26–28 then pursues the subject into detail¹ as regards the relations of the tithe shares of priest and Levite *inter se*, into which, however, Deuteronomy does not follow it. It was not needed for the more popular purpose of the latter book, although a differentiation of a higher and a lower office of ministers is apparent in it (as I hope to find further occasion to show). It remains, then, that the words already cited relative to “Levi,” on the first Deuteronomic mention of that tribe (Deut. x. 8, 9), “Jehovah is his *inheritance*, as *Jehovah Elohim promised*,” are an effective reference, repeated in xviii. 1, to the declaration also cited from Num. xviii. We

¹ But here notice that Jehovah speaks not “to Aaron,” but “to Moses” (ver. 25), as the executive head of the nation, and guardian of sacred and civil rights.

have here, then, another *vinculum* of living continuity between Deuteronomy and the "middle Pentateuch." "Inheritance" in Deuteronomy means in effect tithe property, but from Deuteronomy alone we should never know it; it could be at most only a conjecture of the critic. Only in Num. xviii. do we find it established beyond the region of guesswork. On the "fire-offerings" of Deut. xviii. 1, I will further comment anon. I proceed to the statements of Deuteronomy, as referred to above, in regard to tithes. Several references to tithes occur in chapter xii.; viz., in verses 6, 11, 17, and are to be understood in the total of "holy things" (*qodashim*) summed up in verse 26. The purport of all these precepts is: (1) To ensure the due rendering of these *qodashim*¹ at the central sanctuary; (2) to unite them there with a solemn festive banquet customarily held; (3) to provide for their being duly shared by the persons entitled to that privilege.²

It seems, for a reason to be mentioned later, very doubtful whether the rendering tithes at the central sanctuary or place "chosen by Jehovah to place his name there" applies to all tithes of whatever kind. But all writers on Jewish tithe from Josephus and even earlier, from the author of Tobit downward, recognize a "second tithe,"—probably spoken of specially in xii. 17 and in xiv. 23, as limited to vegetable products, and classed there with "firstlings of herds and flocks," and in xii. 6, 11 this is probably alone referred to, not that due under Num. xviii. 20, 21. In Deut. xxvi. 12 a

¹ The *qodashim* are enumerated (ver. 6, 11, 17) as "burnt-offerings, sacrifices, tithes, firstlings, heave-offerings, freewill offerings, and vows" (i. e. things vowed)—not always in the same completeness or order, but amounting to these when all named are included. They will be noticed further in the text.

² These are enumerated (ver. 12, 18) as "sons, daughters, men-servants, maid-servants [i. e. of the tithe-payer], and the Levite within thy gates." In the third year's tithing, which has some exceptional features (see the text below), "the Levite, the stranger, orphan, and widow" are specially named as the participants (xiv. 28, 29; xxvi. 12, 13). Thus "the Levite" appears in both.

special appropriation of this "second tithe" every third¹ year is directed, and is here expressly so termed by the LXX² (*δεύτερον ἐπιδέκατον*).

Thus in the first and second years of each triad there would be payable the first or Levitical tithe, while the second or festival tithe would be brought to the sanctuary for festive uses, as ruled in Deut. xiv. 23-27.³ In the third year this latter would be specially applied to the permanent support of the non-propertied classes, "Levite, stranger," etc.⁴ So throughout twice three years, and in the seventh the land had by law respite from culture, and returned, as it were, into divine property for the time (Lev. xxv. 3-7). The law of Lev. xxvii. 31-33 relates to the conditions of "redeeming" the tithe merely, and is not noticed in Deuteronomy. It is the only passage in the Law⁵ from which we precisely learn that the tithing extended to cattle.⁶ Whether cattle were

¹ This is confirmed by Amos iv. 4, whatever be the precise meaning of his phrase יִצְחָק שָׁמָּה there.

² They seem to have read תְּנִי for תְּנִי of our Hebrew text there.

³ So Tobit i. 7, τὴν δεκάτην ἐδίδουν . . . καὶ τὴν δευτέραν δεκάτην . . . and verse 8, καὶ τὴν τρίτην ἐδίδουν οἷς καθήκει. And so Joseph., Ant. iv. 8, § 8 and 22, distinguishes *three* tithes; but the better opinion is probably that which views the third as a special limitation, *qua* objects, of the second. The commentators refer to the treatises of the Mishna, Peah, Ma'aseroth and Ma'aser Sheni, as establishing the same view. The law in Num. xviii. deals with the first tithe only.

⁴ It is wrong to view such rules through the distorting medium of a modern poor-law, and the social stigma supposed to attach to those who partake of its relief. In the Hebrew state the very reverse was the case. The land was Jehovah's, the chosen people his tenants, the tithes his demand on them for the rent of it (Lev. xxvii. 30). Thus the Levite, stranger, orphan, widow, were his representatives, rather than pensioners of private bounty or public provision. The right of gleaning belonged as much to Naomi as the field to Boaz.

⁵ See, however, 2 Chron. xxxi. 6.

⁶ Some writers regard the "firstlings" of Deut. xiv. 23, and probably also of xii. 6, as tithe animals (Dict. of Bible, ii. 1071a, 2d ed., s. v. "first-born"); but in Num. xviii. 17 and 21 "firstlings" and "tithes" belong to distinct sections. Further, Num. iii. 41, 45 takes the Levites' cattle in lieu of all the firstlings of the *whole* Israel.

tithed during the wilderness wandering is an obscure question. But unless we assume, with Wellhausen, verses 32 and 33 to have been added later, they would seem to have been so, as a custom familiar by use seems to be there referred to in the phrase "passeth under the rod." If so, they and the firstlings would furnish the altar,¹ and help to maintain the priesthood in the wilderness.

The "fire-offerings of Jehovah" (Deut. xviii. 1) is the most comprehensive term to express all the ordinary and stated sacrifices by fire, with the meaning here implied that a portion of them only was so consumed, the residue being reserved for the priests. Of course there were "whole burnt-offerings," to which this did not apply, and of these we have examples in Lev. i. 9, 13. In Lev. ii. 3, 10 we find portions expressly reserved to the priests. Lev. iii., after a ritual of peace-offerings, closes with the words, "All the fat is Jehovah's," implying that the rest is the priests'. In Lev. iv. the sin-offerings for a priest or the whole people require (ver. 12, 21) the victim to be burnt, but in two parts: (1) the sacrificial fat, (2) the rest; but in those for individuals the former only is prescribed (ver. 26, 31, 35), the priest, by implication, having the rest, as in vii. 7 is expressly stated, for the guilt-offering. Even in a holocaust, the hide was a priestly perquisite (ver. 8). These may suffice for instances of the varying rules. In all these Levitical chapters and in many more, the term *isshe Jehovah* or *Layovah*, "fire-offerings to Jehovah," occurs again and again. Its distribution is a strongly marked feature of the "Priests' Code." In Ex. xxix., Leviticus, and Numbers it occurs nearly sixty times, once in Josh. xiii. 14, once in 1 Sam. ii. 28, once in Deuteronomy, viz., here. I doubt if it is found anywhere else in the entire Old

¹Amos v. 25 has sometimes been interpreted as though no such sacrifices were offered on Jehovah's altar—a total perversion of the prophet's meaning.

Testament. If it is possible for a phrase to bear the stamp of legal formality we have one so stamped here. This strongly legal phrase of the Priests' Code is thus adopted by Deuteronomy.

If we seek the reason for this term appearing in Deuteronomy which seems almost the property of the priestly vocabulary (for in Joshua it is a quotation, and in First Samuel *i.e.* the reference is expressly to priestly dues), we shall find it in the fact that, as no one could fail to perceive the presence or absence of fire, it rested on a palpable fact, and was most readily popularized of all priestly terms. And since in all the variously and minutely differentiated offerings in Exodus-Leviticus-Numbers—known as for “sin, guilt, peace,” or as simply “burnt-offerings”—fire was the prescribed or customary vehicle, the term “*isshe Jehovah*” comprehended them all. From all these some share or perquisite of the priests might be extracted; extending in some to every part except the blood and fat, in others to nothing beyond the hide, and perhaps limited in most to one leg and the brisket, often called in A. V. the “heave-shoulder” and “wave-breast.” For all these Deuteronomy uses the term. The most comprehensive passage in the Pentateuch regarding priestly dues is that of Num. xviii. 8 foll. Ritualistic rules, like that quoted from Lev. i.–iv., regulated what was in each case to be burnt, after which the residue formed a heave-offering or wave-offering, or comprehended both. The first item in the list of Num. xviii. 8 foll. is therefore (1) “heave-offerings of holy things” (ver. 8), and these are, it seems, detailed in verse 9 under their sacrificial heads, meat, sin, etc., offerings. Next come (2) “heave-offerings of their gift with all their wave-offerings”; which again are detailed in verses 12, 13, under the heads of first-fruits (described also as “all the best,” literally “the fat”) of “oil, wine and wheat” and all “first-ripe” produce in other kinds. In the next item (3) “every devoted

thing¹ in Israel," we find a term which seems explained by Lev. xxvii. 2 as devoted under "a singular vow" (see verse 21 there). The next class (4) is that of firstlings (verse 15), subject to the conditions of redemption, which follow as far as verse 18. Lastly (5) comes a phrase which seems to repeat the first in its "heave-offerings of holy things," but is probably differentiated by the further words "which the *b'ne* Israel offer to Jehovah"—meaning *spontaneously*, as distinct from legal dues, and referring probably to freewill offerings and vows.

Now there is not, and need not be in Deuteronomy, any list correspondent with the above. The one which is in some measure parallel to it is that of Deut. xii. 6. But, whereas in Numbers the enumeration is of what the *priests* are to *receive*—without reckoning the tithes, which are not occasional but regular, in Deuteronomy it is of what the *people* are to "bring" to the sanctuary. Among these the term "tithes" occurs, meaning probably the "second tithe" only, before referred to; since the first tithe, if assigned to the Levites territorially dispersed in their tribal cities, would more naturally be rendered on the spot. But when allowance has been made for these considerations we find a very close parallelism. Thus class 1 of the list in Numbers may be paired with "burnt-offerings and sacrifices"; class 2 with "heave-offerings of your hand." "Vows and freewill offerings" represent class 5, and probably include class 3; while "firstlings" have their place expressly in both lists (4). But we see how the finer technicalities of Numbers are sunk in the broadly graded order of Deuteronomy, "meat, sin, etc., offerings," and "wave-offerings," all disappearing in its more summary generalizations.

The fact that part of Deut. xviii. 3 is quoted nearly

¹ The well-known word חָרַם, with cognate verb חָרַם (mostly in *hiphil* form), used of whatever is "devoted," sometimes to destruction under a curse.

verbatim in 1 Sam. ii. 13, there to introduce a deliberate breach by Eli's sons of the law as here laid down, can hardly be accidental. Here "the priest's custom¹ with the people" is his "due² from the people," as laid down in Deut. xviii. 3, consisting of "the shoulder, two cheeks" (doubtless including the tongue), "and the maw" (probably the fourth stomach of the ruminant), to which selection of parts a symbolical meaning has perhaps fancifully been attached by some commentators. Whether these perquisites were additions to, or substitutes for, all or any of parts reserved for the priests by the ritual of Exodus-Leviticus-Numbers, has been much debated. But if we give due weight to the word "fire-offerings" in Deut. xviii. 1, as the perquisites in verse 3 are evidently something over and above whatever the priests enjoyed from those offerings, it seems hardly doubtful that they are additions,³ the rather as the "first shearing of thy sheep" is unquestionably an addition to "the first-fruits⁴ of corn, wine, and oil" (verse 4), which form, as we saw above, an important item in the dues, as fixed in Num. xviii. 12. The phrase "custom with the people" clearly means "with the individual Israelite" coming with a sacrifice on his private account—

¹ The word curiously reflects the English use of the word "customs" which we retain still for the oldest trade-dues levied by the Crown, and which, although now for centuries depending on and regulated by statute, yet carry us back to that period when statute was not. Somewhat similarly the word "excise" reflects the ideas of the LXX translators in their rendering of "heave-offerings" (תְּרוּמָה) by ἀφαιρέμα or sometimes by ἀφαιρισμένον (Num. xviii. 24; cf. 27-29), as something cut out of, or taken away from, a larger bulk.

² The phrase is all but identical in the two, as a comparison of the Hebrew will show. By rendering "due from" in one, and "custom with" in the other, passage, the A. V. obscures this important identity.

³ The Mishna (Cholin x. 1) interprets these perquisites as relating to animals killed for food under the law of Lev. xvii. 3, 4, and the Levitical perquisites to those offered in sacrifice.

⁴ The word רֵאשִׁית (lit. "beginning," as in Gen. i. 1) occurs here, and in Deut. xviii. 14, as an incidental link of implied reference.

sin-offering, vow, or what not—and does not refer to what was on a public behalf and recurrent, in the stated sacrifices. This was what enhanced, not the sin, but the scandal caused by the sin, of Eli's sons. It revolted the laity, some of whom were always present at these sacrifices thus brought of their own free will.

But these dues arising directly from sacrifices, since the latter could only be offered at the central sanctuary, contemplate a resident priesthood at that centre, whereas various other passages which we have had occasion to cite (xii. 12, 18; xiv. 27, 29; xvi. 14; xviii. 6) as clearly contemplate a provincial body of Levites in dispersion through the tribes, yet within the walls of towns—so the phrase “within the gates” at least suggests—in short, just such a distribution as would arise from the direction in Num. xxxv. 2–8 (cf. Josh. xxi. 2–42) as to Levitical cities, being executed in fact. Here then we have a religious ministry in two groups, and the case is next contemplated (Deut. xviii. 6–8) of a member of one of them seeking to change from the provincial sphere to the central. How far these groups correspond with those so clearly distinguished in Leviticus-Numbers, shall be further considered, if occasion offers.

Before passing on to that, we may observe that in the forty years' wandering some social changes evidently happened. In Num. iii. 41, 45, the Levites are cattle-owners, and (xxxv. 3) are contemplated as being so when settled in the land. In the fortieth year the two eastern tribes (for the tenure of Manasseh eastward rested on other grounds) have become the chief herdsmen, and on that fact their claim for an early settlement is founded. They had already entered into that heritage, and had placed their cattle in undisturbed possession there. Thus the law of Deut. xii. 21, which released the Israelite from killing flesh for food at the door of the tabernacle (Lev. xvii. 3, 4), was for them already a necessity, owing to distance.

In regard to the large class of sacrifices known as "peace-offerings," under which three varieties of "thank, vow, and freewill offerings" are distinguished in Lev. vii. 15, 16, there is no distinct assignment which exhausts all the parts of the victim. The fat and blood of course went to the altar (ver. 25, 27, 31), the breast or brisket and right leg are the priests' portion (ver. 30-34), the rest of the flesh is to be eaten on the same or next day (ver. 16, 17)—but by whom? We are left to infer that the worshipper partook of it, probably with his family or invited guests.¹ But this in the priestly ritual is not actually stated. It was not to the purpose of mere priestly regulation. But when we turn to Deuteronomy, which gives the popular side of the matter, we read in xii. 27, after a prohibition of the blood (ver. 23-25), a distinct permission to the worshipper, "The blood of thy sacrifices² shall be poured out upon the altar, . . . and thou shalt eat the flesh." Thus we find, conversely, that where priestly rules leave a question open Deuteronomy fills a gap in Leviticus, and both are in harmony. At the same time we see the reason why the "*b'ne* Israel," not the *b'ne* Aaron only, are, in Lev. vii. 23 foll., directly charged to observe the rules there prescribed, because they were parties in the division of the victim, and a dividend of it went by custom to them for enjoyment. The whole proves the mutual interdependence of the popular and the priestly *corpus iuris*, and shows that, without reference to Leviticus-Numbers, we cannot clearly comprehend Deuteronomy. In short, it overthrows a great deal of modern theory on the subject of the Pentateuch. Nor will it be difficult to confirm this position by a similar careful analysis of other

¹ The same observations apply to Lev. xix. 5-8 ("peace-offerings" at the offerer's "own will"), where the same injunction recurs, "it shall be eaten," etc., no doubt by the offerer and friends.

² Here again the language is general. There were, of course, holocausts, to which "thou shalt eat the flesh" would not apply. But "thy sacrifices" includes the great majority of the popular offerings which it was necessary to regulate.

parts of the Deuteronomic legislation, especially those, like the Law of the Refuge cities, on which, by reason of a difference of standpoint merely adopted by the legislator, hostile critics are wont to rely. It may be said without exaggeration that the most evidentially useful parts of Deuteronomy are its difficulties—those knots in the timber, which, while they turn the edge of the tool, attest the genuineness of the grain.

ARTICLE III.

THE DESCENT OF THE NEW JERUSALEM.

BY THE REV. WILLIAM E. BARTON.

WE have made needlessly hard work of interpreting the Apocalypse. Its date is more certainly indicated than that of any other New Testament book. If to the Occidental mind some of its minutiae defy accurate analysis, its three or four leading ideas may be read by him who runs, and about these the imagery of the book is draped in such a way, that, if each separate fold and festoon convey to the modern mind no separate and complete meaning, at least the whole is congruous and appropriate. Indeed, when the book is read with these leading ideas in their true perspective, it becomes extremely probable that no effort to understand the book is likely to prove so utterly bewildering as that which concerns itself with microscopic search for the meaning of the details.

Omitting from present consideration the latter part of the closing chapter, which contains the finale, and the first three chapters, which contain the introduction and the messages to certain groups of churches whose messages have no more reason to be considered an epitome of universal history than any of Paul's letters to the churches of the same region, and whose distortion to this end is a conspicuous braving of the curse against those who add to the words that are written in this book, there are four leading thoughts in the work. These are treated somewhat in the order indicated, but merge more or less into each other. The plan of the book is iterative and cumulative. It is a work of art. Among works of art, however, there is a difference. The painter who dec-

orates the stage of a theatre may be as great an artist as another who decorates china, or the third who engraves a steel plate under a lens; but the work must be judged according to different standards. He would be a poor art critic who would examine a drop curtain or the sliding scenery of a stage with the same minuteness that he would give to the inspection of a bit of *cloisonné* or the vignette of a bank note. It must be seen at proper distance, and with a glare of light here and a deep shadow there, to do its artistic qualities justice. Then the very defects, as they appear on close inspection, the incongruities, the gaudy patches of paint, and the daubs of color, will be found to blend harmoniously, and to sustain their due relation to the play. The Apocalypse might be spoken of as a magnificent drama, with marvellous and changing drapery, with chorus and orchestra, with Jerusalem, Rome, Patmos, the ocean, and heaven itself among its scenes, and with kings and angels and the hosts of earth and heaven among its characters. Thunders, lightnings, earthquakes, hail, conflagration, war,—these are among the scenes portrayed. The stage fittings vary with the scenes. The lights are turned down until the horror of a great darkness is felt: then the red light of the torch and of the stake illumine the scene with an unearthly glare; and then there streams a pure radiance from the great white throne. The mistake of the ages, as respects this book, has been that it has been viewed through a microscope instead of an opera glass.

Without attempting careful and exact divisions, but only as introductory to the present theme, we may group the leading ideas of the book thus:—

1. *The Overthrow of Jerusalem.*—The city that was holy has become “Sodom and Egypt,” and if there be a worse thing that can be said of it, it is, that it is “where also the Lord was crucified.” The city and its temple still stand, with obsolete rites mocking the real Sacrifice, but it is already measured for destruction. Forty and two months shall it be

besieged by Gentiles, and trodden under foot. When at last it is destroyed, a main impediment to the universality of Christianity will be accomplished. Then in heaven will the real temple be seen, with the ark of God in full sight of all the blessed, and every man may realize himself a part of the kingdom, and a priest unto God.

2. *The Downfall of Pagan Rome.*—Rome stood for persecution: Nero's throne and the throne of Christ stood in direct antithesis. Nero had just died.¹ The fifth Roman emperor had fallen, and the sixth, Galba, then was. His reign of six months and the brief interregnum following, with Otho and Vitellius struggling for the crown, and the joint reign of Vespasian and his son Titus which followed, afforded "a short space" of freedom from persecution. But after this, persecution would revive. One head was dead, but the beast lived. The popular superstition that the dead Nero would come again from the dead contained, for the Church, a terrible truth. The eighth reign would show again the terrors of persecution. The "short space" of relief was none too long for the Church to prepare for the terrible experiences ahead. But this was the word of inspiration and comfort which John spoke: Rome is not the eternal city. Its power will fall as that of Babylon fell. Christ is to reign, and not Nero or any like-minded successor. Like the fall of a great millstone into the sea shall be the fall of the persecuting power.

3. *The Overthrow of all the Power of Evil.*—The Church will have other foes. There will be a terrible Armageddon, lasting for ages, and exhausting every resource of good and evil. All the ancient enemies of good, Gog and Magog, and the serpent of Eden, will seem revived to share in the mortal combat. Yet the end is certain, and all evil will be overthrown.

¹ The author's view of the number of the kings in Rev. xiii., xvii., may be found in a note, entitled "Nero Redivivus," in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for July, 1890, pp. 507-510.

We are now living in the thick of this battle. All the mighty engines of modern civilization are used as weapons on both sides. The ship with the missionary in its cabin has rum in its hold. The telegraph bears with equal speed the report of a Christian convention and a prize-fight. The daily press prints a sermon and a report of a murder in adjoining columns. Never was there more vital need of the assurance of the seer whose inspired faith was the substance of the good he hoped for.

4. Finally, *through it all God is with his Church*, and above the ruins of all evil, Christ enthroned in the Church reigns and increasingly shall reign. When the consummation is reached, then shall men see that the souls of those who have been beheaded in persecutions ages gone reign with Christ, and live. As to the rest of the dead, they have passed from sight, and for a thousand years, for ages and ages, no trace of their life-work appears; but the eternal life and reign of those who have given their lives for Christ, over whom no second death has power, will appear to men as those who sit on thrones through the long centuries, living and reigning with Christ.

The Jerusalem of the old dispensation was passing away when the apostle wrote in the autumn of 68 A. D., but there was even then visible to the eye of faith a New Jerusalem, coming down from God out of heaven, to which would be brought the glory of the nations. It is to this last sublime prediction of the inspired apostle that this article is devoted.

THE NEW JERUSALEM AS RELATED TO INDIVIDUAL CHARACTER.

The New Jerusalem is present and personal. No thought could have been more foreign to that of the apostle than that it is to be local, and dependent upon external conditions. They belong to it, and all of them, whose names are written in the Lamb's book of life. The hour cometh, and now is,

when the true worshippers worship the Father in spirit and in truth; and the New Jerusalem, in which men are permitted acceptably to worship, may as well be on Gerizim as on Moriah. To any who think a certain place or an anticipated physical change necessary, it may still be said, "Ye worship ye know not what." The kingdom of heaven is not heaven: the New Jerusalem is not geographical. It is spiritual, personal, present. Just what Paul meant when he rebuked those who said in Thessalonica that "the day of the Lord is present," may be uncertain, but there is no reason to suppose that he would rebuke any who say so now. The kingdom which in one sense has been present always, as Christ was slain from the foundation of the world, is now present in a sense in which it was not in Paul's day.

Each progressive descent of the holy city begins in an individual call. The call of the Hebrew nation was the call of Abraham. When, after two generations of exile, the captives of Babylon were called to rebuild their city, and establish a new Jerusalem, the call was to the wicked individual to forsake his way, and the unrighteous man his thoughts. The call of Jesus to the building of the city, or as he called it, the kingdom, was to certain individuals to follow him. The call to the Church to come out of the darkness of the Middle Ages to the glory of the Reformation, which was another descent of the city, was to Luther in Germany, Savonarola in Italy, Huss in Bohemia, Calvin in France, and Wyclif in England. When God would let down the holy city in New England, he "sifted three kingdoms" to find individuals, a bare hundred of whom laid the corner-stone. When the holy city descended to Oberlin, to Marietta, to Berea, to a score of towns and institutions whose foundations were laid in prayer and tears, the call was to Father Shipherd, to Manasseh Cutler, to John G. Fee. There is no sort of wholesale social regeneration worth having that overlooks the necessity for individual consecration. "There shall in no wise en-

ter into it anything that defileth, neither whatsoever worketh abomination or a lie.”

The worthies of the dimly lighted ages sought in their early dawn the city. They confessed that they found none, but they continued seeking and expecting one with foundations. They found only the foundations, but these caused God to become to them like the shadow of a great Rock in a weary land. These all died in faith. They saw but the ground-plan of the city, God having provided some better thing than for them to build it and us to live in it, that they without us should not be perfect. But, all the same, they were citizens of the New Jerusalem. They sought it, but the kingdom was within them, and the holy city was their home.

The time is rife with panaceas for social ills and ferments. No day dies but witnesses a new organization for the regeneration of some body of men *en masse*. But no organization will effect the regeneration of the Indians that does not make the individual Indian something better than a savage, or a pauper, or alternately both. No founding of schools for the freedmen will avail except as they reach and enlighten the individual freedman, and teach him, and his son after him, that he cannot stand before the world secure on the platform of the wrongs inflicted upon his ancestors. No appointment of labor commissions, no reduction of hours, no legislation concerning wages, can serve as a substitute for character and a recognition of law and moral obligation on the part of the individual laboring-man. No associated charities, no endowment of homes for the unemployed, no system of relief for the poor, will solve the problems with which poverty perplexes us, except as it has respect to the character of the individual poor man or woman. The most serious feature of the Indian problem, the negro problem, the labor problem, the charity problem, is the elevation of the character of the individual. This done, external conditions would largely right themselves. It is time to return to the old-fashioned

gospel of individual responsibility.¹ There are no "masses." There are multitudes of individuals, needing nothing external so much as a new sense of individual responsibility, and an assurance of individual regeneration. The New Jerusalem is the home of redeemed individuals. "The kingdom of God cometh not with observation. Neither shall they say, Lo here, or, lo there: for, behold, the kingdom of God is within you."

THE NEW JERUSALEM AS SOCIAL AND POLITICAL.

Partly because we desire to know more than has been revealed to us about heaven, and partly because what God has revealed about the redeemed earth seems too good to be true, we have transferred most of the Bible teachings concerning the coming blessedness of mankind on earth to heaven. The Second Adventists have discovered this fact, but with even greater inconsistency have affirmed that this earth is to be the home of the redeemed *after death*. It was neither heaven nor a *post-mortem* earth that John saw. We are not to go to heaven to find the New Jerusalem. No doubt all that is told us of the glory of the redeemed earth is true of heaven, and more; so that any comfort that we may draw from the closing chapters of Revelation to cheer us on the sick-bed, or comfort us beside the grave, may legitimately be drawn from these chapters. But it is certain, past any need of discussion, that this was not John's primary meaning. The New Jerusalem is but another term for this present earth, with its present tides and seasons, inhabited by people like those who at present live here, but under the sway of the Spirit of Christ. It is more than personal redemption. It is social, industrial, and political.

¹ There certainly is need of change in external conditions. See a sermon by the author, on "Cosmic Redemption," in *The Treasury of Religious Thought* for November, 1894. But this is not the prime need.

Men live in many relations. We have begun, and only begun, to know a man when we learn that he is John Doe. He is more than that. To two elderly people he is "our son John." To a certain woman he is "my husband." To a half-dozen people he is "my brother John." To several young people he is "father." To others he is the neighbor across the street. To others he is the senior partner in the firm of Doe, Roe & Co. To others he is Deacon Doe. To others he is The Hon. John Doe, Representative in the Legislature. He is more than all this. These are but a few of his relations. Men do not live solitary lives. God has set the solitary in families, and families in communities, and communities in nations. Under the severest penalties he has kept us in mind of even the remoter of these relations. It cannot be a matter of indifference to one man that his neighbor has diphtheria. It is God's forethought that has so arranged society that "curses, like chickens, come home to roost." To redeem a man is to make scores of social relations redemptive. John Doe cannot be a Christian, and the Hon. John Doe a dishonest politician. If men have attempted to observe a distinction between their private and their professional or business character, the attempt has failed. Men are not the masters of all their environment, but they can modify it. He makes a sad, almost a fatal, mistake, who thinks of one part of his life as sacred, and the other as secular. One man is as much called of God to drive, and another to shoe, the horses of a steam fire-engine, as a third is to preach the gospel. It is a pity if any of them does not know it. The New Jerusalem needs fire-engines, and divinely called men to care for them. A Christian fireman rushing to his post at the sound of the gong, and with no other thought than to do his present duty faithfully, may be as truly worshipping as his brother reverently walking to the house of God in response to the Sabbath call to worship. There is no reason why the fire-alarm should not be made as sacred as the church-bell.

That Christ is to reign in human society means simply that he is to reign in the hearts of its individual members, so that they shall manifest his Spirit in all their manifold relations. With all these relations sanctified, there will arise a new condition of affairs on earth between man and man, and between man and God. Men will build factories in the same spirit in which they ordain foreign missionaries: they will plough their fields in the same spirit in which they pray and worship.

There could be no greater mistake than that God means us to cultivate our religious nature alone, and at the expense of every other part of our being. What we need is not to be taken out of the world, but to be kept from its evil, and to save it from the evil. We shall need to eat and drink in the New Jerusalem; but, through industry and the miracle of commerce, supplemented by Christian charity, there will be no more hunger. Hardly a decade passes that some portion of the world does not afford an illustration of this. Men need not to be free from their bodies and earthly trials, that their spirits may thrive; but, amid the conditions of this present life, to learn faithfully the duty and the glory of their relations to God and man, to their bodies and souls, to the life that now is and that which is to come. Christ's law commands neither worldliness nor other-worldliness, neither egoism nor altruism, but fidelity to all interests, and the sanctification of all human relations. The New Jerusalem is not to descend for the purpose of depriving us of the wholesome necessity of working for our living, or relieving us of uncongenial tasks, but to lift all life and all service into its true position of dignity and glory.

There is no occasion for waiting for the city to descend. Any home may, by unanimous consent of its members, resolve itself into one section of the holy city. Selfishness, fretfulness, disregard for each other's feelings, faultfinding and anger,—all these may be banished any day. This is not all

that is needed, and some requisites, very important, may be at present unobtainable,—fresh air, good drainage, knowledge of the laws of health, and a reasonable income, not only for living expenses, but for those comforts and intellectual and æsthetic surroundings which make life worth living. These will all come, even to the tenement-house district,—if improved means of rapid transit between city and suburbs does not banish (as God grant it may) the tenement-house district altogether, and cause warehouses and wholesale houses to grow up in place of tenement blocks. But here and there, even in tenement houses, the holy city has already descended. It looks little like a gate of pearl—that front door, with its twelve electric buttons to one door-knob, but it leads to an abode where neatness, and simple refinement, and loving service, and unostentatious godliness abide, and through the thin places in its well-worn carpet, the eye of faith sees not the cracks in the rough floor, but the splendor of the golden pavement of the city of God. In like manner may every home, somewhat incompletely as regards comfort, but surely as regards all that is essential to godliness, even now become a part of the holy city. Even now are we sons of God, and it doth not yet appear what we shall be, but in proportion as he who is enthroned in the city is revealed to us, we shall become like him, seeing him as he is.

When all homes, or even a number of homes sufficient to hold the balance of power, become thus annexed to the city, they may dictate to society what shall be its rules and customs, its hours and its fashions, the character of its music, its literature, its amusements, its pictures, its topics of conversation. It will not be true that in the New Jerusalem the sole topic of conversation will be religion, or that we shall have no interest in those concerns which relate to every-day life. We shall need amusements, and will have a purified stage, whose scenes, grave or gay, tragic or comic, will all be helpful, uplifting, and profitable for godliness. There will be

music, and not all of one kind or on one theme. It will vary, from the soothing sound that, stealing over the spirit, stills apprehension and distrust and hushes the heart into trustful submission, to that which rings through the corridors of the soul and stirs it to deeds of heroic activity. There will be fiction; it will be realistic in the sense that it will be true to what is best in life, and it will be ideal in the sense that it will hold before the reader some noble possibility as yet unattained. There will be daily papers—six days in the week,—but the convictions of its editors will not be for sale by the column, and righteousness will always be more sacred to the publishers than increase in the subscription list. The fine arts will all flourish, and the learned professions will be more learned. The signs of Christ's reign may not instantly be apparent to everyone. The careless soul may say, "This running to and fro, this increase of knowledge, is but a harbinger of impending destruction. There has been no progress; and the world is hastening to its doom, and the New Jerusalem has yet to appear." But even so the careless and the prejudiced knew not the prophets of old, and looked for the Messiah, everywhere in earth and heaven, excepting in the manger where he was born, and on the cross to which they nailed him.

When the New Jerusalem has fully descended, men will build shops, dig mines, and construct highways, and organize great corporations, and seek to become wealthy, that they may glorify God. They will desire to make money,—of course they will. Money is labor's storage-battery. The man with a ten-dollar bill in his pocket is capable of doing in one minute ten men's work for all day. No wonder he prizes it. God sends great responsibility with a ten-dollar bill. What will it not do? Not to want money is to wish one's talent buried. In the millennium men will be glad to make money, and they will spend it wisely; and as God gives increasingly to those who are faithful over a few things, so, in the holy city, men will have more wealth than now. But the em-

ployer will never forget that the chief end of his business is not that he may be wealthy, but that he may glorify God in his body. The laboring-man, if he has less than he would be glad to spend, will have enough to live decently and support his family in comfort, and will be content with his wages. The period of strikes and lockouts, of wars between labor and capital, will be studied as part of the history of the dark ages. Selfishness will not be impossible, and it will appear in sporadic cases, but it will not become epidemic, and will yield to proper treatment. The problems of capital and labor must be solved in the New Jerusalem, and nowhere else, and it is time for their solution to begin. Competition will not be abolished,—men will measure strength of arm and intellect with each other, but the competition which seeks one's own by the ruin of another's business will be read of as one of the facts in history all but impossible to realize as having been actual.

There may be political parties in the New Jerusalem, as different theories of the functions of government and the duties of rulers appear differently to honest men of different minds. But machine nominations, packed conventions, party patronage, campaign assessments, and the thousand iniquities to which we have grown accustomed, but which would madden us to revolution if in all their foul hideousness they were to be forced upon us *de novo*, will have no place. In that day it will be said, not "To the victors belong the spoils," but "To the victors belongs the grave responsibility of administering the government so that every official act will stand the white light of public inspection, so that every law enacted, every committee appointed, every office filled, shall be for the glory of God, and of the nation, over which, through us as his chosen representatives, Christ reigns."

One must needs be carried by the Spirit to an exceeding mountain, great and high, that he may see the descent of the New Jerusalem. He must needs have learned the answer of

the Saviour to the question of the disciples, "Lord, how is it that thou wilt manifest thyself unto us, and not unto the world?" Yet, when he is truly manifest to us, the world will be likely to know something about it. Many there are whose hearts burn within them, but whose eyes as yet are holden. The world has taken kindly to, and often repeats, a quotation from Elizabeth Barrett Browning, but almost always omits the line that contains the real lesson:—

"Earth's crammed with heaven
And every common bush afire with God.
But only he who sees, takes off his shoes;
The rest sit round it, and pluck blackberries."

Lightning comes from the clouds to the earth: it also goes from the earth to the clouds. It is said that we could, if we tried, accustom ourselves to see the lightning ascend instead of descend. The holy city is to ascend from earth and descend from heaven. Viewed in progress of construction, it seems ascending. Viewed historically or, as John saw it, in apocalyptic vision, it is more exact to speak of it as coming down from God out of heaven. It is even now ascending and descending. There is evidence of this in the collapse of atheism, and the substitute for it of agnosticism, with its altar to the unknown God. There is evidence of it in the earnest thought which men, in the church and out, now give to the consideration of spiritual questions once passed upon flipantly. There is evidence of it in the impatience of the age with doctrine whose bearing has no apparent relation to character. There is evidence of it in the extent to which Christian principles have come to be accepted as social and business laws. The ideal is far from realized, but an immense volume of our business suffers instant paralysis as soon as certain Christian principles cease to be believed in and expected. There is evidence of it in the eagerness of men of all schools, sometimes with injustice to the equally important truth of the atonement, to emphasize anew the vital truths

of the Incarnation, that Jesus as a real being may come into closer union with the lives of men. There is evidence of it in the study of biblical criticism: in this, as in all else, the pendulum may swing too far, but its present direction is making the Word of God more real and sacred, and is one of the signs of the Holy City's descent.

There is further evidence of the coming of the holy city in the social movements of the time. Even the restless ebb and flow of social and industrial life, advancing and receding, with its waves now dashing in blind fury against the eternal rocks, and now chasing each other in swift retreat, leaving muddy shores and crawling things exposed to view, are, after all, evidences of a deep moral earnestness, a faith in a possible good not yet attained, and indicate the incoming of a mighty tide of righteousness in the relations of man with man. There is evidence of it in the sentiment which compels rich men to endow institutions for the public good, both in the increasing willingness of the men themselves so to do, and also in the public recognition of the obligation, and the scant courtesy with which press and people treat the memory of a man who has lived for himself, and bequeaths wealth to his immediate relatives, with no large benefactions. These are not of necessity to be taken as evidences of individual righteousness, but of an increasingly righteous sentiment. The extent to which the Church is grappling with social problems, in her institutional, her philanthropic, her charitable, her reformatory, her missionary work, even if much that is at present done is no more than wood, hay, and stubble, is still further evidence, and perhaps is one of the most hopeful signs, and shows at least the line of the real Foundation of the holy city.

We speak of this as a sceptical age. It is not so. It is an inquisitive age, an inquiring, challenging age. With more boldness than reverence it puts its finger into every historic nail-print, and not infrequently it grinds as "Nehushtan"

some sacred relic beneath its iconoclastic heel, when it ought rather to loose its shoes from off its feet. It has profound faith in the natural, and none too much in the supernatural: it needs to look less on the things that are seen, and believe more in the unseen as the eternal things. But, it may be questioned whether any age has had more genuine and rational faith, such as the Son of man in his progressive coming rejoices to find in the earth. With all its materialism and speculation, it still is foremost among the ages in which men have not seen, but yet have intelligently believed. And therein is a sign of the descent of the holy city.

There is no infidelity so dangerous as that which denies the power of good to triumph, by its own inherent, God-given power, over evil in the world. Satan felt, in his attack upon the character of Job, that, if he could prove human goodness rotten at the core, it would be the strongest possible arraignment of the divine goodness; and God accepted his challenge. What the city is in all the sum of its heavenly characteristics translated into earthly realities we do not know. We know in part, and prophesy in part only. But that which is perfect is coming. And even NOW abide some things, among which are the faith that goodness has power to triumph, the hope that increasingly it triumphs and is to triumph, and the love which is of God, nay which is God, working in humanity to make the triumph actual and complete.

It is not necessary to go into the imagery of John's description in hope of making it correspond exactly with observable conditions.¹ The picture becomes incongruous as

¹ No more sound or sensible words have been written on the figurative language of this section of the Apocalypse than those of the late Dr. Israel P. Warren, in his *Exposition of the Book of Revelation* (pp. 290, 291):—

"After long study of it, we can only repeat what we have said before, that it seems to us to be an ideal sketch of the church of God in its highest and most perfect state; that which is marked out for her in the

soon as we lay down the binoculars and take the microscope. A wall 216 feet high, and houses 1500 miles high, are not dimensions that, in their relation to each other, will bear exact analysis. Nothing would have seemed more illogical to John than that it should be attempted. A cube was his idea of symmetry,—therefore the city was a cube. It was large, and its walls high and beautiful, and its gates and pavement

plans of her founder, and which she is one day to attain on earth. And because no terms known to John or his readers in that age would have been sufficient for the description in plain prosaic verity, the phraseology was derived from what was the most sacred and glorious object known to them, the temple at Jerusalem. Not that the church was to be literally a building, or a city, or a beautiful woman, the bride of Christ, but that these objects, all centering in Jerusalem and the temple, so dear to all pious hearts, were *sources of language* with which to set forth in the most lively manner what, literally, would have been inconceivable.

"Suppose the little band of the Pilgrims in that first terrible winter at Plymouth, when one-half their number perished from cold and disease, and were buried on Cole's Hill, their graves being carefully smoothed down to conceal their fate from the Indians, had, to cheer their despondency and nerve them to new fortitude, received, through angelic revelation to their beloved Elder Brewster, a vision of what the nation they were founding would be in 1885,—more than twenty-six decades from that time. *No literal* terms would have been sufficient for the description. Republic, States, Union, Congress, President,—much more, railroads, telegraphs, coal, petroleum, cotton, the press, and many others, would have been words without meaning. Even figures would have been to their view as absurd as a city 1,500 miles high,—three and a half millions of square miles of territory, fifty millions of people, an annual bread crop of 2,500 millions of bushels, a national debt of 2,500 millions of dollars, etc., etc. Instead of this, let the language have been derived from some object known and dear to them in the beloved England from which they were exiled, let the great city of London, the palace of St. James, Westminster Hall, the renowned seat of justice, the venerable Abbey where her kings were entombed, the universities where her divines had studied, and the like, all have been laid under contribution to furnish ideals for the magnificent vision. Then let these have been grouped with the skill of a divine artist, and let it be named a "*New England*," and there might have been thus conveyed to the minds of the poor exiles some conceptions of the National Edifice God was about to build, and the foundations of which they were laying in their sufferings and tears. How bright the vision! How blessed the comfort!"

were splendid. Read for its general effect, the description is of entrancing beauty, and it is thus that it should be read.

The city will not be discovered by one who follows slavishly the imagery rather than the spirit of the description. The New Jerusalem will have many names,—Boston, Chicago, Atlanta, Jonesville. It will not be located alone on the Mediterranean, but on the Mississippi and the Orinoco and the Yang-tse-kiang. It will include ocean and forest and prairie. If there is no more sea, it may be because of the perfection of submarine cables and pneumatic tubes and aerial navigation. The monument in Boston Public Garden to commemorate the discovery of anæsthetics may have a suggestion of the correct interpretation of one of the prophecies,—“Neither shall there be any more pain.” If there is no night there, it may be because of the glory of the electric lights: for “the Lord God giveth them light.” Men will leave earth and go to heaven, but they will live longer and better, and death will have lost its sting, so that it may be said that there shall be no more death. There will be meeting-houses, but the real temple will be the heart of each man and woman, and this will make a temple of all the earth. The Psalmist (Ps. xxix. 9) had the thought when, looking out on the earth after the storm, and conceiving of the universe as one sublime holy of holies, he echoed the praise of every rain-slaked pool and dripping leaf, and said, “And in his temple everything saith, Glory.” So, while there will be need of meeting-houses, the real temple will be recognized. The church edifices will be temples after a sort, and so will the state capitols and court-houses, made so by godly legislation and faithful administration of justice. The church spire will point men to heaven, and so will the smoke-stack of the factory.

The New Jerusalem is coming down from God, but not as the image of Diana fell in Athens. The city will be builded of boards and brick and stone and iron, but the spirit will be according to the pattern shown in the Mount. There will be

mayors and aldermen and justices of the peace and path-masters, and every one of them will receive his office as a trust from God. Men will desire office that they may the better serve God. Men will build railroads from one part of the city to another, they will sail in ships and fly in balloons from one part to another, they will buy and sell, marry and give in marriage, teach school and make money, and sweep the streets and vote, for the glory of God. They will be none the less diligent in business, but by their traffic and commerce, no less than by prayer and alms, the kingdom of God will prevail. Men knew not the Christ, because he was born in a manger; so now they know not the New Jerusalem, because it descends to some communities in a prairie schooner, and lives in a sod house, yet there is the home of the Christ, and the holy city of his abode.

It is not worth while to question wonderingly, What are the realities that correspond with these figurative descriptions? with the thought that we may expect to discover any very exact parallel, or that any such was intended. The dimensions, the descriptions, and the chronology are to be interpreted as part of the general picture which, when the features are inspected singly, becomes as meaningless as a single impression on a multichrome. The thousand years which this state is to endure is to be taken as a round number meaning almost forever. We ourselves use the term so. When we wish to sell a piece of land almost forever, but not quite, we lease it for 999 years. That God would spend millions of years—which he counted as only a week—in fitting up the world for man, and thousands of years additional in a struggle which taxed to its utmost the Divine love and wisdom, and caused the death of Christ, to bring humanity to righteousness, and then cause all to collapse and come to an end in ten brief centuries,—this would be inconceivable. How long the millennium will last, no man is safe in prophesying, but it may be said with entire safety that God has in no sense

bound himself to cut it short by reason of John's use of the expression, a thousand years. It is not necessary to multiply it by 360, on the utterly unauthorized "year for a day" theory, nor to multiply its number of days by 1000 years, on the principle that "a day with the Lord is as a thousand years." Any such reduction of tropical language to cold arithmetic indicates hopeless inability to understand the spirit of the book. It is enough to know that the holy city is even now descending: it is not here in its completion and beauty, but "the foundation of God standeth sure," and through coming generations the superstructure will be revealed. Then, yea, even now, "we having the same spirit of faith" which in the Apocalypse causes the Hallelujah chorus to precede the binding of Satan, in cordial recognition of the good already attained, and in faithful anticipation of its culmination and triumph, may echo the glad song of heaven, "Hallelujah! for the Lord God omnipotent reigneth! The kingdoms of this world are become the kingdom of our Lord and of his Christ, and he shall reign forever and ever!"

ARTICLE IV.

THE IMPORTANCE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE
HISTORICAL ARGUMENT.¹

BY PROFESSOR ALBERT TEMPLE SWING.

WHEN a man enters the realm of research, and of argumentation over the results of investigation, it is of vital importance that he hold the fundamental principles of knowledge with very great clearness. Facts and theories, the real and the ideal, *without the right method*, will accumulate in ever-increasing confusion. The more one seems to know, the less he actually possesses of true knowledge.

The historical instinct seeks to discover what has been in the past, and the manner of that being. What has been done and what has been thought; how it was done and how it was thought, are the questions which are ever arising. It is a search after reality as it has manifested itself to life and in life. The primal question is, What can be known? and the primary object of this paper is to emphasize the importance of distinguishing between that which belongs to the true record of history, and that which is only inferred from it; between facts, and theories as to facts; between science in its original and strict sense, and mere speculation, or science falsely so called.² Human teaching can possess no inherent

¹ Opening address before the Theological Seminary, Oberlin, September 20, 1894.

² It is largely a question as to method. No attempt is here made *to locate* the line of division between certainty, probability, and possibility. An absolute theory of knowledge has never yet been successfully formulated. Every attempt thus far has led to divisions and confusion. Kant, the greatest of all contributors in this direction, is yet the most conspicuous failure of all.

authority. It is authoritative only as it presents truth, or reality, as it exists in the physical and spiritual worlds. So soon as a man's facts are exhausted, so soon as he has drawn upon all the truth he has in his possession, his function as a teacher sent from God ceases, and he must hasten frankly to declare, as Paul did, *I do not have this of the Lord; these are my own private inferences.*

Now the truth is, that what we absolutely and definitely know of past reality is limited. The record is incomplete as to its extent, and not absolutely correct in what it presents. It is only the human record of the real. It is the account of what has been seen and handled, so far as it has been preserved for us. For all practical purposes this kind of an account is abundantly adequate. It is not microscopic analysis which is demanded here. The world is wisely content if the general results have been obtained from honest witnesses. If further demands are made, they must be satisfied from other sources, if satisfied at all. Such is the nature of the historical record that we accept it as capable of furnishing genuine knowledge. The man who becomes so extremely sceptical as to doubt the possibility of genuine history in the past has nothing behind him upon which he can build; and, in like manner, he can have nothing before him for his thought. His infidelity is practical insanity.

But the incompleteness of the historical record is a fact of equal importance with its genuineness. The true history stops with the record. All the remainder of the past world, so far as our knowledge goes, lies in silence. It is the great unknown. It stands to us, and must ever stand to us, in exactly the same relation, so far as knowledge is concerned, as does the future beyond our own lifetime. Outside of the recorded history behind us, and of the personal experience before us, we have not history but inference; and if we step beyond this, we have not knowledge but pure speculation. It is also necessary to emphasize the fact that the so-called

historical record has not in every particular been found infallible. Some things have been accepted as history which we know to be not history.

On the other hand, it is also equally true that many things only inferred, without absolutely historical evidence, are true. All so-called history has not been history; and all speculative inferences are not mere subjective fancies without reality behind them. But here is a distinction which is fundamental and all-important. It is only necessary for history to demonstrate the fact that it is *genuine history*, in order to become absolutely authoritative. It is necessary for speculation to demonstrate, *in some way outside itself*, that it is more than speculation. Just here a fatal indistinctness has entered into the deepest questions of human life. In seeking to discover past reality the historical factor, and not the philosophical, must hold sway. The ideal may very well be sought elsewhere, but this is not to be its realm. Here the inquiry is for the real in experience, or in fact. It is not to discover what might have been, but what has been.

In this age of subjectiveness and of fertility in speculative dialectic, it is time to remind ourselves that the gaps of history are to remain gaps unless they can be filled by history itself. The artist who ambitiously restored one of the noted statues of Apollo by placing a lyre in the broken hand, had need to be shown later that the wanting member had actually held in it a bow, from which had just been shot the swift-flying arrow. And as to the Apollo Belvedere, it is now discovered that he did not hold a bow in his left hand, but an ægis with the terrorizing head of Medusa upon it.¹ The question in art history is not, whether some one could be found who could paint a "Last Supper" better than Leonardo has done. The faded and scarred original stands best untouched by the modern brush. The child's astronomical

¹ Grundriss der Kunstgeschichte, von Wilhelm Lübke (Stuttgart, 1892), Erster Band, p. 191.

remark, that "the stars would have covered the whole heavens if they had been spread out, so the astronomers gathered them up into constellations," is suggestive of what has often been actually undertaken by the speculative reconstructor of past events.

The historical argument needs to be better understood and more carefully applied in all the general fields of inquiry. For the purpose of illustrating and further unfolding the principles already indicated, some of these may properly be alluded to briefly in this article:—

1. The first of these is that of History proper. All that has in the past been believed to be historical is not, as we have learned, been really historical. On too slender evidence things were called facts which were not facts. What is to be done here? The whole ground of history is being retraversed. All possible lights are being turned upon all possible phases of the past. The most rigid tests are being applied to the statements of the writers of history. The question is not only what is said, *but also what was known when it was said*. Just how many and how important are the facts from which the conclusions have been drawn? History is being dissolved, and only the original elements are desired for the new product. If the facts are not sufficient for the old conclusions, the verdict is unhesitatingly rendered, that the record may be true, *but it is not proved true*. The events in question *may* have happened, *but they have no place in established history*; they are "under consideration," and, unless something else can be brought into the line of supporting testimony, they must forever remain as non-historical.

But just here must come in the ceaseless caution against drawing a false inference from this situation. No fact which lacks historically acceptable proof is thereby proved in itself to be improbable. We cannot say, for this reason, that the statement is false, or that the event never occurred. What stands must be proved untrue by other facts before it be-

comes *unhistorical*: and to deny authoritatively, requires the same degree of knowledge as to affirm. An unsupported denial of what has been asserted on, what appears to us, insufficient evidence, is not so strong as the original affirmation; for we may believe that the original historian may have had in his possession other means of knowledge than those mentioned by him. And so the presumption will remain with the honest "writer of history at-first-hand" till the facts are forthcoming for final proof or effective denial.

We are in no special way interested personally in the question of whether there were two Homers; or two John Wyclifs; or whether Shakespeare wrote *Shakespeare*; or whether there was a historical William Tell. But when a rigid historical inquiry is directed to the first three centuries of the Christian era, the results immediately become of personal importance to every intelligent Christian. What is the evidence for believing that here all is historical which has been believed to be so? Did the apostolic fathers write the books they have been credited with writing? Are the documents of the New Testament historical? Some of the most significant work in recent times has been done here. Students who are just coming into the great fields of thought need to know the spirit of the doing, and the inferences which are to be drawn from it all. What the present generation of investigators pronounce to be historical we may have a new confidence in, *just in proportion to the rigidity of the principles of inquiry.*

I may here say, in passing, that, to my thought, the historical foundation of the Christian religion was never more clearly demonstrated than after the most thorough investigation that has ever been directed into the realm of history. Most of the Epistles were evidently written before the year 70. And if the Gospels as we have them were used already in a written form before the year 160 A. D. to furnish material for compiling certain Gospel narratives which in part have

come down to us;¹ and if these facts have been accepted as historical under the modern tests of inquiry, then the Gospel documents are shown to stand within the realm of history.

But just here is manifested the importance of a clear understanding of the inferences to be drawn from the situation. As the rigidity of the investigation is increased by the various historians, and the confidence in what can pass the tests is thereby made stronger, there is an enlarged number of items left with no historical evidence yet known, to support them. Are they for this reason disproved? Nothing of the kind. They simply stand awaiting other evidence. If it should never be forthcoming, because the records have forever perished, the stamp of "historical" would, in the judgment of those investigators, be forever withheld, and that too though the events in question may have once had all the reality of your own existence. What is the argumentative meaning of all this? It is simply that the historical method has its limitations. While it intensifies certainty, it limits the range of that certainty. There is a larger field left to probabilities and presumptions. Circumstantial evidence immediately comes into lively operation. And religious faith must have its place for that which is "probable," as well as that which can be stamped "historical"; but it must be absolutely distinct from the historically established. Every link in the chain of circumstantial evidence may be true to the life, but it may also be false. This method inspires confidence and is covered with confusion. While the man who disputes history without evidence is not only an ignorant man, but a fool, the man who dogmatizes in the realm of the merely probable is a dangerous leader to the ignorant, and a troublesome enthusiast to the wise.

In Germany the varying emphasis placed upon the his-

¹ Besides the Diatessaron of Tatian, see H. B. Swete's Introduction and Notes to The Akhmim Fragment of the Apocryphal Gospel of Peter. London and New York: Macmillan & Co. 1893.

torical method has led to a number of distinct phases of religious thought. One class of mind has become sceptically inclined because of what has been left outside their present means of absolute proof, forgetting apparently that a mere "method of proof" cannot in one particular change past events as they have really existed. What has happened, is there, whether it can be proved or not. And there must be a faith in what cannot be proved, because of our faith in what can be proved. A sleeping child is discovered in a basket on a doorstep. The parents of the child may not be found by all the vigilance that the court can exercise: but if the child is not cared for, *it will cease to be a sleeping child, and become a crying child!*

Another type of the German mind has put forth the duty of belief in Christ irrespective of all historical evidence, because of his meeting our spiritual wants. The same investigator who can find no historical proof great enough to bring before him the historical Christ, yet in the church is to turn from this incomplete record of the past, and join with the worshippers in adoring the spiritual Lord whom he knows spiritually and personally. Dr. Reischle, of Giessen, in an essay, entitled, "Faith in Jesus Christ, and the Historical Examination of his Life," declares that, "One cannot delay faith in Christ till historical criticism has settled all its problems." The imperative is to yield to the spiritual Lord, and know of the truth of the doctrine in the soul's own experience. The late Dr. Frank, of Erlangen, while emphasizing the importance of that personal experience directly received in "regeneration" and "conversion" as a means of "assurance,"¹ yet had no complacency in those who directly or indirectly neglect the importance and validity of the historical element in religion.² To him the certainty in the soul was

¹ *System der Christlichen Gewissheit*, 2 Auf. 2 Bde. Erlangen und Leipzig.

² "Eine brennende Frage," in *Neue Kirchliche Zeitschrift*, 1894, No. 3.

not independent of the Gospel record of Jesus, and did not leave that record as a matter of indifference. It sealed for him its perfect integrity, validity, and divinity.

It is not possible to understand the religious position of such scholars as Ritschl, Herrmann, Harnack, and Kaftan without a knowledge of their use of the historical method. But for the purposes of illustration it is not necessary to dwell longer here.

2. Let us pass now into the so-called sphere of Science. Scientific investigation has been greatly enlarged in recent years. But here, in the study of the rocks, the observation of animal existence, and the investigation into the physical basis of life, the right use of the historical method is absolutely necessary for the validity of the conclusions. For the question is not, what might be, or what ought to be; but what is, and what has been. In geology, biology, and physiological psychology fact must be absolutely separated from inference; and both fact and the inferences drawn from fact must be forever distinct from the great mass of mere philosophical speculations. The real strength of these departments will lie primarily in the array of authenticated facts, and only secondarily in the skill of the dialectic used in the realm of the inferential, and in that of the purely speculative which lies beyond these facts.

(1) Geology in its rich field has its work to do in discovering and verifying. But science finds it a limited field, and speculation, as well as inference, must soon be brought into play, if there is an attempt to tell us the particulars of what has happened in the ages of the past. If, however, we clearly hold in mind here the limitations of the historical method; we need not be thrown into confusion when one scientist tells us that a certain event took place ten thousand years ago, and another gives us to understand that the event in question occurred a million years in the past. A discrepancy of nine hundred and ninety thousand years, in a consid-

eration where there are no facts in the way, ought not to trouble any one. It is only when we come back to the rational definition of science that discrepancies are seriously worth considering.

The world of speculation is a free world; and it is free because no man can speak with authority in it. Authority in the sphere of the historical goes only with the verities of history; and where these cease to be verities, authority ceases and freedom comes in. Everything may have been in the fire mist just as truly as if the geologist had been there to make a diagram or take a photograph of the situation; but by the historical argument it can never be demonstrated. It must therefore, for us, stand only in the realm of the probable or possible. New evidence may come in to increase or diminish our confidence in its truth; or, inasmuch as it is not a purely scientific conclusion, it may be completely changed by later science, just as science or verified knowledge reversed the universal belief that the sun revolved about the earth. When it comes to inferences and speculations, the geologist has no more liberty, and scarcely more power, than any other speculator. Certainly the moment he steps *beyond his facts* he loses his pre-eminence. A philosopher who could not tell sandstone from granite may easily become his superior in the realm of pure speculation.

(2) Biologists also find vast fields for their research. But a mist has gathered here, because of a failure to distinguish between fact and fancy. The naturalist has gathered his facts with noble enthusiasm, but these, after all, are to be significant only in their own sphere. The moment any deductions are made *beyond the centre of gravity of these facts*, so to speak, those deductions are of no scientific value. It is not history that is then given us, but assumption. Any one is at equal liberty to assume differently; and no man can assume authoritatively. Some persons forget, apparently, that the development "theory" in its absolute form is not a "devel-

opment fact." Science has not told us by the purely historical method that everything has developed from something below it. The verified facts of all the investigators in these fields are not sufficient to show, whether things have developed wholly upwards, or in part downwards; or whether they began in the middle, so to speak, and developed both ways; or whether, outside the limit of species, there is a development in either direction.¹ The development theory when applied to the whole universe of matter and mind, the organic and the inorganic, is absolutely untenable without admitting a series of unexplained introductions, or of additions by creation, which would modify it so fundamentally as to destroy its primary and literal force.

(3) Those who have been searching to find the elements of life and spirit in matter have never been able to find them. They find matter in motion, but, from the very nature of the investigation, they find nothing more. They have no instruments for anything more. The physiological psychologists can only push their investigations, under more favorable circumstances, one step further into the delicate realm where the molecules are moved. They can locate the source from which the motion proceeds; they can measure its strength: but the animating energy itself forever eludes them. No new introduction of names can cover their defeat or solve the mysteries of "life."

But what are to be our inferences from all this here? It is true that those last substances upon which the physiologist can do his work are properly called only the "physical basis" of life and spirit. But out of the situation there is always arising, not a presumption, but an assumption, that, because nothing but matter can be discovered, therefore there is not a duality of matter *and* spirit, but a monality of matter alone. The physiological scientist and those who follow

¹ See Sir William Dawson's latest work, *Some Salient Points in the Science of the Earth*. New York: Harper Bros. 1894.

his lead are to be bound by the limitations of the historical argument. They can truly say that they find only matter in motion. Did any rational man, understanding the instruments with which they must work, ever expect anything more? Can it be said that there is therefore no spiritual existence in connection with matter, or apart from it? By no manner of reasoning. *All such investigations can never create a presumption against spiritual realities.* Is there no mind because we cannot find it with the probe? Is there no personal God because science cannot find him in the universe? As well affirm that there is no architect of the palace because he is not discoverable in the building. Physical science finds its sphere in the physical side of existences, and there its authority will depend upon the exactness of its work. It can only demonstrate that matter conditions spirit, as well as that spirit influences matter; or, in other words, that the shape of the potato will be determined in part by the obstacles in the soil.

On the other hand, however, President Stanley Hall declares¹ that he has not been able to enumerate a dozen materialists among contemporary writers, and of these only two are academic; and he affirms that the present tendency in science is toward dynamic views of matter, rather than to the materialistic views of force. If this be true, and many of the recent followers of Herbert Spencer would seem to bear out the claim, it will be just as necessary in the future to insist upon the validity and importance of the historical argument for science as it has been necessary in the past to call attention to its limitations. There is certainly no less to be said against a monality of force and spirit in the universe, than against a monality of matter. It is not a legitimate limitation of the historical argument when, for any purpose whatever, facts of importance on either side of a question are ignored.

¹ "The New Psychology as a Basis of Education," *Forum*, August, 1894.

Mr. Benjamin Kidd's great point is in showing that science has made a *fundamental omission* in failing to estimate the great fact of religion. He says:¹ "What then are the religious systems which fill such a commanding place in man's life and history? What is their meaning and function in social development? To ask these questions is to find that a strange silence has fallen upon Science. She cannot answer. Her attitude toward them has been curious in the extreme, and widely different from that in which she has regarded any other of the phenomena of life. . . . These religious phenomena are certainly among the most persistent and characteristic features of the development which we find man undergoing in society. . . . Yet contemporary literature may be searched almost in vain for evidence of any true realization of this fact. Even the attempt made by Mr. Herbert Spencer in his *Sociology* to deal with the phenomena of religions can scarcely be said to be conceived in the spirit of evolutionary science as now understood. It is hard to follow the author in his theories of the development of religious beliefs from ghosts, and ancestor worship, without a continued feeling of disappointment and even impatience at the triviality and comparative insignificance of the explanations offered to account for the development of such an imposing class of social phenomena." To Mr. Kidd this failure of evolutionary science to give due regard to the historical factor has not only weakened, but vitiated, its conclusions.

3. In Literary and Biblical Criticism the historical argument has, in like manner, a special need of recognition. The impulse for greater exactness in the scrutiny of literary and artistic work as a means of determining authorship and time of production, is but a part of the increased interest in historical exactness in general. In its best form it is helped along by a desire to strengthen insufficient historical evidence, or to help to determine the character of that evidence. When

¹ Social Evolution, pp. 19-22.

an old painting or an ancient piece of sculpture is brought to light, it is the aim of "criticism," not by *a priori* reasoning, but by legitimate comparison with works of known antiquity and authorship, to determine whether it is possible to classify the new-comer with any degree of confidence. Or a manuscript is found, which in the light of what is already known in this field, and not by the mere subjective mental state of the inquirer, is located with great confidence, or on the other hand with many improbabilities about it. *If the testimony in its behalf is not historical, as well as critical*, it can never come to be in itself a direct historical authority.

This great activity in seeking to determine by criticism what is genuine, and what is not genuine, has been extended more directly into the realm of religion. But here there is also a biblical and religious criticism, *which seeks, largely by methods of its own*, to determine the authorship and genuineness of our religious books and the character of their teachings. It is important to know how to estimate the real scientific value of this branch of investigation. It is understood at the outset, and from its very nature, that it is critical, and therefore not historical. It appeals not to well-authenticated testimony, but to *a priori* reasons, and to appearances. *Standing alone, it can therefore never be authoritative*. These critical judgments furnish *presumptions*, as working hypotheses; and standing alone they can never be anything else in the courts of evidence but presumptions.¹ Literary critical argument is therefore to be distinguished from the historical method. The two do not conflict with each other necessarily or primarily. They may indeed work together as well as otherwise. But they generally work apart. In other words, where the historical argument is strongest and most complete, the literary critical is least workable. The literary critical has the best field where there is a marked lack of his-

¹ German historians have in frequent use the word *Foraussetzungen*, which is generally translated "presuppositions."

torical evidence. The less that is known, the more attractive is the field. For that which is historically established cannot be overthrown by the disagreement with it of the literary: and when it simply reaffirms what is already proved to be true this new aid is practically superfluous. It is, nevertheless, true that the critical method has added to, and taken from, that which has been accepted as *quasi* history, but only because these controverted points were recognized as lacking in evidence. But it must be kept just as clearly in mind, that, while criticism may lead us to reject *quasi* history, it can never take the place of real history. It can create distrust; with much greater difficulty can it build up faith. A work whose genuineness is assumed on reasonable literary evidence is not historically established. It rests not on reasonable historical proof, but on reasonable literary conjecture. Its truth is a presumption, but the best presumption in the world can be completely dissipated by the discovery of one genuine historical fact.

As literary criticism is primarily only the application of the judgment to appearances, it cannot alone detect a perfect forgery; and, on the other hand, the appearances of forgery, or of artificial compilation, may be equally misleading. A man will often not be able to identify some of his own productions without the aid of the chirography. He does not remember them. They do not "sound like him." But there they are, in his own handwriting and stored away among his treasures. If a hundred of an ordinary man's sermons should be disguised by a typewriter, and then subjected to the usual critical methods, not a few of them would very likely be declared to be weak imitations, if not positive forgeries! If a style of argument be applied to the Pentateuch which, when applied in the same manner, e. g., to the Epistle to the Romans,¹ would demonstrate several original writers besides

¹ See *Romans Dissected*. By E. D. McRealsam (*Prof. Charles Marsh Mead*). Edinburgh: T. T. Clark. 1891.

Paul, then the presumptive value of such a Pentateuchal argument is shown to be inconclusive, and a too literal application of it might even come to appear ridiculous. For what shall we say of that criticism which, in the name of science, proposes to itself, without the aid of any outside facts whatever, to take up some of the oldest records of the race and not only point out for us the original elements out of which the book in question is supposed to have been blunderingly constructed, but even to readjust those elements as they ought to have been used!¹ Biblical criticism employs the historical method when it searches out the facts in the use of Jehovah and of Elohim, or the references to angels in the book of Daniel, etc. It abandons the solid foundations underneath it and steps off into speculations, *when it goes beyond the facts of the Bible without placing its feet upon other facts outside the Bible*. That there were other documents than those preserved in the Old Testament is affirmed in the Bible itself. For "is it not written in the book of Jasher?"² But what we do not know about these other documents would fill several volumes; while what we do know about them, if the truth must be told, is absolutely nothing! Speculation is free here, and it will be usually ingenious and usually confusing. If light is ever to break in with direct rays it will probably have to come from discoveries, which yet may be made, when the world gets hold of that which is now lying buried out of sight.

The so-called "inductive method" of Bible study has set before itself the commendable aim of seeking to bring forth results new and old out of Scripture. But it may be affirmed, without casting any reproach upon this valuable method of study, that some of the greatest questions cannot

¹ Rev. B. W. Bacon in his *Genesis of Genesis* very concisely shows how radical some of the work has been in this direction. See also Professor Howard Osgood's article in *Bib. Sac.*, Oct., 1894, pp. 684-694.

² Josh. x. 13; 2 Sam. i. 18. Compare also Ex. xvii. 14; Num. xxi. 14; 1 Sam. x. 25; 1 Kings xi. 41.

be settled by inductive reasoning. The inductive method used in Scripture interpretation cannot determine whether Scripture itself is genuine or not. It cannot make a legend into history, or turn a history into legend; nor can it get out of Scripture what is not in it. Of all methods of reasoning, it furnishes the least room for magic or mysticism. Now the facts necessary for the success of this method, and which must be found outside the Scripture record, are largely wanting; while the events recorded in Scripture itself are in many cases the very ones which the so-called induction is being used to discuss. But the propositions upon which all perfect induction must ever depend, if it can draw any valid conclusions whatever, cannot themselves be decided in the process. I venture upon a practical illustration:—

One of the most prominent leaders in this department of instruction,¹ after applying his inductive method to the “fall of man as recorded in Genesis,” concludes without qualification or limitation, that the writer “has no thought of geography or history. He asks simply, How can I best impress these truths upon the minds of men? He does what the prophet always does, he idealizes. There is here no history, no geography.” This conclusion, which is the very kernel of one of the great subjects now under discussion, he has arrived at immediately without awaiting for the introduction of any newly discovered fact. For, What is known, one is moved to ask in astonishment, that can bring us so absolutely and easily to that which a moment before was either accepted as containing the truth as it stands; or if it is not true, *then unknown, and to be found out?* At the very outset he assumed in his fifth principle laid down for testing the biblical stories of creation that which is itself under discussion, viz:—that the writer of Genesis compiled his accounts from “four distinct elements, no one of which goes further back than 950

¹ President Harper in a masterly article in *Biblical World*, March, 1894.

B. C." In that case Genesis itself (which is all we have in historical existence(?)) must have been written by some one who lived much later than 950 A. D. (i. e., 662 B. C. (?)) and therefore the probability against his being able to give anything of original historical value is so strong as to make it practically impossible.

The inductive method working alone would hardly be able to establish this "improbability" from Genesis itself, *for Genesis reads exactly like an attempt to give history and geography:—*

Gen. ii. 8-17.—"And the Lord God planted a garden eastward in Eden; and there he put the man whom he had formed. . . . And a river went out of Eden to water the garden; and from thence it was parted, and became into four heads. The name of the first is Pison: that is it which compasseth the whole land of Havilah, where there is gold; and the gold of that land is good: there is bdellium and the onyx stone," etc.

Could an "idealizer" be excused on any scientific grounds, for going so far out of his way as to employ six of the ten verses in this paragraph to describe a purely fictitious geography? Not when he wrote his fiction so much like history that it took over two thousand years to discover its true character. Our inductive leader has been using several methods here. So that, instead of getting out of Genesis what is in Genesis, he has given us just what is in his "fifth principle" for the interpretation of Genesis! It has certainly not been demonstrated by the introduction of any new evidence that the account in Genesis may not have been an honest and straightforward attempt to describe events as the writer *believed* them to have occurred. Or, if the poetical and dramatic element has entered with the narrative, nothing is brought forward to prove the impossibility of believing that it is a poetical statement of an actual fall in the historical location mentioned, whether we to-day can identify the location or not. It is not logic, and it is not science which affirms an interpretation to be the only one when the same method will

establish several other interpretations with no less a degree of certainty.

4. Religious Philosophy is assuming, in certain quarters, a positiveness and an independence in teaching that reminds one strongly of the palmiest day of rationalism. Professor Pfeiderer, of Berlin, is one of the noblest representatives of this type of mind. It is dogmatically affirmed by various members of this class, as if it were intuitive truth, that 'the supernatural and the miraculous do not happen. Jesus moved in the sphere of the Jewish conceptions of his own time:—a kingdom of God and a judgment to come, angels and devils, heaven and hell. These Jewish ideas formed the narrow horizon which shut him in, and out of which we are to break into the larger liberty of dogmatic subjectivism! The resurrection of Jesus Christ was only spiritual and not physical. The story of the evangelists is evidently the result of spiritual enthusiasm. If we knew more, we could point out the original germs of truth in that which we have to admit reads like a simple narrative of history, but which we know *a priori* never took place! Possibly there was some sort of an original Moses. There might have been an historical Solomon, but he never compiled the Proverbs: and a David who may possibly have written one or two psalms. The prophecies must have been written after the events; or they did not refer to the future as it happened except by an unallowable post-adaptation.'

The *ipse dixit* declarations of this subjective method of teaching do not generally aim to leave more things established but less. They are more successful in denying than affirming; in destroying faith than in building it up. But with a man who has the historical sense developed in his soul they are less calculated to disturb faith than to awaken repugnance. The dogmatizings of rationalism, like the vagaries of speculation, are mental activities in which every man is at liberty to indulge if he wishes to do so. But he need not seriously

trouble the world with the product. Such work is not science, nor is it scientific. It is not even rational when it makes the fallible dictates of one's own mind the authoritative centre, in place of the testimony of history and in the very face of it.

The object of this paper, so far as it has any practical reference to the religious and scientific discussions of the present day, has been to emphasize liberty, which has too often been denied by party conservatism; and at the same time to indicate the desirability of having a wholesome restraint placed upon that dogmatism which is too common in the advanced schools of thought. In holding to the simplest illustration of the theme there has yet been the constant aim to show that the historical method does not belong to history alone, but to every department of human thought and knowledge. The growing scrutiny into the so-called "historical" in every field of thought, may crowd it into still narrower limits, and no harm will come, if the situation be understood. It will only be to magnify the strength and legitimacy of its authority. There is much that needs to be restated and reinforced in science and philosophy, in New Testament views and Old Testament views, and there should be absolute freedom for the honest and legitimate doing of the work. We owe it in these difficult fields to recognize the careful scholar and to encourage him in his work. Under his leadership we shall certainly be taught to distinguish conclusions proved, from conclusions which are more or less fanciful, and do not conclude at all. Truth needs truth to enlarge its liberty and give it dominion, and the man who is afraid of new truth does not know anything about truth at all, for truth is really all of the same age.

But the work should be carried on in such a way as to inspire confidence and not distrust. We shall not help either the old or the new, by running off into vagaries. The alarming amount of unscientific work put forth rapidly and

easily in these fields, with all the positiveness of new truth; the clothing of the merest assumptions and fancies in the garb of reality, and putting them forth with all the soberness of historical verities, is not a hopeful sign of the present or for the future. In our desire to satisfy the mind's inborn craving for knowledge, it is important that we do not allow our sober judgment to be defrauded with what is not knowledge,—with what in the business world is called "watered stock." Every "promise to pay" must have the gold or the earth back of it. The man who is so hungry for something new that he is not willing to wait to test it, is in danger of losing his appetite for what he has already in his possession; of disbelieving the old while becoming a credulous enthusiast in respect to the new. He will find himself in the position of one of the English separatists who went on progressing so rapidly that he felt constrained to put into one of his books the caution to his readers, that it was always *his last opinion* which he wished to be taken as "*containing the truth*"!

Theories, and working hypotheses, are necessary and helpful up to a certain point in the investigation, and have done their part in advancing knowledge. But when held too closely they more often mislead than lead aright. We have passed the point of safety in more than one direction. It is time to come back and be content with the slower but surer method of discovery, and of enlarging our knowledge of the unknown by a better knowledge of the known. That is true science and that is genuine scholarship. President Bascom well stated the case in one of his books,¹ and the quotation may fittingly be given here in conclusion: "The skill of an intellectual life is found in getting from the old to the new without the loss of either; from the old to the new in government without the waste and overthrow of revolution; from the old to the new in social customs and order, without the

¹ Science, Philosophy, and Religion, p. 26.

shock of aroused prejudices, the bitterness of sarcasm, the irritation of unwelcome truth; from the old to the new in faith, without schism, the falling of this branch into rapid decay, the putting forward of that into precipitate progress; from the old to the new in philosophy without the irreparable loss of complete rejection, or the irreparable loss of unlimited acceptance, without leaping wholly off from the sure foundation of the past on to other foundations of merely fanciful strength, that have not been tested by the storms of many centuries."

ARTICLE V.

THE AUTHORITY AND INSPIRATION OF THE
SCRIPTURES.

BY PROFESSOR FRANK HUGH FOSTER, D. D.

THE problem of Systematic Theology is always the same. In the various ages of the church, as the introduction of new information or general acceptance of new conclusions, whether from the study of nature or of man, presents it with new material, it has the task of reducing this material to order and setting forth in a systematic manner the sum total of present knowledge upon the themes which it treats. It is always constructive, never destructive. It is not the science of exploration and discovery. It has to wait for the performance of these labors by other departments of theological thought. It may therefore often lag behind the front ranks of progress. But as soon as it can say anything which seems worthy of its special office in the church, whenever it can do anything to calm the turbulent seas of controversy, to relieve anxiety, to give new points of view, or to furnish the doctrinal material for a new advance in the practical work of the church, it is responsible for the faithful performance of these services. For them it exists.

Systematic Theology is, thus, not a stationary science, though it has sometimes been conceived as such by both friend and foe. It is not like a lawyer who has taken a brief to support a certain series of opinions, which are themselves never to be questioned or subjected to revision. The church is actually learning from age to age. New truth does appear. It may not be new in the sense that it is not con-

tained in the Scriptures, explicitly or implicitly, or because it supersedes the doctrines of revelation; but it is new to the apprehension of the age which receives it. The true attitude of Systematic Theology is that of hospitality to it, of critical investigation of its claims, of ready acknowledgment of its reality. Not everything which professes to be true is true. Not every supposed improvement is real improvement. But by receiving increments of new truth theology is still to grow as it has grown during the Christian centuries, distinguishing between the false and the true in that which it has received by tradition, separating the helpful from the harmful in what is offered it in the present, purifying, deepening, and broadening the stream of apprehended reality.

There seems to be special occasion at the present time for the exercise of these functions of Systematic Theology. The past thirty years have seen a great change wrought in the theological thinking of America. Up to that time, what growth there had been had been homogeneous and produced under influences native, for the most part, to the soil. Since then, the influence of the critical methods of Germany, and of the revolution in the natural sciences produced by the introduction of the theory of evolution, has been increasing year by year, till we have been involved in a most momentous controversy upon the fundamental positions of Christian Theology, and particularly upon the Scriptures. At first the issues were far from clear. Time enough has now elapsed, possibly, to enable the Christian thinker to see where he is and whither he is tending. Systematic discussion has already begun, and been vigorously carried on for a considerable period. Two extreme tendencies have already become sufficiently marked: the conservative, which has nothing to learn, has always been in possession of the complete truth, and conceives its problem to be simply to stand by its guns; and the rationalistic, which adopts the evolutionary theory of the origin of our religion, and turns to comparative studies in Bud-

dism and what not for light upon Christian doctrine. Both tendencies are utterly without promise of help,—the one, odious because of a subtile claim of infallibility permeating all its reasonings, and corrupting all its scholarship; the other, pitiable because of its ignorance of the vital and imperishable elements of Christian truth. The call of the day is for something which shall pursue the middle path, and shall perform the true work of the systematic theologian, who is ever receptive, critical, comprehensive, and constructive, who can discriminate and hold the essential elements of truth as it has proved itself such in the past, and acknowledge and incorporate into his thinking the new elements of truth which commend themselves at present.

With this problem the writer has been compelled by his official duty to wrestle and to arrive at some sort of a conclusion. The private scholar may defer judgment, and may continue indefinitely to ponder upon his themes, and to test his conclusions. The public teacher must, however, have an answer to give to those who entrust themselves to him for guidance. This necessity of his situation has both advantages and disadvantages. It certainly should make him modest in his claims for his work, and should render him peculiarly desirous of that correction which the comparison of his results with those of other thinkers is calculated to afford him.

The following pages will present the argument for the authority and inspiration of the Scriptures as it has finally shaped itself in the thinking and teaching of the writer. It is, possibly, in some respects new. It might never have been wrought out except that official duty has demanded it. If it shall seem to any to meet the necessities of the day, and to perform in any sense those services which have just been set forth as the peculiar duty of this branch of theology, it will have answered its purpose.

I.

FUNDAMENTAL PROOF.

The Christian, in consequence of the experience of the new birth, comes to have a considerable body of knowledge springing directly out of that event. Not all parts of this are obtained in the same way. Some are matters of immediate consciousness; others are the result of inferences by longer or shorter trains of reasoning; and, while some possess all the certainty of which human knowledge is capable, others have a less degree of certainty, though they all possess enough to entitle them to the highest value as elements of original and fundamental Christian knowledge. The most important of such doctrines are, that man is a sinner, that there is a holy and personal God, that under divine influence a man may turn from sin and put forth a fundamental choice of the right as such, that thereupon he experiences peace in the forgiveness of his sins, and that he thus begins a new life, under the guidance of a new principle and with the exercise of new powers. All these truths possess to him the character of knowledge, and that, independent, experiential, knowledge. They do not depend to him upon the authority of other men, nor upon the authority of any book. If there are men who have helped him see them, or if he has derived any of his knowledge of the facts or any light upon their proper interpretation from any book, they lie now before him, when his experience has become settled and clear, as matters which he surveys in all their amplitude and in all their significance, and which he thus knows permanently and for himself.

When, now, such a man comes to the Bible, whether it be for the first or for the hundredth time, with the definite question now first definitely asked, What is the source and what the character of this book? he finds that it contains, as its central and dominating portion, the same truths as to sin, God, repentance, forgiveness, and salvation which have al-

ready become a constituent part of his religious knowledge. He reasons thus: My knowledge of these transcendent truths was wrought within my soul by the operation of God upon it. No other agency adequately accounts for them. They are to me the utterance of God. They must have been wrought in the men who wrote this book in the same way. Therefore this book is the utterance, the Word, of God.¹

An analogy may make this argument clearer. A student in the University learns geology. He has presented to him the fundamental facts of the science by his teacher. He also goes out into the fields and over the mountains and examines for himself the facts, and under the guidance of those more advanced in the science comes by the exercise of his own powers of observation and reasoning to an independent knowledge of the great formations, their characteristic fossils, their transformations, and the forces of water, ice, fire, etc., which have operated upon them. He becomes a geologist. He knows for himself. Now there is an unknown (or a known, it is a matter of indifference) book presented to him, and he is asked what, and how valuable, it is. He opens it; and he finds that it describes, just as he has himself seen them in nature, the formations, fossils, ice-marks, volcanic forces, etc., of the earth. His reply is, This is a Geology, and it proceeded from a competent geologist. He argues from his original and independent knowledge of the theme to the character of the book which treats the same theme. So the Christian argues from his knowledge about God to the character of this book which contains the same knowledge.

It will be noted that this argument is not that which is sometimes summarized under the form, The Bible finds me, or, The Bible is inspired because it is inspiring. That is an

¹ This argument, though condensed, is, it is hoped, clear. If not, it may be found drawn out at greater length in previous papers of the author in this Quarterly, viz., 1883, p. 97 ff., 1891, p. 96 ff., particularly 1893, p. 344 ff.

argument from effect to cause. I employ the Bible, yield myself to its teachings, and I find that it works a good work in my soul. I therefore conclude that it is divine. But this argument is a case of identification, or of the deductive application of a principle previously gained by induction to an observed case. It may be logically put thus: *A certain group of truths is God-wrought. The Bible is such a group. Therefore, it is God-wrought.* It rests for its conclusiveness upon the truth of the major premise, and upon the correctness of the observation which is summarized in the minor premise. These two things being ascertained to be correct, it follows as a matter of course.

The elucidation of the argument may be promoted by the consideration of an objection which will ordinarily be raised at this point. The Christian gets his knowledge from the Bible: and when he comes to the Bible, and finds the same things which he believes there, this fact, it is objected, can give no evidence to the Bible. His ideas rest upon the Bible; but what does the Bible rest upon? That question remains still unanswered. It does not prove some new representation of Palmer Cox's brownies to be true to *fact* because my little boy finds them true to his *ideas* of brownies, themselves created and nourished by other productions of Mr. Cox.

The objection is invalid because it overlooks a certain fact, which has already been stated, though not fully expanded. The knowledge with which the common Christian comes to the Bible is not derived from the Bible *in the sense meant*. It may be *historically* derived from the Bible, that is, the first knowledge of truth which the man had may have been communicated by the Bible, but after the experience of the new birth it is *logically* independent of the Bible. The man now knows it in a new way. In fact, he can be said truly to know it only after he has gained this new and independent knowledge. Is the student forever dependent logically upon his

teacher for his knowledge of geology, though he did get all his initial ideas from him? Can he not rise to a point where he knows more than his teacher? possibly, where he can correct errors into which that teacher has fallen, if there are any such? So, if there were errors in the Bible, the Christian might come to where he could correct it, for he does gain—and this is the crucial point—he does gain a knowledge for which he is *no longer dependent upon the book from which he at first derived it.*

It might be said in further rebuttal of this objection, that the Christian is sometimes converted without any direct connection with the Bible. Martin Luther was brought to peace by the old monk who pointed him to the creed, not the Bible, which said: I believe in the forgiveness of sin. Still, of course, this creed, and other ordinary methods of presenting Christian truth are ultimately derived from the Bible. But this answer to the objection need not be insisted on, for the answer is complete, when it is presented as above, and also best, since it deals with the objection in its fundamental and strongest form.

The answer of another objection is still requisite. This argument does not prove the divine origin of the Bible, it will be said, for it would also prove the same of many another book which is quite human, as for example, Luther on the Galatians. I come to this book, and many others, and I find the same great truths taught which I have already come to accept, and I might say also, *This* book is wrought of God; but I should err. The argument, because it proves too much, does not prove anything.

The objection reveals an important fact, that such a book as Luther on the Galatians is, in a sense, wrought of God. Luther could only know these truths, of which the Christian has gained independent knowledge by experience, as he was in one way or another taught of God. Such knowledge can only come from God into the sinful world. But the slight-

est examination of Luther shows that his work is a commentary, and that it only professes to set forth in more detailed form the truths contained in a portion of the Bible. That is the original, the commentary a derived book. And so, in actual fact will it be found in the case of every book containing the peculiar truths which have gained perfect evidence in the mind of the converted Christian. There is but one original, one unique book in this galaxy of truthful books, and that is the Bible. Its truth is God given; and as unique, it is in the full sense, to which no other book can lay justifiable claim, the Word of God.

So far the Christian man comes simply as a converted man, simply as knowing those elementary truths which are involved in the first great experience of his soul. But he does not pause here in his Christian life. Upon conversion follows sanctification, which may be defined, for the present purpose, as increasing stability and prevalence of holy choices. Choices depend upon emotional and intellectual states, and therefore imply knowledge of the truth. Thus as the Christian advances he is constantly acquiring a knowledge of the truth of God through the operations of his own soul. His mind is also illuminated by God. Every holy act, freeing the mind in some respect from the control of sin, tends to cause it to operate normally, or to weigh premises correctly, and hence to discover truth not before known. Hence the circle of independent knowledge is always enlarging. His first knowledge, arising from the experience of the new birth, was limited, though exceedingly comprehensive. Upon the basis of this he ascribed divinity to the Bible. When he has gained this increased knowledge, the argument, though the same in nature, becomes more detailed, and hence more stringent. The Bible is now seen to be the Word of God not merely in its central message, but in many auxiliary utterances. Its possible similarity to any human book, like Luther on the Galatians, which may contain, but is not wholly,

the Word of God, begins to become entirely impossible.

But the life of the Christian is a constant growth, if it is normal, throughout its whole extent. It is nourished by the Bible, and produces an ever greater familiarity with its teachings. Now, the more the Christian reads the Bible, the more evidently do its new truths fit in perfectly into the complex of former known truths and become inseparably associated with them. The divinity of Christ is such a truth. It could never be known apart from the revelation given in the Bible, but when it is once known, and when the believing soul receives Christ as divine Lord, the consistency of this view of his nature with the experiences of the soul in reference to the difficulties and nature of forgiveness lends it such a confirmation that, once adopted, it cannot be relinquished. The atonement is another such truth. When thus known, these truths are known, to be sure, not with the same independent certainty with which the elementary truths given in the new birth are known, but still they are known with a sufficient degree of certainty, and upon the basis of sufficient experimental verification, to give them a character of true independence, and to make them additional evidence, by the employment of the same argument as before, that the Bible is the Word of God. Thus increased knowledge of the Bible enlarges the circle of truths conveyed by it which are known with greater or less certainty by the Christian to be the truth of God, and thus the proof of the divinity of the Bible from experience constantly increases.

Now, the Bible possesses one remarkable peculiarity. There are other sources of religious knowledge besides the Bible. The human reason acting upon the facts of the world, discovers truth respecting the ways of God in creation and providence which give increased knowledge of his greatness and sense of his wisdom. But the reason is weak, and when men follow it too confidently, they find themselves often astray. The whole body of Christian believers, who have re-

flected upon the truths of religion, and have sought to put them into permanent and systematic form through a long series of ages, have much to teach the student of Christian truth. But they have often erred, and doubtless still often err. Neither of these sources is reliable in the sense that it affords a perfect standard by which the thoughts and imaginations of men may be tried. But the Bible never stands in need of correction, as the Christian examines it, and tests it by this increasing and accumulating mass of Christian knowledge which he acquires. And hence, by cumulative evidence, derived from his increasing knowledge of Christian truth, the Bible at last assumes to the mind of the Christian the character of a standard or norm of religious and moral truth. He expects to find it nowhere defective. He is ready to yield it his confidence when it speaks of spheres beyond the reach of experience, of Heaven and of Hell. It is thus a *norm*; and as such, then, considered as a whole, in its fundamental message with the most immediate certainty, in truth allied with this with a certainty only of slightly lower grade, in all its parts with some certainty, the Scripture is evidenced to him as the Word of God, as the utterance by God through human agents of absolute moral and religious truth.¹

II.

CONFIRMATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PROOF.

The authority for the Scriptures as the Word of God gained by the process just sketched is the authority of God speaking in the soul of the Christian. The work of the Spirit upon his heart in the experience of conversion bears its testimony to the Scriptures. The testimony of the Spirit is the work of the Spirit; the work of the Spirit is the experience

¹ For a valuable historical review of this proof of the doctrine (*testimonium Spiritus Sancti*) the reader is referred to articles by Dr. Simon, Bib. Sac., 1891, pp. 27 ff., 369 ff.

of the Christian; in the light shed upon the Scriptures by his experience, the Christian sees their divinity immediately.

Thus for himself alone, any Christian has in his own experience, if it is normal, sufficient ground for believing the Bible to be the Word of God. But the individual Christian does not stand alone, either in having his experience, or in coming to the judgment he makes upon the Scriptures. Any single experience is liable to the possibility that it may arise not from that which is common to Christians at large with the individual who undergoes it, but from that which is peculiar to himself, and so subjective and unreliable. A certain confirmation is therefore needed for his experience before it shall seem even to himself lifted above all possibility of question, and certainly before he can commend it to others as normal and sufficient. Just as no man in a matter of equally vital importance, when he had once heard of color-blindness, would venture to trust his own eyes till he had had them tested by comparison with the eyes of others, so here. The first confirmation sought for the utterance of his experience is in the experience of others; and it is the experience of others that the Spirit does really testify to the Scriptures as the Word of God.

Evidence of this is to be found in the writings of leading teachers of the church whose books have acquired almost the character of symbols. For example, Augustine somewhere says: "Inwardly in the home of my thoughts, truth, which is neither Hebrew, nor Greek, nor Latin, nor barbarian, without the organs of mouth and tongue, without the sound of syllables, would say: 'He [Moses] speaks the truth'; and I rendered certain immediately, should say confidently to that man of thine, 'Thou speakest truth.'" On the basis of what the Christian knows, he can affirm something of the utterances of Moses. Luther says, in the same strain: "The true hearer of the divine word can add thereto that it is not the word of man, but of a certainty the Word of God; *for*

God teaches him inwardly. . . . I must have God's own word [viz., for the Scriptures]; I want to hear what God says. . . I must know that as certainly as I know that three and two make five." Luther is not perfectly exact in this expression, for the Christian does not receive a mathematical certainty in respect to the Bible. Some of the elements of his original knowledge derived from the new birth itself, are of a probable character, as that of the existence of God who thus moves upon him, though possessing a very high degree of proof. Luther's language is thus a strong, rhetorical expression rather than a strictly correct metaphysical one; but his meaning is still clear and correct.¹ In Calvin the doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit, which is scarcely more than hinted at in these passages, is for the first time fully brought out, though even in him attended with some defects. He says: "Let it be considered, then, as an undeniable truth that they who have been inwardly taught by the Spirit, feel an entire acquiescence in the Scripture, and that it is self-authenticated, carrying with it its own evidence, and ought not to be made the subject of demonstration and arguments from reason; but it obtains the credit which it deserves with us by the testimony of the Spirit."² And, to quote but one more of these, and now one who will be of special interest to every American, Jonathan Edwards says: "He that truly sees the divine, transcendent, supreme glory of those things which are divine, does, as it were, know their divinity *intuitively*; he not only argues but *sees* that they are divine. . . . Thus a soul may have a kind of intuitive knowledge of the divinity of the things exhibited in the gospel; not that he judges the doctrines of the gospel to be from God without any argument or deduction at all; but it is without any long chain of arguments; the argument is but one and the evidence direct; the mind ascends to the truth of the gospel but one step, and that is its divine glory."³

¹ See Simon, *l.c.* ² Institutes, Bk. i. chap. vii. sect. 5.

³ Works (Dwight ed.), Vol. v. p. 178f.

When Calvin had fully formulated his view in the last edition of his Institutes (1559), it was immediately taken up with great heartiness by the Reformed churches. The same year saw it incorporated in the Confession of the French churches then first put forth in the Synod of Paris. In fact, this symbol was of Calvin's own original composition. It runs: "We know these books to be canonical and the sure rule of our faith, not so much by the common accord and consent of the church, as by the testimony and inward illumination of the Holy Spirit which enables us to distinguish them from other ecclesiastical books." The *Belgic Confession*, not composed by Calvin, is to the same effect. And the *Westminster*, closing the list of the great symbols of the Reformation, says: "The authority of the Holy Scripture, for which it ought to be believed and obeyed, dependeth not upon the testimony of any man or church, but wholly upon God (who is truth itself) the author thereof. . . . Our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit bearing witness by and with the word in our hearts."

A great number of other witnesses to the value and genuineness of this argument might be cited, but the reader may pursue the theme in the articles of Dr. Simon. Among American theologians, two may, however, be cited; one because he produced the first complete and independent system of theology in this country,—Samuel Hopkins; and the other, because of the clearness with which he states the argument, although, standing upon the threshold of the rationalizing period in New England theology, he makes nothing of it in comparison with the other arguments,—Enoch Pond. Hopkins says: "The contents of the Bible . . . are the greatest and crowning evidence that these writings are given by divine inspiration. . . . The highest internal evidence is fully discerned only by the humble, honest mind, which is disposed to relish, love and receive the truth. To such the true light

shines from the Holy Scriptures with irresistible evidence, and their hearts are established in the truth. They believe from evidence they have within themselves, from what they see and find in the Bible."¹ And Pond: "'If any man,' saith Christ, 'will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God.' The Christians have fulfilled the condition here proposed, and they realize the truth of the promise. They do know of the doctrine that *it is of God*. They find such a blessed agreement between the representations of Scripture and the feelings of their own heart, that they cannot doubt as to the divine origin of the Bible. It must have proceeded from the same Being who knows the hearts of his children perfectly, and has so accurately set them forth in the pages of his Word. This argument has more weight, probably, than every other, with Christians in common life."²

One other fact in the same direction may be mentioned. The fact that the conviction of the authority of the Bible does develop with the development of Christian experience in the individual and the church may be seen, written as with gigantic letters, in the general reception of the Scriptures and their constant use in the church, in spite of the attacks which are from time to time made upon them. When the eye is directed to the practical work of the church in saving souls, it would sometimes seem as if discussions as to the inspiration, integrity, and reliability of the Scriptures had never taken place, so unmoved does the church appear, so unchanged her methods. She goes on employing the Bible as the Word of God without question as to what men say. Such a fact speaks volumes for her inner certainty, which is independent of external arguments.

The proof as thus drawn out is, as has been repeatedly stated, an independent one. Still it stands in certain relations to other facts, for all truth is one; and it makes a certain as-

¹ System (ed. 1852), p. 23 f.

² Lectures on Christian Theology, 1874, p. 120.

sumption as to the genuineness and authenticity of the biblical books. Were the whole Old and New Testaments forged, as some erratic writer has recently maintained, somewhere about the year 1000 A. D., this fact would be obviously inconsistent with the conclusion as to the truth of the doctrines which the book teaches, and its origin in the divine will. While the proof may be consistent with many conceivable views as to critical matters in respect to the authors, age, preservation, etc., of the sacred writings, it could not be consistent with such an utter distortion of the historical perspective as the supposition referred to would involve.

It is therefore another confirmation of the argument, and not altogether unnecessary in the development of the argument itself, that the general external historical facts as to the Bible correspond with this firm conviction of the church which it derives from its own God-wrought experience. The Old Testament evidently embodies the religious life of the Jewish people. It is undoubtedly, in its present form, the production of an antiquity greatly anterior to the Christian era. That is to say, in a general way, a broad sense, it is genuine. Is the Pentateuch the production of Moses? It may, or it may not be. Certainly it is an undisputed fact that it comes, in part at least, from the first periods of the development of a religious consciousness in Israel, and all of it belongs in substance to a period far antedating the appearance of Christ. When it actually did arise, under what circumstances and by what agents it was brought into its present shape, are questions to be answered by biblical criticism. The present argument does not require them to be answered before it is allowed to have a conclusive weight in deciding the character of the Bible. Then, again, it evidently contains a reliable record of the formation by this people progressively of certain distinct religious ideas. That is, it is in a general and broad sense, authentic. And the ideas which it teaches, though sometimes undeveloped as compared with those of the

Christian Scriptures, form the necessary historical background of these, agree with them, and prepare the way for them. The New Testament, in like manner, is a collection of books of homogeneous nature and similar origin, testifying to the historical existence of Jesus Christ, and written by his disciples and followers of the first century. It also is in general genuine and authentic. Should the book of Jonah be thrown out of the canon by future investigation, or should the fourth Gospel be found to be the product of a later age, and not a component part of the apostolic tradition of the life of Jesus, these facts would not invalidate the argument from experience for the rest of the Bible, though such a process of division and elimination could not be indefinitely pursued. But up to the present hour, such results have not been reached by criticism, and the church may wisely dismiss speculation as to what she would be compelled to do if they were, and confining herself to the facts of the case, require that facts, and facts only, be urged upon her before she is called upon to deny that of which she is fully persuaded upon the grounds which have now passed in review.

III.

RELATIONS OF THIS ARGUMENT IN THE SYSTEM.

The basis has now been gained through the argument from the testimony of the Spirit to the Scriptures as the word of God, for their employment in the construction of the system of Christian doctrine. A certain amount of indefiniteness still hangs over the subject, and it is not altogether clear what the exact limits of the proper use of the Bible may be. But enough has been made out to enable the Christian thinker to go on with confidence to discuss the Scriptures as the revelation of the will of God in all the vast sphere of religious and moral truth. He will require no long consideration before accepting those laws of general hermeneutics

which are employed in the interpretation of other ancient documents as the great principles of the exegesis of the Bible. Evidently, before he can go farther, and define more minutely a doctrine of inspiration, setting forth its limits and characteristics, it will be necessary to become fully acquainted with the contents of the Scriptures. This is presupposed in all *a posteriori* systems of divinity, or systems which attempt to base the theory of doctrine upon the facts. It has sometimes, however, seemed as if the method of proof adopted sought to rise in some way above the facts, or to strike into some path which should prove the authority of the Scriptures independently of their contents. If this could be done, it might afford a certain advantage in dealing with the unbeliever, since the theologian might come to him with the demand that he should accept the teachings of the Bible, whatever they might be found to be, on the basis of the delineated proof, itself formed before the investigator opened the Bible. But all such methods are illusive. There never can be a proof of the authority and inspiration of the Bible independent of its contents, for after any such proof were finished the question would remain, Is this the book about which the proof has been given? To connect any proof with the definite book we call the Bible, the Bible must itself be known; and hence the system of doctrines derived from the Scriptures is an essential part of the proof of their authority. The system of theology needs therefore to be developed at the point to which the argument has now been brought, before more detailed investigations can be begun.

We must, therefore, suppose that at this point the system of doctrines is set forth in all its amplitude of discussion and proof. What the result would be, as it lies in the mind of the writer, need not be further defined than to style it the "evangelical" system, which is the common possession of the churches usually designated by this adjective. Between different denominations and different teachers minor differ-

ences exist, but they are of little importance for the present theme, since sufficient scope may be found for the proof in those elements of the system which are common to all. If here and there, some special weight should seem to be laid upon the peculiar views of the school of theologians to which the writer in a general way belongs, this will not invalidate the force of the proof, for such considerations will be of minor importance, and will bear no considerable proportion to the whole mass of arguments presented. The system having been, therefore, detailed, the proof of the Scriptures proceeds from the close of the topic of Eschatology as follows.

IV.

THE AUTHORITY OF THE SCRIPTURES.

1. The system of theology as a coherent whole is a proof of the authority of the book upon which it is founded.

The system of theology is a real system. It has coherency. Given one part of it, and other parts are required. Take away one leading truth from it, and others will also disappear. Now, this coherency is a proof of the truth of the system. Truth has sometimes been defined as conformity to fact or reality. But evidently this is not an altogether satisfactory definition, since the question will immediately arise, What is fact? and the answer must always be, that fact for us is our idea of the fact. It is therefore a deeper and better definition of truth to say, that it is the conformity of idea to idea, of all our ideas to one another. When all our ideas harmonize, we have the truth so far as we can know it. An idea is shown to be false when it is shown to be inconsistent with some idea or group of ideas which has already acquired fixity in our minds on account of its ascertained harmony with other ideas which we cannot question. And when some other idea in connection with the same subject harmonizes with those ideas with which the former did not, then this is

accepted as the truth. Thus the mere fact of the internal harmony of a certain group of ideas one with another is a sign of their truth. It is not a conclusive proof, for there may be imaginary systems of thought, systems which start from premises which are assumed without sufficient scrutiny of the evidence for them, and which, while logically consistent within themselves, are not consistent with ideas lying outside of themselves, and so lack ability to meet the final test of complete harmony with all our ideas. But such a system must necessarily be a limited system. Any comprehensive system, of any considerable magnitude, must touch other ideas of diverse nature at so many points as to meet with constant disproof, if it is wholly imaginary while consistent with itself; and this inconsistency with other ideas will finally make itself manifest in internal inconsistency. It is not likely that any large circle of false ideas will prove to be internally coherent. And thus it remains that the simple fact of internal harmony, coherency, consistency, in a system of thought is, so far forth, a proof of its truth. Now, the system of theology is such a coherent system; and it has, consequently, in this mere fact, an initial proof of its truth.

From the truth of the system we argue the truth of the Bible. That system is at its most decisive points derived from the Bible and these points are necessary to give meaning and value to the other elements. For example, the Trinity is entirely a matter of revelation, so are election, grace, and future punishment. In a sense, the system may be said to be the Bible. That book is a great whole containing a multitude of elements, presenting to the first glance a confusing abundance of rich and striking ideas. It has now been studied, its ideas carefully arranged and their relations ascertained, and the resulting system is the Bible in another form. The system is coherent, and therefore true. And this is the same as saying that the Bible is true.

Now, the truth of the Bible is its authority. When the

question is put, whether the Bible possesses authority or not, the meaning of this question is, whether it teaches the truth or not. The answer is now obtained, so far as this single argument is capable of affording an answer, that it does teach the truth, or that it has authority.

But, now, it is conceivable, though not very probable, when we consider the magnitude of the system,—it is conceivable that the system of theology may be one of those circles of ideas complete and consistent within itself, but not, after all, true. It should therefore be tested as to its conformity with the entire mass of sound human ideas; and of these, that group which is the peculiar possession of the Christian may be first employed as a touchstone to reveal its truth. Accordingly—

2. The system of doctrine found in the Bible receives confirmation from its comparison with the contents of the specifically Christian experience.

Certain elements of the system are derived with equal directness and completeness from the original and fundamental Christian experience as from the Bible itself, such as the new birth and sanctification. The new-born soul knows that it has become a new creature by the formation of a new and fixed choice of duty, and knows certain truths which flow from this quite as well upon the basis of experience as upon the teaching of the Bible. This point, as having already been sufficiently discussed, may be dismissed with a mere mention.

Other elements, when presented to the Christian upon the authority of the Bible and accepted, unite in perfect harmony with the elementary truths known by immediate experience. Such are the personality of the Holy Spirit, the Trinity, the deity of Christ.

Other elements, when tried experimentally by the Christian, give the exact results promised in the Bible, such as justification by faith. This argument, which might be almost indefinitely expanded, has been so fully and excellently de-

veloped by the late Professor Stearns in his "Evidence of Christian Experience" that it need not be more than suggested here.

And, if any further proof is needed of the conformity of the biblical system to those ideas which are the peculiar product in the Christian's mind of all his life experience, it may be found in the fact, already adduced in the fundamental argument, that the older the Christian grows, and the firmer the grounds of his hope, the more complete is his confidence in the Scriptures as true. Thus the Bible sustains the first test with spheres of thought lying outside of itself.

Let the comparison now be made with the sphere of human history, and it will be seen that—

3. The system as a whole constitutes the key of history, and unlocks the mysteries of the world. In this we have, upon the broadest scale, a proof of its truth and of the authority of the book from which it is derived.

Take, as one example of this argument, the largest fact in the history of the world, the coming of Christ as an historical force. It is no exaggeration, but simply historical propriety, to say that this was the pivotal event of all history. We date our era from it. It was the entrance into the world of an institution, the Christian church, which has proved to have more vitality than all other institutions which civilization has known. It has not only outlasted the Roman Empire, but it supplied the spiritual and intellectual forces which could master the enormous problem put upon the world by the rise of new races in the North and by their migration, which could bring new peoples into harmony with the old, save the good of the past, and produce the modern world with its literature, science, and law. Nothing but its divinity, and the divinity of its central personality, Christ, can explain the unbounded importance which time has revealed in the scene at Bethlehem, when a babe was born in a manger, before whom the wise men of the earth came and bowed in

homage, while heaven-taught rustics gazed on in amazement. The central position of Christ in history, and his central position in the system which describes the ruin and the recovery of man, correspond; and this correspondence is a proof of the system and of the book.

But continue the application of tests. Let the system be compared now with human philosophy, especially where this presents insuperable difficulties, and it may be said that—

4. In its separate elements, the system, as affording repeatedly a key to the difficulties of human thought and bringing them into harmony, affords us a proof of its own truth and of the authority of the Bible from which it is derived.

(1) As to the existence of God, the natural reason leaves us in darkness; but the ideas of revelation clear up the obscurity.

The cosmological argument gives us an independent something, but does not teach us whether it is personal, infinite, or God. It may be a mere force working according to an inward necessity. This is the pantheistic conception, and it is not removed by this argument.

The teleological argument adds personality; but it does not prove infinity, unity, or holiness. Not infinity, because it requires only a cause sufficient to produce the universe which we see. True, we are inclined to rise in our conceptions of this cause as we rise in our knowledge of the universe, and to ascribe infinity to the cause of a system which ever surpasses our comprehension; but this argument is derived from the Bible. Not unity, for the line of retreating causes, demiurge rising above demiurge, must stop somewhere, and may stop in a plurality of independently existing forces or beings. Not holiness, for the world contains unholiness.

The ontological argument does not help us; for the highest ideal of some minds, even in the present century, has

been that the absolute being was equal to "nothing," that is, was an undefined, immense, blind force.

But the Christian idea of God, applied as a key, unlocks the mystery and brings all these other arguments into perfect consistency and clearness. It is an hypothesis which explains the facts; and it has in this consideration the proof of its correctness. Starting with the idea of one personal, infinite cause, the "independent something" becomes this cause. The demiurge is also identified with this being. The retreating series of causes which might give us a group of equal demiurges, or an infinite series of causes, now becomes at once the single, infinite, first cause. The reasonable alternative is between a series of causes *ad infinitum* and a first cause. When the latter idea is once given, it is evidently the more reasonable. And, as for the ontological argument, the idea of God, formed from the Scriptures, is in fact the highest idea which the mind of man can conceive; and thus it furnishes the contents which were hitherto lacking to this argument.

(2) The revealed doctrine of the immortality of the soul, doubtful to the natural reason, clears up largely the mysteries of life and renders the human lot explicable.

The mysteries referred to are principally those which are afforded by the existence of pain and by the various inequalities which are seen in the world. The case of a child born into the world deformed and suffering because of the vice of a father, is well-nigh irreconcilable with the idea of a just God except it be understood that there is another life, for which the present is but preparatory, where such inequalities may be made up. The uncertainty with which righteousness and happiness are combined in the experience of the same individual upon earth, as was pointed out by the philosopher Kant, leaves us in great perplexity till the thought of another world where virtue shall have its due reward removes the difficulty.

(3) The divine benevolence, combined with the idea of law in the divine action, both originally Christian ideas, and the former in particular unknown except through the Bible, explains the mysteries of the divine government so as greatly to relieve the difficulty arising from the existence of sin in the world.

It will be enough at this point to refer to the excellent and balanced suggestions which Dr. N. W. Taylor gave as to the prevention of sin, the best contribution to the subject of theodicy which has yet been made. His general idea was that God chose to establish a system in which free will should enter as a factor, and that he may possibly have seen that to prevent sin in such a system might produce more injury in the weakness consequent, or in other natural result, than the permission of some sin. He chose to maintain a system, as the best method of divine government, and to maintain that system which, though it contained some sin, contained the greatest amount of good.

(4) The universality of sin is a truth admitted by almost all thinkers, even in heathen lands. There is no explanation which accounts for its general prevalence, which does not consist essentially in explaining the thing by itself, except the biblical doctrine of the corruption of our nature derived from the transgression of Adam.

(5) The influence of Jesus in the world is a constant puzzle to merely human thought; but the biblical doctrine of the incarnation, as the secret of his uniqueness, explains the puzzle. And so, the possibility of an adequate revelation to men, which can scarcely have complete evidence of its absolute trustworthiness if it be communicated only by fallible men, is also explained by the doctrine of the incarnation. The revealer of God is himself also God.

(6) There is a contradiction evident in the simplest experience of the new convert, which he does not himself understand, and which would remain an unsolved mystery for

all thinking, were it not explained by the Bible, the mystery how the holy God can regard a sinner with favor. Those two terms, sinner and favor, do not belong together according to natural reason. But the doctrine of the atonement, an exclusively biblical doctrine, as the provision whereby men can be forgiven, solves this mystery also.

(7) But there is another. How, in actual fact, when there is universal corruption, and even were this not so, universal bad example, all the forces of the world and the heart of man preponderatingly bad,—how is it that any man ever comes out from under the power of sin and is saved? The only answer which can be given to this mystery is the biblical doctrine of prevenient grace. God first touches the human heart and moves it toward himself. Though man is a sinner, the holy God moves him towards holiness.

Now these are all difficulties of thinking, arising either from the contemplation of nature or of the system of grace as it is in operation, which apart from the Bible turn out to be, actually, insoluble to human thinking. The Bible solves them. It introduces harmony into realms of thought where there otherwise is no harmony. Thus it agrees with the system of human thinking outside of itself, nay more, it is indispensable to that human thinking in accomplishing its own work. Tested, then, by this third sphere outside of itself, it is found to be in harmony with it.

The process of testing the agreement of the system with other spheres of truth is not, however, done. The sphere just examined is that of the philosophical activity of mankind, considered upon the side of its difficulties, raised but not solved by the mind. But there is another way in which these two spheres may be compared. The human reason arrives by its own peculiar processes at certain results in which it has confidence; and of these it may be said that—

5. At various points the system is confirmed by the independent testimony of the reason. Thus—

(1) The freedom of the will, a truth provable by consciousness, and hence a result of human thinking, confirms the Christian theodicy. Sin may exist in a world created by a good and almighty God, if free will is an element of that world, since free will involves the power to choose the evil. Other considerations must enter in to complete this theodicy, but here we have enough to begin it; and this is given by the natural reason.

(2) The Scriptures teach that the government of God extends to all human events, though never so minute. Reason teaches that, if God be the first, he must be ultimately the sole, cause, and hence must govern all things.

(3) The universality of sin is a matter of common human observation.

(4) Reason confirms the biblical doctrine of the nature and existence of human corruption.

When a philosopher has come to acknowledge the existence of human sin, he will perceive that it consists fundamentally in the choice of something other than the greatest good. The question will then immediately rise, How this other thing acquires to the man the character of an apparent good, so as to lead to its choice in preference to that which is the real good. We are to suppose the philosopher in question to be an enlightened one, standing upon such a height of knowledge as is represented in those systems of philosophy of our own day which, while not Christian in their origin, acknowledge the main facts of the human constitution, including conscience. To such a one it will be immediately evident that a first element in the required explanation is to be found in the weakness of conscience. Many men never consider the question of obligation at all. Their only question is, What is of advantage to me in the pursuit of my plans? Then, the intellect is perverted from the pursuit of the highest themes to the lowest, or the lower. The will of God, duty, purity of life, the providence of God as seen in history, are neglected

for the invention of means of livelihood, etc. And again, the lower emotions are more active than the higher, desire for power than love to God. This is found to depend upon two factors, the disorder of the body, which causes its appetites to work with ill-regulated and unnatural force, and the disorder in the world, whereby all its influence, the distribution of its prizes, its whole tone, promote sin. And finally, the force of habit perpetuates and intensifies the evil, once begun.

Now, this is disorder of nature. It is not an ultimate explanation of the question raised, for the weakness of conscience is partially explained by the dullness produced by repeated neglect of its monitions. Thus sin is explained by sin. The perversity of the intellect, and the disorder of the body are themselves facts which call for causes and explanations thereby. But the immediate answer given by reason for the universality of sin is the same as the Bible's, that man, as he is, is corrupt.

To mention but one more of the illustrations of this point,—

(5) Reason confirms the necessity of the atonement to forgiveness.

This confirmation follows upon several lines of reflection. But one need be mentioned here. The law of God, both as given in conscience and in the Bible, attaches penalty to sin. Now, the law is founded in benevolence, that is, was laid down for the good of man. The penalty attached to it, is also for his good. It also, as well as the mandates of the law, has its origin in the benevolence of God. Now, evidently, if such a penalty, with such an origin, and solemnly and tenderly prescribed, is to be remitted in favor of the sinner, there must be some explicit and satisfactory reason for doing this; and when the Bible comes forward with a doctrine of atonement, the reason must say that such a doctrine was a necessity of the case.

But enough of this line of argument. To summarize the

course of the whole discussion and to gain a clear view of the present position of the question,—the Scriptures were first commended to us in general as the Word of God by the testimony of the Spirit. Upon this basis they were employed according to the recognized principles of hermeneutics and they yielded a self-consistent system of religious doctrine. In its coherency with itself, this system had the first proof of its truth. But it has been successively compared with other spheres of truth, historical, experiential, philosophical, and has been found to be harmonious with them also. Thus it has the highest evidence of its truth, which consists essentially in the ultimate harmony of ideas. Its truth is its authority. It binds us because it speaks the truth. It has authority over us at points where we have not yet examined its entire truthfulness, because it has always spoken the truth hitherto. This is the meaning of the word “authority” when applied to a book such as the Scriptures. We need, however, to add certain elements to our study not yet introduced, and so must pass to consider, next, the nature and limitations of the authority of the Scriptures.

ARTICLE VI.

CLOSE COMMUNION.¹

BY A BAPTIST DIVINE.

IT is unfortunate when popular interest in a subject is worn out before the truth is reached. Possibly this may be the case with close communion. But I am so thoroughly convinced that the untenableness of the practice as it stands has not been sufficiently exposed, that I am inclined to incur the risk of a doubtful welcome for the sake of getting at the truth of the matter.

The proposition I undertake to establish is, that close communion, as represented by its ablest apologists, is a jumble of false assumptions and bad logic; and that self-consistency, reason, and Scripture require Baptists, either to abandon the practice in favor of open communion, or else to withdraw Christian fellowship from pedobaptists;—which, I would not presume to suggest. This proposition I shall argue from the Baptist point of view. That is to say, I shall assume the scripturalness of Baptist tenets on all other points but this one. I shall take my stand with Baptists and endeavor to show that the fundamental postulates of their own faith are totally incompatible with the present practice of close communion.

NATURE OF THE PRACTICE.

The word “communion,” as employed in the discussion of this subject, is embarrassed by an ambiguity of meaning. Etymologically and primarily it signifies the spiritual state of

¹ [To be followed, in the April number, by a presentation of the reasons for restricted communion.—EDS.]

those persons who have something in "common" (Latin *communio*, from *communis*, common); a state characterized by feelings of mutual sympathy and good will, and by a tendency to harmonious co-operation and unity of action. In this sense it is synonymous with "fellowship," or the spiritual state arising from being "fellows," or comrades. Christian communion or fellowship is the spiritual state of those who have a common religious faith and experience; who are fellow-disciples of Christ. But communion is also another name for the Lord's Supper. And herein is an ambiguity upon which many a specious argument has gone to pieces. To avoid this ambiguity I shall discard this use of the word, and speak of communion only in the sense of fellowship.

The predominant idea of communion is a spiritual sympathy. That held in common, whatever its nature and whether it be in spiritual or in temporal things, gives rise to feelings of mutual appreciation and regard and to a consciousness of spiritual oneness, which are the essence of communion. But communion seeks to express itself, and the normal expression is in common action,—co-operation, affiliation, union, organization. This formal expression of communion is itself, in strict literalism, also a communion.¹ Thus there are two concurrent communions,—the spiritual and the formal;—or, perhaps better, two elements,—a soul and a body,—of the one communion. We are more or less conscious of the spiritual side of Christian communion; but we are chiefly conversant with its formal element, its co-operative activities. The former is a spontaneous impulse of the soul begotten below consciousness under favoring circumstances by the operation of natural laws. We do not directly deal with or control it. But for whatever we may *do* in conjunction with others we are directly responsible. Of communion as expressed in action we are divinely put in trust. And to this primarily all scriptural regulations of communion refer. In connection with

¹ Century Dict., Communion, def. 4; Fellowship, def. 3.

this alone do we mention "terms." Our voluntary affiliations and co-operative activities are the subject-matter of the communion controversy. And the fact that our earthly fellowship has a voluntary element, and that the best of men are liable to error in judgment and in action, places the discussion of this fellowship upon a distinctly different basis from that of our anticipated communion in heaven.

The adjective "close" does not mend the ambiguity above noticed in the word communion. Close communion is an expression that may mean, either generally a restricted fellowship, or more particularly a restricted observance of the Lord's Supper. The conceptions are different; and, while the nature of the practice indicated is sufficiently obvious, the popular title of it has not only two distinct meanings, but also an uncertain tendency to oscillate to and fro between them. To illustrate:—Good Baptist writers make statements like the following: "We have Christian fellowship for pedobaptists, but not church fellowship"; and, "It is not our communion, but our baptism, that is close." According to the first of these statements, Close Communion is a withholding of church fellowship; according to the second, it is non co-operation at the Supper. The significance of this difference of conceptions will appear further on. Meantime I shall evade the ambiguity by using the title close communion only as a *quasi* proper name, and in connections where the meaning of the terms composing it has no bearing upon the argument.

The word "church" is a translation of the Greek *ἐκκλησία*, *assembly*, and, like it, is used to express two leading Christian concepts: first, the spiritual body of Christ, embracing in its membership the whole number of the redeemed,—the universal, invisible church; and, secondly, a company of persons who profess to have been regenerated by the Holy Spirit, and who, thinking they discover in one another the scriptural marks of discipleship, affiliate themselves together in obedience to the commands of Christ for Christian work

and worship,—the visible, local church. “Besides these two significations of the term church,” says Dr. Strong,¹ “there are properly in the New Testament no others.” “The prevailing usage of the New Testament gives to the term *ἐκκλησία* the second of these two significations. It is this local church only which has definite and temporal existence.”² No other sense of this word is employed by Baptists in the discussion of close communion. They do not use it to designate any association or organization of local churches or of their members or representatives, or any other earthly body but the local church.

As baptism is enjoined in immediate connection with conversion, and as in its nature it is the formal announcement and beginning of the Christian life, the church may rightly be conceived of as a company of baptized believers. Baptism, however, is no more essential to Christian discipleship or to church membership than is obedience to any other divine command; and obedience in general, or an “orderly walk,” is with Baptists as indispensable to the continuance, as baptism is to the beginning, of church relations.

I may now indicate the nature of close communion, in outline, as follows:—

Baptists decline to unite with pedobaptists (not to mention others) in the observance of the Lord's Supper, for the reason that the Supper is a church ordinance, and therefore none but persons maintaining an orderly walk as members of a New Testament church are entitled to partake; and pedobaptists, not having been baptized (immersed), are not duly qualified for church membership; and the churches composed of such unbaptized persons are not, strictly speaking, New Testament organizations. Sister Baptist churches, however, are scripturally constituted, and their members in good standing are duly qualified, and are admitted to the communion table. But this signifies only that there is no church

¹ Theology, Part vii. chap. ii. ² *Ibid.*

fellowship for pedobaptists. Christian fellowship is always freely offered.

I have not deemed it necessary to justify this statement by quotations from Baptist authors. No Baptist will question the correctness of my representations, so far as they go; and in so far as they are defective, the gaps will be closed as the demands of the argument may suggest.

OBJECTIONS.

The doctrine thus outlined is weak in facts and in logic.

1. In logic. The advocates of close communion are unanimous in basing it upon the doctrine that the Lord's Supper is a church ordinance; that is, an ordinance of the local church. Baptism belongs to the beginning, and the Supper to the maintenance, of the Christian life. There are slight variations in the methods of statement, but none in the theory.

That the Lord's Supper is a church ordinance I admit. But Baptists are mistaken in supposing that this is the determining principle, the justification, of close communion, even to their own minds.

The church ordinance theory of the Supper would furnish a specious explanation (but not a true one; not a justification) of close communion on one hypothesis. If Baptists admitted to the ordinance none but members of the church observing it, the theory and the practice would be consistent. A church ordinance is naturally for members of the church, and no others. If close communion is based on the church ordinance theory, as it purports to be, then it ought to correspond to it, and admit none but the members of the local church. If others are to be admitted, it will not be because the Supper is a church ordinance, but rather in spite of the fact, and because of some other, higher, and dominant principle that prevails against the local narrowness of the church ordinance theory. This theory does not touch upon any

inter-church or extra-church relation. If it must be regarded as either definitely permitting or definitely forbidding the welcoming of outsiders to the table, then it must be regarded as an absolute prohibition. The fact that the Supper is a church ordinance cannot possibly authorize the admission of persons not members of the church. But Baptists admit persons not members, namely, the members of sister Baptist churches; and the admission of this class of persons is universal, and characteristic of the denomination. Close communion exists, therefore, not because of, but in defiance of, the church ordinance theory.

Baptist writers all recognize the insufficiency of this theory of the Supper to justify close communion. Says Dr. Hovey,¹ "As the eucharist is a church ordinance, they [Baptists] hold that none but members of the church observing it are strictly entitled to partake." But a little reflection must convince any one that, in abandoning the strict requirements of the church ordinance theory, Baptists have moved to other ground. They do not simply supplement that doctrine by some logical corollary or closely related principle. They adopt an entirely new and different principle, and one totally inconsistent with the other. The main theory asserts that only local church members may be received. The addendum freely admits outsiders. And the addendum, and that alone, controls the practice of the denomination. The church ordinance theory is not merely insufficient to justify close communion; it is irrelevant. It does not account for any part of the practice. Even the exclusion of pedobaptists is not explained by it, but by the new principle. That which admits fellow Baptists for reasons independent of and paramount to the church ordinance doctrine is, as a matter of fact, the same independent and paramount principle that excludes pedobaptists; insomuch that, if the church ordinance doctrine were dropped out of sight as a reason for close

¹ Bib. Sac., 1862, p. 162.

communion, the reason actually assigned by Baptists for the practice would remain intact. The truth is, Baptists are mistaken in their own mental processes. They think they deduce close communion from the doctrine that the Lord's Supper is a church ordinance, and that they merely supplement that doctrine by other considerations to account for the admission of outsiders of the same faith and order; when in reality their minds, unconsciously perceiving the irrelevancy of the church ordinance theory, have passed it by and rested the whole case of close communion upon the supplementary considerations alone. A glance at the nature of this supplementary reasoning will show the truth of these remarks.

Baptists as a denomination have no formulated and authoritative statement on this point. There is, however, substantial agreement in the variously expressed views of individuals. "Courtesy," "consistency," and "loyalty to principle," are samples of expressions by which Baptist writers voice the conviction that *identity of church usages justifies, and a lack of it forbids, inter-communion at the Lord's table*.¹ This statement, considered with reference to the essentials of Christian faith and obedience, is the one and only real foundation principle of close communion. Baptists talk and think the church ordinance theory, but they build on the intuitively perceived principle that *community of interests is the true foundation for communion*. Notice the reasoning. "Courtesy" may justify overriding the exclusiveness of the church ordinance theory in the case of fellow-Baptists. Why? Because fellow-Baptists are scriptural in faith and practice, i. e., they agree with us. And pedobaptists may not be received,—why? Simply, of course, because they lack the qualifications that Baptists have;—they are not scriptural—they do not agree with us. Dr. Hovey, in the article above quoted, after stating the church ordinance theory in the standard fashion, drops it out of sight and states the reasons

¹ See Hovey in Bib. Sac., *ubi supra*; Theodosia Ernest; etc.

for close communion, as follows: "None can properly be invited to join with us in the service, who could not be welcomed without change of views to full membership." "Those who are giving, and pledged to give, the weight of their influence against what is believed to be essential in doctrine and practice, cannot properly be received into its [the church's] fellowship" (p. 162). There is fellowship between those who are true "fellows"—that is all.

Baptists are evidently groping after a theory of inter-church communion. They fail to find, because, partly perhaps from a taint of sacramentalism, they confound the Lord's Supper with communion, and suppose that when they have settled the doctrine that the Supper is a church ordinance they have gone a long way toward settling the communion controversy, when in fact they have not touched it. The fault is one of logic—premise and conclusion erroneously conjoined.

2. Close communion is weak in its facts, in assuming that church fellowship is expressed by the union of churches or of their members in the observance of the Supper, and not otherwise. The maxim is, "We grant Christian fellowship, and withhold church fellowship." But under the head of Christian fellowship, so avowed, there is included almost every conceivable form of *church* union. Baptist churches dismiss their regular services to unite with pedobaptist churches in all manner of religious meetings; there is free interchange of pulpits; and pedobaptist ministers are invited to participate in the recognition of Baptist churches, the ordination of ministers, and what not. Only they must not sit with them at the Lord's table, since that would involve an expression of church fellowship for the unbaptized.

And what, pray, is church fellowship? We have seen that fellowship is the spiritual sympathy, or the outward affiliation, that results from our being "fellows" in the possession of some "common" interest. The affiliation is the natural and

normal expression of the spiritual oneness. Those who unite in any common cause thereby express fellowship for each other with respect to the matter in hand; and that, not accidentally and capriciously, but uniformly and by a necessity of divine law. It is always true that a voluntary affiliation based upon a community of interests is the voicing of a real spiritual fellowship. And this is equally true if the parties to the union are associations of people instead of individuals. It is the union, nothing else, that constitutes the expression of fellowship. And when churches as such unite in any Christian work or service, then and there you will find all there ever is anywhere of church fellowship. There is inter-church fellowship at the Lord's table, not because the Supper has been divinely elected and adapted to be the sole vehicle of church fellowship, for it has not, but for the single reason that churches as such are actually or representatively in union there. That is what constitutes church fellowship—churches acting as fellows. And to assert, as the standard argument for close communion does, that a union of churches at the Supper gives rise to church fellowship, but that a union of churches as such in other religious meetings does not express church fellowship, but something different, namely, Christian fellowship,—shows, to say the least, an astonishing misapprehension as to the nature and determining principles of church fellowship.

Close communion avows a withholding of church fellowship from pedobaptists. The practice is consistent with that profession in one case out of a hundred, namely, at the Lord's table. In the other ninety nine cases, namely, in all other church unions, there is inconsistency.

3. There is no valid and scriptural distinction, like that supposed in close communion, between church fellowship and Christian fellowship. They are but different conceptions of one and the same thing. Christian fellowship, regarded not as a spiritual fact but as a principle of co-operation among Christians, is fellowship based upon a mutual recognition of

discipleship; and it is this recognition of each by all as Christians that constitutes the suggestion and basis of church organization. The church is naught else but a company of people united in the bonds of Christian fellowship. Organization adds nothing to the responsibility of the individual members, and the church as a whole is under no higher or different obligation in any respect from that which would rest upon the aggregate of its membership if they were not organized. We owe organization, as well as all else that we can do for Christ, simply as matter of Christian duty.

Baptists should be the last to deny these propositions. Nothing could be more in harmony with the genius of the denomination than the identification of church fellowship with Christian fellowship. Nothing could more aptly suggest the fundamental ideas by which Baptists seek to justify themselves before the world. Nothing could more pointedly or more favorably emphasize the doctrine of a regenerate church membership, or the principles underlying the discipline of Baptist churches. The Baptist rule and practice are to receive as members all whose Christian profession is, in their opinion, attested by a life of obedience to the law of Christ. The attestation of discipleship is the title to membership. And the title holds good so long as the attestation of discipleship remains intact. The fellowship of the church for its members is simply the fellowship of scripturally attested Christians for another scripturally attested Christian. It is church fellowship, and it is also nothing else but Christian fellowship. The two are one, and that one is Christian fellowship.

The desire and attempt to establish a difference in kind and terms between church fellowship and Christian fellowship arises, and has an existence, only in connection with close communion. It is a marked instance of special pleading, and the result is a notable specimen of unreason and inconsistency. It gives rise, for example, to a double standard in the attestation of Christian discipleship, and in Christian fellowship.

Baptists fellowship as Christians, in their own churches, only those whom they profess to regard as obedient in the matter of baptism; but for those in the membership of other denominations whom they regard as disobedient, they still avow Christian fellowship. In the one case they insist upon a duly attested discipleship; in the other they dispense with the attestation. Or, rather, they grant the fellowship while denying the attestation. Do Baptists then think disobedience no compromise of Christian discipleship? Or have they a conviction, unformulated but potent, that their traditional views as to what constitutes obedience in baptism are too rigidly literal to be true and practical? There is, at least, a question as to what Baptists mean by Christian fellowship; and it is doubtful if that which we may grant to those we regard as disobedient is what inspired writers would characterize as *Christian* fellowship. Again the query suggests itself, why, if they must withhold church fellowship at all, they do not do it consistently by refraining from all church unions with the disobedient? And again, why the obligation to discountenance disobedience does not rest as fully upon individual Christians as upon churches? The ethics of close communion are badly mixed. The practice itself is badly mixed, as I think its advocates will find, if (as they are not accustomed to do) they will explain precisely what is meant by the expressions church fellowship and Christian fellowship, and then make the alleged distinction practical by showing under just what circumstances the fellowship is Christian, and just when there is church fellowship.

THE FUNDAMENTAL ERROR.

The fundamental error of Baptists in close communion, if I mistake not, is in maintaining one or the other of two inconsistent opinions: namely, first, that pedobaptists are disobedient in baptism;¹ and, secondly, that it is right to fel-

¹ Strong's Theology, Part. vii. chap. ii. II. 5.

lowship pedobaptists as Christians. One or the other of these propositions must be false. Disobedience is sin, and it cannot be right to fellowship sin as Christian. And the difficulties of close communion, to some of which I have referred, are an offspring of the attempt to ingraft the falsehood (whichever of the above propositions it may be that is false) upon the Baptist system. The falsehood will not harmonize, and until it is ejected the system will be borne down with a burden of absurdities and inconsistencies. As in line with this diagnosis, the following considerations deserve attention:—

1. To fellowship the disobedient as Christians is to fellowship their disobedience as Christian conduct. Of course this is not saying that I indorse a man's conduct as right in all respects if I fellowship him in any public capacity. As a member of a temperance society, for example, I might without inconsistency fellowship a man whose business methods, or even his personal habits, are known to be morally bad. These faults are not in the sphere of our fellowship as advocates of temperance, and therefore I may fellowship him as a temperance man without indorsing his faults. Taking an occasional glass of beer is in itself a comparatively trifling offence; but it is in the sphere of the fellowship, and therefore may not be condoned. But all morality is in the sphere of religion. All disobedience to divine commands is sin. It is therefore incompatible with Christian fellowship. For this reason, and because they think the Scriptures so require, Baptist churches "withdraw" from such of their members as "walk disorderly" and "obey not" the divine "tradition." The sinner and the sin are identified and inseparable. To fellowship the one is to fellowship the other. And hence it is written, "Be ye not unequally yoked together with *unbelievers*: for what fellowship hath *righteousness with unrighteousness?*"

2. If pedobaptists are disobedient in the matter of baptism, their offence is not a venial one. It is not a mere irregularity or informality in church organization. Disobedi-

ence is always sin, and always to be disallowed as unchristian. At the same time, none are perfect. There are always faults to be found. And we cannot regard a microscopic legalism, that should exhaust itself with ferreting out and judging the faults of our fellows, as a very high order of Christianity. Much better is it to be so filled with the Master's work, and with love for the souls of men, that time and strength shall fail us to take cognizance of any but the most serious and really notable offences. But if the pedobaptist practice as to baptism is really disobedient, then it is a sin of such prominence and obtrusiveness that only an antinomian indifferentism could overlook it or tolerate it as Christian. It is the essence of pedobaptism. If the pedobaptist were to adopt Baptist views as to baptism, he would no longer be a pedobaptist, but a Baptist, though not necessarily a close communionist. To the sin of disobedience, therefore, he adds the sin of schism—the violation of Christian unity. I might pursue this indictment further, and add many serious counts; but I will only remind our Baptist brethren that the word disobedience in this connection is a very serious one—so serious, indeed, that it seems very doubtful if they have adequately apprehended its practical bearings with reference to their own conduct.

3. If Baptists must regard the pedobaptist practice in baptism as disobedient, then they are definitely forbidden to fellowship pedobaptists as Christians. Baptists should read their own proof-texts a little more carefully,—2 Thess. iii. 6, 14, for example. These texts are used by them as authority for the maintenance of church discipline. But if they authorize withdrawal from one professed disciple because of his disobedience, they equally authorize withdrawal from all who disobey. Note the language: "Now we command you, brethren, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that ye withdraw yourselves from every"—member of the local church? No,—"*from every brother that walketh disorderly*, and not

after the tradition which he received of us." The same comprehensiveness of statement is found in the fourteenth verse: "If *any man* obey not," etc. Why should not these commands apply to "brethren" outside the local church, as well as within its membership? Baptists should certainly feel constrained to a consistent withdrawal of church fellowship from the disobedient, which means abstinence from all church unions with them. And why is not Christian fellowship, as well as church fellowship, forbidden? The commands are general in form; and, like many another command addressed to a church, are as obviously adapted for the guidance of individual members as of the body; the idea of Christian fellowship is much more conspicuous in the New Testament than is that single phase of it called church fellowship; and disobedience is much more frequently represented as incompatible with Christian discipleship than as a breach of church order. We read many statements similar in doctrinal import to that of 1 John ii. 4: "He that saith, I know him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him." And where do we find an intimation that church fellowship should ever be withdrawn for reasons that are consistent with a continuance of Christian fellowship? When we bear these facts in mind, and reflect further that the context in 2 Thess. iii. is wholly made up of exhortations to personal duties, rather than to church action; the evidence seems to be satisfactory that the command to "withdraw" from "every brother"—"any man"—who does not "obey," means that the attestation of the disobedient brother's discipleship is compromised by his disobedience, and that he is, therefore, no longer entitled to recognition as a Christian. Will Baptists deliberately repudiate this conclusion? Will they, in one breath, proclaim the doctrine of a regenerate church membership attested by an orderly walk; and, in the next, assert that disobedience is compatible with discipleship? Will they aver that disobedience, even when it rises to the

enormity of schismatic and organized resistance to the commandments of God, is Christian, and to be fellowshiped as Christian? Is high treason against heaven no breach of Christian fellowship? But precisely this is what they say, when they pronounce pedobaptists disobedient in baptism, and yet fellowship them as Christians. Against such monstrous doctrine we may well quote the command to withdraw from the disobedient. And, even if church fellowship were not (as it is) demonstrably identical in nature with Christian fellowship, we should yet find in the whole spirit of the gospel, as well as in many particular commands, admonitions to "have no fellowship," whether church or Christian, with the sin of disobedience (Eph. v. 11).

THE ALTERNATIVE.

Two possible courses of perfect consistency, and only two, are open to Baptists. Perhaps there is but one. That will depend upon precisely what the convictions of Baptists are on certain points. But apparently two courses are open, in either one of which they may go consistently. They may disfellowship pedobaptists as not offering the scriptural attestation of discipleship, which is obedience; or they may abandon the idea that conscientious pedobaptists are disobedient to the commands of Christ respecting baptism. They may be consistent close communionists or consistent open communionists. At present they are half and half, and therefore neither. They never can be self-consistent, or occupy a rationally intelligent position, until they become wholly either one thing or the other.

Baptists as a denomination have no recognized theory of communion. Their doctrine as to the Supper is nothing of the sort, and has no direct relation to any such thing; the statements respecting fellowship, which they append to that doctrine, having no logical connection with it, and being evidently regarded as supplementary to it, rather than as an in-

dependent and self-centred theory. But these fragmentary and isolated suggestions, false as they all are in some respects, and thrown into a wrong light by their misalliance and unnatural subordination to an alien dogma, are practically all that Baptists can show looking towards a theory of communion. The misconception as to the true relation of the Supper to the communion controversy has diverted their attention from the real communion question, so that they have not seriously grappled with it, but have laid out their strength on a side issue, important in itself, but irrelevant. But if consistency is an object, it is time they adopted a theory of communion and squared their denominational usages to correspond.

It is no part of my plan to pave the way for Baptists to either horn of the dilemma I have thus pointed out; and it is useless to speculate as to which of the two they may most easily and most conscientiously choose. If they are as firmly convinced as they sometimes say they are that pedobaptists are disobedient, they would find it difficult to abandon that idea; and it would be easier for them to exchange their present Christian fellowship for pedobaptists (which at the best is but a travesty of Christian fellowship) for a consistent close communion. But I have often noticed, in the course of a somewhat extended experience, that, where the Baptist cause is not established or is languishing, most Baptists find it comparatively easy to unite with pedobaptist churches. Their principles do not prove to be so inflexible as they had thought. And this suggests the inquiry, Do not Baptists as a denomination have a sufficiently tangible doubt as to the Christianity of their stern arraignment of pedobaptists to justify them in abandoning it for the sake of becoming consistent, even though it were to be consistently open, in their communion?

ARTICLE VII.

THE ORDER OF THE ASSASSINS.

BY PROFESSOR HARVEY PORTER, D. D.

OF all the strange and mystic sects the East has produced, none surpass the Order of the Assassins in fanatical zeal, boldness of design, and the ruthless manner of execution which characterized all their measures. It still remains a question, whence the term "Assassin" is derived. It is commonly referred to the word *hashish*, the intoxicating extract of hemp (*Cannabis Indica*). It is supposed that they used the drug to nerve them for their daring exploits, and hence they were called, in Arabic, *Hashishiyeen*, whence we derive "Assassin." This may be incorrect, but there is no doubt that our word "assassin" is derived from this order of fanatics whose deeds of darkness and horror overshadowed all Western Asia for more than one hundred and fifty years, and resounded through all Europe, and gave us our most appropriate word to denote swift and secret murder.

But the Assassins never called themselves by this name. The term which they applied to themselves was *Ismailians*, from a certain Ismail, whom they regarded as the origin of the sect, who will be mentioned further on. *Ismail* is the same as Ishmael; hence they might be called Ishmaelites,—a not inappropriate designation, since their hand was against every man, and every man's hand against them. Their Chief Ismail, however, has no connection with the Ishmael of the Bible.

They were called by the Mohammedans *Batintyeh*, which indicates that they had one doctrine or set of doctrines for

the outside world, and quite another for the initiated. This was true. They held esoteric doctrines, which were taught to the inner circle of the initiated only, and which were of the most abominable character, while their exoteric doctrines were in general accord with the religion of Islam. They were in the outset a heretical sect of Mohammedans, but in their later development they became the bitter foes of Islam, and indeed of every form of faith except their own.

For a better understanding of the order of the Assassins, and its relation to Islam, we must glance briefly at the heretical sects that preceded it.

The first break in the united ranks of Islam occurred during the caliphate of Ali, the fourth successor of the Arabian prophet. Ali was repudiated by a large party at whose head was Moawiyah, the Governor of Damascus, and, after a long struggle, Ali and his sons were put to death, and the family nearly exterminated; but there was a remnant left, and there arose a party among the Mohammedans who claimed that the rightful succession to the caliphate belonged to Ali and his descendants. This party became known as Shias, or Shiites, to whom the Persians belong at the present day, and it has been from among them that the greatest foes to orthodox Islam have arisen, the Assassins most conspicuous of all. From among the Persians came the chief free-thinkers of Islam. In 758 A. D. appeared the Rawendi, who taught the transmigration of souls, whom the Caliph Munsûr was obliged to put down with the sword. Next arose in Persia a certain Al Mukanna who wore a golden mask, whence his name. He taught that God was incarnate in Adam, then in Noah, and in a succession of prophets reaching to and including himself. About the year 817 A. D. there appeared a certain Babek who taught the moral indifference of all human actions, and encouraged his followers to give free rein to their passions. In this they were the forerunners of the Assassins, as we shall see. It is not strange that Babek had

many followers. He attempted the overthrow of the caliphate of Bagdad, and the extinction of this pestilent sect is said to have cost twenty years of bloody conflict and a million of men.

About the year 891 A. D. appeared a still more formidable enemy to orthodox Islam in the sect of the Karmathians, who arose in lower Mesopotamia, but soon spread into Arabia, and inflicted defeat after defeat upon the armies of the Caliph. Their doctrines were a curious mixture of Islam, Magic, and Christianity. Their leader even pretended to be an apostle of Jesus, whom he called the Word. He also claimed to be the Mahdi of Islam and the angel Gabriel. The Karmathians professed an attachment to Islam and the Koran, but they taught that the latter must be interpreted allegorically, and, while apparently receiving it, they maintained doctrines wholly subversive of it. In this they were followed by the Assassins, who may in fact be regarded as their true successors. The Karmathians were hostile to the Caliph of Bagdad, claiming that their *Imam*, or chief, was the only true caliph, and must overthrow the false one at Bagdad. Hence followed the bloody conflict in which hundreds of thousands perished.

In 920 A. D. they attacked Mecca, and thirty thousand of its defenders fell before the city was taken. The Karmathians did not respect the holy places of Islam: they plundered the city, and carried off the sacred black stone of the Kaaba, which was only restored twenty-two years later at a ransom of fifty-thousand ducats. For one hundred years the conflict raged, before the Karmathian heresy was extinguished, or rather compelled to change its form, for it really lived on, and reappeared in all its essential features in the doctrine of the Assassins.

Egypt seems to have been the home of this new phase of heresy. The descendants of Ali—nearly exterminated, as already mentioned, and always persecuted by the caliphs,

who feared their dynastic claims, as being of the lineage of the Prophet through his daughter Fatima, the wife of Ali—succeeded in establishing themselves in Egypt, where they founded the Fatimite dynasty, which ruled from 909 to 1171 A. D. They called themselves the true caliphs of Islam, and they not only antagonized the Abbaside caliphs politically, but in doctrine they departed widely from the so-called orthodox standard maintained at Bagdad. As many of these doctrines were adopted by the Assassins, we will briefly take note of them.

There was at Cairo a great university, richly endowed, where these doctrines were taught; and the Fatimite caliphs fostered it, since it recognized them as the true successors of the Prophet. They were the true Imams, who alone had the divine sanction and inspiration, and hence their teachings comprised the true doctrine of Islam. These teachings were imparted in nine grades. In the first the student was pointed to the endless and inexplicable contradictions and absurdities of the Koran and the orthodox faith, as a preparation for the allegorical interpretation of the book, upon which the whole scheme of the new doctrine depended. The student was required to take an oath to accept without question all that should be subsequently taught. They were to acknowledge seven inspired Imams, the last of whom was Ismail, from whom the sect was afterward named. We need not follow out the teaching in all the successive stages, but note that the sixth taught that all positive religious precepts have no value in themselves, but serve merely as helps to a deeper insight into religious truths, and when this is fully attained they may be wholly discarded. All so-called revelations were but myths; heaven and hell have no real existence, and all actions are wholly alike in a moral point of view. Right and wrong do not pertain to acts, and hence all future retribution is nonsense. To the initiated, nothing is forbidden; everything is lawful. To believe in nothing and follow

one's own will was the only true philosophy. Such doctrines followed out to their logical results were well adapted to nourish the horde of fanatics who terrorized the East for one hundred and seventy years.

The Fatimites were not content to teach their doctrines at home, but sent emissaries throughout Western Asia to lure the orthodox to accept them, and it was there they were to bring forth the most abundant harvest.

One of these emissaries, or *Dais* as they were called, was Hassan ben Sabâh, the founder of the order of the Assassins. He was a native of Persia, who early became a convert to the doctrines of the Ismailians, and went to Egypt and studied at Cairo. He had already at home distinguished himself as a free-thinker. The Caliph received him with honor, but the jealousy of the courtiers made it dangerous for him to remain long in Egypt, and he returned to the East.

He was evidently a man of great magnetic power and supreme self-control. While passing from Egypt to Syria by sea, a fearful storm arose. The crew and passengers despaired of escape, but Hassan calmed their fears by assuring them that God would let no harm come to *him*, and they would be saved with him. The event justified his assurance, and they became his followers. He had evidently already determined to establish a new sect through which he would rise to power. He went to Persia by way of Bagdad. In Persia he commenced his work of making converts, ostensibly as *Dai*, or emissary, of the Caliph of Egypt, but really for his own purposes. He assumed the garb of a strict Moslem and passed for a saint. After gaining many followers in different parts of Persia, he determined to establish himself in some strong position, where he could more securely carry out his designs. He fixed upon a very strong place, in the mountains of Northern Persia, called Alamût, which means "the instruction of the eagle,"—so named, it is said, because the prince who first built a castle there was di-

rected to the spot by an eagle which lighted upon it while he was out hunting. Hassan took the place in 1091 A. D., and from this date commences his career of ambition, and ruthless war upon all rulers and all established forms of order. His aim was to destroy all order, all the foundations of society, and reign upon its ruins; a veritable Nihilist, the greatest Anarchist the world has ever seen.

But while pursuing such a policy towards the organized governments of his day, he had such a control over his own followers, that they implicitly obeyed him, even in the most trying circumstances. There was no anarchy in his camp, however much he sought to promote anarchy in the world around. Nothing more fully attests the remarkable power of the man than this fact; but it should be noted that the rank and file of the order were not initiated into the secret, esoteric doctrines, which abolished all distinction of right and wrong, and annihilated all principles of morality. All members of the order were sworn to implicit and unquestioning obedience to the will of the grand-master, who from his lofty and impregnable stronghold at Alamût issued orders that were promptly obeyed throughout half a continent. He soon acquired the title of *Sheikh-el-Jebel*, the "Old Man of the Mountains," a name that for a century and a half was regarded with terror all through Western Asia and even in Europe.

Besides Alamût, Hassan secured many other strong places in the mountains of Persia and wherever the order gained adherents. This was their constant policy, and it was the only policy that would secure the order in the course its chief had in view. He saw the futility of trying to establish an independent kingdom while the Caliph of Bagdad was still on the throne and powerful. The fate of Babek and the Karmathians convinced him of this, and he determined to pursue an entirely novel course,—that of ridding himself, by the dagger, of every opponent to his ambition, and thus by a

reign of terror bend everything to his will. But, in order to carry out this fiendish policy, he must secure himself from attack, which he might do by fortifying the most inaccessible positions, and holding them by garrisons of his most trusty followers. From these places he could send forth his emissaries, bound to yield blind obedience to his every command, who, utterly regardless of life, would carry the dagger into every court or palace where dwelt a prince or minister obnoxious to him, or into the strongholds of his enemies to strike down the chiefs who guarded them, or into the camp of a foe to assassinate the officers. His followers were always ready for these perilous commissions, being assured that death in carrying them out was but entrance into Paradise. They assumed every disguise to accomplish their fiendish purposes, and it is remarkable how generally they succeeded, even when the victims of the "Old Man of the Mountains" had become so numerous that men feared and apprehended the attacks of his emissaries on every hand.

It seems strange that men could be found to thus surrender their wills to the will of another; but religious fanaticism will go to all lengths, as we have good evidence in the history of the Christian church. The order of the Assassins has been compared to that of the Knights Templars, but the latter never yielded such implicit obedience to their grand-master as did the Assassins to the "Old Man of the Mountains."

When Hassan ben Sabâh had obtained many strong places and a numerous following, Malek Shah, the Sultan of the Seljukian Turks, became apprehensive of his power, and determined to destroy it. He had already reduced the Caliph of Bagdad to a mere shadow as a political chief, and left to him only his ecclesiastical authority. Through the wise administration of his grand-vizir, the renowned Nizâm-ul-Mulk, he had become the leading power in Western Asia, and he saw in Hassan ben Sabâh a rival whom he must crush.

He sent a force to besiege him in his stronghold, Alamût, Hassan was reduced to great straits; but one of his commanders in a neighboring fortress sent him three hundred men, and with these and his own troops he made a successful sally, and dispersed the besiegers. But the Sultan continued his attacks upon the strongholds of the order, and Hassan now determined on a master-stroke which would teach him and all other chiefs that they could attack him only at their peril. He inaugurated his policy of assassination by striking down the grand-vizir, Nizâm-ul-Mulk, who had guided the affairs of state under three sultans, advanced their power to the highest point, and gained a greater name than any of them. He was the greatest statesman of the age. In his youth he had been a fellow-student of Hassan ben Sabâh, and later had introduced him to the court of the Sultan, but Hassan intrigued to supplant his benefactor, and was driven from court. He never forgot the affront, and now had come his day of vengeance. The dagger of his emissary did its work, and the grand-vizir fell, no unworthy victim with which to commence the infernal role that from henceforth became the settled policy of the order. The death of the Sultan Malek Shah not long after, not without suspicion of poison, and the complete failure of his military operations against the "Old Man of the Mountains," exalted the latter more than ever, and gave him confidence in his policy. He pushed forward his operations to secure further strong places by treachery or by force, and in this he was successful. It should be noted that it was just at this time that the warriors of the West were dealing heavy blows to the power of the Turks in Asia Minor and Syria. Malek Shah died in 1092 A. D., and the First Crusade commenced in 1096. In 1098 Antioch fell, and in 1099 Jerusalem. The crusaders unconsciously favored the plans of the "Old Man of the Mountains," for, as the power of the Turks was being broken by them, he could more easily diminish their possessions in the East. He ob-

tained possession of a dozen or more castles in 1099 and 1100 A. D., and he had become so strong that he no longer confined his operations to the regions of Persia. The daggers of the Assassins now took wider range. In 1102 A. D. the Governor of Hums in Syria was struck down by them, and the order began to secure castles in that region. The first one mentioned as seized by them in Syria was Sarmin, about a day's journey south of Aleppo, and it became the residence of Hassan's grand-prior, Abu-l-Feth by name. Even the Governor of Aleppo became the friend and protector of the order, and connived at their dastardly deeds, perhaps through fear of their daggers. Modûd, the Governor of Damascus, soon after fell a victim. Fear of them became general. In 1113 A. D. the Governor of Aleppo died, and the people rose upon the members of the order in that city, and cut down without mercy some three hundred of them,—men, women, and children,—and about two hundred more were cast into prison. But the Assassins took ample vengeance, and in 1119 the Governor of Aleppo and one of his sons were assassinated. They grew bolder and bolder, and demanded castles from the local government, who stood in such fear of their daggers that they often yielded to the demand, or utterly demolished the castles lest they should fall into the hands of the order.

Meanwhile in Persia the reign of terror had been fully commenced. The victims of the "Old Man of the Mountains" fell like autumn leaves, many of them men of the highest rank. He did not always use the dagger. There were some among his enemies whom he chose to terrorize, and thus subdue to his will, so that they would not stand in his way. The Sultan Sanjar was taught that his life was safe only so long as the "Old Man of the Mountains" willed it. A slave of the Sultan was a member of the order, unsuspected by his master. He was commanded by Hassan to place a dagger by the Sultan's side while asleep. When the

Sultan awoke he recognized the sign and trembled. His fear was not lulled when he shortly received from the "Old Man" the following laconic message: "Were we not well disposed towards Sultan Sanjar, we should have fixed the dagger in his breast instead of in the ground." The Sultan was still further terrified by the sudden death of his brother, who was besieging Alamût, doubtless poisoned by the foe. Peace was made with Hassan forthwith, which not only confirmed him in his possessions, but assigned him certain revenues from the land.

But Hassan was not content with shedding the blood of his outside foes: he raised his hand against his own kin, seemingly from mere lust of blood. His nephew, the grand-prior of the order in Syria, and his two sons, fell by the dagger at his command. He did not intend that any of his successors should surpass him in iniquity. It would have been natural had he himself been struck down by one of his followers, but he was not. His death occurred in 1125 A. D., at the age of ninety. He had reigned as grand-master of the order thirty-seven years, during which he never once left the castle of Alamût, and twice only his apartments to show himself upon the terrace. His seclusion was designed to surround his almost unbounded sway with the veil of mystery and impress his followers with awe.

Hassan's successor in the office of grand-master was Bursurgomid, who had been one of his leading commanders. He carried out most fully the policy of Hassan, and the dagger was busy as before. Mahmûd succeeded Sanjar as Sultan about the same time, and thought to fight the Assassins with their own weapons,—the dagger and treachery,—but in these he was no match for the "Old Man of the Mountains." He had no such band of trusty followers. He succeeded, however, in capturing Alamût in 1130 A. D., but accomplished little more. The Turks of Persia and throughout the East were too much divided to make the united and steady

effort necessary to root out the accursed brood. The Assassins profited by their divisions to gain place after place, and plied the dagger with strange impunity.

A certain Bahram distinguished himself in Syria as a worthy follower of the "Old Man of the Mountains." He first put to death his uncle at Bagdad, and then proceeded to Syria, and at Damascus became a preacher of righteousness according to the creed of the Assassins. He gained many followers, and persuaded the Governor of Damascus to surrender to him the castle of Banias, situated on the coast south of Latakia, and this castle became the headquarters of the sect in Syria, 1129 A. D. Here the Assassins gathered from all quarters, and struck terror into the hearts of all neighboring chiefs. If any one was attacked by the Assassins, no chief dared offer assistance, lest he should be struck down by the dagger. Ismail, the successor of Bahram at Banias, gained even a stronger foothold at Damascus. He sent there a certain Abu-l-Wefa, who obtained great influence, and became chief judge in the city, and used his position of course to betray his patrons. He entered into correspondence with the crusaders to deliver Damascus into their hands in exchange for Tyre. The crusaders eagerly agreed, for they had long coveted the famous city of Damascus. It was a strange alliance, this of the dagger and the cross; but no party in those days cared much about means, so long as the end was gained. This famous plot did not, however, succeed. The Governor of Damascus discovered it in time to save the city, and both parties to it suffered severely. The adherents of the Assassins in Damascus were massacred without mercy. Six thousand—men, women, and children—perished at the hands of the enraged Moslems, and Abu-l-Wefa was hewn to pieces. The crusaders were approaching Damascus, all unconscious that their allies had been slain and their plan frustrated. They were careless of discipline, and dispersed among the villages for plunder, when they were

furiously attacked by a Moslem force from Damascus, and suffered a complete defeat. They obtained, however, the castle of Banias, which Ismail delivered into their hands, fearing an attack from the Moslems of Damascus. These events took place in 1130 A. D., the year in which Alamût was lost, as before mentioned, but both these places were soon after recovered.

Meanwhile the dagger was plied relentlessly in the East and West. In 1127, Kâsim ud-Dowlet, a distinguished general, was struck down in a mosque at Mosul by eight Assassins disguised as dervishes, of whom he killed three before he received his death-blow. The others, save one, were cut down by the attendants of Kâsim, as they doubtless expected to be. It was characteristic of the Assassins to glory in death met in executing the orders of the grand-master. The only one who escaped at this time was a youth. His mother, upon hearing of his escape, put on mourning; had he perished, she would have put on garments of joy. To such length could fanaticism go among the Assassins. The various methods employed by them in securing their victims attest their ingenuity and boldness. The vizir of the Sultan Sanjar was assaulted in a characteristic way. The Assassin who had been commissioned to murder him obtained the position of groom in his stables. One day he approached the vizir, leading his favorite horse, and as he neared him, he patted the horse on the neck, and dexterously produced a dagger, concealed under the mane, with which he killed the vizir.

The Governor of Damascus who massacred the six thousand adherents of the order, as above mentioned, was assassinated two years later. No prince was safe. The dagger lay in wait for them day and night. Among their most trusted servants might lurk adherents to the "Old Man of the Mountains." It is strange what a fascination the creed of this accursed sect seemed to have for the people of the East

in those days. It would be an unending task to enumerate the victims of the "Old Man of the Mountains." They fell thick and fast on every side. His arm reached over half a continent, striking high and low. It extended to Egypt, and with a kind of inexorable justice struck the Fatimite caliph, a member of the dynasty that had nursed and promulgated the accursed doctrines preached by Hassan ben Sabâh. The Caliph Amir and his vizir were assassinated in 1129, and, not long after, the grand-master turned his attention to still more distinguished prey. Heretofore the Assassins had spared the head of orthodox Islam; but in 1134 A. D. the Caliph of Bagdad fell a victim, and the Assassins, not content with his murder, horribly mutilated his body, as though to testify their scorn of his sacred office as spiritual head of the faithful. And yet they outwardly still professed the doctrines of the Koran and honored the Prophet.

The succeeding caliph was murdered by them a short time after his accession. Terror now seized the successors of the Prophet, and fear of the dagger of the "Old Man of the Mountains" imprisoned them in the palace at Bagdad. The faithful no longer saw their spiritual head. The second grand-master of the Assassins died in 1137 A. D., and was followed by his son Mohammed. From this time on, the office became hereditary. This was not the design of Hassan, the founder of the order, who intended that the best man in the order should be appointed to the office.

Mohammed continued the policy of his predecessors most fully. He occupied new strongholds, and plied the dagger without stint. Among the castles secured were Kadmûs, Kahaf, and Masyaf, in the Nusairi mountains in Syria. The last named became the chief seat of the order in Syria, and there reside the descendants of the Assassins at the present day, under the name of Ismailians.

With the accession of Hassan II., the son of Mohammed, in 1163, we reach a new stage in the history of the order. As

has been already indicated, there were several grades to which the members of the order were admitted as they proved themselves of sufficient capacity and trustworthiness to be advanced to them. The rank and file of the order, the great mass of adherents, were taught to follow the tenets of orthodox Islam, with the reserve only of perfect obedience to the grand-master, as the representative of the Imam who was to come and give the world a new revelation. Those admitted to the higher grades were alone taught the secret tenets, which inculcated the moral indifference of all acts, and the futility of all positive religion; in fact, the negation of all morality, a bald infidelity, or even blank atheism. These doctrines had been carefully concealed from the world and the great mass of his followers by Hassan ben Sabâh and his two immediate successors, but Hassan II. determined to cast aside the veil, and openly declare to all his followers their release from all religious observances and all bonds of morality, and allow them to give free rein to every lust and passion. He would only enjoin upon them obedience to him as the representative of the coming Imam, from whom he professed to have received a communication permitting him to make this declaration. This was done with great pomp at Alamût, and a new era was thus inaugurated, which Hassan hoped would increase his following and raise his power to the highest point. But he was sadly mistaken. Men are corrupt and easily corrupted, but they have a moral nature that revolts against publishing their corruption to the world. No creed that rejects all moral restraint has any chance of success, and Hassan II. soon found that this open defiance of all religion and all moral principle weakened his forces, and roused the world against him and his accursed crew. It is not strange to learn that Hassan II. fell a victim to his own teaching. His brother-in-law was his assassin. He was succeeded in 1167 A. D. by his son Mohammed II., who, although he preached the same doctrine of moral indifference

of all acts, took care to punish his father's assassin, who with his whole family was executed.

Meanwhile stirring events were taking place in Syria. Many more strongholds had fallen into the hands of the Assassins, chiefly in the Nusairi mountains. The grand-prior of the order in Syria was now Rashîd-ud-Dîn Sinân. The Sultan of the Turks was the renowned Nûr-ud-Dîn, who ruled Syria well for some years, dying in 1173. He was succeeded by the still more renowned Salah-ud-Dîn, or Saladin, who had been Nûr-ud-Dîn's viceroy in Egypt, and had put an end, while there, to the Fatimite dynasty, the former allies of the Assassins. Naturally the latter were not well disposed toward him, and determined to get rid of him after his coming to Syria and assuming the reins of power. As he was besieging Aleppo in 1175, Rashid-ud-Dîn, the chief of the order in Syria, sent three emissaries to assassinate him. They attacked him in his tent, but failed. Later, when Saladin had fully established his authority, he determined to root out the pestilential horde from his dominions. He advanced toward Masyaf, their chief stronghold, capturing and destroying whatever belonged to the Assassins, and finally laid siege to the place. Rashîd-ud-Dîn tried the dagger again, and sent three more assassins to cut him down. They attacked him in succession, but in vain. Saladin seemed to bear a charmed life, and they all met the fate they had intended for him. Rashîd now began to despair, and feared the vengeance of the great warrior. He made proposals for peace, and Saladin granted it on condition that he should make no more attempts on his life with the dagger. When we consider who and what Saladin was, we are impressed with the universal fear of the Assassins that pervaded all hearts, so that even such a prince bargained for safety from their daggers, and let their chief escape when almost within his power.

Rashîd-ud-Dîn seemed desirous of rivalling the "Old Man of the Mountains" himself in dignity and influence. He

claimed to be an incarnation of the Godhead; he secluded himself from the vulgar gaze; he permitted no one to see him eat, drink, or sleep. He would take his stand on a lofty rock, and preach from sunrise to sunset. His eloquence is said to have been remarkable, and his influence over his followers unbounded. It appears to have been his intention to make himself grand-master of the order. He intrigued with the crusaders, and with the purpose of releasing himself from certain obligations to the order of the Templars, which he had entered into, he sent an embassy to the King of Jerusalem, pretending that the Assassins were inclined to adopt the Christian faith. The King and the bishop of Jerusalem were deceived, and sent an embassy to Rashîd-ud-Dîn in return. The ambassadors of Rashîd were cut to pieces by the Templars on their way back, and although the King tried to induce the grand-master of the Templars to punish the murderers, he would not, and all negotiations between the King and the Assassins came to no result. It is not strange that the "Old Man of the Mountains" should take vengeance into his own hands. There had been a sort of truce between the crusaders and the order since 1149, when Raymond, Count of Tripoli, had been assassinated, but now they were to be taught that the dagger was still active. In 1192 two young men of the order appeared at Tyre and demanded baptism. They received the rite, and entered into the service of Conrad, Marquis of Montferrat, Prince of Tyre. They remained in his service six months, devoutly praying to the God of the Christians. One day the Marquis dined with the Bishop of Beauvais, and as he was coming from the Bishop's residence he was assassinated by these two young men. Both were seized, and died under torture without revealing who had employed them to do the deed. Many charged it upon Richard Coeur de Lion, with whom Conrad had quarrelled, and by whose death Richard greatly profited, since it gave him Tyre; others charged the deed upon Saladin, and declared that he

had hired assassins to put Richard out of the way also. But all is conjecture: the mystery of Conrad's death still remains unsolved, and historians have condemned or acquitted Richard very much according to national bias. There can be no doubt, however, as to the instruments employed. They were adherents of the "Old Man of the Mountains," who thereby showed that his dread power still existed, and that he would use it against Christian or Moslem as his own advantage dictated. He still had servants ready to do his bidding regardless of consequences.

Two years after the death of Conrad, Henry, Count of Champagne, was passing Masyaf, and was invited by the grand-prior of the Assassins to visit him in his castle. He accepted the invitation, and was shown about the place with great civility. Standing upon one of the lofty towers, the prior remarked to the Count that his followers were more obedient than those of the Christian prince, in proof of which he gave a sign to two of them who were standing by. They immediately hurled themselves from the tower, and were crushed upon the rocks below. The prior then remarked, that all the initiated among his followers would do the same. "These," said he, "are they who will execute any command, however difficult, I may lay upon them and rid me of any enemy I may designate." In this, Rashtd-ud-Dtn manifested the same authority over his followers as the first grand-master, Hassan ben Sabâh. When Malek Shah sent messengers to the latter, commanding him to become his vassal, he called one of his attendants and ordered him to kill himself. Without delay the attendant thrust a dagger through his own body, and fell dead at his master's feet. He ordered another to throw himself from the parapet; he obeyed, and a moment later lay dashed in pieces below. Said Hassan to the messengers of Malek: "Go, tell your master what you have seen, and that I have seventy thousand such to do my bidding; let that be my answer to his command." It was this devo-

tion that enabled the "Old Man of the Mountains" to overawe so many princes.

Mohammed was succeeded by his son Jelâl-ud-Dîn, Hassan III., as grand-master of the order, 1182. He was opposed to the policy of his father and grandfather; for, while they had released their followers from the observance of the laws of Islam, he returned to the policy of the founder, and enjoined the strictest orthodoxy in regard to the observance of all the precepts of Islam. His opposition to his father appeared before the latter's death, and when he came to power he strained every nerve to prove to the Mohammedan world the reality of his faith, and his sincerity in keeping the law. But he could not wholly undo the work of his predecessors, and many distrusted his professions altogether. The true inwardness and spirit of the order had been laid bare, and most men could not believe that such a spirit and creed could nourish any sincerity save in iniquity.

The dagger slept, however, during the reign of Hassan III., but revived again in that of his son Ala-ud-Dîn. Orchân, the Emir of Nisabûr, had ravaged the territory of the order in his vicinity. Ala-ud-Dîn sent messengers to warn off the invaders. The only answer the Emir gave was, to draw several daggers from his girdle and cast them on the ground, as much as to say: If you care to use the dagger, I can use it equally well. But he reckoned without his host. Not long after, he was set upon by three Assassins and killed. They then boldly rushed through the streets of the town with their bloody daggers in their hand, calling aloud the name of their master. They next sought Orchân's grand-vizir in his own house; but, not finding him, they stabbed one of his servants, by way of leaving their card denoting that they had called in person. They then returned to the street, declaring to all who they were, until the people rose and despatched them with stones. At the same time a messenger from their master was approaching. Hearing of what had happened,

he halted, and sent to the vizir, asking whether he should appear at court or not. The vizir, afraid of refusing, replied, telling him he might come in safety, and when he arrived, treated him with honor, and granted his demand that the Sultan's forces should withdraw from the possessions of the "Old Man of the Mountains." He delivered up to him also a certain fortress, and promised to pay a yearly tribute. The messenger remained at court several days, and to show the vizir and his master how much they were in the power of the "Old Man," he informed him that several of the pages and body-guard of the Sultan were of his order. The vizir, greatly astonished, demanded proof. He was told that they would declare themselves if he would swear that they should not be harmed. He did so, and then the messenger gave a sign which brought forward five of the most trusted servants of the Sultan, who affirmed that they belonged to the order. One of them declared to the vizir that the only reason why he had not assassinated him was that he had received no command from his master to do so. The vizir in dismay made them swear in turn that they would not injure him, asserting that he would secretly obey the "Old Man of the Mountains" as he did his own Sultan. When the latter heard what had transpired, he compelled the vizir to put to death the five Assassins, and the chief of the pages for having admitted them into his service. The vizir obeyed, but he feared the vengeance of the "Old Man of the Mountains," and it was not long before a message arrived from him to this effect: "You have executed five of my servants to save your own head; pay for each of them ten thousand pieces of gold." The vizir complied. Thus dearly did princes and vizirs purchase safety from the daggers of the Assassins.

But although Ala-ud-Dîn could protect himself against outsiders, he could not against those of his own household. It is more than surmised that he had killed his own father by poison, and now he met a similar fate. His son hired a

Moslem to murder him. The chiefs of the Assassins had to learn that patricide begets its like.

Rokn-ud-Din, who succeeded Ala-ud-Din in 1255 A. D., was the last grand-master of the order, whose end was near at hand. It was the Mongols who gave the death-blow to this scourge of Asia. They overran nearly the whole continent, and were led at this period by Hulagu Khan. As they approached Bagdad, the Caliph, whom we have seen imprisoned in his palace through fear of the Assassins, sent messengers to Hulagu entreating him to wipe out this accursed order from the face of the earth. Other princes joined in the entreaty, and when Hulagu drew near the territory occupied by the Assassins, he sent repeated commands to the grand-master to submit. Rokn-ud-Din had a vizir named Nâsir-ud-Din, a distinguished astronomer, who had previously been in the service of the Caliph, but, regarding himself slighted by him, had joined the grand-master of the Assassins with the hope of inducing him to assassinate the Caliph. As Rokn-ud-Din did not seem inclined to do so, he determined to betray him into the hands of the Mongols, hoping to secure through them means of revenge upon the Caliph.

To further his plans he induced Rokn-ud-Din to negotiate with the Mongols, who were now plundering his territory. Hulagu would hear of nothing save the destruction of his castles and complete submission. Rokn-ud-Din hesitated, urged to do this by his traitorous vizir, and this proved his ruin. Hulagu sent him peremptory orders to appear before him; but, as he did not, he at once besieged him in the castle where he was then residing. The vizir soon delivered it into his hands (1256 A. D.), and Rokn-ud-Din, made a prisoner, was obliged to give orders for the surrender of other strongholds to the Mongols, and he even gave command to his distant officers in Syria and elsewhere to deliver the positions they held to the agents of Hulagu. The strongholds numbered more than one hundred. Alamût, the chief, resisted,

as did some others, the order of the grand-master, but they were finally compelled to submit. Alamût was found well provisioned, and might have held out long, and would have done so at an earlier day. Quarried out of the rock beneath the fortress were found great store-houses and vaults filled with wheat and honey, said to have been stored there by Hassan ben Sabâh from one hundred and thirty to one hundred and forty years before, and so secure were the vaults that all were still in good condition. Rokn-ud-Dîn, despised for his weakness, was murdered by the Mongols in 1257 A. D., and vengeance did not stop with him. His family was exterminated, and orders were given to exterminate the accursed race of the Assassins, root and branch. Executioners were sent in every direction, and any one of them they could apprehend was despatched on the spot. Neither age nor sex was spared. Thus did long-suffering humanity wreak vengeance upon the order that had held so much of the world in terror for one hundred and fifty years.

The Assassins were blotted out in the East, but in Syria they held out some years longer. The Mongols could not for some time proceed against them there. Meanwhile the Mamluke Sultan of Egypt, Bibars, gained the supremacy in Syria, and the chief of the Assassins, Nejm-ud-Dîn, gave allegiance to him, and consented to share his authority with the lieutenant of Bibars. The latter gradually obtained possession of all their fortresses, but did not exterminate them. The Mamlukes preferred to use them for their own purposes, and accomplish by means of their daggers what they could not by the sword.

In 1326 A. D., Mohammed, the son of Bibars, sent more than thirty Assassins from Syria to Tabriz to destroy the Emir Kara Sonkor, with others, but they failed, and some of them were seized and executed. But Mohammed did not give up his design against the Mongol rulers, his rivals, and hired other Assassins from Masyaf. Kara Sonkor was again

attacked, but again escaped. One of the assassins fled, a second killed himself, and a third died under torture, without revealing his accomplices. Another Assassin, sent to Bagdad, struck down the governor of the city in broad daylight, and escaped to tell Mohammed of his success. Kara Sonkor, however, seemed to bear a charmed life. Assassin after assassin attempted his life, but in vain. If we can believe Macrisi, one hundred and twenty-four perished in the attempt to assassinate him. The Assassins of Masyaf seem to have been as devoted to their accursed work as those of Alamût, but less skilful.

As they lost political power they resorted to intrigue, keeping up the organization in the hope that some turn of fortune would again give them the power they had lost, but fortune never smiled upon them a second time and they rapidly sunk into one of the insignificant heretical sects of Islam. The remnants of the order still exist in Syria at Masyaf and a few other places, but the Nusairi, or Ausairi, have crowded them out of much of their former territory. In 1809 they took Masyaf, plundered and killed many of the Ismailians, as they have always called themselves, and as they are now known. The Governor of Hamath did not wish to allow the Nusairi to become too powerful, as they are now far more formidable to the government than the Ismailians, and hence he reinstated the latter at Masyaf, and there they still reside, a miserable remnant of that once powerful order which for a century and a half played one of the strangest roles in history.

ARTICLE VIII.

THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC AND THE DEBS
INSURRECTION.

BY MR. Z. SWIFT HOLBROOK.

THE American Republic is the fruitage of a religious inspiration. Our democratic institutions, our notions of liberty and equality, had their origin with men who practised every form of self-denial, that they might be free from hierarchical authority and worship God according to the dictates of conscience. They were not men, like the colony that landed at Jamestown in 1607, moved by the spirit of adventure or by the desire to acquire,—both worthy and useful passions when subordinated to higher ends,—but they came to an unknown land, braving the perils of the sea and enduring the privations incident to such a perilous journey, that they might have freedom to worship God.

To what extent these men had caught the inspiration of Luther and had given it a new interpretation, need not here be traced; but the age was one of discovery, of heroism, of adventure, of awakened intellect,—giving the world the revival of faith, hope, and learning. It was the Elizabethan Age in literature. It was the period of the centuries when, freed from the bonds of ecclesiastical authority, individualism burst the barriers which had restrained it, and men took on new conceptions of liberty and of individual worth. Man as an individual, a unit, free and independent in his relations to the unseen, and bound by social compacts only because thus his individualism found higher freedom and fuller development,—this was the conception that inspired

the men who founded this Republic, and was enunciated by those choicest minds and spirits of the seventeenth century.

It was not a mere intellectual conception; it was a spiritual experience, involving the conscience, and having practical relations with life, liberty, property, and reputation. For these very reasons it led the Pilgrims and the Puritans across the sea.

When man has tasted the sweets of liberty, persecution augments, but it cannot destroy, its growth. Wyclif caught the idea one hundred and forty years before Luther, and taught that the New Testament is a sufficient guide in church government. The growth of that idea and its final permanency in men's minds, before the assent of king and priest, cost many lives and untold suffering. Henry VIII., Edward VI., Bloody Mary, and Queen Elizabeth found people who, with Peter, said, It is right to obey God rather than men. That class sought to purify the church,—its clergy, its membership, its forms of worship, and its ordinances. They were known as Puritans. It was a common thing for them to resist unto the death any attempt of human authority to take the place of Christ over the conscience.

While democratic and social equality were terms that in 1631 had no meaning, for no one could have a voice in town affairs unless he had been elected a freeman by the Court, and, after May 31, 1631, unless he was a church member, yet Robert Browne, the founder of the first Congregational church in Norwich, England, in 1580,

"clearly stated and defended the theory that every man had a right to choose and practice such religion as his conscience approved; and that the king, hierarchy or magistrate had no right to meddle in any way with his liberty of conscience. . . . This defense of absolute toleration by Browne is a whole generation before the writers whom the Baptist historians claim to be the originators and two generations before Roger Williams."¹

No student of history in the historical development of

¹ William Frederick Poole, in *Dial*, August, 1880.

modern free thought can ignore the origin, growth, and development of Congregationalism.

"New England was settled under this polity, and its influence was dominant for two centuries in moulding New England institutions."¹

As the individual was the unit of power in church and state, it was essential that all the citizens should be educated; hence colleges and free schools were established at the outset.

"This zeal for education prompted the people of Massachusetts to found a college before they were yet free from the perils of starvation, and to establish a complete system of free schools before the first generation born in their new home had passed the age of childhood."¹

Thus the Pilgrims of 1620 from Holland and the Puritans from England (of whom some 22,000 came over between 1630 and 1640) laid those solid foundation-stones—religion, morality, knowledge—which have ever been the basis of our institutions. It was a most felicitous and providential union, that—the Pilgrim a Separatist and the Puritan an Independent; for it combined the intense religious zeal and other-worldliness of the one, tuned to so high a pitch, with the healthy regard for this world and the practical affairs of life so characteristic of the other. The Pilgrim was earnest to secure a mansion in the skies; while the Puritan, none the less zealous for that heavenly home, kept his economic eye on a corner lot on earth. The Massachusetts Colony soon learned to know God no less than religion; and they mixed in delightful proportions a zeal for fishery and whaling with that for religious discussions and protracted meetings; they compounded in an ingenious manner a love for New England rum with a clear conscience toward God; "pine-tree shillings and piety"; a love for heaven and a perfect willingness to remain on earth.

But the Puritans, under Governor Winthrop, were moulded in their religious and intellectual life by the Pilgrims. The

¹ William Frederick Poole, in *Dial*, 1880.

Puritans had attempted in England to purify and reform the church through the State; but when on American soil they soon saw that the

"best service the State can render to religion is to leave it free to live and act according to its own nature, in obedience to its own laws, prompted by its own impulses, guided by its own spirit and judgment."¹

The Cambridge Platform of 1648 has been the authoritative manual of the church for two centuries, and a comparison of it with the Declaration of the National Council of 1871 will reveal how clearly and uniformly Congregationalism has moved along a definite line of thought in its polity.

The compact in the Mayflower was a covenant binding the Pilgrims to all due submission and obedience unto such just and equal laws, ordinances, acts, constitutions, and officers from time to time as shall be thought most meet and convenient for the general good of the community; and they clearly stated that they combined into a civil body-politic for their better ordering and preservation. And the motive asserted was the glory of God and the advancement of the Christian faith. As De Tocqueville well says,

"A democracy more perfect than any which antiquity had dreamed of started in full size and panoply from the midst of an ancient feudal society."²

The divine and natural order for the development of society are all on the Mayflower in the germ. Religion seeking divine assistance, and wisdom, with good-will toward one another, which is its natural fruitage; or, in other words, morality; and evincing itself in the loftiest notions of liberty and equality. This is the true historical and scientific development; for, as De Tocqueville says,

"Liberty cannot be established without morality, nor morality without faith."³

As has been said: "Here was the spirit of religion and

¹ Encyclopædia Britannica, "Independent."

² Democracy in America, p. 35. ³ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

the spirit of liberty, which so often were in open conflict," happily combined and united to accomplish a result. And what was that result? Congregationalism in religious affairs and democracy in civil affairs, for democracy implies equality, —one being the same as another in law.

As to the notions of liberty which prevailed among the Puritans who came over with Governor Winthrop in June, 1630, hear what he says:—

"Nor would I have you to mistake in the point of your own liberty. There is a liberty of corrupt nature which is affected both by men and beasts to do what they list; and this liberty is inconsistent with authority, impatient of all restraint; by this liberty, '*sumus omnes deteriores*': 'tis the grand enemy of truth and peace, and all the ordinances of God are bent against it. But there is a civil, a moral, a federal liberty which is the proper end and object of authority; it is a liberty for that only which is just and good: for this liberty you are to stand with the hazard of your very lives, and whatsoever crosses it, is not authority but a distemper thereof. This liberty is maintained in a way of subjection to authority; and the authority set over you will, in all administrations for your good, be quietly submitted unto by all but such as have a disposition to shake off the yoke and lose their true liberty, by their murmuring at the honour and power of authority."¹

This whole conception of liberty is biblical, and founded on Christ's definition, that only truth (or law) can set free. This idea of liberty became the sentiment of New England; and Governor John Treadwell, of Connecticut, wrote a letter to Rev. Nathaniel Emmons, July 11, 1800, in which he says:

"Liberty I love; but it is that liberty which results from the most perfect subjugation of every soul to the empire of law, and not that which is sought by illuminers and atheists."²

Weeden says:—

"In 1641 these legislators whether in their political or ecclesiastical capacity never conceived any polity which should grant freedom of action in the modern sense. They did not believe such a society to be possible and they would not have considered it desirable. Freedom and liberty meant the working out of a life soberly restrained according to the will of the majority. This major will was directed divinely through the medium

¹ De Tocqueville, *Democracy*, p. 42.

² Biography of Emmons, by Edwards A. Park.

of the Bible interpreted by pastors and elders. This was the mind of Massachusetts and Connecticut."¹

Josiah Quincy said, that liberty of conscience would have produced anarchy in the seventeenth century. This conception of liberty and equality is the gift of Congregationalism to the Republic, and its fruitage is seen in Mr. Lincoln's high thought of obedience to law:—

"Let reverence for law be breathed by every mother to the lisping babe that prattles in her lap; let it be taught in the schools, seminaries and colleges; let it be written in primers, spelling-books and almanacs; let it be preached from pulpits and proclaimed in legislative halls and enforced in courts of justice; in short let it become the political religion of the nation."

The late Dr. William Frederick Poole wrote as follows:—

"The rise and growth of Congregationalism make an important chapter in the historical development of modern free thought. It is in religion what democracy is in the conduct of civil affairs. It inculcates the duty and right of each individual to interpret the Scriptures for himself and vests all ecclesiastical power in the brotherhood of each local church as an independent body. Every other human authority in spiritual affairs, whether it be council, hierarchy or synod, it rejects together with all antiquated symbols, rites, functionaries and other machinery which come between the individual soul and its Maker. It is the exaltation of the individual, and the dethronement of all outside spiritual dictation. . . . It was the polity under which New England was settled, and there it was the dominant influence for two centuries in moulding its institutions. It is not strange that a system so unlike that of England and the other nations of Europe should have wrought out an independent and peculiar people. As the individual was the unit of power in Church and State, it was essential that all the citizens should be educated; and hence colleges and free schools were established at the outset. Such a development of individualism was necessarily the occasion of many internal controversies and disputes; but both State and Church withstood the strain, grew strong under it, and enjoyed a material and social prosperity such as fell to the lot of none of the other early American colonies."²

On September 4, 1633, there arrived in Boston a man of heroic faith and scholarly attainments,—the Rev. Thomas Hooker. His coming was destined to have far-reaching re-

¹ *Economic and Social History of New England*, Vol. i. p. 179.

² Poole's review of Dexter's *Congregationalism*, in the *Dial*, 1880.

sults in its effect on the life and development of the colonies; for he was the one who inspired the Connecticut Constitution, and first stated clearly, not only the right of the people to elect their magistrates, but to limit them in their powers by laws which they must follow. In other words, the absolute sovereignty of the people, or democracy in its modern sense.

Mr. Hooker had been a fellow of Emmanuel College, Cambridge, England, and had been influenced profoundly by the teachings of that most eminent divine, Thomas Cartwright. It is significant that Emmanuel College was regarded as a Puritan institution, and the men it graduated were all of a distinct and pronounced type. Such were Robert Browne, Nathaniel Ward of Ipswich, Thomas Hooker, and John Cotton. For his opinions, Mr. Hooker was persecuted, and cited to appear before the High Commission Court in England, July 10, 1630. He fled to Holland and then to America. His ideas of liberty, equality, and democracy were dearly bought. They were not intellectual discoveries; they were spiritual experiences. Hear his words:—

"We (as it becometh Christians) stand upon the sufficiency of Christ's institutions, for all kynde of worship; and that exclusively the word and nothing but the word, in matters of Religious worship. . . . Christ we know; and all that cometh from him we are ready to embrace. But these human ceremonies in divine worship we know not, nor can have anything to doe with them."¹

Hooker was a giant in stature, in faith, and in intellect. After remaining in Massachusetts a few years, he went to Hartford, Conn., in 1636. It is well to remember that the Massachusetts government was not, and was never intended to be, democratic.² Mr. Hooker was exceedingly jealous for popular liberty, and his influence among his early associates in the Massachusetts Colony is revealed by the statement, made by an early chronicler, that,

¹ Walker's Life of Hooker (Dodd, Mead & Co.), p. 58.

² *Ibid.*, p. 119.

"after Mr. Hooker's coming over, it was observed that many of the free-men grew to be very jealous of their liberties."¹

In the autumn of 1638, Governor Winthrop, who was an aristocrat, and had never divested himself of aristocratic notions, even in government, wrote a letter to Mr. Hooker² expostulating with him about—

"the unwarrantableness and unsafeness of referring matters of counsel or judicature to the body of the people, because the best part is always the least, and of that best part the wiser part is always the lesser."

Mr. Hooker replied that the judges must simply enforce the law, and the general counsel should be chosen by all; and he even goes so far as to say that otherwise it would lead to tyranny and so to confusion. He says, he would choose neither to live nor to leave his property under such a government. He quotes the Scriptures for his authority.³ The late historian of Connecticut, Alexander Johnston, says that this letter to Winthrop might be made the foundation of the claim that Mr. Hooker had supplied the spirit of the Connecticut Constitution.⁴

In Massachusetts, the advice of the ministers of the churches was sought and followed as the practice, and Massachusetts was theocratic and aristocratic, for both John Cotton and Governor Winthrop contended for this; but the first written constitution in human history was that of Connecticut, adopted in 1639, and it was framed clearly on these lines marked out by Mr. Hooker. There was an adjourned session of the General Court in April, 1638. To this Court, says Dr. Trumbull, was intrusted the formation of that Constitution which was formally adopted in January, 1639. On Thursday, May 31, 1638, Mr. Hooker preached a sermon before the General Court, and he held:—

"*Doctrine.* I. That the choice of public magistrates belongs unto the people by God's own allowance.

¹ Hubbard's General History, p. 265. ² Winthrop, ii. 428.

³ Conn. Hist. Soc. Coll., i. 11, 12. ⁴ Johnston's Conn., p. 71.

"II. The privilege of election, which belongs to the people, therefore must not be exercised according to their humors, but according to the blessed will and law of God.

"III. They who have the power to appoint officers and magistrates, it is in their power, also, to set the bounds and limitations of the power and place unto which they call them.

"*Reasons.* 1. Because the foundation of authority is laid, firstly, in the free consent of the people.

"2. Because, by a free choice, the hearts of the people will be more inclined to the love of the persons [chosen] and more ready to yield [obedience].

"3. Because of that duty and engagement of the people."¹

Dr. Leonard Bacon said:—

"That sermon by Thomas Hooker, from the pulpit of the first church in Hartford, is the earliest known suggestion of a fundamental law, enacted not by royal charter, nor by concession from any previously existing government, but by the people themselves,—a primary and supreme law by which the government is constituted, and which not only provides for the free choice of magistrates by the people, but also sets the bounds and limitations of the power and place to which each magistrate is called."²

Professor Alexander Johnston says:—

"Here is the first practical assertion of the right of the people, not only to choose but to limit the powers of their rulers,—an assertion which lies at the foundation of the American system."³

John Fiske says:—

"The Connecticut Constitution was the first written Constitution known to history that created a government, and it marked the beginnings of American democracy, of which Thomas Hooker deserves more than any other man to be called the father. The government of the United States to-day is in lineal descent more nearly related to that of Connecticut than to that of any other of the thirteen colonies."⁴

In May, 1639, Mr. Hooker and Mr. Haynes went to Massachusetts to renew negotiations about the Confederation which had been unsuccessfully begun two years before. Mr. Hooker preached a sermon of more than two hours in length before the Governor, and we know that the result of

¹ Walker's Life of Hooker, p. 125.

² Centennial Conf. Address, pp. 152, 153.

³ Conn., p. 72. ⁴ Beginnings of New England, pp. 127, 128.

this visit was an agreement of the Commissioners of the various Colonies in twelve articles, which constituted in effect, for certain matters of common interest, a federal government under the title of the "United Colonies of New England."¹ This Federal Constitution prepared the way for that of 1787.

We now turn to another step in the development of our national political life, and again we find the moving spirit was a Congregational clergyman. We refer to the famous "Body of Liberties," which Massachusetts Bay adopted in 1641, and which was mainly the work of the Rev. Nathaniel Ward, of Ipswich, who graduated at Emmanuel College in 1603, one year before Thomas Hooker entered. This "Body of Liberties" formed the basis of the law and civil government of the Massachusetts Colony.

"In one hundred sections it lays down the substantial principles securing life, liberty, property, etc., and the methods of civil administration adapted to the time. It was fully studied and amended in the towns, and was adopted in the most deliberate way."²

Nathaniel Ward had studied law in England, and he was of course most intimate with Thomas Hooker; for, not only as graduates of the same college, but in their weekly ministers' meetings, they must have met often and compared views. This is significant, for both Nathan Dane and Rev. Manasseh Cutler, who wrote the Ordinance of 1787, came from the same town as Ward,—Ipswich.³ The laws and customs of New England were enforced by the magistrates in the spirit of a "sacred trust," for they were not accustomed to use office for personal ends.

We now pass to the most important of all legislative en-

¹ Winthrop, ii. 121, 127.

² Weeden, Vol. i. p. 77.

³ So far as we know, the significant fact has not heretofore been noticed that, whoever wrote the Ordinance of 1787, whether Nathan Dane, as stated by Daniel Webster, or Dr. Manasseh Cutler, as stated by Dr. Poole, it emanated from Ipswich, Mass., the home of Nathaniel Ward, the author of the Body of Liberties.

actments that Congress ever passed with regard to the public domain,—the Ordinance of 1787.

Mr. Shosuke Sato,¹ after reviewing carefully the claims of different men to the authorship of the Ordinance, says:—

“Mr. Poole's article remains the masterpiece on the subject of the Ordinance of 1787.”

This article of Dr. Poole² says:—

“On the 13th of July, 1787, the Congress of the old Confederation, sitting in New York, passed an ‘Ordinance for the Government of the Territory Northwest of the River Ohio,’ which has passed into history as the ‘Ordinance of 1787.’

“The territory embraced what is now the States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin. Its provisions have since been applied to all the Territories of the United States lying north of latitude 36° 40', which now comprises the States of Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, and Oregon. August 7, 1789, the Constitution of the United States, having then been adopted, Congress among its earliest acts passed one recognizing the binding force of the Ordinance of 1787, and adapting its provisions to the Federal Constitution.

“The Ordinance, in the breadth of its conceptions, its details, and its results, has been perhaps the most notable instance of legislation that was ever enacted by the representatives of the American people. It fixed forever the character of the immigration, and of the social, political, and educational institutions of the people who were to inhabit this imperial territory,—then a wilderness, but now covered by five great States, and teeming with more than ten million persons, or one-fourth of the entire population of the United States. It forever prohibited slavery and involuntary servitude,—that pestilent element of discord and tyranny in our American system, which then existed in all the States except Massachusetts, where it had come to an end by a decision of its Supreme Court only four years before. It declared that ‘religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall always be encouraged.’ It prohibited the feudal law of primogeniture, and provided that the property of a parent dying intestate should be divided equally among his children or next of kin; that no person demeaning himself in a peaceable and orderly manner shall ever be molested on account of his mode of worship or religious sentiments; that the inhabitants shall always be entitled to the benefits of the writ of habeas corpus, of trial by jury, of a proportional representation in the legislature, and of judicial proceedings ac-

¹ Land Question in the United States.

² North American Review, April, 1876.

cording to the course of the common law; that all persons shall be bailable unless for capital offences, when the proof shall be evident, or the presumption great; that all fines shall be moderate, and no cruel and unusual punishment shall be inflicted; that no man shall be deprived of his liberty or property but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land; and should the public exigencies make it necessary to take any man's property, or to demand his particular services, full compensation shall be made for the same; and in the just preservation of his rights and property, it is understood and declared that no law ought ever to be made or have force in said territory that shall in any manner whatever interfere with or affect private contracts or engagements *bona fide* and without fraud previously made.

"This was the first embodiment in written constitutional law of a provision maintaining the obligation of contracts. Six weeks later it was, on motion of Mr. King, of Massachusetts, incorporated in the draft of the Constitution of the United States."

" . . . Every square mile of territory that was covered by the Ordinance of 1787 was patriotic, and gave its men and its means for the support of the Union."

"Dr. Manasseh Cutler, of *Ipswich, Mass.*, arrived July 5th.

"In April, 1788, the Ohio Company made the first English settlement of the Northwest Territory at Marietta, Ohio, at the mouth of the Muskingum, on the land which Dr. Cutler had bought on this occasion. General Washington,¹ writing from Mount Vernon, two months later, said: 'No colony in America was ever settled under such favorable auspices as that which has just commenced at the Muskingum. Information, property, and strength will be its characteristics. I know many of the settlers personally, and there never were men better calculated to promote the welfare of such a community. If I were a young man, just preparing to begin the world, or, if advanced in life and had a family to make provision for, I know of no country where I should rather fix my habitation than in some part of that region.'

"Massachusetts had in 1780 abolished slavery, established public schools for general education, and framed the most advanced code of laws concerning the liberties and natural rights of man, civil jurisprudence, and public polity, which the world had then seen.

"The Ordinance of 1787 is a condensed abstract of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780. Every principle contained in the former, either in a germinal or developed form, except that relating to the obligation of contracts, and some temporary provisions relating to the organization of the territorial government, is found in the latter, and often in the same phraseology."

In 1830 Daniel Webster, in his answer to Hayne, as-

¹ Sparks' edition of Washington's Writings, Vol. ix. p. 385.

cribed the authorship to Nathan Dane, of Massachusetts. Mr. Benton, of Missouri, said it was not the work of Nathan Dane, but of Thomas Jefferson, of Virginia. Hon. Edward Coles, Governor of Illinois (1822-26), in January, 1856, claimed the honor for Jefferson. Dr. Poole clearly proved that it could not have been the work of Jefferson.

Of the Ordinance, Daniel Webster said:—

"We are accustomed to praise the lawgivers of antiquity; we help to perpetuate the fame of Solon and Lycurgus; but I doubt whether one single law of any lawgiver, ancient or modern, has produced effects of more distinct, marked and lasting character than the Ordinance of 1787. We see its consequences at this moment, and we shall never cease to see them perhaps while the Ohio shall flow."¹

Judge Story said:—

"The Ordinance is remarkable for the brevity and exactness of its text and for its masterly display of the fundamental principles of civil and religious liberty."²

Judge Timothy Walker said:—

"Upon the surpassing excellence of the Ordinance no language of panegyric would be extravagant. The Romans would have imagined some divine Egeria for its author. It approaches as nearly to absolute perfection as anything to be found in the legislation of mankind; for after the experience of fifty years it would perhaps be impossible to alter a word without marring it. In short, it is one of those matchless specimens of sagacious forecast which even the reckless spirit of innovation would not venture to assail."³

Dr. Poole clearly showed that this Ordinance was the work of the Rev. Manasseh Cutler, of Ipswich. He admits that it was in the handwriting of Dane, whom Webster credited with being its author, but both Dane and Cutler came from Ipswich,—Dane being the member from the Essex district. Ipswich was the home of Nathaniel Ward, the author of the "Body of Liberties," and he was the great friend of Thomas Hooker. It must be that Congregationalism in Ipswich was thoroughly imbued with sound piety and polit-

¹ Daniel Webster, *Work*, iii. 263.

² Story's *Commentaries*, iii. 187.

³ Quoted by Poole, *No. Am. Rev.*, April, 1876.

ical sagacity, and we imagine we know its origin. It was Rev. Nathaniel Ward, who was trained to the law and practised it in England.

Let us examine one more political document, famous as a title-deed to liberty,—the Emancipation Proclamation.

In the early part of the century a Congregational home missionary settled upon this Western Reserve, at Tallmadge, Ohio, and afterward moved to Detroit, Mich., when a son was born to him. This boy became one of the heroic, distinguished, and useful men in the denomination. His name was Leonard Bacon. He wrote a tract on Slavery which fell into the hands of another Western boy,—Abraham Lincoln. When the Emancipation Proclamation became famous, and was recognized as worthy to be ranked with the Magna Charta and the Declaration of Independence, as one of the world's three title-deeds to liberty, Lincoln was asked as to the source of his inspiration, and he gave full credit to that tract of Dr. Bacon's for its influence upon him in his earlier years.¹

It makes little difference, therefore, at what point we analyze the waters of that stream called "American History." The simple elements are ever the same. The Congregational idea is clearly revealed. At whatever point of vision we view the past four centuries, the same rugged truths stand out in bold relief against the sky. They are the basal ideas of Congregationalism on their religious side, and American democracy on their civil side. They are religion, morality, knowledge; liberty, equality, democracy. Individualism and true socialism; egoism and Christian altruism; liberty by bondage to truth. We find these truths in the Connecticut Constitution of 1639, in the Body of Liberties of 1641, in Federal Compact of 1643, the Declaration of Independence, the Ordinance of 1787, the Constitution of 1789, and the

¹ Lincoln's Declaration to Dr. Jos. P. Thompson, *Century Magazine*, Vol. xxv. p. 658.

Emancipation Proclamation of 1863. The Thirteenth Amendment, prohibiting slavery, is identical with the sixth clause in the Ordinance of 1787. All of these documents are the result largely of the influence and teaching of Congregational clergymen at periods in the nation's history most pivotal and critical. As a spiritual force and polity the Congregational idea has been a powerful magnet, giving direction to all the religious, civil, and political forces in America. Thus the founders of this nation were men of faith and wisdom. They went upon the mountain, and Christ was transfigured before them. They worshipped him. When they came down they built three tabernacles,—one to religion, one to morality, and one to knowledge.

It has been said they were narrow. So is electricity, but it is concentrated. Sometimes it is narrow; sometimes it is broad. Strange such narrow men should have been such powerful metaphysicians and theologians as Edwards, Taylor, Emmons, Hopkins, Stuart, Finney; and should be succeeded by such men of breadth as Mark Hopkins, Noah Porter, Hickok, and President Fairchild. True, they were Calvinists, and split hairs into sixteenths over such subjects as the freedom of the will, the state of the mind a minute before conversion; the doctrine of election, of foreordination. But they had a sense of the immanence and sovereignty of God, and of man's accountability to him, that would put the amiable doctrines of this age to shame. Where are the men to-day preaching the doctrine of sin and the persistence of force in character? Where is the heroic truth that has moral fibre and tissue; that has will for the basis of character instead of sentimentalism or emotion? And yet these fathers, while so severe with themselves, were tender and beautiful in their lives, gentle in manner, and lovely in character. This age needs to learn that love is made of sterner stuff than sentiment; that it seeks the good of all, and is not cultivated for subjective purposes. It can shoot Indians, throw

tea overboard, and make quick work with disturbers of the public peace. They had virtue, moral dignity, moral character, because they had freedom which, as they had learned from Christ, came from bondage to truth or law. They defined all of life in terms of faith and duty, and not in terms of expediency or sentiment.

Strange, is it not, that where Scotch piety prevails in its sternest type, Scotch bankers are the most reliable; where parents are most honored, that nation has outlived all others; and where stern sense of duty prevailed, the most beneficent economic conditions flourished.

The founders of America went to the heart of things, and psychology, no less than moral philosophy, as it is taught in our universities to-day, is the gift of Congregational clergymen to this age. But some say they had no religious toleration except in theory. This is the 'charge of the youngest scion of the Adams family against his own ancestors and the founders of the Massachusetts Colony. Neither had our fathers Winchester rifles to shoot Indians with; nor could Paul Revere telephone the news of the arrival of the British; nor did they come over the ocean on the White Star Line, or bring stem-winding watches with them. These, all, were the fruit of a later age. So was religious toleration. One age must not judge another by its own standards. Brooks Adams has judged by the standards of to-day the men who founded Harvard College, and, as Dr. Poole well says in his review of the book,¹ it bears evidences throughout of the work of a callow dude.

But the Puritans sang psalm tunes through their noses; they wore wigs and enjoyed long sermons; they went to bed early to save candles. Do we not wish that our slums could be induced to do the same? They suffered slavery to exist. Emmons, Edwards, Hopkins, were hostile to involuntary servitude, and all preached against it. Emmons did so when it was sanctioned by his own State. Kidd says:—

¹ Emancipation of Man.

"The two doctrines which contributed most to producing the extinction of slavery were the doctrine of salvation and the doctrine of the equality of all men before the Deity."¹

These two doctrines are the key-notes of Congregationalism. Massachusetts abolished slavery in 1780 in her Constitution. Pennsylvania and Connecticut made a partial abolition in 1784. De Tocqueville prophesied that slavery could not long exist in America in contact with American thought, and it did not. Judge Samuel Sewall, in 1700, printed a tract against slavery. He said:—

"These Ethiopians, as black as they are, seeing that they are the sons and daughters of the first Adam, the brethren and sisters of the last Adam, and the offspring of God, they ought to be treated with a respect agreeable."

The family which did the most in America towards creating public opinion against slavery was the Beecher family, —Congregationalists. "Uncle Tom's Cabin," one of the greatest novels of history, was on every tongue, and Plymouth pulpit was protected by the police. Phillips Brooks was asked to name the three greatest Americans, and he said: Daniel Webster, Henry Ward Beecher, and Abraham Lincoln. They were all great and famous, because they were wedded to those Congregational ideas, liberty and equality. Dean Stanley and Canon Farrar both admitted that the church polity which the apostles acted upon was the Congregational.

The founders of American institutions believed in that orderly development of national life, evolution and not revolution, except as the latter was necessary to right wrongs which could be righted in no other way. First the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear. First the individual, then the family, then the church, then the state, and finally a nation. The doctrine of the sovereignty of the people thus unfolded. It was nurtured in the township, it then took possession of the state, and finally of the nation. They never dreamed of a democratic Republic as being free, desirable, or

¹ Social Evolution, p. 168.

safe except as it was founded on religion, morality, and education; and except as the right of franchise was in the hands of integral units who were themselves lovers of God and man. Person and property were to them safe so far as they were held to be sacred.

And when it came to the individual, they had scientific notions of his orderly development. They believed that religion strengthened the will, clarified the intellect, and softened the sensibilities. It was not simply the "sweetness and light" of an æsthetic dreamer nor an emotion; but it was *will* renewed, strengthened, and healed from the impotency caused by sin; it was conscience awakened, educated, and ever operative, giving the only true conception of good-will; it was thought, broad in its sweep and comprehensive in its grasp, but none the less synthetic and analytic. It gave generalizations from an absolute knowledge of detail.

As Dr. Poole said:—

"From that prolific stock has sprung a race of men and women, who, by character, energy, and ideas, have largely controlled the tier of Northern States from the Atlantic to the Pacific."¹

Since these men landed on American shores, great advancement has been made in notions of religious toleration, of democracy, and of political liberty; but a loftier faith and heroism; a greater fortitude and self-denial; a keener insight into principles giving wisdom and political sagacity will never be found in the American people than that which characterized the Founders of this Republic.

¹ Dial, Jan. 1891.

[*To be Concluded.*]

ARTICLE IX.

RELIGION AND WEALTH.

BY THE REV. WASHINGTON GLADDEN, D.D.

RELIGION and Wealth are two great interests of human life. Are they hostile or friendly? Are they mutually exclusive, or can they dwell together in unity? In a perfect social state what would be their relations?

What is Religion? Essentially it is the devout recognition of a Supreme Power. It is belief in a Creator, a Sovereign, a Father of men, with some sense of dependence upon him and obligation to him. Such a belief and such a sense of dependence are elements of human nature. "Religious ideas of one kind or other," says Mr. Herbert Spencer, "are almost universal. . . . The universality of religious ideas, their independent evolution among different primitive races, and their great vitality, unite in showing that their source must be deep seated instead of superficial."¹ "Of Religion, then, we must always remember, that amid its many errors and corruptions it has asserted and diffused a supreme verity. From the first, the recognition of this supreme verity, in however imperfect a manner, has been its vital element; and its various defects, once extreme but gradually diminishing, have been so many failures to recognize in full that which it recognizes in part. The truly religious element of Religion has always been good; that which has proved untenable in doctrine and vicious in practice has been its irreligious element; and from this it has been ever undergoing purification."²

This testimony of the chief of the agnostics to the uni-

¹ First Principles, p. 13. ² *Ibid.*, p. 101.

versality of religious ideas and sentiments will not need confirmation. These ideas have found many grotesque expressions, with which we need not concern ourselves at this time; it is with their most perfect expression that we have to deal. In its most perfect expression Religion conceives of the Supreme Being as infinite in power and wisdom and perfect in goodness, and represents him as holding communication with his children and seeking to make them partakers of his perfection and his blessedness. The religious life is the life according to God, the life whose key-note is harmony with the divine nature, and conformity to the divine will.

What will the man who is living this kind of life think about wealth? How will his religion affect his thoughts about wealth? If all men were, in this highest sense of the word, religious, should we have wealth among us?

To answer this question intelligently we must first define wealth. The economists have had much disputation over the word, but for our purposes we may safely define wealth as consisting in exchangeable goods. All products, commodities, rights, which men desire, and which, in this commercial age, can be exchanged for money, we may include under this term. Under this definition, the poor man's hoe and rake, the homespun garments he is wearing, and the potatoes in his bin are wealth; and they do belong in this category;—they are certainly part of the national wealth. But the popular use of the word is hardly covered by the economic definition; some measure of abundance is generally connoted. The poor man's little all may be part of the national wealth, but we should hardly call that a wealthy nation in which none had more than he. The question before us has in view the abundance, the profusion of economic goods, now existing in all civilized nations. There is vastly more in the hands of the men of Europe and America to-day than suffices to supply their immediate physical necessities. Vast stores of food, of fuel, of clothing and ornament, of luxuries of all

sorts; millions of costly homes, filled with all manner of comforts and adornments; enormous aggregations of machinery for the production and transportation of exchangeable goods,—these are a few of the signs of that abundance toward which our thought is now directed. Our question is, whether, if all men lived according to God, in perfect harmony with his thought, in perfect conformity to his will, the world would contain such an abundance of exchangeable goods as that which we now contemplate.

This is a question which the devout have long debated. Through long periods and over wide areas the prevalent conception of religion has involved the renunciation of riches. The life of the pious Brahman culminates in mendicancy; he reaches perfection only when he rids himself of all the goods of this world. "When the householder is advanced in years," says Professor Eggeling, "he should disengage himself from all family ties—except that his wife may accompany him if she chooses—and repair to a lonely wood, taking with him his sacred fires and the implements required for the daily and periodical offerings. Clad in a deer's skin, with his hair and nails uncut, the hermit is to subsist exclusively on foods growing wild in the forest, such as roots, fruit, green herbs, and wild rice and grain. He must not accept gifts from any one, except of what may be absolutely necessary to maintain him; but with his own little hoard he should, on the contrary, honour, to the best of his ability, those who visit his hermitage." Finally, as the end draws near, "taking up his abode at the foot of a tree in total solitude, . . . clad in a coarse garment, he should carefully avoid injuring any creature or giving offence to any human being that may happen to come near him. Once a day, in the evening, . . . he should go near the habitations of men, in order to beg what little food may suffice to sustain his feeble frame. Ever pure of mind he should thus bide his time, . . . wishing neither for death nor life, until at last his soul is freed from his fetters and

absorbed in the eternal spirit, the impersonal self-existent Brahma."¹

Buddhism does not demand of all devotees the ascetic life, but its eminent saints adopt this life, and poverty is regarded as the indispensable condition of the highest sanctity. The sacred order founded by Gautama was an order of mendicants. Three garments of cotton cloth, made from cast-off rags, are the monk's whole wardrobe, and the only additional possessions allowed him are a girdle for the loins, an alms-bowl, a razor, a needle, and a water-strainer. "The usual mode of obtaining food," says Mr. Rhys Davids, "is for the monk to take his begging-bowl, in shape nearly like a soup-tureen without its cover, and holding it in his hands, to beg straight from house to house. He is to say nothing, but simply stand outside the hut, the doors and windows of which in India are usually large and open. If anything is put into his bowl he utters a pious wish on behalf of the giver and passes on; if nothing is given he passes on in silence, and thus begs straight on without going to the houses of the rich or luxurious rather than to those of the poor and thrifty."

Such an ascetic rule could hardly be regarded as a precept, binding upon all, but must rather be held as a "counsel of perfection," applicable to the elect only. For some must dig, else none can beg; and the superior sanctity of the mendicant must be won through the worldliness of his neighbors.

The monastic rule has had wide vogue, however, in Christian communities, and great numbers of saintly men have adopted the rule of poverty. Many of the early Christian fathers use very strong language in denouncing the possession of wealth as essentially irreligious: "The rich are robbers," says Chrysostom; "a kind of equality must be effected by making gifts out of their abundance." "Opulence is always the product of theft," says Jerome, "committed, if not by the actual possessor, by his ancestors." "Let him who has been

¹ Encyclopædia Britannica, article "Brahmanism."

deceived and conquered by his wealth," cries Cyprian, "neither retain nor love it. Property is to be fled as an enemy, to be avoided as a robber, to be feared as a sword." Sentiments of a very different nature are often expressed, it is true, by these teachers; but the trend of their doctrine is, nevertheless, ascetic; and the germs of the later monasticism are in the words of the early fathers. The corner-stone of monachism is the sanctity of poverty. It is not too much to say that for ages the ideal of saintliness involved the renunciation of wealth. Nor is this notion confined to the monastic ages or the monastic communities. There are many good Protestants, even in these days, who feel that there is an essential incompatibility between the possession of wealth and the attainment of a high degree of spirituality.

Doubtless the ascetic doctrine respecting wealth seems to find support in certain texts of the New Testament: "Ye cannot serve God and Mammon." "How hardly shall they that have riches enter into the kingdom of God." "Whosoever he be of you that renounceth not all that he hath, he cannot be my disciple." That word of Paul's, also, so grievously misquoted and even mistranslated, in which he is supposed to have said that money is the root of all evil, has doubtless contributed to the formation of this notion. All these texts, and especially the words of Jesus, must be interpreted in the light of Jesus' method, in which, as Professor Caird has expressed it, "complementary but contrasted elements of truths are set side by side, each of them being stated so positively as to lead to a verbal contradiction with the others." It will not be difficult for the student to find other words of Jesus, relating to the possession and use of the good things of this world, in which the subject is placed in a different light. The fact that several rich men are mentioned as intimate friends of Jesus must also be taken into consideration. The ascetic doctrine with regard to wealth cannot, I think, be clearly drawn from the New Testament. Neverthe-

less this doctrine has greatly influenced the thought of the Christian church. The life of the church it has not greatly influenced; for the love of gain has generally been a stronger motive than godliness; but the minds of devout men have been troubled by the feeling that riches are essentially evil, and that some taint attaches to wealth, no matter how moderately it may be sought.

This feeling has been strengthened also by the abuses of wealth. How grave these abuses have always been I need not try to tell; it is the most threadbare of truisms. There is no kind of power that may not be abused; and wealth, which is the sum and concentration of material power, has always been subject to terrible abuses. The love of money, in Paul's words, has been "a root of all kinds of evil." Allowance must indeed be made for the hyperbole even in this statement; for there is a great deal of indolence and thriftlessness and prodigality which do not grow from this root; some kinds of evil would be materially lessened if the passion of accumulation were stronger in the hearts of those who are addicted to them. But the truth remains that the evils which grow from this root are multifarious and enormous. The desire of wealth is the parent of pride and extortion and cruelty and oppression; it is the minister of treason and corruption and bribery in the commonwealth; it is the purveyor of lust and debauchery; it is the instigator of countless crimes. Augustine once declared that "all the strife in the world, wars, rebellion, offences, murder, injustice, arise concerning what we individually possess." It is an extravagant saying, but our daily experience almost justifies it.

It is in the abuses of wealth, doubtless, that devout men have found the chief reason for their scepticism concerning it and their renunciation of it. It is often difficult for ardent and strenuous souls to distinguish between uses and abuses. Many good things have been cast aside because of their perversion. Still, the ascetics are sometimes right. What is the

truth in this case? Do the anchorites rightly interpret the will of God? Is their manner of life the perfect life? Would God be better pleased with men if they had no possessions beyond the supply of the actual needs of the hour? A little elementary thinking upon these questions may be helpful to some minds.

It may be well to resolve this abstraction, wealth, into its concrete elements. What is the wealth of America to-day? It consists in the development of the earth's resources. The wealth of this land is in its fertile fields and their fruits, in its mines and quarries and their products. The wealth of the nation has come out of the earth. The processes of agriculture and mining are the foundation of it all. The wealth of this continent is vastly greater to-day than it was two centuries and a half ago, and why? Because the resources of the continent have been developed. The soil has been cleared and subdued and cultivated, until its power to bring forth food for the sustenance of life has been indefinitely increased; a wise selection has been made of grains and fruits and herbs and roots most serviceable to man, and these have been improved by cultivation until their abundance and perfection have banished all fears of famine; animals, also, under the same skilful breeding have been rendered far more useful to mankind; from the heart of the earth minerals and metals have been drawn forth and chiseled and smelted and refined and shaped for human uses; above all, the forces of Nature have been caught and harnessed and compelled to serve in a thousand ways the convenience and comfort of man. A large part of the wealth of the land consists in contrivances for the utilization of natural forces.

The earth's riches are simply the development of the earth's resources. It is plain that these material resources of the earth readily submit themselves to this process of development under the hand of man. Is it not equally plain that these processes of development have followed, for the most

part, natural laws,—that these grains and fruits and roots and living creatures have simply been aided by men in fulfilling the law of their own life? There have been cases of perversion under the hand of man; but, as a general rule, that improvement of the earth's powers and products in which the wealth of the world consists, has been wrought by closely following the lines of development indicated in the nature of the things themselves; by helping each to become what it was meant to be.

Now we are told by a high authority that, "for science, God is simply the stream of tendency by which all things fulfil the law of their being." For faith God is more than this, but it is worth something to know that for science he is as much as this. So much, we are told, is scientifically verifiable. Such a stream of tendency there is; and the scientific man as well as the religious man has a right, Mr. Arnold says, to call it God. If this be true, then those who are working for the improvement of natural products, and for the development of the earth's resources, and for the utilization of natural forces are workers together with God. In the production of wealth men are constantly co-operating with the Creator. It is clear, therefore, not only that there can be nothing inherently wrong in the production of wealth, but that it may be, and indeed ought to be, essentially a religious service.

By another consideration this judgment will be fortified. All religious beliefs assume that the perfection of man is part of the divine purpose. In him, also, there is a stream of tendency, by which, if he will but yield to it and follow it, the law of his being will be fulfilled; and this is God working in him to will and to work for his good pleasure. For the attainment of the perfection to which man is called wealth is the indispensable condition.

It is evident that when man lives in utter penury, from hand to mouth, having no surplus beyond the day's need, his powers can reach no large development. In such conditions

drought or frost or blight or flood may sweep away whole populations; we have had frequent instances, in Russia, and in China, of what may happen in a community where there is not much surplus wealth. Such a condition of things cannot be in accordance with the purpose of a benevolent Creator. A state of society in which such an impairment of human power and such a destruction of human life could occur cannot be approved by religion. And even counting out such inevitable calamities, it is evident that human beings who are thus living on the very verge of starvation cannot make the most of themselves. In order that men may realize their own manhood, may fulfil, in any adequate degree, the law of their own being, they must live beyond the reach of immediate want. They must have permanent and safe shelter from the elements; they must have comfortable clothing; they must have an abundance of palatable and nourishing food. Even the physical nature will not reach perfection under the discipline of penury. The noble savage is physically a far less perfect being than the civilized man. But beyond all this there must be abundance in order that there may be leisure, that the higher interests of man may be cultivated. Learning and art are dependent upon leisure; and leisure means a surplus, somewhere; abundant stores laid by for future use; some measure of wealth. In order that men may reach intellectual and spiritual perfection, there must be time for study, for meditation, for communion with Nature; there must be time and facilities for travel, that the products and thoughts of all climes may be studied and compared, that human experience may be enlarged, and human sympathies broadened and deepened. It is no more possible that humanity should attain its ideal perfection in poverty than that maize should flourish in Greenland. For the ripening of this harvest of the æons there must be rich soil and genial seasons. The wealth which is represented in the vast aggregate of machinery—the machinery of production and transportation—for the multi-

plication of the necessities and comforts of life, and for the movement of men and things to the places where they are most needed; the wealth which is represented in schools, colleges, libraries, cabinets, galleries of art, places of public assembly, parks and pleasure grounds, charitable, educational, and missionary funds, is part of the necessary provision for the elevation of the human race to its best estate.

It is most true, let me repeat, that this beneficent power may be perverted and abused; men may make the bounty of Nature a curse through gluttony and drunkenness; they may waste the opportunities of leisure in debasing idleness and in enervating and corrupting indulgences; wealth may be and is to millions the instrument of self-destruction; but this is no disproof of its essential beneficence. Freedom, also, is to countless millions the gateway to ruin, but it is the condition of manhood. And while it is true that through the abuses of wealth nations have been ruined, it is also true that without the aid of wealth no people has brought forth the best fruits of intelligence and virtue.

If, then, the material wealth of the world consists simply in the development of powers with which Nature has been stocked by the Creator, and if this development is the necessary condition of the perfection of man, who is made in the image of God, it is certain that in the production of wealth, in the multiplication of exchangeable utilities, man is a co-worker with God. Note that I have said "*utilities*"; for I am not considering the cases of those who gain by the making and vending of poisonous and deleterious commodities; nothing can be wealth, in the sense in which I am using the term, which may not conduce to the weal of those who use it. It is the production of exchangeable *goods* of which I am speaking; and that, I say, when rightly understood, is not only not an irreligious act, it ought to be in every case an act of worship.

So much has religion to say concerning the production

of wealth. I am sure that the verdict of the religious consciousness on this part of the question must be clear and unfaltering.

But there is another important inquiry. That wealth should exist is plainly in accordance with the will of God, but in whose hands? Religion justifies the production of wealth; what has religion to say about the distribution of wealth? The arts of production have been raised to marvellous perfection; can as much be said of the methods of distribution? There is a great deal of wealth in the world; are we satisfied that it is, on the whole, where it ought to be?

The religious man must seek to be a co-worker with God, not only in the production, but also in the distribution of wealth. Can we discover God's plan for this distribution?

It is pretty clear that the world has not as yet discovered God's plan. The existing practice is far from being ideal. While tens of thousands are rioting in superfluity, hundreds of thousands are suffering for the lack of the necessities of life; some are even starving. That this suffering is often due to indolence and improvidence and vice—a natural penalty which ought not to be set aside—may be freely admitted; but when that is all taken account of there is a great deal of penury left which it is hard to justify in view of the opulence everywhere visible. That there are multitudes of human beings who have wrought nothing but benefit to society all their lives—honest, industrious, faithful men and women—who are still very poor, is undeniable; and it is equally evident that there are a great many other people who have wrought no benefit to society in all their lives—some of whom are utterly idle and worthless, and some of whom expend all their ingenuity in despoiling and corrupting their fellows—who are very rich. There are no principles of equity on which such a state of things can be justified. Inequalities so gross cannot be in harmony with the will of a God of righteousness.

What is the rule by which the wealth of the world is now

distributed? Fundamentally, I think, it is the rule of the strongest. It is what Rob Roy describes as

"the good old rule, the simple plan,
That he should get who has the power
And he should keep who can."

This rule has been greatly modified in the progress of civilization; a great many kinds of violence are now prohibited; in many ways the weak are protected by law against the encroachments of the strong; human rapacity is confined within certain metes and bounds; nevertheless the wealth of the world is still, in the main, the prize of strength and skill. Our laws furnish the rules of the game; but the game is essentially as Rob Roy describes it. *To every one according to his power*, is the underlying principle of the present system of distribution.

A striking illustration of the fact that this is the fundamental principle of the existing industrial order is seen in the recent occupation of the Cherokee lands. Our government had a little property to distribute, and on what principle was the distribution made? Was the land divided among the neediest, or the worthiest, or the most learned, or the most patriotic? No, it was offered to the strongest. Only those of toughest muscle and greatest powers of endurance had any chance in the *mêlée*. The government stood by to prevent the competitors, so far as possible, from killing or maiming one another in the scramble; it tried to enforce the rules of the game; but the game was essentially a contest of strength. It is evident that under such a system, in spite of legal restraints, the strong will trample upon the weak. We cannot believe that such a system can be in accordance with the will of a Father to whom the poor and needy are the especial objects of care.

What other rule of distribution can religion suggest? Let me quote a few comprehensive words from Dr. Newman Smyth: "Three socialistic principles have been proposed;

—to every one alike; to every one according to his needs; to every one according to his work. But would either be a sufficient ethical distribution? What under perfect economic conditions would be an ideal distribution of goods? The first principle of distribution, to all alike, would itself occasion an unequal distribution, because all have not equal needs, or the same capacity for reception and ability to use what is received; heaven can be no communism; every cup will be filled, but there may be differences in the sizes of the cups. The second principle may be charitable but it is not just, as needs are no standard either of service rendered or true desert. The third may be just but it is not merciful. In a perfect distribution of good, justice, mercy, and regard for possible use must be combined.”¹

These words bring clearly before us the problem of distribution. I think that we can see that none of these methods, taken by itself, would furnish a rule in perfect harmony with divine justice and benignity. The communistic rule is clearly unjust and impracticable. To give to all an equal portion would be wasteful in the extreme; for some could by no possibility use their portion; much of it would be squandered and lost. Some could use productively and beneficently ten times or even a thousand times more than others. The divine wisdom must follow somewhat closely the rule of the man in the parable who distributed his goods among his servants, giving “*to every man according to his several ability.*” But ability here is *not ability to take*,—ability to grasp, to get,—*but ability to use beneficently and productively*, which is a very different matter.

The ability of men productively and beneficently to use wealth is by no means equal; often those who have most power in getting it show little wisdom in using it. One man could handle with benefit to himself and to his fellows one hundred thousand dollars a year; another could not handle

¹ Christian Ethics, p. 450.

one thousand dollars a year without doing both himself and his fellows a great injury. If the function of wealth under the divine order is the development of manhood, then it is plain that an equal distribution of it would be altogether inadmissible; for under such a distribution some would obtain far less than they could use with benefit, and others far more.

The other socialistic maxims, "To each according to his needs," and "To each according to his work," are evidently ambiguous. What needs? The needs of the body or of the spirit? And how can we assure ourselves that by any distribution which we could effect, real needs would be supplied? Every day we meet in the street men who are undoubtedly in want of food, and who ask us for food; but we know that if we put into their hands the means of purchasing food, they will use it to purchase poison. Any distribution according to supposed needs would thus be constantly perverted. It is impossible for us to ascertain and measure the real needs of men.

"To each according to his works" is equally uncertain. What works? Works of greed or works of love? Works whose aim is sordid or works whose aim is social? According to the divine plan the function of wealth, as we have seen, is the perfection of character and the promotion of social welfare. Wealth is the material for character-building; it is the foundation of the kingdom of heaven. The divine plan must, therefore, be, that wealth shall be so distributed as to secure these great results. And religion which seeks to discern and follow the divine plan, must teach that the wealth of the world will be rightly distributed, only *when every man shall have as much as he can wisely use to make himself a better man, and the community in which he lives a better community—so much and no more.*

It is obvious that the divine plan is yet far from realization. Other and far less ideal methods of distribution are recognized by our laws, and it would be folly greatly to

change the laws, until radical changes shall have taken place in human nature. But the inquiry of this paper is not what politics or economics have to say about the production and distribution of wealth, but what religion has to say about it. And the councils of religion will furnish to us, as individuals, far higher and safer principles for the guidance of our conduct than those which are current in the political or the industrial world.

To many a man whose portion of this world's goods is very small, religion must say: "You have but little and you ask for more. But it cannot be the will of God that you should have any more. You are using what you have in a way to disfigure and degrade yourself, and to do no good to anyone. Until you have learned to make better use of what you have, you mock God by asking for more."

To many a man whose portion is large, religion must say: "You glory in your possessions, and your legal title is probably secure; but you have really no divine right to them. Your wealth is making you hard, cynical, unjust, untruthful, uncharitable; you have built with it a pedestal on which you have lifted yourself above your fellows; you are using it in such a way as to embitter them and alienate them from you and from one another; or, perhaps, you are using it in such a way as to corrupt their minds and debauch their characters; this wealth is not intended for any such uses; you are defeating the purpose of him who has entrusted it to you; it cannot always remain in the power of those who thus misuse it; as God's great designs slowly but surely ripen, the wealth of this world will pass into the hands of men who know his will and do it."

ARTICLE X.

SEMITIC AND ORIENTAL NOTES.

EARLY ISRAELITISH MONOTHEISM.

THE discussion as to when the Israelites became, in any proper sense, monotheists, is not yet ended, if indeed, from the nature of the subject and the character of the proofs adducible, it will ever be finally settled for all alike. There is cumulative evidence of various kinds for the prevalence of early monotheism among the Hebrews, but there are also many evidences to the contrary. In the May issue of the Proceedings of the Society of Biblical Archæology, Rev. Charles James Ball presents some very interesting facts against the monotheistic view.

Among other cases, he cites the fact that in at least two cases Jacob's sons were named after deities quite distinct from the God of Israel, though, as he alleges, often associated with Him in worship. The passage is in Gen. xxx. 9-13 as follows: "When Leah became aware that she had stopped bearing, she took her maid Zilpah, and gave her to Jacob to wife; and Leah's maid Zilpah bore Jacob a son. 'With Gad's help' [pointing בְּגָד], cried Leah, and named him Gad. After that Leah's maid Zilpah bore Jacob a second son. 'With Asherah's help,' cried Leah, 'for maidens must needs call me happy'; so she named him Asher."

Gad, Mr. Ball points out, is rightly translated Τῆχῆ in the Septuagint, and is the Latin *Fors Fortuna*. In the Babylonian Exile, the Jews are reproached for worshipping this god of good luck. In Isa. lxxv. 11 we read: "But ye that forsake the Lord, that forget my holy mountain, that prepare a table for Gad [Fortune], and fill up mingled wine to Meni [Destiny]." These images were probably worshipped in much the same way as the teraphim of David, alluded to in 1 Sam. xix. 13. He also thinks that perhaps *Gad* here is a Semitic adaptation of the Accadian *Gud*, as a title of Merodach (Marduk), who assigns and determines the fate of men and nations.

Asherah is, he continues, known to have represented the female principle of Nature, according to the conceptions of Canaanitish religion. She is always associated with Baal, and her image was even set up in the temple of Jerusalem (2 Kings xxiii. 6). Among the planets she was Venus, just as Gad is associated with Jupiter in the Arabic astrology. Another

instance which he cites, is that of the burial by Jacob of all the foreign gods in his family under the terebinth by Shechem (Gen. xxxv. 1-4).

These are not the only instances of this kind in the earlier literature of the Old Testament, and seem to offer pretty clear evidence against anything like a pure monotheistic conception, at least, in either the Jahvist or the Elohist narratives. But there is one thing to be said, in connection with all these cases, and that is, their isolated and comparatively rare character, as connected with the general trend of the worship, which uniformly has Jehovah for its centre and object. These instances look more like survivals, than as indicating a fixed type of worship, though there can be no doubt that Abraham's ancestry and the worship of Sin, the Babylonian Moon-god at Ur, might easily have brought a polytheistic bent into successive generations, both reasonably and naturally. The belief in early monotheism, however, rests not, as Mr. Ball seems to think, upon "special objective revelations" so much as upon the method of explaining with least violence, to the data at our disposal, the phenomena before us. But it is vastly easier to accept a polytheistic touch, in the period from which these examples are chosen, than to suppose, as we are so frequently asked to suppose, that a real monotheism was not attained until after the Captivity. Lapse into the polytheism of Babylonia, during the latter, was natural enough, inasmuch as this usually happens to captive races, that they fall into the religious life and ideas of their conquerors, but hardly is it likely, that, during the prophetic period at its height, the Israelites were anything other than simple monotheists.

Speaking of the little detached passage (Gen. iv. 19-24) about Lamech and his children, Mr. Ball has a much more interesting discovery to relate. Zillah, it appears, was the mother of Tubal-cain, the worker in copper and iron, and his sister's name was Naamah. Mr. Ball points out, the most interesting fact, that, though the Bible has little to say about Tubal-cain, and nothing about Naamah, in both the Babylonian and the Chinese mythology, the inventor of metallurgy shares the honors of his art with his sister, who appears as a co-equal benefactor of mankind. The table as follows shows the connection between the three in a most interesting manner:—

FOUNDERS OF METALLURGY.		
Old Babylonian.	Chinese.	Hebrew.
Bal-gin Bilgi.	Bak-ki Fuhhi.	(Tu)bal-cain.
Nin ka-(si) or	Nü kwa-(shi) or	Noğma, "Naamah."
Nin-gu-(si).	Nü-hi-(shi).	

As the affinities of the Chinese with the Accadian become more perfectly known, we shall expect a host more of just such connecting links as this. A large number has already been established, and if a sufficient number more develop, the material for a wider induction as to the sources

of the early Hebrew belief in connection with those of the Chinese, will be of first importance for the more accurate study of early religious ideas.

A not uninteresting passage in Mr. Ball's paper is the following, which, though purely personal, is not less striking as showing a type of scholar not so frequently met with as might be desirable:—

"Speaking as a sincere Catholic, but also as one whose conviction is that the highest interest of Religion is truth, I do not hesitate to say that the Old Testament itself is in manifold contradiction with that uncritical exegesis which arbitrarily ignores too many of the most original facts and features of its unique records to be worthy even of the serious consideration of earnest seekers after truth. . . . Believing therefore in truth, and in the God of truth, I am not alarmed by the results of recent inquiry nor by the hypotheses which those results seem to warrant in the field of Old Testament studies. . . . We can all do something to further or retard progress; and if we are animated by a worthy desire to advance the most sacred of all causes, the cause of that Truth, which is indeed Divine, we shall be content to work our way onward in patience, faith, and humility."

THE THREE RELIGIONS OF CHINA.

The already growing interest in the religions of China has received a decided stimulus, from the increasing evidence of the similarity of the primitive religious ideas of China and the earlier inhabitants of the Tigris-Euphrates Valley, and makes a right understanding of the former of very great importance to the students of the latter. In fact, the comparative study of religions has opened here a wide field for investigation, and we may expect that within a few years there will be a much larger study of Chinese in this country than is at present the case.

At the Oriental Congress held in London, in 1892, Professor Legge, of Oxford, presented a most absorbing paper on the theme "A Fair and Dispassionate Discussion of the Three Doctrines Accepted in China," being a translation, with comments, of a paper or treatise of that title by Liû Mî, a Buddhist writer of the thirteenth century of our era. Liû Mî's book is said to be one of the most widely read and well-known books in Japan. He is an earnest advocate of Buddhism, for which he pleads much more earnestly than for Confucianism or Tâoism, though he gives a very fair account of both these forms of Chinese religion.

The account which he offers of the first appearance of the three religions in China is very interesting. The "Doctrine of the Literati," which is his name for what we know generally as Confucianism, began, according to Liû Mî, with Fû-hsi's making of the Right Trigrams. These are trilinear symbols from which are developed the sixty-four Hexagrams which compose the Yi-Ching. The date of Fû-hsi is not given, but Professor Legge thinks that at least a thousand years elapsed between him

and Yáo, who is said to have lived in the twenty-fourth century B. C. The author probably means to give the impression that Fú-hsi was the inventor of written characters.

The "Doctrine of the Táo" is dated from the sixth century B. C., during the life of Confucius, though there was an earlier doctrine of the Táo of which Hwang-tí is said to be the author. His rule is placed as beginning about 2697 B. C.

Buddhism came into China in the reign of the Emperor Ming (A. D. 58-75), though there has been a conjecture, of which this author says nothing, that an entrance was made some time in the third century B. C. It is for the sake of Buddhism that the treatise is evidently written, and though the first two of the doctrines receive careful and painstaking attention, yet genuine enthusiasm appears only in his discussion of the third. His summary of the three and their relation to each other for practical religious living is interesting. He says:—

"The fundamental idea with the Literati is correctness of morality; with the Táoists veneration or giving honour to their Táo; and with the Buddhists vastness. They agree in their love of life and dislike of putting to death, and so (the principle of) Benevolence is common to them; in their regard for others as themselves, and so (the sentiment of) Justice is common to them; in their repression of anger and opposition to lust, in their prohibition of excess and precautions against wrong, and so (the maintenance of) Self-Culture is common to them. They all, as if with the crash of thunder, penetrate the ears of the deaf, and, as with the brightness of the sun and moon, give light to the darkened understanding, and so a Transforming influence is common to them.

"It readily appears that there are only two paths of good and evil open to man, and it is the common aim of the three doctrines that all men should take the good path. One writer has said that Buddhism regulates the mind, Táoism the body, and the doctrine of the Literati, society. But the mind, the body, and society, require each of them to be regulated, and how can any one of the three doctrines be left uncultivated? Another writer has said, that the doctrine of the Literati cures the skin, Táoism the pulse, and Buddhism the marrow. But as the skin, the pulse, and the marrow, all require to be kept in healthy action, how can any one of the doctrines be allowed to fall into disuse?"

In his description of the doctrine of the Literati, which he shows has to do chiefly with the relationships of the social order, he says, it has to do simply with the bonds of society and the constant virtues, and the power and use of ceremonies, music, punishments, and government. With these dominant, a happy order prevails in heaven and in earth. There seem to be in this doctrine, two parts, namely, (1) that which analyzes human nature into its elements; and (2) that which distributes society into its constituent relationships. It does not appear in the exposition here given by Liú Mi, as Professor Legge thinks it should appear, that a

most important element in the doctrine is the recognition of the fact, that man's existence, nature, and duties, are from a Supreme Being now called by the impersonal term Heaven, and now by the personal name of Supreme Ruler. Not only, says Professor Legge, was the doctrine of the Literati theistic, but even monotheistic, in character. Liü was probably not ignorant of the fact, though his interest in Buddhism made it easier for him to overlook it.

Of Tàoism, he says that it makes "men pure and humble in the keeping of themselves, and lowly and retiring in the assertion of themselves. It washes away all practices of a heedless and disorderly character, and brings its professors back to the regions of quiet, silence, and non-action." On Buddhism, he says that it makes "men put away what is vain, and seek after what is real; reject what is false, and turn to what is true; convert action which requires effort to that which is easy; to advance from what is profitable only to one's self to what is profitable to others. It is the dependence and resource of all living people, to which nothing can be added"; and he quotes the opinion of Li Shih-Ch'ien, of the Sui dynasty (589-618), that Buddhism may be compared to the sun, Tàoism to the moon, and the doctrine of the Literati to the five planets."

Commenting on the highest doctrine of each system, he says that the Literati achieve, as their best result, the regulation successively of the person, the clan or family, and finally the State. And by means of the State, all within the "four seas" are regulated, and the doctrine gains the widest acceptance. The Literati are scholars, he says, "complete and admirable," of great service to rulers, and conferring great benefits on the people. They maintain the culture of society and produce the highest order and peace.

Tàoism he sets forth as a kind of mysticism. It starts from the bodily person, but soon rises above the sky, and, mounting from forests and craggy peaks, soars in the boundless infinite to the golden gate of the great firmament. In its greatness it embraces the utmost limits of the sky, and in its minuteness it penetrates the atoms of the dust. Those who embrace the doctrine, study it with undistracted spirits, have union with the disembodied, living grandly in the region of absolute purity and few desires, accumulate meritorious performances and good deeds, and so deliver themselves from the trammels of the body.

Of Buddhists he says, They will be pure and holy, they will be self-forgetful, they will be fearless, they will have contempt for riches or any possessions, their minds will be earnest and resolute, they will be virtuous, and free from error. And, after showing its superiority to the first two doctrines, he adds: "Students of the doctrine of the Literati die, and there is an end of them; they and their system are an affair of but a hundred years. Students of Tàoism eagerly seek after long life; they and their life may endure for a thousand or a myriad years. Students of Buddhism wish to obliterate the distinction between life and death, and

will consequently abide in a condition of tranquillity, passing through a multitude of kalpas innumerable and inexhaustible. The system of the Literati may be compared to a lamp which gives light for a single evening. When the bell sounds, or the clepsydra is exhausted, the oil is expended, and the lamp goes out. Taoism may be compared to the lamps which the King Ajâtashatrû made to illuminate the relics of Buddha, but which would become extinguished after a hundred years. Buddhism may be compared to the illuminating power of the bright sun, shining constantly through myriads of years, disappearing in the West, but rising again in the East, with unceasing revolution."

The latter, he goes on to show most elaborately, penetrates every part of the world, and its essences, and is the final and enduring quality of all things. It is an interesting estimate by a Chinese scholar, who, with all his extravagances, is quite worthy of his own modest designation of himself as "Liû Mî, the Distinguished Scholar of the Quiet Study."

ON THE HISTORICAL STUDY OF RELIGION.

"*Unter der Hülle aller Religionen liegt die Religion selbst.*" Nothing more profound or far-reaching, as affecting the method and scope of religious investigation, has ever been uttered than this impressive sentence. The exclusivism which, until within very recent times, obscured or misrepresented the religious tendencies of other nations than those which professed Christianity, seems to be in a fair way to break away, and we are coming into the sunlight, where the object is truth first, and particular dogma afterward.

But the pioneers in this investigation were men in whom the religious faculties had been more or less dulled, either by neglect or otherwise, and who brought to their task only the barren furnishing of cold intellectual theories, which, having no kinship with the theme, necessarily brought forth only a single phase of the truth which they were obligated to seek. A healthful spirit is beginning to prevail, which, when it is everywhere brought to bear on the questions at issue, cannot but produce a great deal of light.

At the Anthropological Congress, held during the World's Columbian Exposition at Chicago, there was read a very suggestive paper by Professor Morris Jastrow, Jr., of the University of Pennsylvania. Its title was "The Scope and Method of Historical Study of Religions." It is interesting to find him suggesting a point which has appeared more than once, already, in these *Notes*, namely, the importance of applying the results of the new psychology to the historical study of religions. He says on this point:—

"No less important than the utilization of researches made in this direction, are the bearings of the new psychology on the history of re-

ligions. The interdependence between psychical processes and physiological states, is the part of the subject which I have more particularly in mind. Complementary to the more general bearing of racial traits, we have in the study and interpretation of mental phenomena, a valuable aid to an understanding of special and individual religious temperaments. It is perhaps too early to apply the results of physiological psychology in their fullest extent, but one is quite safe in predicting that our view of the great religious teachers of mankind, more especially of the mystics, is certain of being both clarified and modified by a deeper penetration into the workings of the mind peculiar to them."

Dr. Jastrow has here sounded a note of vast importance, and which, as he intimates, is bound to make a great difference in many of the received views about holy things and holy places, and in the regard which primitive man had for certain objects of worship. We shall find it not unlikely, that the rationale of the worship of sacred trees and stones, of caves and jinns, may have a very different foundation than that which is now commonly supposed. In the discussion of totemism, this view is sure to make a vast change of view. Of course the application can be neither complete nor thorough, until the phenomena of the primitive religious mind have been as carefully and thoughtfully gathered and classified, as those of primitive religious practice and worship have been. The emphasis upon the history has had as one of its injurious effects, as Dr. Jastrow indicates, but does not state, that the personal element has been almost entirely ignored. On the spirit of such study, he has also some very good words. He says:—

"It is idle to disguise the fact, that in many even scientific circles, there prevails a certain fear upon entering what appears to be a thorny field; in other quarters there is a vague notion, that in some way the investigation of religions is bound to create havoc within the domain of religious faith. I venture to controvert both allegations involved. The scholar who permits himself, in his researches, to be swayed by any other motive or consideration than the pursuit of truth, is a traitor to his cause, and yet I see no reason why the scholar in dealing with matters that constitute the most sacred possessions of mankind, should not be reverent in his manner of treatment. He should remember that the ground on which he treads is holy—if not to him, then what is more important, to others. This is the one concession that may be legitimately demanded of him, or rather a proper regard for the feelings of others should be so natural to him as to remove the consciousness of making any concession."

It is the lack of this very spirit, for which the essayist so thoughtfully pleads, that has been productive of the greatest difficulties in the way of securing the wide acceptance of the best established results of modern scholarship, both in Oriental study and comparative religious research. It is in this one characteristic, that the English Semitic scholars so far excel their Continental brethren, that, though they are the inferiors of the

latter often, in their breadth of view and the philosophical insight into the problems handled, yet they reach the popular mind and sway the popular thought. To some scientific men this is not a great achievement, and radicals who imagine that they are accomplishing nothing if they are not slashing into the sensibilities of non-experts, will probably continue to accuse moderates of truckling to prejudices. But it will still remain true that the reverent scholar who has proper regard for the momentous character of the effects which his investigations will produce, will, all things considered, more surely and more wisely lead his generation out into the larger light of scientific views and rational interpretation.

Perhaps it is too early to expect a department of Psychological Anthropology, a division of the subject which shall have for its *Aufgabe* the gathering of the materials for the study of the mental life of primitive man. But here we shall find the missing link in our present theory of primitive religions. It is one of the most suggestive facts, that this demand comes from so many different sources simultaneously. Dr. Emmanuel Bonavia, who has just published a book on the "Flora of the Assyrian Monuments," also calls for a re-examination of mythology from the psychological view. But that we should have supposed, or that we should have been asked to believe, that the primitive worshippers, without reason or rationale, built up a vast mass of symbolic ritual and religious practice, without a single thought in their minds as to the results they sought, or without any primary convictions as to themselves, their deities, or the world in which they lived, will, in the light of such study as is here suggested, be very amusing. Perhaps we shall even find that the making of cosmogonies, which until now we have imagined to be a very late manifestation of the religious activity of earlier peoples, began at a much earlier period. At all events, in this as in other branches of the historical study, we shall endeavor to get all the facts, and follow, as Dr. Jastrow observes, the leading of the facts, without *Tendenz* indeed, but with a surer and more sound instinct for the truth. And we may be sure that no true interest of either religion or faith will sensibly suffer.

A. A. BERLE.

BOSTON, MASS.

ARTICLE XI.

GENERAL AND CRITICAL NOTES.

GREENLAND CHRISTIANITY.

THE race of men commonly known as "Eskimo" presents more points of interest to the anthropologist than does almost any other people. A small colony of them lives in Northeastern Asia, west of Bering Strait, but the largest proportion, about 20,000, is found in Northwestern Alaska. From there they extend, in inconsiderable numbers, eastward along the northern coast of British America, to Baffin Bay, and down the coast of Labrador to the Straits of Belle Isle. The western coast of Greenland, however, affords support to the great bulk of the race in Eastern America, about 10,000 of them being at the present time found there.

The name *Eskimo* is not of the people's choosing. It is supposed to mean "eaters of flesh"—a descriptive designation of which they are not proud. They prefer the name *Innuít*,—a term meaning "the people," and implying that they are the only people worthy of consideration. But such egotism is pardonable on account of their isolation, and of their ability to endure conditions of life to which all other races would succumb.

Through the efforts of Lutheran and Moravian missionaries, the natives of Greenland were converted to Christianity more than a century ago (Hans Egede began his work there in 1721); yet by the force of circumstances, the people are compelled to live in nearly the same stage of outward civilization as that which originally characterized their condition. Indeed no other civilization would seem to be possible in their present environment. If Greenland is inhabited at all it must be by people who make the most of its advantages, and the least of its disadvantages. In some countries the degree to which Christianity prevails may be determined approximately by the increase of their commerce. But this sign entirely fails among the Greenlanders, since it is scarcely possible for them to have any extensive commerce which is not to their disadvantage. Almost without exception their products have, to them, a much higher value in use than they can have in exchange.

As is well-known, the interior of Greenland is a vast ice-field, thousands of feet in depth, covering an area of more than 320,000 square miles. Around this central ice-field there is a fringe of mountainous country free from ice, upon the western side varying in width from five to eighty

miles, and still less upon the eastern side, with occasional interruptions where the glaciers come down to the very margin of the sea. Altogether, this fringe measures something less than 200,000 square miles and presents a peculiarly barren aspect. There are no trees in Greenland. The wood employed in making frames for boats and handles for implements, and in constructing roofs for houses, is derived from the drift-wood which is brought down from far-off Siberian rivers, and mingles with the Spitzbergen ice-floe to whose mercy Nansen is now trusting to be carried past the north pole. This moves slowly along the ice-bound coast of Eastern Greenland until it passes Cape Farewell, where it is deflected by the Gulf Stream northward three or four hundred miles along the western coast. Borne along upon this Spitzbergen ice, there comes, with numerous other animals, the saddleback seal, which is the one absolutely essential provision of Nature for the existence of life on these inhospitable shores; for it not only provides meat of nourishing quality in abundance, together with a generous supply of fat to give light and heat to the Eskimo's lamp, and fuel to support his body during the inclement weather of winter, but, most important of all, supplies him, in its skin, with warm clothing from head to foot, and with material for the construction both of his open boats and of the *kayak*, by which he is rendered superior to the billows of even the arctic seas.

The vegetable products of Greenland are scarcely worthy of mention, being limited to a few berries and succulent plants, and an abundance of mosses, which furnish food for reindeer and decompose into peat, which is used to some extent for fuel, but chiefly for sod in banking up and covering the walls of their low stone houses, to protect them from the cold of winter. The diet of the people is thus limited almost exclusively to fish and flesh. Fish of different species and various qualities throng the fiords and channels of the coast during almost all seasons of the year, while, in addition to the flesh furnished by the seal and the reindeer, immense flocks of birds choose the rocky cliffs for their breeding-place in summer,—the eider duck and some other species lingering during the entire year. So useful are these birds and so regular are they in their migrations, that it is difficult for the Greenlanders to see anything miraculous in the ravens which supplied Elijah with food. The skins of the birds, also, furnish a warm lining for the winter clothes of the natives. In the absence of vegetable food, it is a physiological necessity that, ordinarily, both fish and flesh, should be eaten uncooked, while the blood is no less a necessity for the health than a dainty dish for the palate.

Both the style of the houses and the fashion of the dress of the Eskimos are determined by the exigencies of the case, rather than by the caprices of European civilization. The fashions of Paris have no attractions to the native Greenlanders. The prime necessity in the Greenland house is that it be so low, and the walls so thick, and the entrances so narrow, that it shall be protected from the fierce blasts, the deep snows, and the

extremely low temperatures of the winter season. From the necessity of the case, also, the clothing of the men and women must be nearly alike. It would be impossible for a woman with skirts to perform with comfort and safety, not to say with cleanliness, either the outdoor or the indoor duties, which, in the appropriate division of labor, fall to their lot; or indeed to get in and out through the passageways which are best fitted to protect their homes from the inclemency of the weather. It is related that a tall missionary could get into the igloos of his parish only by enveloping himself in a sleeping-bag, and then being drawn through the narrow opening.

Yet into these forbidding forms of life, Christianity has poured its inestimable blessings, and brought the full tide of its hopes and consolations, until the whole people observe the morals, support the institutions, and cherish the faith of Christendom. The population is so scattered that the maintenance of Christian institutions is beset with special difficulties; yet by judicious organization the whole field is successfully covered, eight Danish missionaries (to say nothing of the Moravian missionaries) being sufficient to oversee the work of a large number of native catechists, who attend to the instruction of the people both in letters and religion, and maintain services upon the Sabbath, with great faithfulness and regularity. Indeed, I have never been more deeply impressed than by the Sabbath services I was permitted to attend, during a recent visit, at Sukkertoppen, where there is a settlement of about four hundred natives and a substantial church building, and again at Ikamiut, where there are but thirty individuals, living in the most primitive condition in three or four igloos. In the former place the church was crowded to its utmost capacity, the entire population of all ages apparently being present. The services, conducted by a native in the Eskimo language, were evidently of the most inspiring nature, the singing especially being universally participated in by the congregation with great heartiness, after the model of the best congregations in Germany. At Ikamiut the conditions were as primitive as possible. The service was held in an igloo so low that no one could stand upright in it, and during a storm so severe and prolonged that the water was dripping through the roof at almost every point. Yet here, too, the entire population was gathered, who listened attentively to the reading of the Scriptures and to a devout sermon in the native language by the catechist who lives among them, while all united in the dignified chorals, which we had heard at Sukkertoppen.

Nor is Christianity with the Greenlanders a mere form. During this prolonged stay in this out-of-the-way settlement we had abundant opportunity to observe their scrupulous honesty. Notwithstanding the temptation afforded by our defenceless situation, there was not an instance of pilfering, and we experienced nothing but the utmost kindness from them. Apparently, also, the morality of the sexes among themselves is of a high order. Indeed, the very promiscuousness in which they occupy their

habitations is made to contribute to the protection of female virtue, since the girls are constantly under the eye of their mothers, and are thus "chaperoned" without any special effort.

The work of the Danish missionaries in Greenland is sometimes criticised because it has not succeeded in making the people self-contained and capable of an independent political life. Indeed, it is doubtful if the natives could of themselves successfully resist the contamination of foreigners if they were allowed freely to mingle with them. Hence the Danish government has, by treaty with other nations, prohibited the landing of the crews of the vessels which frequent the region, and the trading is entirely in the hands of the agents of Denmark. It can scarcely be questioned that if the country were thrown open to unrestricted commerce with the outside world, the first effect would be a great deterioration of morals and great present distress, ending probably in extermination. To such an extent would the confiding natives at first part with the necessities of their life, in exchange for cheap clothing and stimulating food that satisfy not, that they would be likely to bring themselves to the verge of famine during their long winters, when they are beyond the reach of Christian philanthropy. The free use of alcohol (from which they are now entirely debarred) and the allurements of the other vices of civilization would probably make quick work of the whole population. Under the protection, however, of the Danish government the people have been so shielded from the immoralities consequent on contact with civilized nations, that venereal diseases, usually so fatal in the wake of the track of commerce, have been almost wholly unknown.

An important lesson forced upon the student of history by such facts as are witnessed in Greenland is, that what is called a high state of civilization is not a necessary consequent of Christianity. Nations, like people, have their period of childhood, and in certain conditions this state is permanent. It is to the glory of Christianity, rather than to its discredit, that it meets the wants of childhood as well as of mature manhood. In such conditions as those which prevail in Greenland, a complex civilization cannot exist. Life there must always continue in about its present simple conditions. In fact the stage of civilization is just about that which is consistent with the practice of those principles of socialism, which are advocated by many modern theorists. The accumulations of food and of material for clothing and for necessary utensils cannot be large, and must all be consumed as they go along. The successful hunters and fishermen must each year share all with their less fortunate or less capable companions. At the same time it is evident that the population has already attained its natural limit in numbers. The stern necessities of the case forbid any great increase. In such a condition of things one may well ask, Is life worth living? The answer is emphatically, Yes. Even in this world they have enough to make them a happy people, and when to this are added the Christian hopes of the life to come, the emphasis of the affirmative answer is overwhelming.

G. FREDERICK WRIGHT.

ARTICLE XII.

SOCIOLOGICAL NOTES.

PULLMAN'S TESTIMONY,—AN OBJECT LESSON.¹

THE Hon. Carroll D. Wright, Chairman of the Strike Commission appointed by President Cleveland to investigate the Debs strike and to make a report thereon, has expressed his gratification at the satisfactory work done by the Commission while sitting in Chicago.

We wish to examine the Committee's work in respect to the testimony of two men only,—that of George M. Pullman and of T. H. Wickes. If the examination of these gentlemen is a fair sample of all the work done by the Commission, the public will find their report of very little real value, for this part of it is so incomplete as to be actually misleading.

If the Committee was appointed by the President as a sop to labor unions, as a sort of an apology for his patriotic and heroic action in calling out the troops at the time of the Debs insurrection, it may have fulfilled its mission, irrespective of any value to be attached to the completeness and accuracy of its investigations; but the American people who suffered from the outbreak and are anxious to know how such deplorable occurrences are to be avoided, have a right to expect substantial results from the work of the Commission and to hear suggestions as to adequate remedies.

We wish to do the Committee no injustice in advance of its published report² for, it may be, the ground is fully covered despite the

¹ Statements of President Geo. M. Pullman and Second Vice-President T. H. Wickes before the U. S. Strike Commission. Also published statements of the Company during the continuance of the strike. Pamphlet, 38 pp.

² Since this article was put in print, the Strike Commission has made its report to the President. It has gone further in the direction of revealing the true spirit of Pullman than one would have supposed possible from the information it derived from actual witnesses. In fact, Pullman replies to their indictment that there is nothing in the evidence to warrant their strictures, and he is right. The Commission seems to have condemned him on general principles, the same as it has, with the greatest injustice, the General Managers' Association. In other words, the Commission signally failed to judge Pullman out of his own mouth, as it might easily have done, had the proper questions been put to him. We see no occasion to alter a line of this editorial because of the publication of that report.

incompleteness of its examination of Mr. Pullman and Mr. Wickes. The questioning of these gentlemen stopped at the very point where it should have begun.

Mr. Pullman clearly stated before the Commission what he had asserted in his letter to the public on July 16, 1894, that he had taken contracts "at less than the actual cost to the company of delivering, without any reckoning for the use of capital and plant." He further said: "This work was taken to keep the large force of men employed, and to postpone and with the hope of avoiding the numberless embarrassments to all classes of people at Pullman and in its vicinity of a closing down of the works, to prevent which the company considered it wise policy to operate the shops temporarily at a loss." This is the constant assertion of both Mr. Pullman and Mr. Wickes. (See pp. 7, 14, 15, 26, 27, etc.)

The "loss" estimated by Mr. Pullman upon certain contracts was \$112,000, which he divided into nearly two parts,—asking his wage-earners to stand \$62,000, by a reduction in wages, and throwing \$50,000 upon his stockholders, to come out of their \$36,000,000 surplus. It does not seem to have occurred to Mr. Pullman that the fairness of such a division might be questioned by minds of a doubting nature. But that is immaterial.

Mr. Pullman's statements up to this point stand unchallenged and unquestioned, and just here the Committee dropped its investigation. It should have gone further and asked Mr. Pullman how he estimated "cost." He did not, naturally, volunteer information upon this point; for this was the vital point which, in his differences with his employees, he had declined to arbitrate.

In the manufacturing business, "cost" is usually estimated as follows: (1) the actual cash outlay for material; (2) the same for labor; (3) estimated waste on material; (4) estimated *fixed charges*. This last item is as much a part of the real cost of manufacture as the first three, being such items as rent, insurance, depreciation of plant, overseers, engineers, draughtsmen, timekeepers, watchmen, bookkeepers, taxes, etc., etc. But it differs from the other items in this, that such charges are *fixed*, and attach to a plant in a larger or smaller degree whether the works are running or idle. In such a plant as Pullman's a fair percentage to be added to actual cost for *fixed charges* would be, in our opinion:

Add to material, 10 per cent.
Add to bench labor, 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ per cent.
Add to machine labor, 50 per cent.

As the *fixed charges* are nearly the same for a factory running on half time as for one running on full time, the percentage naturally increases when work is light. It naturally decreases as the works are busy; hence it is economy for a factory to run at "white heat" even at a seeming loss; or, in other words, when cutting into estimated *fixed charges*. The same

argument holds true when the question arises as to the wisdom of closing works or of taking work at prices estimated below "cost." The fixed charges remain nearly the same; hence, in such an alternative, no wise manufacturer estimates fixed charges as a part of cost. That the Pullman Company follows this plan of reasoning is evident from Mr. Pullman's statement, that he did not reduce the salaries of high-priced men because he was obliged to keep such men *permanently* in his employ.

When Mr. Pullman, therefore, stated that he took contracts involving a "loss" of \$112,000, and he proposed to divide it among his wage-earners and stockholders in the proportion stated, the vital question to have asked him was as to what constituted "cost." Mr. Pullman would have been compelled to tell what the percentages were that he added as *fixed charges*. Assuming the contracts to amount to \$1,500,000, upon which he sustained a loss of \$112,000, it would have been drawn out that fixed charges amounted probably at least to \$250,000. If, then, asked if these charges were not actual gain compared with the alternative of shutting down his works, Mr. Pullman would have admitted the truth, which, as matters stand, has not been brought out.¹

If, then, questioned as to the necessity of running his works for "repairs," he would have admitted that these same fixed charges might be charged to repairs as well as to new work. It would then appear that his best interests demanded that he should take contracts below "cost," not to keep his men busy simply, but to save his fixed charges; permit men to earn enough to pay him rent on the 1,800 tenement houses, which he deducted from wages; prevent his salaried men, no less than his machinery, from rusting, and securing good advertising from taking such large contracts. In all human probability such reasons urged him to bid below ordinary prices. His statement, therefore, that he took such contracts to keep his men busy, has, in our opinion, not even the merit of a half-truth, but more nearly a thirty-second part of the truth. The purpose to use his men, instead of desiring to serve them, finds expression in many ways in the town of Pullman, and it is Mr. Pullman's one fatal blunder. To awaken a man's self-respect, his sense of ownership and independence is of incalculable benefit to a manufacturer; but such is not the evident plan and purpose of the man who conceived and laid out

¹ Mr. Wickes said (see p. 6), "In giving these figures and the figures which I am going on to give, I desire to say distinctly and explicitly, that by 'shop cost' I mean the cost of any work spoken of, excluding any element of charge for depreciation of machinery or plant, or for interest on the value of machinery or plant, or for interest on the capital invested or employed in any way. The estimated shop cost, or the shop cost ascertained after the completion of any work, contains no such element in any case in this statement."

Perhaps Mr. Wickes will now explain if these items are the only ones in fixed charges left out in "cost," and what actual items are estimated in "cost."

the town of Pullman, as Judge Gibbons has so clearly shown in his able work "Tenure and Toil."

Mr. Pullman's desire to use his men unjustly in order to serve his stockholders appears even more evident from his admission that his works are compelled to employ 800 men in order to keep his cars in repair for service.

His enormous dividends depend on his cars running; cars get out of repair; works must run to keep them in order; fixed charges are necessary to running his works for such repairs; and he declared his usual dividend!

Why was he not questioned then as to what part of his fixed charges were laid at the door of repairs and what part on those disastrous contracts?

The American people may take their choice of these two views: Mr. Pullman took contracts below cost to keep his men busy; divided such loss generously between his workmen and stockholders; could not afford to reduce rents even if he did wages; hence he is a philanthropist who has suffered the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune because he is successful. The other view is: Mr. Pullman saved a quarter of a million dollars in fixed charges by losing \$112,000 on some contracts; kept his works running for repairs necessary to the running of cars which were necessary to the earning of dividends; charged the \$112,000 off against his men by reducing wages \$62,000 and saving \$50,000 in rent and other items which he otherwise would lose; did not reduce rents when rents were "off" elsewhere at least 20 per cent; declared his dividends as usual and then would use the President's Strike Commission to post him on the boards as an Abou Ben Adhem, or one who loves his fellow-men.

But the worst is not yet. Pullman's annual report admits that it was not the reduction in wages which led the men to rebel, but it was the want of steady employment. In other words men were permitted to work long enough in the month to pay their rent, and instances were cited¹ in which less than twenty cents was left for food and clothes for the family, after rent was deducted. It is difficult to define economics in terms of the intellect, and not of the emotions, when the naked facts in such cases are known.

Here is a corporation, fattened at the public expense; protected by patents granted by the government, whose courts thereby become the servants of a monopoly exercising those patents; defended by state and national troops at enormous expense; paying insignificant taxes in return for such privileges; monopolizing the privilege of furnishing a place to sleep on public carriers run on public highways under charters granted by the people; with dividends and a surplus out of all proportion to the services rendered; starving its colored porters, and then

¹ Before the Grand Jury.

turning them loose upon the public sympathy for proper remuneration; and finally, to cap all, using the Strike Commission to foist its president upon the innocent public as a much abused millionaire and a white-robed philanthropist. No wonder that workmen rebel when asked to make bricks without straw, and the American people rebel when used to prop up such a company. How can such a state of affairs continue to exist in a Christian civilization?

SOME INTERESTING QUESTIONS

NOT ASKED BY THE STRIKE COMMISSION.

1. "Working people are the most important element which enters into the successful operation of any manufacturing enterprise." (Pullman, p. 1.)

Question: Was it not your mistake in supposing that people instead of their *labor* is the element?

2. "It was not the intention to sell workmen homes in Pullman. . . . If any lots had been sold in Pullman it would have permitted the introduction of (the) very baneful elements." (Pullman's testimony, p. 2.)

Question: Can any element be more baneful than to rob a man of his sense of ownership, of responsibility, of self-respect, leaving him without ambition and without hope?

3. 'The investment (on homes) returned a net income during the last two years of 3.82-100 per cent' (p. 3). 'The average rental is \$3 per room per month' (p. 28).

Question: Do you mean to say that the cost of the houses in Pullman was \$900 per room?

4. "As to whether a fact which I know to be true, is true or not, I could not agree to submit it to arbitration." (Pullman, p. 3.)

Question: If workmen doubt an employer's word on so vital a point, is it not his duty to convince them of the truth? Did you do it? If not, why?

5. "The facts are that Pullman car repair work requires a force of about 800 at the Pullman shops." (Wickes, p. 6.)

Question: In estimating costs on contract work what part of fixed charges is put upon repair work? Did you reduce the wages of these 800 men as well as that of contract men?

6. "Rather than discharge absolutely a large number of men, we tried to give all of them some work." (Wickes, p. 9.)

Question: Did not this plan result practically in securing your rent on your houses which you did not reduce? Did not some men work just long enough to earn their rent?

6. Coombs earned for the year ending April 30, 1894, \$345.68. (p. 9.) His rent and water tax was \$15.71 per month. (p. 19.) He had to support his wife and two children." (p. 19.)

Question: Do you think \$157.16 for a year's wages enough to sup-

port four persons, exclusive of rent? Do you think a company with \$36,000,000 surplus can afford to treat an employe in that manner? How many others received similar treatment?

7. "In establishing the rate of wages for piece work over so large a force of workmen, the principle adopted is that the day's wage is to be a reasonable wage for ten hours at that particular work for a competent workman, not an expert." (Wickes, p. 16.)

Question: Miss Curtis, who was not proved incompetent, earned in a year \$346.82. (p. 19.) Is that a reasonable wage to support a family on?

8. "A charge [for the library] of 25 cents a month for adults and one-third that amount for young persons is made for membership, not for profit, but to give subscribers a sense of ownership." (Wickes, p. 23.)

Question: If it is so desirable to create a sense of ownership in a library why is it not equally so in a home! Why did you not, then, sell the houses in Pullman to the workmen?

9. "It was the hope and belief of the management that . . . such surroundings [fine streets, houses, etc., in Pullman] would improve the character of the working people." (Wickes, p. 24.)

Question: Is character improved by living in borrowed houses that are elegant so much as in humble homes that are owned by the workman? Is character improved by show or by simple reality?

ATTORNEY-GENERAL OLNEY AND LABOR ORGANIZATIONS.

THE Reading Railroad is in the hands of Receivers, and certain of its employes were discharged because they were members of the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen. This action brought on a controversy which was brought before Judge Dallas, of the United States Court, and the case is still pending. In a letter written by Attorney-General Olney to Judge Dallas, labor's right to organize is stoutly upheld and the action of the Receivers, in discharging the men, is condemned. This letter from the Attorney-General is reported to have been printed by the labor organizations in the form of a circular, and is being widely distributed.

The ground for the discharge of the men was clearly stated by the President and Receiver, Joseph H. Harris, as follows: "The policy of this Company is well known to be that it will not consent that persons in its service shall owe allegiance to other organizations which may make claims upon them that are incompatible with their duties to their employers. This position was taken advisedly and we have no intention of departing from it."

The Attorney-General has made a lengthy report giving the reasons

for his views, and bases his argument on the right of laborers to belong to an organization to which they are bound by oath, and at the same time to be in the employ of a railroad to which their organization may, on the tap of the bell, become hostile, so long as no overt acts have as yet been committed by them, and so long as the constitution of their organization contains nothing hostile to the laws of the land.

It is a fact that thousands of employees are to-day the *paid enemies* of those whom they profess to serve. This is because of their allegiance to organizations that demand the first place in their loyalty and good-will. This is the first demand of labor organizations upon their members, and it appeals to laboring-men especially, because it assumes to have their interests at heart, and is based upon the assumption that the employer has not. As a matter of fact employers get the second run of the sap,—the second place in the good-will, loyalty, enthusiasm, and affection of their employees. The first place is usurped by the labor leaders. To hold their position all sorts of economic falsehoods are taught to the men, prejudices are awakened, the men are embittered, made surly, cross, ugly; and, in time of strikes, desperate and violent by leaders who are supported by the wage-earners and use the organizations for selfish and political ends. There are a sufficient number of exceptions to prove the rule. Could a general, in time of battle, handle troops who were loyal to the enemy? Could a college govern students who were pledged to organizations hostile to the management? Would a servant in the house be tolerated who was loyal to some union that permitted or sanctioned violence and crime?

The managers of large industries know all these things to be true, and the opinions of Attorney-General Olney are those of a theoretical lawyer dependent on politics for his position. How far will politics be permitted to mislead the American people on these vital questions of the relations between capital and labor? The true friends of labor are those who furnish employment, and, sooner or later, this truth must be made clear to the wage-earners. Otherwise, American industries must decline,—the most serious disaster that could befall the laboring-people. Organizations that recognize this great truth, encourage it and stimulate it, will be the true friend of the laborer, and of the employer as well. Such organizations should have the support and good-will of the people, the sanction and protection of the courts, and none others should.

OBERLIN INSTITUTE OF CHRISTIAN SOCIOLOGY.

IN response to an invitation sent by President W. G. Ballantine, of Oberlin College, to prominent leaders in social reform and to Christian sociological thinkers, a large and enthusiastic gathering of distinguished

men convened in the Second Church, in Oberlin, Ohio, November 14 and 15, 1894. President Ballantine presided.

The object of the meeting was to consider the advisability of holding a Summer School of Sociology in Oberlin during a part of the month in July, 1895.

Letters of regret were read from ex-President Benjamin Harrison, Professor Albion W. Small, of the Chicago University, Dr. Samuel W. Dike, Professor Mattoon M. Curtis, of Adelbert College, ex-President George F. Magoun, of Iowa College, Rev. Professor Graham Taylor, of Chicago, and many others.

Ex-President Harrison expressed his heartiest approval of the plan for such an institute, and emphasized the necessity of bringing together at such a time those who are in closest touch with the live questions of the day; such as, the employers of labor, and the leaders of labor organizations. Professor Small warned against the common error of assuming to know and teach Christian sociology until one was first trained in sociology. Professor Curtis's letter, read by President Charles F. Thwing, called attention to the importance of individualism in character in all schemes of social reform. Dr. Dike expressed his apprehension of the use of the word "Christian" as applied to sociology, calling attention to the fact that the Hartford Theological Seminary had dropped the use of the word in that connection. Ex-President Magoun was emphatic in favoring the use of the word, and gave a concise and clear *résumé* of his reasons for so doing.

The convention elected Dr. Washington Gladden as president, and Mr. Z. Swift Holbrook as secretary. An executive committee of seven was chosen, with power to choose two additional persons, the entire committee to have full charge of the program for a Summer School of Christian Sociology. The following were appointed as such committee: Rev. Dr. Washington Gladden, Columbus, Ohio, president; Mr. Z. Swift Holbrook, Chicago, secretary; President W. G. Ballantine, Oberlin, Ohio; Lucien C. Warner, M. D., New York City; Professor Stephen F. Weston, Cleveland, Ohio; Rev. Sydney Strong, Cincinnati, Ohio; Rev. Dr. Henry M. Tenney, Oberlin, Ohio; Rev. Dr. Levi Gilbert, Cleveland, Ohio; Rev. Dr. Samuel P. Sprecher, Cleveland, Ohio.

The speakers selected were Dr. H. W. Stuckenberg, of Berlin, Germany, who gave an admirable address on the Evolution of Society. Dr. Stuckenberg was the first to use the word Christian in connection with sociology, in a book published by himself in 1880.

Dr. Josiah Strong spoke on the Law of Service, and the principle of greatness by giving service instead of by receiving was unfolded logically, clearly, and powerfully.

Dr. H. M. Tenney recalled Oberlin's history as a fitting environment for a sociological convention, as it had always been identified with all practical reforms for the uplifting of humanity.

Professor W. I. Thomas, of the Chicago University, gave a clear outline of the duties of the sociological student and the methods and scope of his work.

On Thursday afternoon Lucien C. Warner, M. D., the well-known and successful merchant and philanthropist who gave Warner Hall to Oberlin College, made a practical address on the Relations of Capital to Labor. It was clear, simple, business-like and scholarly, and will appear in a future number of this magazine.

He was followed by Mr. Z. Swift Holbrook, who spoke on Christian Sociology, defending the use of the word "Christian," and showing the necessity of having the work of students so practical that Christian reformers can take their conclusions and press on to accomplish actual results in uplifting humanity and in solving the social problems of to-day.

In the evening Dr. Gladden gave the address which appears in this number of the BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

The Convention closed with the unanimous opinion that it was a distinguished success and a hopeful beginning for an enthusiastic, scholarly, and practical summer school in July, 1895.

ARTICLE XIII.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS

NOVUM TESTAMENTUM GRAECE, ad Antiquissimos Testes denuo Recensuit. Apparatum Criticum Apposuit Constantinus Tischendorf. Editio octava major. Volumen III. Prolegomena. Scripsit Casparus Renatus Gregory additis curis † Ezrae Abbot. Pars Altera (1890). Pars Ultima (1894). Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs.

Tischendorf's last and greatest work is now completed. The text and critical apparatus of his eighth edition of the Greek New Testament was given to the world nearly a quarter of a century ago, but the death of the gifted editor in 1874 seemed to cut off all hope that the promised and much desired Prolegomena would ever appear, especially since Tischendorf left behind him very few memoranda. Two American scholars, Dr. Caspar René Gregory, of Leipzig, and Dr. Ezra Abbot, of Cambridge, Mass., undertook to supply the want. The death of Dr. Abbot left the full labor of completing these invaluable Prolegomena to Dr. Gregory. Whatever faults or shortcomings there may be in the work as it has now appeared, they should not be allowed to interfere with the most sincere and abundant gratitude on the part of all New Testament scholars to him, but for whose patience, skill, industry, and, we believe, love for his arduous task, as well as for the memory of Tischendorf, we should still be in sore need of this well-nigh indispensable aid to the investigation of the text of the New Testament.

The Prolegomena constitute Volume III. of Tischendorf's eighth edition, and have appeared in three parts. Pars Prior was published in 1884, and needs no special mention here. Pars Altera came from the press in 1890, and Pars Ultima in 1894. The three parts are connected so as to form one complete whole, with consecutive paging and divisions into chapters. The whole work contains 1426 pages and thirteen chapters, of which Pars Altera includes Chap. VIII., "De Codicibus Minusculis" (pp. 451-800), and Pars Ultima the remaining five chapters and 626 pages. Chap. IX. (pp. 801-1128), "De Versionibus," includes catalogues of all known MSS. of the versions of the New Testament in the Syriac, Egyptian, Armenian, Georgian, Persian, Arabic, Gothic, Slavonic, Frankish, Theotiscan and Bohemian languages. The last four of these are of little importance. Prefixed to the whole is a brief discussion as to the general use and value of the versions for text-critical purposes. Before each catalogue the author has given us his views as to the proba-

ble age of that particular version, the class of text represented by it, and also a brief history of the different editions of the New Testament in it. This is the same general plan already followed by the author in the previous portions of this work. The catalogues are as full as the present state of knowledge permits. The author deserves many thanks for the great amount of toil, perseverance, and expense, as well as travelling, he has had to undergo in order to give us his lists of the thousands of MSS. registered in this and the preceding chapter.

Chap. X., "*De Scriptoribus Ecclesiasticis*," contains a dissertation, covering some twenty pages, on the use and value of patristic testimony, followed by a catalogue—alphabetically arranged—of ecclesiastical writers. This catalogue will be found very useful for purposes of reference, as well as for its intended use, namely, as a key to the patristic references in the critical apparatus of Tischendorf's eighth edition. Unfortunately, the author limited himself to those writers and works that are made use of in the apparatus. There are other works—especially those that have come to light since Tischendorf's death equally valuable for text-critical use, so far as they contain New Testament quotations—which should have been mentioned in the catalogue.

Chapter XI. is a Table of Witnesses (*Tabula Testium*) arranged according to centuries. The table is complete as far as the end of the tenth century; after that, it is confined to the Greek cursives and a few ecclesiastical writers.

The twelfth chapter contains the *Addenda et Emendanda* both to the text and critical apparatus of Tischendorf's eighth edition and to the *Prolegomena*. Not a few changes in the text will be found to be made here.

The necessary indices and explanations of the abbreviations both for the New Testament and the *Prolegomena* constitute the last chapter.

Such, in brief outline, are the contents of a work that has been looked forward to with more than ordinary interest by the whole world of New Testament scholarship. Any criticism of such a work must bear in mind that it includes two separate and very different elements. On the one hand, there are the catalogues of MSS. which make up a large portion of the whole; e.g., Chap. VIII., including altogether 349 pages, with the exception of but twenty pages, is simply a list of nearly two thousand different cursive Greek MSS. These catalogues are simply a register of facts, with no particular expression of opinion. As to the correctness with which the facts are registered, there is no man living competent to judge in regard to them all, and the statements by Dr. Gregory will be generally accepted as true. His lists are far in advance of any previously published, as to general accuracy and completeness, and probably will remain as a guide for future workers in the same field. But, on the other hand, Dr. Gregory's work also contains explanatory and introductory matter which is largely his or others' judgment on

questions which have two sides, when he was liable to cross swords with other critics. That the author has been cautious and reserved, even to extremes, every reader of his work will at once perceive. On the whole, it is well that he was so prudent. His work should not support any theory, or favor any particular edition of the New Testament—not even Tischendorf's. It should serve as an encyclopedia of reference for the use of all critics of the New Testament text, and hence should be as impartial as possible. So, while some may perhaps be disappointed because his views do not coincide with theirs, yet all will feel that the work is that of a patient searcher after the truth, and, where opinions were necessary, they are given as the result of an impartial examination of the evidence. For instance, Dr. Gregory gives as his opinion that the Curetonian, Peshitto, and other Syriac versions are but four species of one original version, dating from the latter part of the second century, the Curetonian being nearer the original than the others; that the Egyptian version can justly claim for itself a great antiquity; that the oldest Latin translation had its home in Proconsular Africa, was made up little by little, and that it dates from the second century; that the translator of Irenaeus was nearly contemporary with Irenaeus himself. On these and many other points there are conflicting opinions—high scholarship being ranged on both sides. But Dr. Gregory's way of stating his opinion is so candid and courteous that no one can take offence. Besides, full and exhaustive references to all the literature of the different subjects, well up to date, are given in the footnotes. This is a very valuable element of this work, for references are much needed here, and much increases its usefulness. We very much wish a reference had been given to Zahn's "*Geschichte d. N. T. Kanons*" in the discussion as to the origin of the Latin version. We also wish that the true character of the text of Codex Bezae were more correctly stated. Dr. Gregory's statement on page 954 is very partial, if not absolutely incorrect.

This work is very opportune. It reveals the actual condition in which the material for the criticism of the text of the New Testament lies. It points out what must yet be done in this important field of work. Within the last quarter of a century three great editions of the New Testament have appeared—Tregelles', Tischendorf's, and Westcott & Hort's. These followed close upon the heels of predecessors and in all probability will have successors.

But these Prolegomena raise the question, Is the material of Text Criticism yet in such a condition as to warrant another constructed text of the New Testament? A decidedly negative answer is given by the facts presented. Of the whole vast amount of material included by the Greek uncials and cursives, the MSS. of the most important versions and the patristic quotations but one portion—the most valuable, it is true—has been examined and sifted to a degree sufficient to make its testimony of a character to be depended upon. The remainder is yet an al-

most unexplored mine of rich material. This is particularly true of the Greek cursives and the Syriac version. What is now especially needed in the field of text criticism is work upon the history of the cursive MSS. and of the MSS. of the different versions, in order to determine in what relation their text stands to the uncial texts. A laudable beginning has been made in the now partially completed edition of the Latin Vulgate by Wordsworth and White, though we regret that the editors have not been more careful in their use of the collations of the MSS. used by them.¹

Dr. Gregory's work is a call to the world of New Testament scholarship—pointing out its duty in this line. From an American who has won for himself an enviable place in Europe, it comes with especial force to American scholarship. Dr. Scrivener's words will bear repetition: "Out of the long array of uncollated manuscripts which swell our catalogues, let the student choose from the mass a few within his reach . . . or exhaust the information some ecclesiastical writer of the first six centuries can afford; or contribute what he can to an exact acquaintance with some good ancient version, ascertaining . . . (where this is attainable) the literary history of its text. . . . He will be helping to solve that great problem which has hitherto in part eluded the most earnest inquiries, the investigation of the true laws and principles of Comparative Criticism."² The harvest is great; where are the laborers?

EDWARD E. NOURSE.

JENA, GERMANY.

HISTORY, PROPHECY, AND THE MONUMENTS. By James Frederick McCurdy, Ph. D., LL.D., Professor of Oriental Languages in University College, Toronto. Vol. I. *To the Downfall of Samaria.* New York: Macmillan & Co. 1894. (Pp. xxiv, 425. 6½x3½.) \$3.00 net.

This volume meets a long-felt want, and is prepared with such thoroughness, and written in such a judicial spirit and clearness of style, that it is likely for many years to be the standard book upon the subject.

For more than a quarter of a century new material of the highest importance has been accumulating respecting the development of civilization in Western Asia and in Egypt; but, for the most part, this information has been scattered in a variety of learned periodicals and monographs, which are beyond the reach of any but the favored few. With ample knowledge of the facts, Professor McCurdy has brought these scattered fragments together, and with rare powers of generalization has presented them in a well-arranged and readable volume, covering the period to the downfall of Samaria. It is to be followed, in due time, by a second volume completing the history.

¹ Cf. E. von Dobschütz, *Studien zur Textkritik der Vulgata*, Leipzig, 1894.

² *Introduct.*, 3d ed., p. 520.

The work will serve several important ends. Not only does it present the facts in a manner which commands the confidence both of the scholar and of the general reader, but it will be specially useful in clearing the air of two classes of misconceptions. It dispels both the misconception of those who have imagined that the biblical history of the earliest times was completely to be upset by the revelations of the Babylonian monuments, and that of those who have expected minute and specific reaffirmations of biblical history, with little enlargement of view. While neither of these expectations has been realized, the result must prove eminently satisfactory to all. The history of the Bible is confirmed to a degree which removes all reasonable doubt of its genuine character; while the horizon has been greatly enlarged, so that the history of Israel appears, while equally important, far more intricate in its relations, and really more wonderful in its revelations of divine Providence, than it has heretofore been thought to be. It is due to the writer of the volume, however, to say that he has left the reader to draw his own inferences upon these points, having written the volume with scarcely any distinct reference to its apologetic value, but throughout in the calm temper of one whose quest is the truth, and not the support of any preconceived opinion.

It now seems beyond reasonable question that the Semitic language and the main features of Semitic culture were already established in Babylonia 4000 years B. C.,—Sargon the First having, as early as 3750 B. C., penetrated to the coast of the Mediterranean Sea, and even to the Island of Cyprus, while his immediate successors extended their conquest down to the valuable mines which have been so long worked in the Sinaitic peninsula. As to the origin of this civilization, it seems now pretty clear that it was independent of, and older than, that of Egypt, and was the product of races occupying Northeastern Arabia, who from that point spread upwards along the fertile valleys of the Euphrates and Tigris (pages 99, 137). The author properly sides with those who reject Sayce's theory, that the earliest civilization was Akkadian, and regards the Semitic as the older. To the Babylonian Semites we owe "the arts of writing, of measuring and marking off terrestrial and celestial spaces, of navigation and elaborate architecture," and, what was more important, the skill which enabled man to redeem the marshy plains of the Euphrates Valley, and to place them under such cultivation that for thousands of years they were the garden of the world—an achievement which modern science is likely to be long in re-accomplishing.

The original settlement of Palestine seems to have been effected from the north by tribes which were either themselves Semitic or had lived in close association with the Semites. The reader of these early annals is, however, likely to fall into error through a misunderstanding of the words "city" and "king," since the cities of those days were not the organized units with which Western civilization has become familiar, nor

were the people capable of association into anything like the compact civil corporations of modern times. Most of the cities of Canaan were, according to modern ideas, insignificant, and their "kings" extremely restricted both in the range and character of their authority. The word *Malk* is about as pervasive in Western Asia among peoples of Semitic descent as *Cæsar* is among the royal heads of Europe, or *Cohen* among the descendants of the Jews. History amply sustains the representations of society in Palestine which are made in the records of the Pentateuch.

Among the most important discoveries yet made which reveal the condition of Palestine before the period of the Exodus is that of the Tell-el-Amarna tablets, of which a full account is given by our author. These tablets, discovered in the valley of the Nile in the year 1888, number no less than three hundred and twenty documents, and are proved, by various lines of evidence, to have been written in the fifteenth century before the Christian era, while Israel was still in bondage to Pharaoh. These documents consist of letters, written for the most part in the Babylonian language, and addressed to the Egyptian court existing at that time. The larger number of them were from various officers, or vassals, in Syria and Palestine, revealing the important fact that the Semitic, like the French at the present time, was then the court language of the world, and that the knowledge of writing was universally practised by the ruling classes in Palestine long before the age of Moses. These letters from Palestine reveal a political condition which would be the natural preparation for the state of weakness and dependency which seems to have existed at the time of the conquest by Joshua. Jerusalem was already numbered among the "cities" of the region. Though the language of these tablets is Semitic, it is not Hebrew, and it is written in cuneiform characters; so that the origin both of the Hebrew alphabet and of the Hebrew dialect still remains among unsolved problems. The most which can be said, is that the revelation made by this discovery concerning the spread of Semitic literature at this early date renders it entirely credible that the Pentateuch should have been written in the age of Moses, i.e., so far as the linguistic argument is concerned. The permanence of these tablets which have preserved the writing of the long-forgotten scribes of Palestine for more than three thousand years, makes short work of many hasty inferences which have been drawn by such egotists as the late Robertson Smith, concerning the impossibility of preserving extensive literature from the ravages of time during the long periods of early history.

Professor McCurdy would place the Exodus about the year 1200 B. C., during the reign of Rameses III., instead of that of Merneptah, whose reign he thinks to have been nearly one hundred years earlier than the Exodus. This inference rests largely upon the fact that it was not until this later date that Egyptian influence had so lost its hold in Palestine as to be insignificant during the period of Joshua (page 204).

But space forbids our even touching upon a tithe of the most inter-

esting subjects treated in this comprehensive and elegantly printed volume. Its possession and perusal will be almost a necessity to those who attempt a thorough study of the Old Testament times and of Old Testament literature.

LIFE IN ANCIENT EGYPT. Described by Adolf Erman. Translated by H. M. Tirard. With 400 Illustrations in the Text, and 11 Plates. New York and London: Macmillan & Co. 1894. (Pp. xii, 570. 8x4¼.) \$6.00.

The rapid advances made in Egyptian explorations have created a pressing demand for a full and authoritative work presenting the facts in their most modern aspect. This want is now happily supplied for the English public by Mrs. Tirard's translation of Professor Erman's great work on "Life in Ancient Egypt." The work commends itself to the reader by the orderly arrangement of the matter, the numerous references to original sources of information, the clearness of its literary style, the abundance of its illustrations, and the beauty of its printing. The illustrations are freely drawn from the great works of Wilkinson, Lepsius, and Perrot-Chipiez. Only thus could such a large number have been incorporated in a volume of moderate price. The generous size of the page favors the convenient introduction of a great variety of illustrations without interfering with the letter press.

The subject is treated in topics, and is limited to the period extending from the fourth to the twenty-first dynasty, or about the year 1000 B. C. After a brief but vivid description of the Land and the People, we find chapters on The History; The King and his Court; Political Conditions under the Old and New Empires; The Police and Courts of Justice; Family Life; The House; Dress; Recreation; Religion; The Dead; Learning; Literature; The Plastic Arts; Agriculture; Arts and Crafts; Traffic and Trade; and War. Each of these subjects is treated with all the fulness that could be desired.

The author's treatment of the prehistoric period is conservative, as is his position upon the chronology of the Empire. Menes is placed by him at 3200 B. C., with the statement that he may have been much earlier, but that the data are too indefinite for accurate computation. The chapter on Religion is mainly limited to a plain statement of the most interesting facts, with little comment upon the philosophy of their development. His view is, that originally the country did not possess a common religion, but that each town and community had a special divinity, and that a process of simplification had gone on during the prehistoric period until, in the time of Menes, all the gods had been identified with Ra, or Ré, as he spells the name. This, however, is wholly theoretical; for, as the author admits, the tendency in later times was to confusion. The attempt of Amenhotep IV. to return to the earlier simplicity of faith proved futile in presence of the strong attachment of the common people to polytheism,

so that after him the deterioration of the popular faith in that direction went on faster than ever.

It is needless to attempt to give any adequate idea of the rich treasures of this volume, since it is really a cyclopædia in itself, and must be owned and read to be fully appreciated. For convenience and fulness of detail, combined with the authoritative statement of the wonderful facts of Egyptian history, it has no equal in the English language.

THE EGYPTIAN BOOK OF THE DEAD: The Most Ancient and the Most Important of the Extant Religious Texts of Ancient Egypt. Edited, with Introduction, a Complete Translation, and Various Chapters on its History, Symbolism, etc., by Charles H. S. Davis, M. D., Ph. D., Member of the American Oriental Society; American Philological Society; Society of Biblical Archaeology of London; Royal Archaeological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland; Associate of the Victoria Institute, or Philosophical Society of Great Britain; International Congress of Orientalists; Société d'Anthropologie of Paris; American Association for the Advancement of Science; Local Honorary Secretary of the Egyptian Exploration Fund, etc. With ninety-nine Plates reproduced in Facsimile from the Turin Papyrus and the Louvre Papyrus. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1894. (Pp. 186. 9 $\frac{3}{8}$ x6 $\frac{5}{8}$.) \$5.00.

In this beautiful quarto volume the ordinary student has brought before him the great original itself, as well as a translation of the "Egyptian Book of the Dead." Such is the power of modern science that one can now study the relics of ancient and far-off civilizations as well at a distance as near at hand. If we mistake not, many a clergyman on a small salary will rejoice to have this work brought within even his means. Once in possession of it, with a small manual upon the hieroglyphic characters, and such a history of the ancient empire as that recently published in translation from Erman, the lone student can feel that he is reading history and studying archæology at first hand.

In addition to the text and translation of the celebrated book, this volume contains a full account of "The Mythology and Religion of Primitive Peoples," of "The Egyptian Pantheon" (with illustrations of some of the more important Deities), and of "The Mythology and Religion of Ancient Egypt." The special introduction to the document occupies fourteen of its large pages.

THE EXHAUSTIVE CONCORDANCE OF THE BIBLE: Showing Every Word of the Text of the Common English Version of the Canonical Books, and Every Occurrence of Each Word in Regular Order; together with a Comparative Concordance of the Authorized and Revised Versions, including the American Variations; also Brief Dictionaries of the Hebrew and Greek Words of the Original, with References to the English Words. By James Strong, S. T. D., LL. D. New York: Hunt & Eaton; Cincinnati: Cranston & Curts. 1894. (Pp. 1340, 262, 128, and 79. 10x7 $\frac{1}{4}$.) Cloth, \$6.00; Half American Russia, Cloth Sides, \$8.00; Half Turkey Morocco, extra strong, \$10.00.

THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCORDANCE to the Holy Scriptures. By Rev. J. B. R. Walker. A Practical, Convenient, Accurate Text-finder. Un-

essential Words omitted; all Serviceable Words retained. Only One Alphabet for All Words, including Proper Names. Proper Names accented. Fifty Thousand More References than in Cruden. Based on the Authorized Version. With an Introduction by M. C. Hazard, Ph. D. Boston and Chicago: Congregational Sunday-School and Publishing Society. 1894. (Pp. 922. $7\frac{1}{4} \times 4\frac{1}{4}$.) Cloth, \$2.00; Half Leather, \$3.00.

The simultaneous appearance of these two Concordances is one of the striking indications of the continued interest in the study of the Bible. We have no doubt that they will both receive, as they merit, such a wide sale as amply to justify the immense work which has been spent upon their preparation, in which the authors have aimed to remedy the deficiencies of all previous works of a similar character. So far as we can see, they are both of them successful and as nearly perfect in their way as human workmanship can make them.

Dr. Walker contents himself with carrying out more fully the plan of Cruden, but does it so thoroughly that there is now no verse in the Bible which cannot, by the use of this concordance, be found by any one who remembers a single word occurring in it. A great recommendation of the volume is its compactness, combined with comprehensiveness,—the 922 pages being printed on such thin and elegant paper that the book can be easily handled; its cheapness,—retailing at the low price of two dollars; the arrangement of the proper names in the alphabetical order of the rest of the material; and the legibility of the type,—the verses being printed in a lighter faced type than the chapters, which prevents the confusion of the two in the reader's mind.

Dr. Strong's "Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible" is a more costly and larger work, covering a wider range of topics, and will prove invaluable to the large number of students of the Bible who need to have at hand the variety of references which are here combined in a single book. The Main Concordance seems to be as complete and accurate as it is possible to make such a work. A marginal numeral reference opposite each verse quoted indicates whether the original is translated by the same word as in the A. V., in the regular R. V. of 1881, and by the English Revisers and the American Revisers. Where a change has been made, its character can be readily determined by consulting the Comparative Concordance. By referring to the corresponding number in the Dictionary of the Hebrew and Greek Words of the Original, one will find the transliteration, pronunciation, and ordinary meaning of the Hebrew or Greek word represented. This is of especial value to those whose knowledge of the Hebrew language is limited, and will be found extremely convenient for all. This addition combines the excellences of Young's Concordance with the advantage of giving a complete list both of the translations of each particular original word, and of the various original words which are occasionally translated by the same English term. It is difficult to see how any additional features could improve the volume,

or how it can help finding its way to the study table of all thorough students of the Bible.

LIFE OF SAINT FRANCIS OF ASSISI. By Paul Sabatier. Translated by Louise Seymour Houghton. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1894. (Pp. xxxv, 448. 6¼x3½.) \$2.50.

This book, as we had been led to expect from the notices coming across the water, proves itself to be a notable one. The author gives us also a critical study of the sources from which he has formed his particular conception of his hero. The study of the times is exceedingly interesting, and although this is but the background it forms an important part of the picture. The author, having gained what to him seems the true conception of St. Francis, is probably justified in this case in focusing his lenses until these particular features are brought out in the clearest light, while others are either materially reduced, or rejected entirely as unworthy (p. 212).

The two great thoughts of the book are the early freedom and originality of Francis, and the later transforming of the Brothers Minor and the Clarisses through the determined and persistent agency of Ugolini, afterwards Pope Gregory IX. Around these two ideas the illustrating facts are gathered, and from them the obscuring legends are cleared away. Although the atmosphere in which Francis ripened was thoroughly saturated with the ideas of the Poor Men of Lyons, it was unconsciously to himself that these entered into his being. The subjectivism of St. Francis is clearly established. He was an original character, and in that originality free. The authorities of the church clearly see the dangers. They see also the value to the hierarchy of such a power as the Brothers Minor were creating. St. Francis sees the impending ruin of his ideal: the black shadows settle over his soul; but out of his agonizing struggles he finally comes to something of his early joy; he sets the brothers to singing the Canticle of the Sun and joins in it himself when others are thinking of his death. In his last will he seeks to reconnect the developed order with the original ideal. His Rule and Will were never to have commentary or gloss. But the papal penman at once set about interpreting the rule according to the church views, while the will itself was annulled. The *little* brothers whom he had brought into being through the travail of his soul were persecuted or enticed from the simplicity of their early life. How changed from those little ones whom Francis sent forth in poverty and love were the mendicant friars whom Wyclif saw in his day!

The author's account of the conversion of Francis, in spite of the vivid picture which it presents, must be characterized as not free from superficiality. One is almost led to suspect Francis of being only an adventurer seeking the glory in religion which he could not find elsewhere. It needs the real Francis in his later love and simplicity to dispel the misapprehension. He would have his family "content to be real saints and not to wish to appear such." They were not only to be *minores* when neces-

sary, they were never to allow themselves to be *majores*! Conversion was not something vague and indistinct, to take place only between God and the hearer. He will have immediate and practical proofs of conversion. Men must give up ill-gotten gains, renounce their enmities, be reconciled with their enemies.

The real mission of the Brothers Minor consisted, above all, in being the spouses of Poverty. Terrified by the ecclesiastical disorders of the time, haunted by painful memories of his past life, Francis saw in money the special instrument of the devil. "Grave authors," says Sabatier, "have demonstrated at length the economic troubles which would have been let loose upon the world if men had followed him. Alas! his madness, if madness it were, is a kind of which one need not fear the contagion." Francis saw only too well that the brothers, having renounced everything, were in danger of being unjust or severe toward the rich and powerful of the earth, and often concluded his counsels with these noble words, "There are men who to-day appear to us to be members of the devil who one day shall be members of Christ." "Be not an occasion of wrath or scandal to any one, but by your gentleness let all be led to peace and good works. Ye proclaim peace; have it in your hearts!" His only weapon was love.

That the original brothers did not feel the burdens of poverty is clear from the fact that the word "joy" comes most frequently to the pen of the Franciscan authors. Bursts of joyous laughter rang out high and clear in the history of the early Franciscan missions. When Gregory IX. offered to release the astonished Clara from her vows of poverty, she exclaimed, "Holy Father, absolve me from my sins, but I have no desire for a dispensation from following Christ." Francis never separated the contemplative from the active life. He never dreamed of creating a mendicant order: he created a laboring order. With all his gentleness he knew how to show an inexorable severity toward the idle: he even went so far as to dismiss a friar who refused to work. But the bread of charity is also the bread of angels: it is also that of the birds, which reap not nor gather into barns. He called the table around which the little poor ones gathered, *mensa Domini*. St. Francis no more condemned the family or property than Jesus did: he simply saw in it the ties from which the apostle, and the apostle alone, needs to be free. He and his companions aimed to be the apostles of their times, and their association was meant to be the leaven of the rest of humanity. Their life was literally the apostolic life, but the ideal which they preached was the evangelical life of love, joy, peace. To Francis the gospel life is the natural life of the soul. The sentiment of nature was innate with him: it was a perpetual communion which made him love the whole creation,—forests, brooks, flowers, birds. "Only a profoundly religious and poetic soul (is not the one the other?)," declares Sabatier, "can understand the transports of joy which overflowed the souls of St. Francis' spiritual sons. The greatest crime of our

industrial and commercial civilization is that it leaves us a taste only for that which may be bought with money, and makes us overlook the purest and truest joys which are all the time within our reach. . . . Joys bought with money—noisy, feverish pleasures—are nothing compared with those sweet, quiet, modest but profound, lasting, and peaceful joys, enlarging, not wearying the heart, which we too often pass by on one side, like those peasants whom we see going into ecstasies over the fireworks of a fair, while they have not so much as a glance for the glorious splendors of a summer night."

Although the author finds no place in the world for real miracles (p. 433), he believes in the reality of the stigmata. He acknowledges the difficulties, yet the historical testimony, to which he gives a place in an appendix, seems to him "too abundant, and too positive not to command conviction." On the whole, this new St. Francis whom Paul Sabatier has made to live before us is not entirely out of the sphere of our sympathy, admiration, and love. Minor! Little child of God and of nature! Find-est thou not in these our days some kindred spirits who feel thy sorrows, and live very near thee in the joy of simple love?

A. T. SWING.

SOCIAL EVOLUTION. By Benjamin Kidd. New Edition with a New Preface. New York and London: Macmillan & Co. 1894. (Pp. x, 348. 6½x3¾.) \$1.75.

The old proverb "Out at the door, in at the window," applies to the supernatural after every supposed expulsion at the hand of natural science. Avowed Christians like Clerk Maxwell and Asa Gray have declared that their deepest investigations in science only led them to God, whose purposes of wisdom and love work in and through all processes of evolution. A naturalist like N. S. Shaler, whose early bent was toward atheism or at least agnosticism, has found so many "critical points" in the evolution of life that he calls its history "revolutionary."¹ Benjamin Kidd,—perhaps a Christian believer, but in this book expressing no opinion of Christianity except that it has been influential and useful,—writing from the standpoint of strictest evolution, finds the progress of society inexplicable without the introduction of "ultra-rational sanctions" (pp. 92, 101, 103, and *passim*). The supernatural enters in another form in the appeal to "the unseen evolutionary forces at work amongst [sic] us" (p. 327), and equally in his repeated acceptance of Weisman's sweeping denial of the preservation of acquired characteristics. Variations that are the acquired characteristics of individuals adjusting themselves to their surroundings might be called the work of nature. Congenital variations call for an explanation back of the individual parents, and back of their physical environment; i. e., a supernatural explanation. Before hailing such an argument for the supernatural, however, the Christian reader

¹ The Congregationalist, Nov. 1, 1894.

should make sure whether it points to theistic purpose or pantheistic necessity. Our author does not make the matter clear.

The vogue this book has had in England is a striking offset to the remark, sometimes made of late, that "Calvinism has gone from England, and left not a shadow behind." Such a remark shows a strange obliviousness to the persistence, in all the history of thought, of the stern and serious view of life, represented in varying phases by Stoic against Epicurean, by Augustine against Pelagius, by Calvin against Arminius. In spite of many excrescences that have attached themselves to this view of human life, the general scheme of thought suggested by a proper use of the word "Calvinism" has been associated with a large part of that which has been noblest in character and grandest in achievement. Kidd's "Social Evolution," like the rest of the Darwinian literature, is strongly and in places extremely Calvinistic. He does not use the theological terminology, but the theological reader inevitably translates. Behold original sin extended to the whole realm of organic life in the averment, that if individuals were allowed to follow their own inclinations the tendency in all species would be distinctly the reverse of progress (p. 34). In the accumulation by natural selection of congenital variations, but not of acquired characteristics (p. 192), what a sweeping doctrine of absolute election and prevenient grace injecting the desirable characteristics before the individuals are born! In science (or the scientific man) complacently viewing the host exterminated in the process of securing the advance of an infinitesimal number (chaps. ii. and iii.), one finds the counterpart of some scholastic theologian, writing without a tremor of pity, in his cell far from human fellowship, of the doctrine of Reprobation. The extreme high Calvinism of science is reached, however, in the varied phrases which exclude free will and all second causes: "Character a product of circumstances" (p. 25); "Every quality of mind and body a product of this rivalry" (p. 211); "Progress born of conditions" (p. 41); "We are all the creatures of inheritance and environment" (p. 76); "No power to help ourselves" (p. 189); "Destiny which works itself out irresistibly" (p. 46). The frequency of such phrases shows the strong fatalistic drift of studies in Natural History, unless one has been better grounded than our author in metaphysics.

The fourth chapter of the book finds "the central feature of human history" in the strife between religion and reason. Yet in another place (p. 116), he calls religious beliefs "the natural and inevitable complement of our reason"; and again (p. 194) says, "The central feature of human history" is the "dominance of that progressively developing class of phenomena included under the head of religious." This is by no means the only instance of discord between different parts of the book.

In treating of the conflict between reason and religion, Mr. Kidd makes the reason capable of considering nothing but self-interest, and uses "rational sanction" as equivalent to selfish utility. From his failure

to discern that the whole conflict described is caused by the element of selfishness or sin that has slipped in beside "reason," he is not aware that this part of the book is only a confused and confusing attempt to give in terms of modern science an exposition of Paul's law in his members warring against the law of his mind. Paul gives us an assured hope of an end of the struggle through the power of Christ. This peace is not, as Mr. Kidd would find it, through the subordination of the individual and his interests to the antagonistic interests of the social organism (p. 103), nor through the surrender of the reason to "ultra-rational sanctions," but is found in the "reasonable service" of the re-born sons of God.

When we pass to the parts of the book more closely connected with its title, we find, as in the subsidiary parts, a broad and breezy treatment that is everywhere interesting and suggestive of thought, but everywhere raising question marks both as to the meaning of terms and the correctness of details. His fundamental thesis is vastly important and no doubt true, that social progress has no tendency to eliminate competition or rivalry, but broadens and deepens the struggle which is the necessary lot of every progressive being, by continually lifting more and more classes into the higher ranges of competition. To an American reader more striking evidence of this truth than any Mr. Kidd presents is the spectacle of the negro population of the United States thrust by emancipation into the struggle of competition of which they had had no experience as slaves. The lack of thrift, adaptiveness, and self-reliance with which they emerged from generations of entire absence of competition, shows us what flaccid moral fibre would be the inevitable outcome of any scheme of national socialism that kept a whole population untouched by competition. From the danger of the degradation of society and of individuals by the organization of such a socialist state the human race is guarded by other defences than the "ultra-rational sanctions" on which our author places his sole reliance. The individual self-interest of men makes competition as persistent as gravity, and as inevitable in its results as that round stones will roll farther down a hillside than flat stones. Competition need not be selfish, nor cruel, nor unjust. It may be an essential part of a wholesome, helpful, Christian life in the individual and in society, as the weight of granite in a temple's walls may be essential to the stability with which it supports the roof and makes the interior safe for worshippers. This Mr. Kidd partly sees, but depends too much for comfort on the development of "altruism."

When he traces all the amelioration of human life to a "fund of altruism," we desire a definition of the phrase. Does "altruism" mean loving the other with a disregard of relative values, like that of Buddha casting himself before a tiger in pity of his hunger? Does it mean self-annihilation, akin to Nirvana? Is it, perchance, simply another name for the golden rule of loving others as ourselves? The golden rule is at least three parts righteousness or justice to one part sacri-

fice. -Only in exceptional cases do we need or wish that others should sacrifice themselves for us. For the most part we would have them treat us justly, give us a fair chance. Mr. Kidd recognizes this when he represents the goal of the progress of society to be a condition where competition shall be raised to its highest degree as a means of progress by "bringing all the people into it on a *footing of equality*" (pp. 140, 238). The value of his book would have been much increased by holding firmly to the supreme importance of this "*footing of equality*," i.e., of justice or fair dealing. If the reader will substitute for "altruism" some such definite term as "sense of justice," the substitution will add clearness to many a passage. This may be tested in the pages (175-182) that describe the privileged classes of England helping for a century to abolish privileges and enfranchise the people. A similar substitution will relegate to the waste-basket some other remarks like those about "anti-vivisection" and "vegetarianism," and will assign to more conspicuous rejection the laudatory comments on England's policy in Egypt, and the very crude discussion of the negro problem. In some of the most valuable parts of the book the author forgets "altruism" and "ultra-rational sanctions" as in the suggestive passage on the French Revolution, pointing out the influence of such intelligible forces as "ideas" and "conceptions" and "humanitarian feeling" (pp. 170-173).

Among the book's defects may be mentioned, as one of the least important, an amusing admiration of almost everything English and belittling of almost everything else, except ancient Greece. More disappointing is the thinness in much of the historical parts. After reading such a book as George Burton Adams' "Civilization of the Middle Ages," one feels in Kidd's historical pages, like a skater on ice that bends and cracks beneath him. The most serious defect is the mystical and sentimental element. This element appears most in the use of "altruism," and in the discussion of the relation between religion and the intellect.

In spite of defects, the book is profitable and wholesome. It is not sentimental, but intellectual. It presents a serious and at the same time a hopeful view of life. It discourages belief in any short method for a social millennium. It expects further intervention by the state in social life, but only "*in order to preserve or secure free competition*" (p. 237), which must mean the restraint of tyranny, whether by monopolies or by labor organizations. It magnifies not the showy qualities of intellectual keenness, but the moral qualities that make for social stability and efficiency; such as, reverence, persistence, probity, and devotion to duty.

If such teaching can be made to penetrate the popular mind, it will rob of all terror the advance of Demos which our author pictures so graphically, and will justify his optimistic peroration.

W. E. C. WRIGHT.

THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH. By John R. Commons, Professor of Economics and Social Science, Indiana University. New York: Macmillan & Co. 1893. (Pp. x, 258. 5 $\frac{7}{8}$ x3 $\frac{3}{8}$.) \$1.75.

The time-honored division of Political Economy into Production, Exchange, Distribution, and Consumption is still retained for purposes of instruction, but the attention of economists is now concentrated upon the subject of Distribution. This is the subject that is uppermost in the minds of the public generally. Human limitations are such that we must expect a great deal of work to be done along this line and rejected before a final solution is reached. Accordingly we ought to welcome any work that makes a contribution to the subject, even though it be in some respects faulty. On this ground we must commend Professor Commons' book.

He begins with a restatement of the Austrian theory of Value and its application to the shares in Distribution. He is thus in line with the most advanced investigators. In his discussion of the Factors in Distribution he seems to have given too much space to some of the unimportant factors and too little to the three primary factors,—Land, Labor, and Capital. Moreover, he has not escaped from the ancient delusion of Natural Rights. It is time for economists to discard this notion and to test everything by the Principle of Utility. He is even guilty of using that meaningless term "wage-slaves." He would find it extremely difficult to defend on scientific grounds such a statement as "But to-day freedom of industry is no boon except to the wealthy capitalist" (p. 81). Most people probably believe that the movement for Civil Service Reform is a demand for a more efficient public service, but Professor Commons is quite sure that it is "a demand for recognition of the right to employment" (p. 81).

His greatest contribution is his admirable analysis of the doctrine of Diminishing Returns. He shows that discussions on this question have been from four different standpoints, greatly to the confusion of all concerned. In straightening out the tangle he has performed a service which makes us all his debtors.

T. N. CARVER.

THE THEORY OF SOCIOLOGY. By Franklin H. Giddings, M. A., Professor of Sociology in the Faculty of Political Science, Columbia College. Supplement to the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Philadelphia. (Pp. 80. 6½x3½.) Paper, 50 cents.

SOCIALISM AND SOCIAL REFORM. By Richard T. Ely, Ph. D., LL.D., author of "The Labor Movement," "Problems of To-day," "Taxation in American States and Cities," "Social Aspects of Christianity," etc. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell & Co. (Pp. 449. 5½x3¼.) \$1.50.

SOCIAL REFORM AND THE CHURCH. By John R. Commons, Professor of Economics and Social Science, Indiana University, Secretary of the American Institute of Christian Sociology. With an Introduction by Prof. Richard T. Ely. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell & Co. 1894. (Pp. x, 176. 5x3.)

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF SOCIETY. By Albion W. Small, Ph. D., and George E. Vincent. New York, Cincinnati, and Chicago: American Book Company. (Pp. 385. 5½x3¾.)

The year 1894 has been most prolific in the production of books, good, bad, and indifferent, on the subjects most near to the public heart,—socialism, social reform, sociology, political economy, and social aspects of Christianity. It has been a condition, and not a theory, that confronts the American people; and, as Benjamin Kidd says, the entire Western civilization is being shaped and influenced by the “political and social enfranchisement of the masses of the people hitherto universally excluded from participation in the rivalry of existence on terms of equality.”¹ Hence the deep interest taken in practical themes which formerly were supposed to belong to the domain of theory.

One of the most charming writers of the time is Professor Franklin H. Giddings, of Columbia College. In his *THEORY OF SOCIOLOGY* is brought out in clear language the idea, province, problems, and method of sociology. He agrees, with Kidd, Bascom, Ely, Small, and other reputable writers, that there is no science of sociology at the present time, and that the complexity of the data renders it well-nigh impossible to so observe, discriminate, and classify the phenomena of society as to generalize with safety and precision. Whether sociology and social statistics are not near of kin is an interesting question, and especially in view of Hon. Carroll D. Wright's opinion as to some misleading tendencies of statistics. It becomes a fruitful question, whether sociological students can do more than exercise the faculty of scientific imagination, and attempt to define society in terms of science, viewing society as an organism. Professor Giddings will soon issue a larger work which will be looked for with deepest interest by every student of social problems.

Professor Ely is always concrete, simple in his style, and in deepest sympathy with every effort to uplift humanity. He is, by all odds, the most popular writer on social problems in the United States. This was seen clearly in the quick collapse of the attempt to prove him a sympathizer with Socialists,—an attempt which proved to be an ill wind that blew somebody good no less than somebody ill. The most valuable part of Professor Ely's work, to our mind, is his earnest effort to “socialize the natural monopolies.” We doubt the correctness of the use of the word “socialize” in such a connection, as it is misleading. The assuming by the State of the control of the natural monopolies is not socialistic, nor a single step in the direction of socialism.

If Professor Ely will write a few chapters in language as unmistakable as his statement in the *Forum* for October, he will no longer be interpreted as simply a popular book-maker, nor as a writer with secret wishes to make half-truths do him service. That statement was this: “There is no royal road to a happy condition of society, but the road is long, arduous, and often painful. There is no escape from toil and suffering. Mitigation and gradual improvement are the utmost which we can hope for, and it is a duty of all those who have the ear of the masses

¹ Kidd's *Social Evolution*, p. 139.

to tell them this plain truth, even if it be not altogether palatable. To arouse false hopes and to cultivate illusions result only in increased suffering."

In Professor Commons' *SOCIAL REFORM AND THE CHURCH*, the want of employment is made the ground for an indictment against churches. The churches are responsible for about all the ills that flesh is heir to. There is a social problem; Christianity is the cause of it; the failures of Christians perpetuate and intensify social problems; and the Christian preachers are responsible for the entire program.

This reminds us of the boy's definition of salt: "It is what makes potatoes taste bad when you don't put it on." Small and Vincent well say: "The most mischievous social *doctrinaires* among us are not the theoretical anarchists, who attack social order directly, but those zealous prophets of righteousness who teach that the only reason why the kingdom of God cannot be established on earth to-morrow is that Christians will not put their knowledge of social principles into practice."¹

But Professor Commons is an earnest and sincere writer, and the spirit and purpose of his book is excellent, despite some minor defects, which he will without doubt correct in later editions.

Small and Vincent's *INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF SOCIETY* is the first book from the press designed as a text-book for actual use in the class-room, although Bascom's "Sociology" and Dr. David J. Hill's "Newton Lectures" can be so used with profit. Ex-President Bascom believed that the facts of Sociology must be used as illustrations, and the proof must stand forth in its own light, and in the reflected light of the manifold things illuminated by it.² Small and Vincent believe that "the method of credible Sociology must be the method of observation and induction."

Auguste Comte is admitted to be the pioneer in sociology for many reasons, among them being his statement that intellectual anarchy was the source of social evils; his insistence upon the need of rational classification of phenomena; his principle of classification; and the results of applying it. It is frankly admitted that sociology is not a science (pp. 31, etc.); it is "passing through a stage of struggle for the application of scientific principles of investigation in place of loose criticism and silly utopianism" (p. 32). This is in accord with Kidd, who says there is no science of human society at the present time.³ Small and Vincent view society as an organism and define it in terms of biology and of the sciences. They admit, with Ward, Ely, Patten, Kidd, and others, that Herbert Spencer stopped his investigation where he should have begun.

Sociology having been born again, because of some vital social problems demanding practical solution, we cannot escape the conclusion that sociology must become a living, practical science, so far as it can claim to

¹ Introduction to the Study of Society, p. 19.

² Bascom's Sociology, Preface, p. vi.

³ Social Evolution, p. 5.

be such, whose mission it is to add to the sum of human happiness and to find answers to questions that are burning. To do this it will need to study psychical forces inductively and hold to absolute clearness of thought and simplicity of style.

If the work which Comte and Herbert Spencer attempted is held to, and sociology aims to know something about everything instead of everything about something, it will die an intellectual dwarf. If it can be redeemed from the sphere of theory, and can sit, clothed and in its right mind, at the feet of some earnest, living, sociologists, like Hosea, Amos, Isaiah, Micah, Christ, and Paul, and can clear its brain from the cobwebs of such a bald materialist as Comte, and from the social physics of Spencer, there is hope that its mission may justify its existence. It must observe the phenomena of society, and this it cannot do except as it takes cognizance of sin in all of its subtle workings and of that power which no man can tell whence it cometh or whither it goeth.

Herbert Spencer says, that ornament precedes utility, in the earliest stages of development, and the beginnings of sociology in its practical stage would seem to verify the observation in its own case. It is useless for sociology to attempt to form a huge synthesis of all knowledge. It cannot be done. Comte's mistake was in supposing that mankind needs light, instead of life. St. Paul covered this point, that what he would he did not, and what he would not that he did (Rom. vii. 15). The world has never lacked theorists. We would not be interpreted as assuming that sociology is to be confounded with social reform, but sociology is to furnish data which become the ground and justification of practical Christian work in the effort to make of society as a unit all that it should be; but the perfection of individuals cannot be overlooked as a condition precedent to such a consummation so devoutly to be wished. Or, as Small and Vincent have so clearly shown, it must first be descriptive, then statical, then dynamic.

We believe that sociology is practical, so far as it gets away from Comte and Herbert Spencer, and though it studies society as an organism, it is an organism having not simply resemblances to vegetable and animal organisms, but it is a living, practical unit, with a life that is beyond scientific analogies because it is not merely an aggregation of units or, "secreting layers of fiber around a nucleus," has resemblance to "growth"; but because each civilization has its own form, its own fragrance, its own subtle influences; and carries within itself, hidden from the eyes of men, the seeds of life and death. To observe all these phenomena requires a microscope that is simply infinitely powerful in discovering ultimate life, and a telescope equally powerful in reading all the spheres of knowledge. Let us frankly admit that sociology is largely a speculative philosophy and must remain so, but let it not hinder the excellent work of perfecting sociology as a science to which Small and Vincent have so ably contributed.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

- BIBLE CLASS EXPOSITIONS.** By Alexander Maclaren, D. D. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1894. (5 $\frac{1}{2}$ x 3 $\frac{1}{4}$.) \$1.00 per volume. *The Gospel of St. Matthew.* In two volumes. (Pp. vii, 255; vii, 238.) *The Gospel of St. Mark.* (Pp. viii, 247.)
- THE TRIAL AND DEATH OF JESUS CHRIST: A Devotional History of our Lord's Passion.** By James Stalker, D. D. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. (Pp. xv, 321. 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ x 3 $\frac{1}{4}$.) \$1.50.
- FATHER ELLS; or, the Results of Fifty-five Years of Missionary Labors in Washington and Oregon.** A Biography of Rev. Cushing Eells, D. D. By Myron Eells. With an Introduction by Rev. L. H. Hallock, D. D. Boston and Chicago: Congregational Sunday-School and Publishing Society. 1894. (Pp. 342. 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ x 3 $\frac{1}{4}$.) \$1.25.
- SERMONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL SUNDAY-SCHOOL LESSONS FOR 1895.** By the Monday Club. Twentieth Series. 1894. Boston and Chicago: Congregational Sunday-School and Publishing Society. (Pp. 383. 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ x 3 $\frac{1}{4}$.) \$1.25.
- WEALTH AND MORAL LAW.** By E. Benjamin Andrews, D. D., LL.D. The Carew Lectures for 1894, Hartford Theological Seminary. Hartford, Conn.: Hartford Seminary Press. (Pp. 135. 5 $\frac{1}{4}$ x 3 $\frac{1}{4}$.) Cloth, \$1.00; paper, 50 cents.
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THE BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC AND THE DEBS INSURRECTION.

BY MR. Z. SWIFT HOLBROOK.

[*Concluded from page 152.*]

BUT the times have changed. That tree planted by the rivers of water, that brought forth its fruit in due season, whose leaf did not wither, and whatsoever it did prospered, is now bearing sour fruit. Those branches may be, for the most part, the engrafted ones, but they are none the less a part of the tree. It may not have been wise to engraft so many, but it has been done, and it is our duty faithfully and with confidence in God, to treat them as a part of the tree. for whose fruit, be it good or bad, we are responsible, Let us examine the tree and its fruits.

And the first thing we notice is the swarms of parasites that are living upon it and eating into its very life. The ideas which were once considered an inspiration are being superseded, though we believe only temporarily. They are like the pulpit behind which once officiated an eminent New England divine, whom Judges and Governors delighted to honor, but which is now stored away under the hay in the loft of an old barn. And when it is the fashion to copy the

old New England homestead,—its colonial architecture, so severe and simple; its low ceilings, small windows; its open fireplace, with the crane, the spit, the kettles, the bellows, and even the andirons and tongs,—who knows but it may yet be the fashion, and our clergymen will yet esteem it an honor, to preach behind those old pulpits, and again exalt the sovereignty of God and the exceeding sinfulness of sin with its sure reward. Who knows but the great mass of common people may yet learn, by bitter experience in the wilderness, that the way to the promised land is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever; not by materialism and rationalism, which give expediency in the place of faith for a rule of conduct, but by following religion, morality, and knowledge as leaders, instead of politics and economics.

But that tree under whose branches the fowls of the air have found lodgment and shelter; which poet and scholar in every age have praised, from Coleridge to our own Whittier and Holmes; from De Tocqueville to Bryce and Von Holst, is now passing through a new experience. Cut it down, shrieks the anarchist; Replant it, cries the socialist; Shower it with acid, says the economist; Let me manage it, says the demagogue. But the true husbandman has it under his own care. He planted it, he digged about for it, he trimmed it, cared for it when it was a sapling, and now he is simply pruning it that it may bring forth more fruit.

We cannot agree with President Eliot, that the Mormons resemble, in any particular, the founders of this republic; nor are we attracted by the intimation of doubt in his latest inquiry as to whether this country can endure.¹ T. P. O'Connor, member of Parliament, has even gone so far as to revile our Constitution. He said:—

"The Constitution of the United States is, in my judgment, one of the most unjustly eulogized instruments of political history. . . . It is a machine, which to a large extent means not the regulation, but the paralysis of government."²

¹ Forum, Oct. 1894. ² Chicago Tribune, Sept. 14, 1894.

Von Holst pertinently asks if the United States Senate ought to be abolished.¹

That scavenger, the sparrow, imported in an evil hour, is making war on our native birds of plumage and of song that have delighted the eye with their beauty, and have filled our trees with their melody. As Senator Edmunds said before the Squantum Club, "We are suffering from an overdose of Europe." Howells called upon Hawthorne forty years ago, and Hawthorne said he 'would like to see some part of the country on which the shadow of Europe had not fallen.'² In 1840 William Ellery Channing wrote:—

"Sooner than that our laboring classes should become a European populace, a good man would almost wish that perpetual hurricanes driving every ship from the ocean, should sever wholly the two hemispheres from each other. . . . Anything, everything, should be done to save us from the social evils which deform the old world."³

Washington urged the American people to remain so far as possible isolated from Europe. President Woolsey showed that the question of "Equilibrium," which occasions so much solicitude and diplomacy in foreign nations, could never disturb us, owing to our isolation. But the equilibrium of forces within our nation is a far more serious question and an inviting field for thought. And this question arises because of the rapid development of our manufacturing industries paying much larger wages than in Europe, and our untilled lands offering hope of reward. The consequent result is an enormous influx of foreigners, and especially of the dependent, deficient, and delinquent classes.

We cannot here give all the statistics of immigration. They are alarming. Dr. Strong estimates the foreign population from the Tenth Census to be 15,000,000, and in 1900 estimates it will be 43,000,000.⁴ He says:—

"During the past four years we have suffered a peaceful invasion by

¹ Monist, October, 1894. ² Harper's Magazine, August, 1894, p. 444.

³ Channing's Works, p. 65. ⁴ Our Country, p. 40.

an army more than twice as vast as the estimated number of Goths and Vandals that swept over Southern Europe and overwhelmed Rome."¹

And what does life in the slums show? The Hon. Carroll D. Wright, in his seventh special report to the President, reports that liquor saloons and illiteracy flourish in the slums and among foreign born nearly as two to one, compared with native born. The foreign-born voters are as follows: Baltimore, 20.13 per cent; Chicago, 50.62 per cent; New York, 49.93 per cent; Philadelphia, 29.94 per cent. Vice, disease, and crime follow these statistics intimately. Venality in voting is increasing rapidly, for politics is not slow to trade on the miseries of the poor. Demagogism is rampant, and the thought which once held men seems no longer able to control them. As Kidd says, "The fact of our time which overshadows all others is the arrival of Democracy."

We agree with him, but it is not that Demos whom our fathers knew who has been honored and respected in this country as a familiar figure for two and a half centuries. It is a foreign Demos who frequents the saloon; sells his vote, which the American people have so generously bestowed upon him; who shouts for Coxey and Debs. It is not the Demos who was a friend to Thomas Hooker in 1639. It is a foreign Demos who has had good cause to find fault abroad with the laws of primogeniture, entailment, landed aristocracy and titled nobility. Such an environment as European nations furnish, makes Demos a divine missionary there, but he cannot frame the same indictment against American institutions that he would against monarchies and have it hold.

The great friend and ally of Demos is Politics. Some evil spirit has led Politics upon an high mountain, and showed him all the kingdoms of the world, and said unto him, "All these things will I give thee if thou wilt fall down and worship me." Of course Politics says: "Is thy servant a dog that he should do this thing?" And, as Dr. Bacon said,

¹ Our Country, p. 30.

“the dog did it.” We know there is one flaw in that promise of that evil spirit to Politics: he cannot deliver the goods. But politics has no faith,—it is selfish, materialistic, rationalistic, full of expedients and of demagogism.

The influence of politics upon thought is most marked. Economics has already begun to bow the knee and worship at the sound of the cornet, flute, harp, sackbut, psaltery, and dulcimer; but there are three, like Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego, who will never bow the knee to the golden image. They are Religion, Morality, and Knowledge. They are passing through the fiery furnace of experience, and for centuries have been tried.

There is a deal of misapprehension in this day on the wage question. There are many industries in which the toilers are underpaid; and many, in which the women and children compete, that are positively wicked and shameful. But these are forgotten in the scramble of well-paid men for more, and are used largely as texts merely to show up the miseries of the poor and oftener as pretexts, or a justification of violence. The great body of intelligent workmen employed in the manufacturing industries in the United States are well paid, considering the qualifications required; for it is ever true that the more mind that is mixed with muscle, the greater the reward. That is all that distinguishes “skilled” workmen. Few millionaires, comparatively, have made their fortunes in manufacturing, and the few that have so acquired it were, for the most part, protected by patents, which is a testimony to brain, and not to brawn.

The American people are sympathetic, they love fair play; hence, they are easily misled by demagogues of the press and platform upon the subject of the relation of capital to labor. The truth is that both capital and labor are drugs in the market to-day, and what is needed, is men of executive ability and brains to bring them together to their mutual advantage. Brains are never a drug in the market. It costs

more to sell a piano than to make it. The laborers imagine that when an article is created it is sold. They seem to think it sells itself. They find no use for executive ability, and very little for capital. The everlasting proposition of economics, overlooked by many, is this: *Every manufactured article is the product of brains, capital, and brawn.* The laborers say: "We move the world because you cannot do without us"; but capital and executive force have an equal right to make the same claim. It is a tripartite agreement, and no one of the three partners can claim the entire honor or credit for the result. Interest for capital, salaries for the brain-worker, and wages for the manual toiler. Capital is the heart; brains the head; and labor the hands. One cannot do without the others; but, taken together, they produce results. Capital and ability are under the same obligations to share with labor their part of the product that a woman is to divide her wardrobe with the cook; or, a clergyman on a good salary to share his earnings with the sexton; or, the lawyer to pay the office student for the first year's work in his office. It is a matter of Christian duty, and not of legality; it is a question of Christian stewardship, and not of law. When labor organizations, therefore, demand, as a legal or moral right, what is theirs only by the higher laws of the spiritual kingdom, and then only as the free gift of the steward, they are making their necessities the ground for legal action. This is precisely what the anarchist does. Just here is where so many clergymen find themselves on the same platform with violators of law. Poverty, from whatever cause, becomes not simply a misfortune, and deserving of help, but the ground for an indictment against society; and, therefore, a legal demand.

This distinction is important, and must be kept clearly in mind; for the demands of labor to-day are not based upon grounds of brotherhood, good-will, and Christian stewardship, for that is benevolence, but upon grounds of legal justice and natural rights. Hence Commons' new book¹ says

¹ Distribution of Wealth.

that a right to employment is a natural right of man,—a most dangerous and absurd proposition to teach the young, but it is being taught in our schools. The *Chicago Journal of Political Economy* says the book is a disguised attempt at socialism.

The attack which is made on our industries by labor organizations in the form of demands for wages that are out of all proportion to those paid in other countries, is doing more to crush them than foreign competition or free trade. The protection which American industries need to-day is a deeper feeling of loyalty to invested capital, which must have its just reward or it will seek new fields for activity; and to executive ability, which is always the wise captain that leads to victory. These deserve protection no less than the manual toiler. The *London Times*, in commenting on the Debs strike, said editorially:—

"The questions of currency, depreciation, silver, etc., sink into insignificance compared with the immense reduction in the returns on capital due to a continual rise in wages."

The *Wall Street Daily News* gives a list of three hundred million dollars of income bonds, not made of water, which have,—with the exception of eleven million dollars,—never paid a cent of income, and the eleven millions very little. Where can money be invested in manufacturing industries that are safe? The condition of our railroads—their earnings, and the number in the hands of receivers,—will reveal the undisputed fact that the wage-earners on railroads are receiving their full share of the product or receipts.

The Massachusetts "Report on Statistics of Labor" of 1890 will prove interesting reading. On "Net Profits" it says:—

"The year selected was a normal one. Returns from 137 cotton goods establishments show that allowing five per cent for capital and ten per cent for depreciation and selling expenses there was no net profit but actual loss. Allowing two per cent for depreciation and one per cent for selling expenses the profit left was 2.23 per cent to reward capital for its part of the product."

The truth is, that monopolies and trusts began largely as economic necessities owing to the increased demands of labor. Trusts have thus increased and grown until now they menace the state. Capital is moved by the law of self-preservation, no less than other forms of life. Combinations of capital have arisen for the purpose of diminishing the cost of production, because organized labor has taken the lion's share of the product in many industries, not protected by patents or by a high tariff. The professors in our colleges and universities have far greater justification for organizing, and going on strikes, than the workmen in nineteen cases out of twenty; for our professors have a large capital investment in the form of an education. Imagine the professors of a college, as the chapel bell strikes for recitation, going out in a body, picketing the campus to keep out competition, and watching the railroad trains to inquire of every stranger who has unusual space above the eyes, if he is coming to supplant the poor, over-worked, down-trodden, and despised professors.

Seventy-one per cent of the nation's wealth is in the hands of nine per cent of the population, it is said. If so, it were a grievous fault, and grievously hath Cæsar answered it. The truer proportion, considering foreign born, dependents, delinquents, and deficient, is that fifty per cent of our wealth is in the hands of twenty per cent of the people.

Let us not be interpreted as saying a word against ameliorating the condition of the poor. This is a duty pressing upon the American people, not because, in the main, the lower classes have been exploited or robbed or deprived of any rights,—though the exceptions to this general rule are many and distressing, and deserving of legal redress in the form of statutory regulation; but because the great laws of brotherhood and good-will enforced by the spirit and precepts of Christianity make humanity one. This takes on the form of friendship and fellowship no less than of charity;

and of justice in the way of legal enactments regulating hours of labor, child labor, sweat shops, and any forms of injustice where man's greed overlooks the laws of humanity. Justice, also, can punish for violations of respect for person and property, whether on the part of the poor or the wealthy.

We are not arguing against the rights of the poor, nor restricting the full force of the laws of Christian brotherhood as taught and exemplified by Christ. We simply object to well paid organized labor, like the Indian, dodging behind innocent women and children, whenever it is likely to be punished for its misdeeds.

Politics is demanding not only that economics shall bow the knee and worship, but it is dictating terms to our courts and to the powers that enforce the laws. It cracks the whip over the heads of our Executive and of our Judiciary. It demands a new ruling on what constitutes contempt of court; it seeks favorable decisions on the rights of conspiracy, and strikes accompanied by violence; and it would, if it could, compel arbitration against constitutional rights whenever demagogues and wage-earners put their heads together and need more funds for campaign purposes. It protects gambling, prostitution, Sabbath breaking, and the saloon. Economics has awakened to find itself famous. It feels flattered by the attention it is receiving. It is beginning to bow the knee. We refer not entirely to the economics of the schools; but that of the common people believed in and acted upon by the allies of politics. May not standard thinkers be replaced by the popular writers in course of time?

Kidd says:—

"Socialism seems to many minds to have been born again, and to be entering on the positive and practical stage."¹

But the theories of the newer school, simply enlarging the limits of economics to include all the wants of man,

¹ Social Evolution, p. 8.

must not be confounded with the popular economics which we may call "demagogical economics or the economics of the street and of the slums." The latter would have the equal distribution of the product artificial, and not natural; material, and not spiritual. It would have the common people believe they can be made happy by Act of Congress; by environment and externals; and no longer by homely honesty, vulgar industry, and plebeian thrift; not by reformation from within. Wealth comes by inspiration, not by perspiration, they think. Politics, therefore, in company with a vagabond economics, clothed in the garb of saviours, are in the van; while religion, morality, and knowledge, the fruitage of faith that once controlled men, have gone to the rear.

But a new school of Christian economics has arisen, endeavoring to meet the demand of the times and the wants of men.

"It is no longer the school of Hobbes, and Locke, of Hume, Adam Smith, Bentham, Ricardo, and Mill."¹

The influence of Ruskin and Carlyle, who never imagined themselves economists, and whose principal efforts were stray snarls or isolated indictments of the English environment, have found a fruitage calling for new writers like Jevons and Cliffe Leslie.

Professor Alfred Marshall has widened out the science into an attempt to explain all our social phenomena, so that Mr. Leslie Stephens' scientific principle comes nearer a standard by which to judge:—

"A genuine scientific theory implies a true estimate of the great forces which mould institutions and, therefore, a true appreciation of the limits within which they might be modified by any proposed change."

To meet these enlarged views of economics a comparatively new science has arisen which we call Sociology. If we expand economics to include a study of all the related phenomena of the science of life in its social aspects we shall have

¹ See Kidd, p. 23.

sociology. And this Professor Simon N. Patten is endeavoring to accomplish. Man as a bread-winner is giving way to man in his efforts to satisfy all his wants. In other words economics is usurping the place of religion and ethics.

The remarkable fact of to-day is the prominence given to social themes, therefore, and this is the result largely of the arrival of Demos. Economics and politics are leading the people. Karl Marx has been the Bible of the lower classes in England, and he was a materialist.¹

"The development which Marx contemplated is, it may be observed, thoroughly materialistic; it takes no account of those prime evolutionary forces which lie behind the whole process of our social development. The phenomenon which has been called the exploitation of labor is in no way new or special to our time."² "Social forces, new, strange, and altogether immeasurable have been released among us." "The one absolutely new and special feature which distinguishes the relations of the workers to the state and to the capitalist class as compared with all past periods is that the exploited classes, as the result of an evolution long in progress . . . have been admitted to the exercise of political power on a footing which tends more and more to be one of actual equality with those who have hitherto held them in subjection."

Kidd's generalization will hold in the American environment only as to the novelty of the spectacle. And Ruskin's definition of religion applies abroad, and not here:—

"Our national religion is the performance of Church ceremonies and preaching of soporific truths (or untruths) to keep the mob quietly at work while we amuse ourselves."

It is thus seen that Kidd's English Demos is not only different from our American Demos, as he has been known here for nearly three centuries, but he resembles very strongly our American politics. He is materialistic, rationalistic, and knows no morals but that of expediency.

This rationalism and materialism which result from following politics and economics as leaders will usher in a French Revolution, unless economics and politics are soundly con-

¹ See *Introd. to Das Kapital*, Kidd, p. 217. ² *Ibid.*, p. 218.

verted and bring forth fruits meet for repentance. As well might one hope for fruit in due season from a tree planted with its branches in the ground and its roots in the air, as to displace religion, morality, and knowledge with politics or economics, and expect good fruit. The result will be rationalism in the place of faith, expediency in the place of morality, and error in the place of truth. Politics and economics cannot pull the beam out of their own eye; how can they see clearly to pull out the mote that is in their brother's eye! We are realizing the words of Macaulay, that there is no tyranny like the tyranny of a democracy. Utilitarianism, materialism, rationalism, exalted by the vote of a majority,—in other words, resulting from the spread of the spirit of democracy among the ignorant and vicious,—marks one of the earlier stages in the line of development through which a free democratic republic must pass. If the children in the public schools could elect their teachers by popular vote, we should not be surprised to find a menagerie at the head of the school in the place of wisdom, until they learned by experience that wild animals are ignorant and vicious.

Majorities cannot change the nature of things. The town pump cannot furnish milk by vote of the people; sixteen parts of silver to one of gold cannot be made a true ratio by Act of Congress, unless all nations agree to call it so for purposes of convenience; the principles of Euclid are not changed by time or by majorities. A nation must be true to the nature of things, and then it will be true to itself. Politics and economics have not, never did have, and never will have the qualities of leadership. They were present when Mary broke the alabaster box of ointment, and exclaimed: "Why was not this sold for three hundred pence and given to the poor?" But religion, like the sweet perfume that filled the house with its fragrance, has never put a money value on affection or spiritual forces. It is politics that is trying to reward patriotism with pay; while religion and morality would provide for

the invalid from motives of gratitude and not as assumed equivalents.

The influence of politics is seen again in the demands of socialism, that the state shall assume charge of production both in the natural monopolies and in the competitive industries. Kidd seems to be misled at this point when he says:—

“Socialism seems to many minds to have been born again and to be entering on the positive and practical stage.”¹

Socialism is simply joining hands with politics to defeat the old conception of the duties and functions of the state: that state is the best which gives the largest individual freedom compatible with the common welfare.

Rev. Philip S. Moxom, who is a scientific socialist and makes the amusing claim that it is identical with Christian socialism, says:—

“England furnishes, perhaps, the most notable example of the present rapid progress towards socialism as evinced by its actual municipal and national collectivism.”²

Mr. Moxom, it seems to us, simply confounds the natural heat of an excited body with that which comes from a high fever. The natural monopolies, which he cites as being assumed by the government, are not evidences of the growth of socialism. When a government assumes exclusive control of the competitive and private industries, and begins to make soap and matches and shoes for the people, that will be socialism. England, Germany, France, America, have as yet taken no practical steps in this direction. Mr. Moxom attributes the struggle for bread to *selfishness*. He confounds selfishness with self-interest,—a most common and fatal blunder of emotional economists.³

When questions like the equitable distribution of the product are referred to Sunday pulpits for solution, would not Christ say: “Man, who made me a judge and divider

¹ Social Evolution, p. 8. ² New Eng. Mag., March, 1894, p. 24.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

over thee?" Economic falsehood does not become truth by pulpit indorsement. The economic instincts of men must not be violated by passionate and prejudiced judgments on such broad themes as distribution of property. The churches that imagine they have espoused the cause of wage-earners, and prejudge their case, will be the last to gain the confidence of these same wage-earners when the naked truth in its heroic aspects is demanded by all. Economics must be defined in terms of intellect and not of emotion. Just here is the wage-earners' indictment of society, and it certainly demands the most careful inquiry, for it can be conceived that John might say to nine out of ten, "Be content with your wages." Christ might say: "Take that thine is and go thy way. Can I not do what I will with mine own?" "Did'st not thou agree with me for a penny?" This reply came in answer to a demand for artificial distribution. As R. T. Ely truly says:—

"There is no possibility of escape from toil and suffering. . . . It is the duty of all those who have the ear of the masses to tell them this plain truth, even if it be not altogether palatable."¹

And that genuine economic scholar, Arthur T. Hadley, says:—

"A nation must let intellect rule over emotion whether it likes intellect or not. The alternative is political and industrial suicide."²

In a country so conceived and developed, with such enlightened principles for its foundation; amid forces so complex and perplexing, the Debs insurrection came.³

¹ Forum, Oct. 1894, p. 183. ²*Ibid.*, p. 190.

³ The question as to whether it was an insurrection has not yet been decided. Judge Grosscup said in his charge to the Federal Grand Jury that indicted Debs: "Insurrection is a rising against civil or political authority; an open and active opposition of a number of persons to the execution of laws in a city or state. Now the laws of the United States forbid under penalty any person from obstructing or retarding the passage of the mails and make it the duty of the officer to arrest such offenders and bring them before the court. If, therefore, it shall appear to you that any person or persons have wilfully obstructed or retarded

The forces which gave it birth had been developed by well-known causes, and are so plain that a wayfaring man, though a fool, need not err therein. They were hatred of capital by labor; the rise and growth of organized labor unions which look to politics for salvation; the growing disrespect of these unions for law, and their vicious practices in contrast with their honied theories; the increase of demagogism and of its friend and ally, the saloon; the natural envy and hatred of the unsuccessful and the unfortunate for the successful and well-to-do; false political economy of the slums as to the origin of value and the causes of poverty; emotional sympathy on the part of many for those who are reaping the results of violated law,—not distinguishing between the Lord's poor and the devil's poor; amiable answers to socialism, and sweetened rose-water for criminals; the pardon of the anarchists, and reviling of the courts by a demagogue Governor; monopolies and trusts that threaten to destroy the State; indifference of the educated classes to politics; wrong notions of liberty, equality, and the rights of property among the voting majority; and, finally, the inflammable material in the form of ignorant foreignism that welcomes any change as one for the better, that follows the beck and nod of demagogues, and, that, in our congested cities, creates our judiciary. Pullman's treatment of his employes, while it was apparently utterly selfish, was not the cause of the Debs insurrection. It was, at the most, merely the occasion of it, and need not

the mails, and that their attempted arrest for such offense has been opposed by such a number of persons as would constitute a general uprising in that particular locality, and as threatens, for the time being, the civil and political authority, then the fact of an insurrection within the meaning of the law has been established." The definition adopted by the court is from Webster's Dictionary. Anderson's Dictionary of Law defines insurrection to be: "A rising against civil or political authority; the open and active opposition of a number of persons to the execution of the law in the city or state." It cites *Allegheny County vs. Gibson*, 99 Pa., 417 (1879). The jury found a true bill against Debs on this ground, judging from the evidence.

again be mentioned. It was the best text that could be found to serve as a pretext for violence; but Debs' genuine regard for the Pullman employes finds as little convincing proof as the proposition that Pullman built fine houses to improve the character of his men through their environment rather than to make a fine appearing town which should bear his name and be profitable and creditable to him. Pullman's evident attempt to pose as a philanthropist and as the genuine friend of his wage-earners will not bear investigation. As such, he was, however, better than Debs.

But who was Debs? Was he to the manor born and in sympathy with our institutions, a lover of law and order? Did he go forth to battle in behalf of the down-trodden and oppressed, inspired by a deep sense of their wrongs; jeopardizing his own life and liberty by espousing conscientiously the cause of labor? Was he a John Brown or a Nathan Hale, who forgot self in his devotion to his notions of duty? Not at all. He was a graduate of an institution for the cure of drunkards. He lived extravagantly on poor men's money at the best hotel, smoked fine Havanas and sent wordy telegrams to his wife at the expense of the laboring men. He was probably sober while the battle was on, but was intoxicated with notions of his own importance and of his power and influence,—having just waged a successful battle with the Northern Pacific. He was desperate in his determination to show his power as a leader of organized labor, and was willing to paralyze the industries of a nation in order to do it. If he thought to increase the wages of the Pullman employes by ordering a boycott on all Pullman cars, and then on all railroads that sympathize with those roads that hauled the Pullman cars, he was simply beside himself. Debs knew well the import and result of his orders. On July 15th he said:—

"This is not a strike. This is an evolutionary revolution."

To the Railway Managers he wrote:—

"The strike, small and comparatively unimportant in its inception, has extended in every direction, until now it involves or threatens not only every public interest, but the peace, security, and prosperity of our common country. The contest has waged fiercely. It has extended far beyond the limits of interests originally involved and has laid hold of a vast number of industries and enterprises in no wise responsible for the differences and disagreements that led to the trouble. Factory, mill, mine, and shop have been silenced. Widespread demoralization has sway. The interests of multiplied thousands of innocent people are suffering. The common welfare is seriously menaced. The public peace and tranquillity are in peril. Grave apprehension of the future prevails."

It thus appears that Debs knew well that he was virtually inciting to riot and insurrection. The telegrams which he subsequently signed with his own hand, and all of which he denied in his defence, were, by reason of this knowledge, criminal and insurrectionary. And he did sign them himself, for the Grand Jury that indicted him took pains to select such telegrams, out of several thousand, as bore his own handwriting, knowing that he would probably deny all others.¹ And what did the Mayor of Chicago do? He took from this Dictator the permit to remove some dead animals for the sake of the public health. Who shall say that politics has not usurped the place of morality in the leadership of the common people? What is treason?

Article III. Section 3 of the Constitution says:—

"Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort."

Did Debs give aid and comfort to the enemies of this government, or are the enemies of a nation only hostile foreigners who would destroy it?

Article V. Amendment of the Constitution says:—

"Nor shall any person be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."

The Debs insurrection cost nearly a hundred lives and as many millions of dollars. Was this constitutional?

¹ The writer of this article was a member of the Grand Jury.

Article VIII. says:—

"Cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted."

Debs said:—

"The public need not come to us with supplications, for we shall not hear them" (July 13th).

And what say the leaders of the labor organizations of this insurrection? Not one has condemned it, nor have the unions done so by any resolutions. Mr. Robert Bandlow, of Cleveland, Ohio, takes exceptions to this statement, and says that Mr. Sovereign's order to strike was not obeyed, and that Mr. Gompers' opinions must not be confounded with those of the individuals who compose the unions. Mr. Arthur's refusal to join the Debs strike and to order out the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers is also cited. The writer refers to public utterances of labor unions, not on the folly of the strike, but on its wickedness. They condemned President Cleveland for interfering to protect the lives and property of innocent citizens who had looked in vain to a sycophant Mayor and a demagogue Governor for protection. The representatives of three hundred and fifty labor unions sent word to Governor Altgeld:—

"We insist that your excellency take legal steps to compel the withdrawal of said army forces at once."

On July 13th, the American Federation of Labor passed the following resolution:—

"The heart of labor everywhere throbs responsive to the manly purposes and sturdy struggle of the American Railway Union in its heroic endeavor to redress the wrongs of the Pullman employees."

But they deemed a sympathetic strike at that time *inexpedient*! At the head of this organization is the man who usually prefaces his public addresses with the statement that labor produces all value¹; that the laborers are the exploited classes,

¹ See Gompers' address in Boston at the time of the Homestead riots, and in Chicago on the Lake Front in 1893.

and that capital is a parasite of labor. This is Karl Marx pure and simple. It may be asserted, without fear of contradiction, that the wage-earners in the main hold the following to be self-evident truths:—

1. Value is created by labor alone.
2. Capital may be the fruit of yesterday's toil, but it takes an unjust part of the product.
3. Executive ability plays little or no part in production.
4. Poverty is largely the result of unjust distribution.
5. The church is the friend of intrenched capital, and not of labor.
6. The hope of wage-earners (who are "slaves") is in artificial, and not in natural, distribution, which must come by law through the friendship of politics.
7. The true friends of labor are, therefore, not religion or morality, but politics and economics.
8. Christ was poor and a day laborer, a "walking delegate"; hence he is the wage-earner's friend, but the churches neither know him nor have seen him. Hence we cheer for Christ, and hiss the churches.

The Woman's Federal Labor Union has resolved that it—

"Takes its stand with the laborers and against the parasites who fatten upon them, for humanity and against inhumanity, for man and against mammon, and with our feeble strength we join in the fight to prevent this republic from being destroyed by a plutocratic despotism."

Was it a chance that the Debs insurrection occurred in a city like Chicago, the new centre of manufacturing industries, whose population is so largely foreign; where the anarchists were hung, and where the most daring projects, bad as well as good, are carried out,—a city distinguished for its ambition, enterprise, heroism, philanthropy, and faith no less than for its crimes, pauperism, and dirt. Was it a chance that it came in a city whose Mayor is a demagogue; in a State whose Governor is ineligible to the office of President of the United States because he was born in Prussia.¹ Where was the spirit of the Revolution when that insurrection came;

¹ A foreign citizen is one who remains alien to the spirit of our institutions and ignorant of American ideas of liberty and law. He may be born abroad or in America.

where were the ideas of law and order so essential to the permanency and safety of a self-governed people?

Von Holst says¹ the highest type of commonwealth conceivable to the human mind is that in which the rule of men is wholly supplanted by the government of law in the sense: (1) that no authority is possessed by the rulers except as organs of the law; (2) that all the members of the commonwealth are equally and absolutely subject to the law. This is precisely the conception of Thomas Hooker in 1639. Must these conceptions be laid aside at the behest of labor organizations that war on our Republic no less than on capital for the sake of a little more gain?

A scientific formula for producing insurrection and riot that will destroy a free democratic republic may here be given:—

1. Adopt a high protective tariff, thus increasing wages. Thus close the gates to foreign goods.
2. Open the gates wide to the toilers who make the goods. Put no restriction on immigration.
3. Make the price of an ocean passage ten dollars.
4. Adopt these foreigners into our national family as citizens with the right of franchise without property or character qualifications.
5. Elect the executive and judiciary by popular vote.
6. Make the cities attractive by taxing the property owners for parks, boulevards, free concerts and amusements.
7. In such congested centres where wealth and luxury are side by side with squalor and filth let the demagogue incite to hatred and passion by false teaching as to the causes of poverty.
8. Elect these demagogues guardians of the peace; let them make, interpret, and enforce the laws.
9. Organize the wage-earners into unions and then confederate these unions. Elect leaders whose commands are authoritative.
10. Warn them against religion, morality, and knowledge as allies of capital; exalt politics and economics as their friends.
11. Put a drunkard, an atheist, an alien at the head of all for absolute dictator, and then await the result.

The result will be riots, mobs, insurrection, revolution, anything that is lawless and destructive.

¹ Journal of Political Economy for September.

And this was the environment: churches for the wealthy, jails for the poor; hungry children trying to support widowed mothers by selling papers on the street for a cent apiece while they stare through the windows at children with hundred-dollar dolls and fifty-dollar poodle-dogs; the common people, hungry and hollow-eyed, like sheep without a shepherd, rushing after every new ism like anarchism, communism, socialism, Georgeism, Bellamyism; or after every false Christ like politics or economics, only to be deceived and used, and then to become discouraged, hardened, desperate. Then come suffering, want, degradation, starvation. Then organized charities with alms-giving and consequent pauperism. Is it a wonder that Debs paralyzed the industries of the country? But unless law is upheld, and Debs I. is punished for his crimes, Debs II. or Debs III. will overturn the government.¹

Debs is now trying to form a new secret organization with the same hatred for law and order; with even greater confidence in politics and false economics for breastworks. From their new vantage-ground such men will again try their hand when a President is in power who does not wear a number 19 collar; when a more desperate set of demagogues dares the United States to call out troops in defence of person and property. Their ranks will be filled with the hungry, the criminals, the haters of mankind. That most despicable and dangerous demagogue that trades on the miseries of the poor—the cheap newspaper—will encourage and applaud their rioting, and endeavor to make public opinion to justify their action.

Surely the times *have* changed. To many they seem to have changed for the worse; but a step in the line of development, even if it be downward, must not be interpreted as retrogression. Society sometimes seems, like a huge wave, to go downward, before rising with renewed momentum to a greater height. There are greater hopes awakened

¹ Von Holst.

among the world's weary toilers than history has heretofore witnessed, and it is an omen for good, though attended with temporary frictions. We should not interpret society's growth in the spirit of pessimism, or have a thought of doubt as to God's evident plans for the raising of humanity to a higher level than the world has yet dreamed of. But the mistakes of humanity which retard and postpone the fulfilment are the real enemies of the people; and the mistaken and misled are easily enrolled in the ranks of anarchy and disorder.

The emancipation of the masses must surely come. Those who have been bound, for these many years, will be set free. But it must come from him who was anointed to preach the gospel to the poor; who came to heal the broken-hearted, to preach deliverance to the captives, the recovering of sight to the blind, and to set at liberty them that are bruised. In other words,—religion, morality, education, must be the divine leaders of politics and economics, in a free democratic republic. The wage-earners will be won not by emotion, but by heroic truth and genuine good-will. But what will this liberty be? Will it be freedom from effort, from industry, from economy, from the need of thrift, from the inexorable laws of the economic world which are as permanent and universal as the laws of gravitation? As well might we look for the sun to rise in the west, or for all the angles of a triangle to equal three right angles. As well might we ask that the laws of the universe be suspended or abrogated for our selfish benefit. But it will come by revolution of character, more than from environment, giving a love of toil, a desire to overcome and succeed by self-denial and thrift; by careful observance and obedience to law. But every form of oppression must cease and good-will must reign. The wage-earners, whom the world needs, must always be, and the reward for physical labor can never be great. It must, however, be a living wage, and the wage-earners must be

helped and respected as the children of God and our brethren. We are all the children of a common Father. A nation can never be civilized with its masses brutalized. It is the one opportunity of the ages to win the world by genuine friendship, earnest devotion to truth, sincere loyalty to the eternal principles of the gospel of Christ, the Alpha and Omega of which is heroic love.

ARTICLE II.

THE AUTHORITY AND INSPIRATION OF THE
SCRIPTURES.

BY PROFESSOR FRANK HUGH FOSTER, D. D.

V.

THE NATURE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE AUTHORITY OF
THE SCRIPTURES.

GIVEN the authority of the Scriptures, the nature and limitations of that authority will be found, not by some *a priori* principle, which must amount to a mere guess, but by an examination of the phenomena presented by the Scriptures, or of their statements about themselves, if there are any such to be found.

Upon the general claim of the Scriptures to possess authority, there can be no doubt to the most superficial reader. The command, Search the Scriptures, and the further command; Obey the Scriptures, are implicitly or explicitly written upon their every page. But if they were not, the whole impression of the Bible is a claim to authority. Its different books constitute a unit in their supreme impression of sin, of ruin, and of salvation by God through spiritual union with himself. In this single impression made by these different writings, there is an air of entire certainty and absoluteness, which constitutes in and of itself a claim to authority.

But, now, where does that authority lie? For what is authority claimed? The reply is, For the final form which the teaching and institutions of the Scriptures take.

Between the Old Testament and the New, the relation is that of the preparative and rudimentary to the final and com-

plete. The law was a "schoolmaster" to bring us to Christ. Within this twofold and progressive book, the revelation which God made was progressive. His triune nature, his love, the universal purposes of his mercy, the method of salvation, were all only gradually revealed, and hence only partially apprehended at first. The conceptions of the people as to truth and duty were consequently progressive, and hence necessarily imperfect in the early stages of the revelation. For example, polygamy was practised by David without thought of wrong, and was even sanctioned by God (2 Sam. xii. 8), but it was not contemplated in the original constitution of things, nor can it be regarded in one instructed in the lofty morality of the New Testament as permissible. So the commendation lavished upon the deed of Jael in slaying Sisera could not be bestowed upon one who should in this day, when we possess the teaching of the New Testament, commit a similar deed, which, because committed under so great light, would be nothing better than a foul murder. The sentiments expressed in the so-called "imprecatory Psalms"—"Happy shall he be that taketh and dasheth thy little ones against the rock"—are not upon the level even of the book of Proverbs, which utters the warning, "Rejoice not when thine enemy falleth, and let not thine heart be glad when he is overthrown"; to say nothing of the New Testament, "Thou shalt love thine enemies."

To be sure, these psalms have been variously defended as normal expressions of right feeling. Some of the explanations are ingenious; but they do not satisfy the mind. Apart from the notion that it is necessary to maintain the perfection of Scripture by such arguments, they would never have been made. They are a kind of steadyding of the ark. Not every expression of the Bible taken in isolation from its place in the sacred volume is perfect. The grand onward sweep of revelation, and the ultimate form of the teaching, are elements which must never be left out of the account.

For revelation comes to its apex in Jesus Christ. He fulfils—fills full—the Law and the Prophets. Nothing surpasses him. Here the Bible reaches its culmination of teaching and impression. It is for this culmination that absolute divine authority is to be claimed for the Scriptures.

There is another statement to be made. The authority claimed is authority as to the central message of salvation and the things involved in it, and is, therefore, authority in the moral and religious sphere.

It cannot be doubted that so much at any rate is claimed. The only question is, whether much more is not also claimed. Particularly, does not the Bible claim authority for its history?

Undoubtedly, in the main, it does. It states a great number of historical facts in a way to demand our acceptance of them. They are so inextricably bound up with the central message of the Bible, that they must be accepted if that is, and implicitly the same claim is made for them as for it. If Jesus Christ never lived, if the miraculous birth, the temptation, the crucifixion, the resurrection, the mission of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost, the conversion of the first church, the missionary labors of Paul, and those great preparatory facts of the Old Testament—the call of the Jewish people, the deliverance from Egypt, the sacrificial system, the establishment of the Kingdom, the captivity, the return—are not facts, no one would be so foolish as to try to maintain the claims of evangelical Christianity. And if the appeal be made to historical criticism to ascertain whether these statements of the Scriptures can be maintained before that tribunal,—since the whole method of treating the general theme pursued in these articles consists in an appeal to facts,—it may be declared, though time cannot here be taken to substantiate the statement, that no sufficient reason can be alleged for doubting the historical character of these great facts related by the Scriptures.

As to this position little question will be raised. But the further question rises, Whether the Scriptures claim for themselves historical *infallibility*, so that every historical statement which they make, of however little importance and however remote a bearing upon the central message of the Bible, is to be received, simply because they make it, as infallibly true?

It is first to be noted that the biblical writers make no express claim to any such infallibility. True, it is taught by some theologians that such a claim is involved in the very word "inspired" which is employed of the Scripture. The consideration of this reply to our statement may properly be deferred till the subject of inspiration is reached in the regular development of the theme. But certainly, aside from such considerations, there is no claim for historic authority as such. The whole treatment of historic themes in the Bible may be said to be unhistoric, to be governed, that is to say, by other considerations than those which govern the mere historian. All biblical history is history with a purpose,—didactic history,—and the purpose is always one, to promote the salvation and sanctification of men. Should the Chronicler be shown, in magnifying the prosperity of a faithful Israel, to have exaggerated the size of her armies or the importance of her victories, the main object of his contention, that faithfulness to God's commands exalteth a nation, would not be impaired, except the entire structure of his historical statements were disproved, and it were shown, for example, that the nation was really retrograding while he said, for sake of proving his point, that it was advancing.

And when we look at the facts, there is evidence of historical fallibility in the Bible. Dr. Charles Hodge himself admits that this fact, if shown to be such, would invalidate his doctrine of inspiration. "It is, of course," he says, "useless to contend that the sacred writers were infallible, if in point of fact they err. Our views of inspiration must be determined

by the phenomena of the Bible as well as from its didactic statements." And he also implicitly admits that they do err, for he says that many of the confessed apparent discrepancies "may fairly be ascribed to errors of transcribers." Of course, in the view of most Christians, these errors are, as Dr. Hodge suggests, like specks of sandstone, the existence of which, here and there, would not disprove the fact that the Parthenon was built of marble. Still, it cannot be maintained that the Bible is historically *infallible*, if there be such errors, any more than it can be maintained that the Parthenon is built of *nothing but* marble, when small specks and pieces of sandstone are to be found in its walls. On the whole, then, as all confess, the Bible, as we have it to-day, even when every attempt has been made to obtain the very best text of the originals which is within our reach by critical processes, contains some errors, however unimportant they may be. Dr. Shedd has a curious theory that from our list of such errors must be deducted "all such as Scripture itself enables the reader to correct." Thus the fact that one part of the Scriptures proves another part to be in error, is, according to Dr. Shedd, proof that it is not in error. But this will scarcely commend itself to the ingenuous student.

What the limits which have been set to error in the Scripture are, and whether it is proper to call the Scriptures errant or not, are points which will be treated at a later stage. Enough at present to note that neither the biblical writers claim absolute historical infallibility for themselves, nor do their strongest defenders, when their words are carefully weighed, make this claim.

To summarize the course of the argument for the authority of the Scriptures as it has been here presented, and to come to a concise definition of the position maintained, it may be said that—

The internal harmony of the system of doctrine contained in the Scriptures; its usefulness in solving difficulties

suggested but not removed by natural reason; at many other points, its agreement with the independent conclusions of the reason; and its relation to Christian experience and to the history of the race;—all unite to give ground for the affirmation of the truth of the Scriptures: and since it has already been proved that they are the Word of God by the testimony of the Spirit, it follows that their truth is divinely designed, or that it carries the divine authority. An examination of the facts of the Scriptures themselves leads to the restriction of these statements to the Scriptures as a whole, that it may not be implied that they apply to every separate portion as such; and there are additional grounds for restricting the final definition to the moral and religious elements of the message of the Scriptures. Accordingly the authority of the Scriptures is to be thus defined:—

The Christian Scriptures as a whole possess divine authority; that is, the ethical and religious teaching of the Bible as a whole is without error and is designed by God for the instruction of man.

VI.

REVELATION.

The whole argument up to the present point rests upon the idea of the supernatural origin of Christian experience and Christian knowledge. From the beginning, therefore, the general proposition has been implied that the Scriptures are given by revelation of God. This idea is now to be more strictly defined.

The discussion of the theme must again suffer somewhat from the fact that it is presented as a separate topic, whereas it belongs in the midst of the whole system of Christian doctrine. The person and offices of Christ must be supposed to have been already considered in the development of that system. The positions must be supposed to have been advanced and satisfactorily sustained, that all revelation of God to men

is made ultimately through the agency of the Logos; that the Old Testament revelation was made by the pre-existent Christ; that even the heathen were in some degree taught by him; and that, when at last he had come in the flesh, he taught by his personality and character, by his formal discourses, by his suffering, death, resurrection, and ascension, truth as to God and man in the most perfect way, so that, beholding him, we behold the Father.

Such being the fundamental position of Jesus Christ in reference to both the Old Testament and the New, it is not surprising to find claims made in various forms in both parts of the Bible of a special revelation as the actual basis of the authority of the message delivered. Sometimes these are restricted in form to special cases, but their total impression is to convey the claim of divine authority for the general teaching of the person in question, as, for example, Moses, Isaiah. Moses receives special revelations upon the mount, but whenever he spake in the name of the Lord, every Israelite was inclined to ascribe to what he said the same authority which he at other times expressly claimed. Isaiah begins his prophecies with a "vision"; and such phrases as "the word of the Lord," "saith the Lord," etc., and the form of personification employed in Isa. v., convey but one impression of an invariable claim to divine teaching. And so the other prophets, as it is not necessary more fully to exhibit.

The New Testament, in the parts which do not record the personal teaching of the Saviour, is no less explicit in claiming divine authority upon the basis of divine revelation. The Apostle Paul says in 1 Cor. ii. 10, "Unto us God revealed them [viz., the things which may be comprehended under his term of 'wisdom'] through the Spirit." He relates how, upon one occasion, he was caught up into Paradise and heard "unspeakable words" (2 Cor. xii.). His word was in truth "the word of God" (1 Thess. ii. 13), and, indeed, the Old Testament and the New were one "foundation," which

was the "apostles and prophets," the indispensable cornerstone of both being "Jesus Christ" (Eph. ii. 20).

The farther position may, therefore, be laid down that—

The divine authority of the Scriptures rests upon the fact that its truths have been communicated by God to the teachers by whom they have been communicated to us. The Scriptures as they thus appear in their historic form are the record and the vehicle of revelation.

VII.

INSPIRATION.

Whatever may be true as to inspiration, nothing further is necessary to secure to man the blessings of the Christian religion than that there should have been a real revelation of himself by God to chosen men, and that the writers of the Bible who bring this revelation to our knowledge should have been honest men, competently informed, and sincerely endeavoring to convey to future generations the knowledge which they had themselves received. There might be, under such circumstances, an error of understanding here or there, memory might have slipped now and then, subjective modifications of the Master's doctrine might have blurred its reproduction by the disciple, but upon the whole the picture of the life and teachings of Christ, and of every other prophet and biblical teacher, would be substantially correct. We know something about Socrates and his teachings upon which we can depend, though Xenophon was not inspired, and though Plato presents us with an ideal, as well as an historical, Socrates. The Bible uninspired would have been as true to the divine original in its picture of Christ, as these books to Socrates, or even truer. Inspiration is therefore not absolutely necessary to the existence of Scripture.

This position need not be regarded a radical one. It has been acknowledged by theologians of so different standpoints as President Fairchild, upon the one hand, and Pro-

fessor Warfield, on the other. The President says: "The truth of Christianity—its claim upon us as a revealed religion, does not turn upon the inspiration of the Scriptures. If one of the Gospels be true, as ordinary history, Christianity is true. God has revealed himself to men. Jesus Christ, the Emmanuel, has come into the world."¹ And the Professor: "Were there no such thing as inspiration, Christianity would be true, and all its essential doctrines would be credibly witnessed to us in the generally trustworthy reports of the teachings of our Lord and of his authoritative agent in founding the church, preserved in the writings of the apostles and their first followers, and in the historical witness of the living church. Inspiration is not the most fundamental of Christian doctrines, nor even the first thing we prove about the Scriptures. It is the last and crowning fact as to the Scriptures. These we first prove authentic, historically credible, generally trustworthy, before we prove them inspired. And the proof of their authenticity, credibility, general trustworthiness would give us a firm basis for Christianity prior to any knowledge on our part of their inspiration, and apart indeed from the existence of inspiration."²

Our position is, then, not revolutionary. It merely represents the lowest terms to which the doctrine under discussion may be reduced. It has thus a value for the thinker as showing what is, and what is not, the citadel which the Christian apologist must defend at all hazards. But it does not represent the sum total of Christian truth which the church needs for its own edification. It has never satisfied the great teachers of the church, and never seemed to come up to the high level of biblical truth. There is a doctrine of inspiration.

The fact of inspiration is not proved by merely rational arguments. Were the style of the Bible as high above the

¹ Elements of Theology, p. 77.

² Presbyterian and Reformed Review, April, 1893, p. 208.

possibilities of human composition as its thoughts are above human thinking, and were it without a blemish of any sort, these considerations would form a striking argument for its immediate inspiration. But it is a very human book, its style is rugged, its excellences are of thought rather than of form.

Nor are we to advance from the fact of revelation to inspiration on the supposition that inspiration alone can secure us a revelation. Such a supposition at this point of the discussion would be an unfounded assumption, and would not rise in rank above a mere guess. We must derive both the proof of inspiration, if there is such a thing, and the concept of it from the Bible itself. How does it claim to have been written? What are the considerations derived from the teachings and the phenomena of the book which determine the boundaries of the idea? These are the only questions which promise to give us much light upon our problem.

The claims of the Scriptures that their writers were inspired, or had special divine assistance in writing the books which have come down to us from them, may be analyzed into various elements. They are contained, first, in the promises of such assistance found in the discourses of Jesus to his apostles. "The Comforter . . . shall teach you all things and bring to your remembrance all that I said unto you" (John xiv. 26). "The Spirit of truth . . . shall guide you into all the truth, . . . and he shall declare unto you the things which are to come" (John xvi. 13). It is unnatural to believe that such help should have been given for their oral teaching or for their defence in court (Matt. x. 19, 20), and not for the performance of a work which was, under the divine providence, to influence the most distant times. The fundamental promise of inspiration is therefore rightly found in such promises as these.

But, second, the promises met their fulfilment in the work of the apostles, which work is said to have been founded

upon special divine guidance, or inspiration. "We [the apostles] received not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit which is of God, that we might know the things which are freely given to us by God. Which things also we speak, not in words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Spirit teacheth. . . . We have the mind of Christ" (1 Cor. ii. 12, 13, 16). "Them that preached the gospel unto you by the Holy Ghost sent forth from heaven" (1 Peter i. 12).

The Old Testament is joined with the New in those passages which ascribe to it also inspiration, and treat it as inspired. "Men [i. e., the ancient prophets] spake from God, being moved by the Holy Ghost" (2 Peter i. 21). "Every Scripture, inspired of God, is also profitable for teaching," etc. (2 Tim. iii. 16).

It is not necessary to multiply such passages. They are not, in fact, very numerous in the Scriptures, since comparatively little emphasis is laid upon Inspiration in comparison with Revelation. The latter is the principal thing: the former is less important. We thus have reached the general position that the Scriptures are given by inspiration, but a more precise definition of this inspiration, which shall mark out its limits, is still to be gained. This is to be sought, again, by an appeal to the facts. Does the biblical inspiration cover every word of the written Scriptures, so as to exclude every error, though never so small? The answer to that question is not to be gained from the mere idea of inspiration, which is quite general and vague, as heretofore obtained, but by a scrutiny of the facts pertaining to its extent as they are found upon the pages of the Scriptures.

It has recently been said that this style of investigation is vicious. The Bible itself contains a distinct doctrine of Inspiration in the sense that the biblical writers themselves define what their inspiration is. If they are trustworthy as religious teachers at all, they are trustworthy here. There-

fore, when their doctrine of inspiration is learned, all discussion for Christians stops.

Upon this point it will be necessary to delay a little. Professor Warfield defines the doctrine of inspiration which he believes the biblical writers to teach as follows: "That the sacred writers were under the influence of the Spirit of God in the whole process of their writing in such a sense that, while their humanity was not superseded, the Holy Spirit so co-operated with them in their work that their words were made to be at the same time the words of God, and are to be esteemed by us therefore, in every case, and in all their implications alike, absolutely true, entirely infallible, and simply authoritative."¹ The evidence for this definition is briefly given in the following context, and when compared with the treatment of the same subject in Dr. Charles Hodge's "Systematic Theology," this presentation will give, doubtless, the strongest case that can be made out for the doctrine defined. Certainly, no contemporaneous writer has excelled, or is likely to excel, Professor Warfield in the ability with which he has defended the traditions of his school.

In the following criticism of this definition, it should be distinctly borne in mind that objection is not made to every element of it. The authority of the Old Testament in the minds of the writers of the New, their own authority, and also their inspiration, are not questioned. The question is only whether Professor Warfield makes out his point when he contends that the *biblical words* are "at the same time *the words of God*," indifferently to be viewed under either one of these two lights, and "in ALL [not MOST, not ESSENTIAL] implications alike, *absolutely* true, *entirely* infallible, and simply authoritative."

We agree therefore with the Professor when he claims that the assertion beginning the Gospel, "It is written," "is

¹ "The Bible Definition of Inspiration," a paper before the "Summer School of the American Institute of Christian Philosophy," 1893, p. 166.

an assertion of the authority of Scripture," but we shall disagree with him, if he claims that this is equivalent to saying what the definition says. If the New Testament writers attached the kind of importance to the words of Scripture that is implied in the definition, we should see a very different use of Scripture from that which we actually find in the New Testament. On the one hand, we find such a use as that of Matt. ii. 23, He "came and dwelt in a city called Nazareth: that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophets, that he should be called a Nazarene." But there is no such passage in the Prophets. Amid the various explanations, that probably is to be preferred which connects the verse with Isa. xi. 1, "And there shall come forth a shoot out of the stock of Jesse, and a branch out of his roots shall bear fruit," where the Hebrew for branch is *nezer*. That Christ was a *Nezer* was taken as a prophetic intimation of his residence at *Nazar-eth*. Now this may seem the height of verbal reliance upon the Scriptures, and may be thought to substantiate Professor Warfield's claims. But other passages must be taken in connection with it, such as Heb. ii. 8, "Thou didst put all things in subjection under his feet," in which the phrase "all things" is used in its *full meaning* and the argument is dependent on that meaning, whereas in the original Psalm it is immediately *restricted* by the following context, "all sheep and oxen," to a significance which would rob the passage of all force as a proof of the writer's proposition, if it were to be interpreted according to the laws of modern exegesis. I do not mean to say that the writer to the Hebrews made an illegitimate use of the Psalm, but it is evident that he did *not* make such a use as a writer would who thought that every word of the Old Testament was in effect the word of God, and was to be handled with the exactness and reverence which are due to God's words. The New Testament writers, on the contrary, used the ancient Bible freely, interpreted it with great liberty, now insisting upon a special word, now arguing on a

"tense," or the "number" of a word, as Professor Warfield says, now finding hidden allusions, now quoting in a way to show they were merely clothing their own thought in biblical language without stopping to ask whether it was the original meaning or not, now abandoning the literal meaning of prophecy to find a larger meaning in its words, because the spirit of the whole Old Testament was larger than any one passage seemed to express. No sane man could believe that Isa. xi. 1 was ever meant to prophesy the residence of Jesus in Nazareth, or if he did he was altogether wrong. A literalist in theory would never have thus employed it. We have a right to use the treatment of the Scriptures found in these writers to explain their meaning when they quote them authoritatively. So while we may accept Dr. Warfield's statement that the titles applied to the Scriptures in the New Testament, and the formulas of quotation "imply their conception of it as a Book of God, to every word of which man must yield belief and obedience," we must deny the implication that belief was to be accorded to every historical detail. To get this farther element of his defined doctrine, he must go on, as he does, to attempt to show that "for them to say 'Scripture says' is equivalent to their saying 'God says' (Rom. ix. 17; x. 19; Gal. iii. 8)." Examine the last of these passages, which is the strongest of them. It runs: "And the scripture, foreseeing that God would justify the Gentiles by faith, preached the gospel beforehand unto Abraham, saying, In thee shall all the nations be blessed." This is a bold figure of speech to say that God taught the same method of justification in the Old Testament as in the New. But does it amount to putting the WORDS of Scripture upon the level with God's words, so that, because a word is in the Bible, it has all the truth which would attach to it as if it were audibly uttered by God? Professor Warfield must bring more cogent proof than this, and he attempts to do so by advancing to the statement: "It is God who speaks their words (Matt. i. 22; ii. 15)."

All the proof which these passages give of this broad assertion is that they contain the phrase, "spoken by the Lord through the prophet." But I speak through another man whom I commission and who conveys my thoughts, whether he uses the *words* which I would myself employ or not. The proof is still lacking. The last quoted sentence continues thus: "It is God who speaks their words, even those not ascribed to God in the Old Testament itself (Acts xiii. 35; Heb. viii. 8; i. 6, 7, 8; v. 5; Eph. iv. 8)." The first of these passages is this: "Because he saith also in another psalm, Thou wilt not give thy Holy One to see corruption." The connection shows that God's act in raising up Jesus from the dead is presented as the fulfilment of prophecy by Peter. The text means simply that such a prophecy existed, and all prophecy, of course, comes from God. But it does not say that the terms "Scripture says" and "God says" are interchangeable in the sense of the definition which Dr. Warfield has given at the outset. If Peter meant to express the thought which is attributed to him, he was very unsuccessful, for what God did actually "say" in the Psalm was, Thou wilt not give thy Holy One to see the "*grave*," and not "*destruction*," which is an unfortunate rendering of the Hebrew by the LXX, misunderstood by Peter. The citation from Heb. viii. 8 seems to be a slip on Dr. Warfield's part, for the quotation is ascribed to God in the Old Testament (Jer. xxxi. 31). The other texts cited do not furnish any new points, nor does what the Professor further says till he makes the statement: "Still more narrowly defining the doctrine, it is specifically stated that it is the Holy Ghost who speaks the *written words* of Scripture (Heb. iii. 7), and that, even in the narrative parts (Heb. iv. 4)." But the first passage does not prove the point. It is: "Wherefore, even as the Holy Ghost saith, To-day if ye shall hear his voice," etc. Now, this passage does not say that those words, *simply because they are written* in Scripture, are the words of the Holy Ghost, for in the Psalm they

are represented as being spoken by God from out the sanctuary, after the congregation has sung his praises — “When your fathers tempted ME . . . I was grieved . . . I swear.” Doubtless in Heb. iv. 4, as well as other passages cited above, and not cited here, the Old Testament scriptures will be found to be ascribed to God as their source, but whenever the further and exact meaning, presented in the definition above given is urged, it will be found that it is not contained in the passage.¹ To pass over some other passages, we may come at once to the strongest which Professor Warfield cites, which is indeed his proper starting-point, as it was with Dr. Hodge, who placed it at the beginning of his discussion, the text, 2 Tim. iii. 16. It is the idea both of Dr. Hodge and Dr. Warfield, though not so stated in the paper from which the above discussion is taken, that by the word *θεόπνευστος*, applied to “scripture” in a way to make it apply to all scripture, that is, the whole Bible, of both testaments, is meant that the scripture is itself inspired, and thus has become the word of God in the sense claimed in the definition. Both of these divines emphasize the fact that it is possible to know what the word *θεόπνευστος* meant by the processes by which the meaning of other words is gained, and that we thus gain a knowledge of what Paul meant by what he said, to which meaning we are bound. Doubtless the lexical method of investigation should be applied to the passage; but Cremer has

¹ In the Presbyterian and Reformed Review for October, 1894, p. 615, Professor Warfield has adduced, in support of the same position, several more passages. Of these the strongest is Matt. xix. 5, “in which our Lord declares that it is to Him who made man that the words are to be ascribed, ‘For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother,’” etc., though they were originally spoken by Adam. But if they are God’s words *because* they are Adam’s words, then the words of Bildad the Shuhite are, or Job’s wife’s, when she says, “Renounce God and die.” No! They are God’s, not because Adam spoke them, nor because they are in the Bible, but because they were the natural conclusion from what God had done, and because Adam correctly interpreted God’s purpose, and spoke the truth, what God intended him to speak.

shown, in his last edition of the "Biblisches-theologisches Wörterbuch," that such an investigation into usage and meaning of the word does not favor the theory under discussion. He translates it "endowed with God's Spirit" or "breathing a divine spirit," and expressly rejects the meaning "inspired by God." He declares, in contradiction of various loose claims which have been made in respect to the usage of the word, that it is not found in classic nor in later Greek. The undoubted and independent cases of its occurrence are only six.¹ In two cases, where it is used of men, the most natural meaning is "endowed with God's spirit"; a third case, where it is used of a *fountain*, and a fourth, where it is used of a *sandal*, given the meaning "breathing a divine spirit," which meaning best fits a fifth case. From these last cases the meaning of our text is best determined, and it should read, "Every scripture, since it breathes a divine spirit, is also profitable for teaching," etc. Thus the appeal to usage, for a minuter discussion of which the reader must be referred to Cremer, would seem to take away the last prop upon which the defined doctrine rests. Certainly, a *fountain* or a *sandal* could not be "inspired" in the sense Dr. Warfield claims the scriptures are.

This criticism shows, as I think, that the doctrine which Dr. Warfield claims as the Scripture doctrine, is not its doctrine. It was necessary to meet the claim at its very centre. But there are still farther, and much graver objections to make to his treatment of the subject, and to his denial of the rightfulness of the method which it is proposed to pursue, that of an appeal to the facts of the New Testament to determine what the true doctrine of Inspiration is.

He constantly affirms, in the early part of his section upon "Facts versus Doctrine"² that the doctrine which he

¹ Viz., Pseudo-Phocylides, 121; Sibylline Books, v. 308 and 406; 2 Tim. iii. 16; a passage quoted by Wetstein from the Vita Sabæ; and Nonnus, paraphr. ev. Joh. i, 102.

² Presbyterian and Reformed Review, April, 1893, p. 202.

has defined is to be obtained by plain exegesis from the Bible without any consideration of the "facts" of the Scriptures, as they are styled, that is, without any weighing of the evidence from the use of the Old Testament made by the writers of the New, and without any attention to those results of biblical criticism which are so much pressed upon the attention of Christian thinkers in this day. Thus every attempt to find out what the doctrine of Inspiration is by a large induction from all the facts, and not from a mere verbal argument such as that reviewed above, which is, in the judgment of most exegetical scholars of the present day an entire failure, is "an effort to *modify the teaching of the Scripture* as to its own inspiration," and this is "*not* an attempt to obtain a *clearer knowledge* of what the Scriptures teach, but to *correct* that teaching, and to *correct* the teaching of Scripture is to *proclaim Scripture untrustworthy* as a witness to doctrine." We shall say with all distinctness, in reply, that the appeal to facts IS, in the intention of every sober theologian making it, *exactly* "an attempt to obtain a clearer knowledge of what the Scriptures teach," and that it rests upon a great postulate of all Christian thinking, which Professor Warfield would be the last to deny, that *Christian doctrine is, and must be, in accord with facts*. Ascertained facts are always employed in the settlement of exegetical questions. It is proposed to employ them for this purpose in the settlement of the question what the term "breathing a divine spirit" in 2 Tim. iii. 16 means. That the Scripture has authority, that it conveys to man the voice of God, that it is inspired, are the results of exegesis. But for the purpose of determining how far that inspiration extends, and whether it includes historical facts so as to render the biblical writers infallible in every minutest historical detail, can only be answered by bringing to bear upon the exegesis of the texts the light which comes from the facts embedded in the Bible itself.

In the second part of this section, Professor Warfield gives up, as it seems to us, his whole case. He admits the necessity of a broad induction to the establishment of the doctrine of inspiration, and says: "Nor again is it to be thought that we refuse to use the actual characteristics of Scripture as an aid in, and a check upon, our exegesis of Scripture, as we seek to discover its doctrine of inspiration. . . . No careful student of the Bible doctrine of inspiration will neglect anxiously to try his conclusions as to the teachings of Scripture by the observed characteristics and 'structure' of Scripture, and in trying he may, and no doubt will, find occasion to modify his conclusions as at first apprehended." These sentences amply justify the method of discussion which it is here proposed to adopt. But Dr. Warfield does not squarely allow what he has himself conceded, for he goes on to say: "But it is one thing to correct our exegetical processes and so modify our exegetical conclusions in the new light obtained by a study of the facts, and quite another to modify, by the facts of the structure of Scripture, the scriptural teaching itself, as exegetically ascertained." That is to say: The facts as to the structure of Scripture may *enter in to determine exegetical results*, but the exegetical results *must not be afterwards compared* with the same facts! Why, in the name of all that is rational, not? We should say rather: Therefore, *of course*, they may be so compared, and must necessarily be found harmonious with them. Professor Warfield is landed in this self-contradictory position because he is contending against himself. He cannot deny the appeal to facts, for he regards them himself too highly. His real reply to those who propose to modify the old doctrine of inspiration by an appeal to the facts should be, and finally is: The doctrine, as presented in the biblical forms of statement, is not vague, as you claim; and the facts you propose to adduce are not facts. The "high" doctrine is true, and you have nothing new to bring in. In both of these statements he would be, as we think,

wrong; but he would promote self-consistency by avoiding the line of argument sketched above.

To resume the course of the argument—the actual extent of inspiration is, then, to be learned by an appeal to facts. Now, so soon as this is made, it becomes evident that in historical matters, the writers of the Bible generally gathered their materials as other historians gather them, the prime distinction between sacred and secular history being in the *use* which is made of the materials. Thus Genesis, for example, is a composite book, made up of materials gathered from several distinct sources, put together by a later hand than the authors of the documents themselves. Or, if this be disputed, the books of Kings and Chronicles repeatedly refer by name to the sources whence their writers derived their information. The three synoptic Gospels bear marks of similar dependence upon documentary sources. Luke expressly confesses his dependence.

All this is, however, perfectly consistent with historical infallibility. The writers might have been guided in their use of their sources so as to avoid all error; but an examination of the facts makes it clear that they were not.

In the first place, the narratives display the same kind of variations as are found in the narratives given by fallible men of the same event, even when they are perfectly honest. In one narrative, a centurion comes himself to ask for the healing of his servant, in another he sends his friends. One evangelist says that two possessed men met Jesus at a certain place; another, one. Such discrepancies amount to little or nothing. They do not impair the general credibility of the narrative, but rather strengthen it. They do, however, exhibit the presence of human fallibility. It must be true that either the centurion came to ask the favor, or that he did not come. Both statements cannot be true. In any other narratives, this would be admitted, and it must be admitted here.

Again, differences in chronological statements and com-

putations involving error are common. These are, to be sure, unimportant, but they exist. They are unimportant when they are admitted, but the moment they are denied, or an infallibility claimed for such statements which they do not possess, they become important. The apparently systematic chronology of the genealogical tables of Genesis cannot be employed as the basis of a computation of the earth's age. The computation of Paul (Gal. iii. 17), that the law was four hundred and thirty years after the Abrahamic covenant, does not agree with the computation (Acts vii. 6) by which it was made four hundred years. Now, this variation may be explained in various ways so as to preserve the complete trustworthiness and reliability of both writers; but, so long as four hundred and four hundred and thirty remain different numbers, so long will it be true that inspiration did not preserve one or the other of them from error. The numbers in the books of the Chronicles, when compared with the Kings, give a large variety of cases in which divergencies exist, and are scarcely explicable even upon the supposition of errors in transcription. It is common to make this explanation in case of numerical discrepancies. Still, allowing all that can be said, it seems scarcely probable that the divine wisdom would go to the extent of special inspiration to secure in the Bible what the same providence would subsequently permit to be lost. After all, the only real question is about the Bible which we have, and not about some one which we can never have. The present Bible has not been so watched over as to secure immunity from all these various trifling errors.

And lastly, under this head of historical error, if the modern analysis of the Pentateuch be accepted, even in its most conservative form, it will be evident that there was at least some development in the Mosaic codes during the history of Israel, and that consequently the picture presented by the Pentateuch, by which Moses is represented as having given all the Levitical law in the journeyings of Israel, and rehearsed

all Deuteronomy in his address just before his death, is not in every respect correct. It is not necessary to suppose, as some have done, but as no careful reader of the Old Testament can admit, that these incorrect features rest upon fraudulent design, and that there has been a conscious attempt to father upon Moses, for the sake of gaining favor for them, the productions of later centuries. It is simply necessary to suppose that the inspiration of the writers of the Old Testament did not preserve them from all historical error. They attributed to Moses what was, in fact, the growth of ritual tradition far subsequent to him, though very ancient as regarded themselves. This argument will have just so much force as is the credit which the individual thinker ascribes to the critical analysis.

But one more line of evidence need be at present cited, that which is afforded by the use which the writers of the New Testament make of the Old. While, on the one hand, they treat it as of the highest authority, as already sufficiently shown, on the other, they differ as widely from a course natural and indeed inevitable if they had the ideas about its minute infallibility which have been often taught in the church, as it is possible to conceive. They pay little attention to the mere words of Scripture as such. They generally quote from the LXX, a translation made by men "who had forgotten their Hebrew, and who had never learned Greek," and they do this at points where the Greek differs from the Hebrew, even to the extent of basing an argument upon a word from the Greek text not found in the Hebrew (Heb. x. 5, "body"). Equally loose are their quotations from the sayings of our Lord himself, even when just given by themselves. They certainly knew nothing about the doctrine of "verbal inspiration," nor that curious theory of Dr. Shedd's, that thought cannot be inspired without inspiration of words! They were engaged upon the thought, sometimes the thought which was implied rather than expressed, and contrived, in spite of the

"impossibility" of doing so, to convey it in words quite different from the original. And, certainly, all the painful methods of modern exegesis, which are inevitable upon the doctrine of a verbal infallibility, or any sort of universal infallibility, lay absolutely beyond their horizon.

The foregoing considerations, which have been rather hinted than stated, are mostly negative. There remain two passages of a positive bearing upon the subject which should yet be considered. The first of these, 1 Cor. ii. 6-16, may be summarized in the following form. The Spirit of God is the essential and primary factor, with which the spirit of man is co-operative. The contents of inspiration are spiritual realities. They are the deep things of God. They are above and beyond all secular science, the embodiment of a divine philosophy, attained through a divine initiation. They date from a past eternity and fill a future eternity. They are supra-sensual, supra-psychical, supra-rational. They are the peculiar province of the Spirit, are freighted with divine grace, and culminate in spiritual perfection. The processes by which they are apprehended are spiritual, the utterances by which they are expressed are given by the Spirit, and this Spirit is the "mind of Christ." The second passage needs no summarizing. It is 2 Tim. iii. 16, 17—and it states the object of inspiration, and thus implies the nature of inspiration, to be the *spiritual preparation* of the good man for *spiritual work* in the world.

Putting, now, all these facts together we may say that inspiration is not exclusively supernatural, since it co-exists with a human element in the preparation of the Scriptures; not verbal, since little stress is laid upon verbal accuracy by the biblical writers in their own work and in their use of other scriptures; not a preservative from all error, since certain classes of mistakes are found in the Scriptures; and does not embrace scientific subjects, this phrase being taken of all merely human science, not only historical, as has been

shown more particularly, but also natural, as is involved in this position, and will be admitted without further discussion. It is, however, a connection with God, operating by a spiritual force in the minds of the writers, opening to them spiritual realities, making them trustworthy agents for the correct transmission to men of revelation, and doubtless special with reference to the written books, as distinct from the oral instructions, of the apostles.

Hence inspiration may be thus defined: It is that union of the writers of the Bible with God through his Spirit which enabled them to teach without error, and in the best manner for the permanent instruction of mankind, those things which they intended authoritatively to teach, viz., all ethical and religious things necessary to the salvation and sanctification of men.

VIII.

CONCLUDING REMARKS.

The proof of the Scriptures here presented rests fundamentally upon the testimony of the Spirit to the Bible as the Word of God. The subsidiary and collateral proof is derived from the contents of the Scriptures themselves, from the System of Doctrine found there, from the claims which the Scriptures make for themselves. This element is, as already remarked, fundamental to all methods of proof; but in many systems, it is introduced surreptitiously, inasmuch as implications are made as to the contents of the Bible before it has itself been studied, and while professedly ground is being sought which shall justify that study. But a mere mention of this fact is enough for this place.

The argument also presupposes, as a general result of historical criticism, the general genuineness and authenticity of the Bible as a whole. But it makes only this general supposition. Hence place is left for special investigation of individual points, such as the genuineness of Second Peter, of

the Fourth Gospel, of the so-called Mosaic books. And further, since minute historical infallibility is not affirmed of the Scriptures, but is rather refuted by the facts which have passed in review, and this without affecting the foundations of the argument for the Scriptures as here traced, place is also left by the argument for those further inquiries as to the historical credibility of the Old Testament which the labors of the biblical critics have forced upon our attention. Inasmuch as historic credibility does not enter into the argumentative process by which the authority of the Scriptures is proved, investigation in this sphere can be freely pursued without the paralyzing effect of a constant fear lest a certain decision upon some given point may throw the existence of our Bible into jeopardy. Of the authority of the Bible in its spiritual sphere the church has no doubt. The whole discussion of the present day may in this respect be likened to the trinitarian discussions of the fourth century. The whole church believed without exception that Christ was God, but they sought in different ways to show the consistency of this fact with the unity of God. Paul and Lucian, and even Arius, taught that Christ was God, for they had so elastic a conception of the meaning of that word that it was possible to apply it to the Logos, who was himself in the last analysis, in their mind, a creature. The final triumph of the Nicene doctrine was brought about by the fact that it alone, when tried in the agitations and conflicts of the times, finally proved to be sufficient to afford a firm basis for this universal and never relinquished doctrine of the Godhead of Christ. So now, in all the discussions in the church over the Scriptures, their authority, and our dependence upon them for religious light and for our knowledge of the way of salvation and sanctification, are undisputed. The simple question is, What is essential to this main position? and when this is answered, finally and conclusively, then the doctrine of Inspiration will be settled.

Inasmuch, then, as the authority of the Scriptures does

not depend, in our argument, upon the historic infallibility of the Bible, investigation into the issues raised by the critics may be freely pursued without anxiety as to the results. The truth will be consistent with all other truth, and with this of the authority of the Scriptures also.

Whatever may be the result of that investigation, the result of the present is to show the perfect divine authority and reliability of the Bible in its entirety as a source of information upon ethical and religious subjects, as a guide to salvation, and to growth in the knowledge of God. This point is deemed as clearly proved as the existence of God himself. The proof of the Scriptures and of the existence of God both take their rise in facts of certainty of equal rank with our own existence, in the certainty that the Christian has of the new birth as an experienced fact. Both of these doctrines are confirmed by subsequent proofs derived from both the religious and the philosophical sphere; but neither of them has pre-eminence over the other.

Professor Warfield, in his review of the views of Professor Henry Preserved Smith, says, in effect, that the position that the Bible is authoritative in the religious and ethical sphere, but not infallible in the historical sphere, destroys the authority of the Bible even in the religious sphere. We can test its infallibility in the sphere of science, thinks the Professor, but the religious sphere is that in which we have to depend upon authority alone. "How do we know that no error has entered into the description of the future state, for example; or into the definition of the relations of the persons of the God-head to one another? This is a sphere in which authority must rule: and into which a stringent test by induction cannot enter—for the simple reason that we have no extra-biblical criterion of the facts." But is this so? Is it not rather true that the doctrine of the Trinity, because of its harmony with the rest of the Christian system, and with the ideas of creation and revelation, as well as of redemption, has a proof in

addition to that derived from the mere statements of Scripture, and which may in turn be used, as has been done in the section upon the authority of the Scriptures above, to prove the Scriptures themselves? Professor Warfield surely cannot mean to deny all the proof of the system and the Bible which is derived from the agreement of the different parts of the system with one another, with Christian experience, with philosophy, and with history, for the sake of staking all upon the infallibility of the Bible in every one, even the least, of its statements.

One word more, and that upon "errancy" and "inerrancy." Is the Bible "errant"? Every Christian will at once reply, "No! It will certainly lead every one who follows it to salvation and heaven." The objection to the application of the word "errant" to the Bible is simply this, that it will be understood as implying what the whole church must ever deny. But just so soon as the "inerrancy" of the Bible is employed to deny patent facts, such as this, that 400 and 430 are not the same numbers, then it is important to maintain that the Bible has not THAT "inerrancy."

ARTICLE III.

THE BOOK OF ACTS AND THE HISTORICAL
METHOD OF INTERPRETATION.

BY THE REV. JAMES BRAND, D.D.

WHEN Peter visited Cornelius at Cæsarea, a great step was taken in the historical development of Christian doctrine. The apostle himself received such an enlargement of his ideas of the character of God and the scope of Christianity as made him a different man for the rest of his life. Possibly he never had really thought God was a "respector of persons," but it is one thing to know a truth theoretically and quite another to experience that truth in real life, or to apply it in a case where it conflicts with all our preconceived notions of society. Peter's mind was evidently tremendously impressed with his new view of the divine plan and the world-wide reach of the gospel. And that great discovery through the vision of the sheet, and the visit to Cæsarea, naturally put the apostle, and ought to put all men in every age, into an attitude of readiness to welcome new truth. He learned that the gospel, as applied to human life, is full of *surprises*; that we are constantly to expect new developments of truth, new and larger and truer interpretations of truth, and new applications of truth to life, as the history of the world unrolls. Such scriptures, therefore, are a standing rebuke to the narrow idea that no new light is for us beyond that of our fathers. There is such a thing as the *progress of doctrine*. Not that the Bible changes, not that we read more, merely between the lines, not that we put into the Bible what was not there before; but, as taught by God's ever-new providential events, we dis-

cover a larger meaning. The apostles themselves, from their first acquaintance with Jesus till the last one of them had suffered martyrdom, were constantly enlarging their views and modifying their interpretations of Scripture. It has been so with the church ever since, and will be to the end. While the great cardinal truths of revelation have remained clear and settled, the views of scholars and commentators have been changing and enlarging in regard to many principles and applications of Scripture. In other words, God interprets his own word by his providences. Therefore the *historical method* of interpretation is the only true one. We need to stand, as Peter did, with mind ever open, and expectant of new views and larger meanings of the Bible, as time goes on.

Now, in accordance with, and in illustration of, this historical development of truth, we may find some marked changes and enlargements of idea, in the treatment of revelation.

In the *first* place, Christian men in their interpretation of Scripture now appeal to reason, more than in former ages. We do not mean to imply that clear thinkers did not always use reason in their interpretation and defence of the Bible. But in past generations a statement found in the Bible was accepted literally, chiefly because it was in the Bible; whereas to-day the same doctrines are received more generally, because they commend themselves to enlightened reason and the moral sense of man. This does not mean that human reason is co-ordinate with Scripture as a source of religious truth, as Dr. Briggs at first seemed to imply. The Bible, when once established as a revelation from God, is the final and sufficient authority. But in the interpretation and application of it to society, and even in the defence of the fact of a supernatural revelation as against rationalism, reason has now, rightly, a larger place. Slavish literalism, which has so often been the bane of biblical interpretation, and the mere massing of texts, often of doubtful relevancy, is no longer a chief reliance. Texts and doctrines are alike subjected to criticism,

and the Bible as a whole is defended because it is reasonable. This perhaps has some perils, but yet it is a great gain. The critical judgment, enlightened by the Spirit of God, and broadened by scholarly investigation, and the unfolding of history, has now a supreme place in the work of interpretation. This is no disparagement of the mission of the Holy Spirit in leading men "into all truth." For the Spirit's field of operation is not words, but *minds*. His holy work is not superficial, but fundamental. His mission is not to interpret the meaning of Greek or Hebrew verbs or particles, and thus supersede the necessity of reason. He acts rather on the hearts and characters of men, leading them into "all truth" by bringing them into a right attitude toward God, so that reason and judgment may act wisely and without prejudice. Thus, with the progress of knowledge, the unfolding of history, and the enlargement of the experience of the church, we inevitably come to new and larger apprehensions of the Bible.

For example, Paul's language as to the silence of woman in the churches, and indeed in all public assemblies, has, till within a few years, been taken literally, as applying to woman in all places, and all time, and all degrees of intellectual and moral development. Nearly every commentary yet to be found takes that view, without the slightest regard to the improvement of society under the gospel of Christ; and in utter defiance of the progress of Christian experience. In this way the Bible itself has been made to appear to fall behind its own results and to fail to keep pace with the best progress of civilization. Now, it is morally certain that, in view of the vast change in the position and condition of woman, the commentaries which are to be written in the next twenty-five or forty years will reverse that state of things, by showing, according to the historical method, that Paul's language was intended to apply only to such a state of society as existed in the church to which he wrote. If this new principle of interpretation had been applied fifty years ago, it would have

prevented slave-holders and their pastors from claiming the Bible as supporting chattel slavery in the South. The principle, however, is now prevailing, and thus all men will come to see that we have a Bible that not only keeps pace with its own intellectual and spiritual results, but a Bible that is to be eternally in the lead of the highest development of mankind, and adapted to every age and clime.

In the *second* place, under this principle we are getting rid of the old excitement about the relation of religion to science which has tormented the church for fifteen hundred years. Although Christianity has doubtless helped science as truly as science has helped Christianity, yet it is humiliating to find that theologians have, for a time at least, fought nearly every great, new discovery in scientific research as if it were an enemy of religion. Under the old principle of literalism, geographers and astronomers have been, at first, branded as subverters of truth. Discoverers in the laws of physics have been charged with being in league with the Devil. The science and art of medicine have been condemned with a force which has hardly yet lost its sting. Geology has been called an attack upon the Word of God. Political economy has been said to be anti-Christian. The taking of interest, for money loaned, was anathematized for a thousand years as a sin. Even Luther said that every usurer was "a thief worthy of the gibbet." This warfare of Christians upon scientific progress has been waged, no doubt, in part, because of the hasty, and often unfounded, and pugnacious assumptions of some scientific men, but chiefly in obedience to that short-sighted literalism which has led so many interpreters astray. All this would have been impossible if a broader principle of interpretation had been applied. We believe, with Ex-President Andrew D. White, that "In all modern history interference with science, in the supposed interest of religion, no matter how conscientious, has resulted in evil to both science and religion. And all untrammelled scientific investigation, no matter how dan-

gerous to religion some of its stages may have seemed for a time to be, has invariably resulted in the highest good of religion and science."

If President White had added to this true statement, that, on the other hand, all unscientific attacks of scientific men upon religion as such, had invariably resulted in evil to both science and religion, his reasoning would have escaped the merited criticism of being *one-sided*. The unseemly fight between science and religion has been fought with equal zeal on both sides: neither can complain of the other. It is now, however, perfectly manifest that Christianity and science are divinely intended to live and develop together. They help each other. They stimulate and interpret each other. The idea of a conflict between them when each is rightly understood is utterly passing away. This is because we are all learning to interpret according to the historical development of the race and age in which we live. The Bible cannot hold its place on any other principle. In learning this lesson, there is no better book to study than the book of Acts. We find that it is not only the record of the acts of the apostles, but pre-eminently the record of the growth of apostolical conceptions of divine truth—the book of the enlargement of the apostles' ideas, the broadening of their thought, the gradual correction of their false conceptions of the Christian scheme. Peter had been for some years a devoted follower of Jesus before he went to Cornelius, but he had never grasped, till then, the breadth of God's plan of grace. Both he and the six men of the circumcision who went with him were surprised and astonished that the gospel was for the Gentiles, on precisely the same conditions as for them. It was a great, new, discovery. The Holy Spirit had prepared the way for it in the fulness of time, both with regard to Peter's mind and that of Cornelius. Peter accepted the larger view with gladness of heart. When he went back, however, to the brethren in Jerusalem, he was taken to task by them for having gone

beyond the old Jewish conception of the gospel. And he had to proceed in his own defence by the recital of the facts in his own experience, in order to correct their narrow views, and convince them that there was a broader and diviner plan. They had all, doubtless, known in a general way of Christ's command to "Go into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature," but the full meaning of that, in its application to social relations, had not dawned upon them till now. In the same way, we ourselves, of *this* generation, are learning, as no generation before us ever did or could, the larger meaning of that great second command, to love our neighbors as ourselves. The events of history and the sufferings of men are crowding its meaning upon us. That command is illuminated to-day, and its application made imperative, by the lurid logic of nihilism, by the struggle between capital and labor, by the satanic spirit of caste, North as well as South, by the perils and losses of strikes, and by the accumulating woes of men and women in their crushing, grinding poverty, as contrasted with the selfish luxury of many a self-indulgent church. And just as, in the case of the early disciples, when they learned their new lesson, so we, when we have learned ours, shall surely stand on a higher plane.

Some fifteen years later in apostolic history, when a good beginning had been made in the conversion of the Gentiles, we see that still another advance step had to be taken in the broadening of Christian ideas. Many in the church at Jerusalem still held that the heathen converts could be saved only by entering the church through the Jewish law of circumcision, according to the law of Moses. This raised another contest, which resulted in the great debate in the Council at Jerusalem on the subject of religious liberty. Paul and Barnabas were appointed delegates, and came on from Antioch, bringing with them Titus, a heathen convert, as a sort of argument made to order; and there they met the men of the narrower view, and the battle was joined. After much dis-

puting, Peter, whose ideas had been enlarged before, rose and took a manly position, with Paul and Barnabas, in favor of breaking down the old wall of prejudice between Jew and Gentile, and recognizing the divine largeness of the gospel. His first point was to relate his own experience with Cornelius, fifteen years before. He told how the Holy Spirit had fallen on heathen converts as on the Jews, how God made no conditions but the purifying of their hearts, how they must put no yoke on their brethren from heathen communities, and that they must all stand by the great principle that all men are saved by grace alone through Jesus Christ. Then followed Paul and Barnabas, giving their missionary experience; and finally, James the Just, the chairman of the council, arose and outlined what ought to be done. The "decrees" were then formulated, granting liberty and equality to all Christians for all time. This was another forward step in the conception of the gospel brought about in God's own time and way, according to the historical method. These steps could hardly have been taken any sooner than they were. The enlargement of view had to come in connection with the development of the events. So it must be through all time. Men's conception of the comprehensiveness of the gospel must constantly expand till every need, and every condition of society, in every age and nation, shall be met. And thus the world will have a gospel of love that can never be outgrown or left behind.

This historical interpretation of Scripture may be looked upon, is looked upon by some, as only a dangerous tendency toward the liberalism of a shallow age, or as the Athenian passion for "some new thing." But surely such a position is both unnecessary and unjust. Such fear is groundless, *provided* always that the new ideas are not only broader, but also higher. Of course there is nothing gained by broadening our view at the expense of thinning it. Gold-foil may be the right metal, but it is not fit for crown jewels. What the

objectionable liberalism of to-day needs, is, on the one hand, to look *up* and *down*, as well as abroad—a little perpendicular expansion, as well as lateral, a profounder idea of the plan and the attributes of God, of the government of God, and of the guilt and doom of sin. On the other hand, narrowness is not necessarily deep. There is no value in narrowness except the advantage of being easily upset. There is no help for humanity in mere orthodox conservatism, unless it has also the element of breadth and progress in its application to the expanding wants of the world. There is never any danger from broad, liberal views if they are only deep and high as well as broad. But this was precisely what the apostles gained in the historical development of the book of Acts. It was not simply a broadening of views, but a real *enlargement* of their conception of God and his gospel. And if they had lived a thousand years longer, they would doubtless still have gone on enlarging.

Peter's opening words to Cornelius have sometimes been explained as meaning that all religions are equally valuable—that the "light of Asia" is as good as the "Light of the World," and that it makes no great difference what a man believes if he is only sincere. Close examination will show that Peter meant no such thing. He did not say that one religion is as good as another. As Bengel has suggested, "It is not indifferentism to religions, but indifference as to nations" that Peter discovers. God does not regard the external or accidental relations of persons. He makes no difference between Jews and Gentiles with respect to his grace in Christ. In every nation he who has the true Christ-spirit will be accepted of God, *through the atonement of Christ*. And so Peter at once set to work to preach Christ to that very Cornelius, whose temper of mind was already such as to gladly accept him. All this is in perfect accord with the declaration of this same apostle in another place, that "there is

none other name under heaven given among men, whereby we must be saved."

In conclusion, then, it would seem, that—

1. We all need to study the Bible according to the progressive and historical method. We need to stand, as the apostle did, with open mind, ready to correct or enlarge our views as the advancement of Christ's kingdom may demand. We, too, must expect the Bible to be full of *surprises*, full of unlooked-for greatness of capacity of adaptation to the ever growing and changing conditions of mankind. And thus the church will clear itself from the charge of having no fitness to meet the needs of to-day. Thus, too, we shall refute the argument of the rationalists, that Christianity has reached its climax, and is being left behind, eclipsed by "the more unclouded light." We must still study the book of Acts, for it contains not only the summary of gospel principles, but a continuation of the history of Christ and "the issue of his predictions." It contains a specimen of the method and spread of the gospel. It contains the victory of the gospel in the temples and palaces of the rich and in the hovels of the poor. And that history is a fair specimen, a kind of prophecy, of the history of Christ's kingdom throughout all time.

2. We may also find by this method of interpretation the true conception of our *duty to the heathen*. Let it be freely granted, as Dr. Bushnell has claimed, that in every nation, even the darkest and lowest, there may be some saved, accepted of God through the atonement of Christ without having the gospel actually preached to them; let us hope and pray, nay, let us *believe*, that this may be the case; but surely such a bare possibility does not remove the need of the Bible and the preaching of the living Christ. It seems to have been God's own thought that even the candid, truth-seeking soul of Cornelius needed the gospel, or he would not have been directed to send for Peter. The case of Cornelius simply shows that there are souls in pagan lands struggling for

the light of God, yearning for the peace and the pardon of God, listening to hear just such words as Christ uttered to sinners, and ready to accept Christ himself when presented to their minds. But surely this, instead of being an argument against the need, is rather a tremendous plea for the prosecution of missionary work. Indeed it is the most potent encouragement for us all to give, and to go. And if it be said that God is all-merciful; that the Holy Spirit is working always in society, striving with guilty hearts in all ages and nations, warning them against evil, prompting to good, secretly pleading with the darkest minds, even in the heart of Africa, under all the weight of their disgusting superstitions and crimes and woes,—as it were in advance of the proclamation of Christ,—if this be claimed, let us accept that, too, with adoring gratitude. It is just like God. And if he succeeds in saving one here, and another there, before we, tardy ones, get to them with the story of the cross, let us still say, Blessed be the God of our salvation. He *is* near to every one of us. We are *all*, even in Africa and India and China and America, “his offspring.” But that is the very reason why we should make haste to co-operate with the Spirit, and to run to the hungering millions of our brethren with the glad tidings of great joy.

3. This historical method of interpreting the Bible, which keeps it always in touch with Christian experience, and makes it the leader of Christian thought in every age and stage of culture, ought to remove all anxiety as to the result of historical criticism of the Bible itself. Honest historical criticism has again and again proved itself a friend to the Bible, and has already done much for the progress of the faith. For example, it would be difficult to overestimate its value, in establishing, as it has, the authority and divine mission of the Gospel of John, which has been so long under debate. Indeed, every book of the Bible may be said to stand as it does in the sacred canon by having first passed

through the crucial test of historical criticism. The critical tests being applied to some parts of the Bible in our own day—some of them by friends and some of them by enemies, some of them just and some of them unjust, some of them destined to modify our views, and some of them to be simply blown away—are only another step in the historical development and enlargement of Christian ideas with regard to the gospel of salvation. The more criticism the better. The more criticism the more light. The more study of the Bible from every quarter, the more God's own plan is being carried out, and the more invincible will be the confidence that "the Word of our God shall stand forever."

4. This gradual historical unfolding of the riches of the gospel is one of the dearest facts in Christian experience. It protects the soul against needless forebodings. The apostles were not prepared for martyrdom when first converted. They were only told that, as their day, so would their strength be. They were to act up to the light they had at any given time, and take no anxious thought for the morrow. Circumstances might be very different the next morning, but God would be on the morrow just as he is to-day. So now, God is on hand not *before*, but *when*, our emergencies arise. We look at certain untoward events, bad government, tardy justice, false leaders, rash reasoners and critics, and say, Morality and religion are going to the wall. We look at certain possible disappointments, certain crosses, certain bereavements, by anticipation, and it seems clear that we never could endure them. But when they come, God comes with them, and all is right. We look forward to old age and death, and cannot see how we shall endure the one or face the other; but when old age comes, it brings its own compensations. When death comes, the sting is taken away. The face of the Christ shines into the darkening room, and we learn to say, "O death, where is thy sting! O grave, where is thy victory! The sting of death is sin, and the strength of sin is

the law. But thanks be to God, who giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ." The historical method of Christianity for the world, for the nation, for the individual, is all folded up in that sublime promise in Deuteronomy—"As thy days, so shall thy strength be." Therefore, do not fret about to-morrow.

ARTICLE IV.

THE SOCIAL ETHICS OF JESUS.

BY PROFESSOR JOHN S. SEWALL, D. D.

WAS Jesus a Social Reformer? Was the renovation of society the special object of his mission? Did he come to regenerate the individual, or to rectify the community? These questions will open the gateway into the field before us.

It is a wonderful vision we see when we look across the ocean and back through the centuries to the country and the times of our Lord. There lies little Palestine, rugged with mountains, rich with orchard and vineyard, her soil fertile with the blood of countless battles against heathen invaders, her people ennobled by a history which no other nation could even approach; but now a province prostrate at the feet of pagan Rome, her people corrupt, her temper soured, her religion degraded, her character haughty, provincial, intolerant, hypocritical, her burdens fierce, her masses a slumbering volcano ready to burst into flame at the first word of revolt. In the midst of these disorders stands a central figure of light, calm, collected, busy with his own mysterious project. He recognizes the wrongs, the confusions, the oppressions, the perversions of character and justice and truth all around him. But he does not appear to be alarmed. He is not in a hurry. He starts no crusade against Rome. He breaks no lance with Herod, nor with the priesthood, nor with the laws, nor with existing institutions, nor with social custom. It is not along these lines that he appears to be working.

And yet when we think of the evils which afflict the race, it would seem as if here would be the point at which

Jesus would begin. The wars, the oppressions, the cruelties, the class hatred, the feuds between capital and labor, the business monopolies, the frauds, speculations, gambles on 'change, the passions and crimes which prey upon society, the sufferings of the unemployed, the homeless, and the starving,—surely such calamities show how badly the planet needs disinfecting. Here is a Cause of sufficient magnitude to enlist even a reformer from heaven.

When we look at Jesus himself we note how finely he was adapted to just this work of social renovation. In person and character he was a God. In sympathies he was a man, and understood men. In spiritual gifts he was equipped with a revelation of divine love and divine grace to save men. In miraculous endowment he had power over the forces of nature, exorcised both demons and disease, held the keys of life and death. He claimed that all authority had been committed to him. His life, his character, his teachings, show how competent he was to assume that royal trust. And his works show him using it,—a kingly dispenser of gifts from heaven.

Into the chaos of human society comes this regal Being, freighted with the love and endued with the power of God. What will he do? Face to face with these monstrous maladjustments, these cruel and measureless wrongs, what can he do otherwise than set himself instantly to the work of redressing them? We expect it. We shall be disappointed if he does not. We look to see the demons of malice and misrule fleeing in horrid rout before his lance. The shadows of grief and care, of hunger and hate, will melt away before his luminous presence. Perhaps he will set up an ideal society in Palestine, and by some intangible but irresistible pressure will move the other nations to build by that pattern. Perhaps he may journey from kingdom to kingdom, and mould each successively into the perfect form. Or it may be he will send an accredited envoy to each, well equipped with

light and force and miracle to bring about supernatural lustrations in thrones and dominions, in commerce and trade, in friendship and home.

It is not easy to predict the labors of such a unique visitor. His ways are not our ways. But we can see what Jesus did in Judæa, and reverently study both his methods and the results.

Some things which we might have expected may be ruled out with a negative at the start.

Jesus did not enter upon the role of the statesman or of the political economist. We look in vain for legislation. He enacts no code. He leads no party. In an empire full of slaves, he opens no crusade against slavery. War all around him at almost every point where the imperial boundaries touch the tribes outside, yet he makes no sign against war. His native province languishes and frets under the tyranny of Rome, yet he issues no counterblast against tyranny. Neither does he predict the perils of the coming democracy. The divine right of kings gets no mention, nor the diviner rights of the people. He leaves to the world no suggestion as to the proper form of government for either church or state. He has nothing to say of free schools, or of woman's rights, or of popular suffrage. He does not forecast the boasted progress of our modern civilization, the triumphs of science and invention and art, our liberties, our luxuries, our illusions. He knew the intemperance of the times, and into what bloated sensuality it would grow with the unrolling ages; yet his followers hear of no temperance pledge, nor get any hint as to whether license or prohibition would make the more effective line of attack upon the monsters of the saloon. He could foresee the fathomless iniquities which would in time grow out of the gambling instinct in human nature,—the wreck of fortunes, the ruin of homes, the swarms of fraud, deceit, robbery, suicide, murder, and all other blackest imps from the pit, that would hover about its track down through

the ages; yet in all his discourses no allusion to a moral plague so black and so destructive; no law against it. The "social evil" was an evil in his time, already portentous, and destined to taint all future generations with its swiftly spreading virus. He cast out the demons of impurity from a few wretched women. He warned men that they would be judged for the lust of thought as well as the lust of act. But he made no attempt to hedge the social evil about with laws; he built no reformatories; he organized no brotherhood of the white cross. In like manner his spirit was oftentimes burdened with the physical maladies that so racked the bodies and tortured the minds of the suffering multitudes around him; and he often healed by miracle such as came in his way, —the blind, the palsied, the leper, the lunatic, the maniac. But there he rests; and we look in vain for some system of associated charities, or any great organized philanthropy bearing his name and spreading through all lands in memory of his pity and love.

It is to be noted as a further negation that the Master never interferes with the constitution of things as he finds them in vogue in his day. If his countrymen are restive under the Roman yoke, he never preaches rebellion or anarchy. Such terms as communism, chartism, landlordism, nationalization of land, anti-monopoly, competition, co-operation, and the like, are foreign to his dialect. When a man who had been defrauded comes with the appeal, "Master, bid my brother divide the inheritance with me," he who is the very impersonation of justice declines to interpose. So far from interrupting the ordinary current of things in church or state, Jesus conforms himself thereto. He obeys the laws of the land. He teaches his disciples and the multitude to do the same. "The scribes and the Pharisees sit on Moses' seat: all things therefore whatsoever they bid you, these do and observe." They are the constituted authorities, therefore obey them; the same persons whose private life, whose ava-

rice and hypocrisy, later on in the same chapter, he scorches with such terrific denunciation. When the temple tax is due and Peter refers it to him, he pays it without a question, even works a miracle to get the pittance required. If one would rightly render unto God the things that are God's, he must also render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's. Jesus holds himself amenable even to the habits and manners of his day. He dines with Pharisee as well as with publican and sinner. He joins in the festivities at the wedding. He is a guest at the marriage feast. He crowns the cheer with wine supplied on the spot by miracle. So entirely is he at one with the people about him in the daily incidents of life, that the rabble contrast him with the ascetic of the wilderness: "John the Baptist is come eating no bread nor drinking wine; and ye say, He hath a demon. The Son of man is come eating and drinking; and ye say, Behold, a gluttonous man, and a winebibber, a friend of publicans and sinners!"

II.

This does not strike us as a Social Reform; nor as an attempt at social reform. Whatever his errand, Jesus evidently did not set up as an agitator. With a divine insight into the needs of humanity, and with a settled purpose to destroy the works of the devil wherever he found them, in high places or low, it was plainly no part of his plan to storm the social problem by direct assault. He was not operating down among the details. He was arranging a campaign of great forces under which the details would work themselves out in good time. His whole attention was concentrated upon the founding of a spiritual kingdom. This was not to be some kind of a ghostly Utopia, but a present practical union of renovated hearts and lives. "My kingdom is not of this world," he testified before Pilate. It does not originate in this world. Its principles and laws are not of this

world. Its atmosphere, its inspiration, its aims, are not of this world. But its subjects are. This empire of divine love, issuing from the heart of God, reaches down into every region of human life, and, laying hold of even the weakest, the least hopeful, the most depraved, raises them up to be sons and daughters of the Almighty.

This promotion is a purely spiritual promotion. The one aim of the kingdom is to produce right character. Therefore it works upon persons, one by one. It plies the soul with motives. It offers divine inducements. Upon every soul that consents it places the crown of life. No pageantry—no lordship—no sceptre and throne—none of the insignia of prerogative and power; but something diviner—the purification of the heart and the rectification of the life.

As, if to show the world some external symbol of these inner transformations, Jesus applies his power here and there to some of the ravages of sin. Miracles of mercy radiate from his divine person. He heals the sick. He restores sight to the blind. He gives speech to the dumb, soundness to the cripple, the vigor of health to the palsied. He casts out demons. He calls the dead from the stillness of the tomb. Everywhere his ministry is one of physical restoration as well as of spiritual teaching. Everywhere he shows that he aims not only at the root of sin in the soul, but at the poisonous fruitage of it in the life. The forces of his kingdom, beginning with the spiritual, would reach out into the physical and secular, would pervade and sweeten every province of life, and would repair the damages that come from sin. The miracles of healing were samples of the complete effect which Christianity would have when in full operation among men. Set up the kingdom, and in time it would carry all other good with it. Seek ye first his kingdom and his righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you.

Thus in founding a spiritual empire Jesus set in motion causes which start with the individual, and through the indi-

vidual reach out into society. His parable of the leaven is the best description of the process. Christianity is a leavening force in the world. It is a quickening force, and constructive. So far as it transforms an atom, that atom helps to transform the mass of which it is a unit. And thus is gradually progressing the moral disinfection of the world, and the moral integration of humanity.

These forces of social renovation are to be seen in the great principles which Jesus laid down.

He taught the universal Fatherhood of God, and the universal Brotherhood of Man. God made man. And therefore all mankind is his family. The members are directly connected with him, and therefore interrelated with each other. We are not a world full of dismembered units, incoherent, isolated, independent. No man liveth to himself; no man dieth to himself. Every man is neighbor to every other man. And the Good Samaritan shows just what Jesus means by "neighbor." The relationship is not so much in the blood, but in the common humanity. A man is a man, and therefore all other men are his fellows. All other men share with him in the common manhood. They have the same organs and senses, the same intelligence and affections. And men recognize their common status. They are gregarious. They unite in great corporations for manufacturing or trade. They combine in great armies for conquest or defence. They gather in great churches and sects, in populous cities and empires. Men do not form copartnerships with the beast of the field, or the fowl of the air, or the fish of the sea. There is no common basis. But man with man is a brotherhood. There is unity of being and unity of aim. And already are there lofty souls who recognize also the spiritual obligations of the brotherhood and act the Good Samaritan to their kind.

For the law of this human fraternity Jesus adopted the Golden Rule. Nothing could be more unlike the codes by which men have usually been governed. The divine right of

kings has generally signified that the realm belonged to the ruler. "The State—it is I!"—with emphasis on the I. The share that fell to the unlucky subject has been too often only neglect, injustice, oppression. The improved relations now subsisting between monarch and people are due to the humanizing power of Christianity. But the Golden Rule is not designed simply as a check upon tyrants. It has universal application. Is a man a brother? Then treat him as a brother. "All things whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, even so do ye also unto them." Your neighbor's interests are intrinsically of as much account as yours. His membership in the great family is of the same sort as yours. His relations to God are on the same basis with yours. He has therefore no inherent supremacy over you, nor have you over him. No member has the right to exploit his fellow-members for his own selfish ends. Admit the Golden Rule, and that is the end of slavery. Admit the Golden Rule, and that is the end of fraud, of speculation in the necessities of life, of ruinous competition, of lotteries, of all those traps and snares by which greed endeavors to get for itself that which belongs to another. Put society under the Golden Rule, and every man is bound to consider not his own rights and interests alone, but the welfare of the rest of the world. How far-reaching, how all-comprehending, such a principle as this.

Jesus made of this rule something more than a command. He carried it up, as usual, into the region of motive. He elevated it into a principle and sentiment,—"*Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.*" These acts of reciprocity (to use Confucius' term) are to spring not from obedience to an order, but from regard to our fellow-man as a brother. Help him when occasion comes, not as under the compulsion of law, but by the inspiration of love. Here is the true "nerve of missions." In his last command Jesus pointed out the thing to be done: "Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature." But what is the motive? Not

obedience to a military order, but the promptings of a divine love.

Furthermore Jesus widened out this precept till it should include not the neighbor only, but the enemy. "Ye have heard that it was said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor and hate thine enemy; but I say unto you, Love your enemies." Lest we should be asking with the lawyer in Luke, and narrowing it down too as he did to the singular number, "And who is my neighbor?"—the Master at a stroke dispels our sophistries, and shows us that our discords and brawls with one another are so petty, so low, so unhuman, that they do not and cannot annul the real unity of the race. Serene above the bickerings of man, undisturbed by wars or rumors of wars, is the magnificent assurance that "God hath made of one every nation of men for to dwell on the face of the earth." If hostile armies then do sometimes spill each other's blood, it is a temporary insanity. When reason returns, they will shake hands across the bloody chasm, and weld again the broken links. Jesus applies his rule to all men. What is your status toward your fellows? Is it affection? Is it indifference? Is it disgust, or fear, or hate? In each and every case you are bound by the Golden Rule. No conditions release you. Be it neighbor or enemy, you are to imitate the Master, and treat men on the high principles of divine compassion. If they persecute you, nevertheless pray for them.

Here lies the explanation of those difficult precepts about non-resistance. "Ye have heard that it was said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth: but I say unto you, Resist not him that is evil: but whosoever smiteth thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if any man would go to law with thee and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloke also. And whosoever shall compel thee to go one mile, go with him twain. Give to him that asketh thee, and from him that would borrow of thee turn not thou away." Society on this basis would be chaos. The good would be at the

mercy of the bad: a universal spectacle of the forces of darkness preying upon the subjects of the kingdom, plundering, fleeing, outraging those pure and conscientious souls who imagine, as Tolstoi insists, that Jesus meant literal non-resistance to evil. The meek, instead of inheriting the earth according to promise, would be but a handful of victims under the tyranny of the violent and depraved. Nothing could be more absurd. Jesus himself obeys no such rule. What he is aiming at is to get lodged in the human heart the great idea of mutual forbearance. And to make an impression sufficiently vivid, he sets forth examples which are too paradoxical to mislead, and yet startling enough to compel the attention of the world. He shows therein his purpose to get the *lex talionis* out of human history, and to substitute for it the law of kindness. This does not annul the right of self-defence. It did not prevent some punitive acts of Jesus himself. It is an anticipation, an ideal; not literally possible now, but to be wrought out in the evolution of the Christian ages. Just so fast and so far as the principles of the kingdom prevail in the world, the doctrine of non-resistance must come to be a realized fact. There will be no foe to resist. War will slink back into the night and be forgotten with the other outgrown barbarisms of the past.

As Jesus expanded his great law to include all sorts and conditions of men, so too he lifted it into a more spiritual interpretation. In his kingdom the Golden Rule rises into the Christian Law of Service. Here one has the privilege of doing for others not by the measure of their labor for him, nor by what he would have them do for him, but by the kingly example of the Master. He came into the world not to be ministered unto, but to minister. He could not hope for a return. He stood on a higher level than the Golden Rule. From that high level he poured down upon men those divine benefits which they could never render to him. He invites men to come up and stand with him. As if he should say,

Be not content to do for men, with square and even dealing, just what they can do in return, but bless them with service which is beyond their power to recompense. Whoever aspires to be great in the kingdom, let him serve. Let him rise above the Golden Rule. That is for the rank and file—for the common equities of the brotherhood. For him there is a larger place, beside his Master. Let him rise to that, and minister to men not according to the ratio of what they might do for him, but far beyond anything he could ever hope or wish they would do for him; in many cases indeed beyond anything they possibly could do for him. A missionary carrying Christianity and civilization to a Hottentot does for him what the Hottentot could not conceivably do for the missionary. This is the law of service. Jesus builds his kingdom on it. Not self-aggrandizement, not self-exaltation, not place and position and power to lord it over one's fellow-subjects—these are not the prizes of the kingdom; but that self-devotion which shall inspire one to spend and be spent for his fellow-men. This is the humility that shall be exalted. "Ye know," said the Master, "that they which are accounted to rule over the Gentiles exercise lordship over them; and their great ones exercise authority upon them. But so shall it not be among you; but whosoever will be great among you, shall be your minister: and whosoever of you will be the chiefest shall be servant of all." It is along these higher lines that men do the finest and noblest things that ever sweeten our human history. Why are men placed in high station? Not for the rank and emoluments, but for the enlarged opportunity for service. The time will come when men will aspire to office, not to gratify ambition, but from a desire to serve their country and their kind with a more abundant helpfulness than they can render down on the lower levels. In that golden age too capitalists will handle their business not simply for the purpose of increasing their own dividends, but to build up the manhood and welfare of their workmen, to relieve

the hardships of poverty, to give to labor a more equitable share of the wealth it helps to create. In many firms and factories that day has already come. And down on the common level, also, all through the ranks of the masses, there are already to be found admirable and even brilliant examples of that mutual charity, that unselfish kindness, that self-forgetting devotion, which are of the very essence of our Saviour's teaching. These are results; and they show how, and how far, the leaven of Christianity is already penetrating the heart of the race.

III.

These in outline are the primary ideas Jesus announced as the motive of his kingdom. Taking our stand now at that point, we can look out as he did on the complications of society. How was he impressed with what he saw? How did he intend his disciples should work out these principles and apply them to the successive conditions that might arise? It may be answered at once, and in general, that his method was that of spiritual evolution; the method of the leaven. Implant certain forces in the mind, and let them work. Magnetize the human will, and of its own accord it will point to the pole.

The unit of society is the family. It needs no effort of the imagination to picture the sweetness and satisfaction of Jesus' early life in the home of Joseph and Mary. It must have been an ideal family. So too the home in Bethany, where later he formed such strong and congenial attachments. Endowed as he was with an affectional nature whose origin and whose ideal was the home on high, he must have felt the deepest interest in the family life here below. He was an honored guest at the marriage feast. He loved the children, and took them in his arms to bless them. He held them up as models to his hearers,—“whosoever therefore shall humble himself as this little child, the same is the greatest

in the kingdom of heaven." He identified their interests with his,—“whoso shall receive one such little child in my name, receiveth me.” He does not draw up any code of ethics for the fireside. He leaves no specific instructions for the training of children; nor rules to control the mutual conduct of husband and wife, or to govern the evolution of the family, or to enlighten parents on the laws of heredity. If the family conforms to the principles of the kingdom, he knows that all these special lines of the common life will go of themselves, and there he leaves it. The truth and honor and purity which are the fundamental ideas of his gospel, will manifest themselves first of all in the sacred precincts of the home, and will make any special legislation superfluous. For a similar reason doubtless he leaves polygamy to die its own death. It is a monster so alien to the very idea of the family, so incongruous and divisive to the home-unit, that, although permitted with other evils in the earlier barbaric conditions of the race, there is no fiat needed to bring it to an end. Let the light shine, and this spectre of the dark will flee away. But with divorce it is otherwise. Jesus evidently regards this as an ever-present menace to the peace and purity of the home which will not so easily down. It must be dealt with, directly and forcibly. The family is a divine institution, and therefore inviolable. The link which unites husband and wife creates a new being,—“of twain one flesh.” If that link be broken, it deprives the new being of life. Divorce destroys the family. It is therefore fatal to society. The family bond must be preserved in its integrity. The instructions given by Jesus therefore are absolute and inexorable. Wendt cites them all, and, after analyzing them, puts his conclusion into this emphatic statement: “Where the unit of husband and wife thus rests on a divine command, a human divorce could not be justifiable.”¹ Since from a

¹ The Teaching of Jesus, i. 353.

clear source no corrupt stream can flow, it is plainly the purpose of Jesus first of all to keep the fountain pure.

Stepping out from the shelter of the home into the general walks and ways of men, we are at once aware of the vast differences and contrasts in human conditions. The two extremes in society are the rich and the poor. How did Jesus regard them?

To the rich his message is one of admonition,—always earnest, sometimes sharp and stern. He looks upon them as living on a wrong theory. "A man's life consisteth not in the abundance of things which he possesseth." Life is not made up of "things." And yet he finds multitudes of the devotees of mammon, whose treasure is in things, and whose heart is down with and in their sordid treasure. The silly epicure, who cares only for his purple and fine linen and the voluptuous banquets at which he fares sumptuously every day,—that is the character Jesus singles out for the terrible picture of retribution in the parable of Dives and Lazarus. And the companion picture is almost as fearful—in the parable of the bacchanalian farmer, who fills his bursting barns and then settles down to a life of gluttonous ease; "Thou fool!" cries a startling voice from heaven, "this night thy soul shall be required of thee!"

Jesus looks upon wealth as in itself of small account. We can see in the two parables of the talents and the pounds, that he recognizes the legitimate uses of money. It has its place as a means to an end. He even directs his followers to make to themselves friends by means of the mammon of unrighteousness—that is, use it so that the results shall accrue to their spiritual interests; a precept which shows that he did not think of money as inherently base and corrupting, but, on the other hand, regarded that kind of spiritual gain with it as entirely feasible. But he invariably rebukes the spirit that would spend anxious thought on the temporalities of life. So little is wealth worthy of such headlong quest,

that when a man comes to him smarting under the greed of his brother, and begging Jesus to restore to him the share of the inheritance of which he has been defrauded, Jesus repels him almost indignantly,—“Man, who made me a judge or a divider over you!” How could mere “things”—a whole worldful of them—draw the Son of God aside from his mission? And he takes the incident as a text for a scathing indictment of avarice.

Jesus regards the rich as in great spiritual danger. In the parable of the sower, the deceitfulness of riches is enumerated as one of the many thorns that spring up to choke the word. The luxury of having tends so often to develop the baser sentiments of pride, selfishness, arrogance, hardness, injustice, rapacity, deceit, sensuality. Such characters oppress the poor. They devour widows' houses. Upon all such Jesus pours his indignation,—“Woe unto you that are rich!” And the tenacity with which they hold their riches, or their riches hold them, wrings from him the almost judicial verdict,—“How hardly shall they that have riches enter into the kingdom of God! . . . It is easier for a camel to go through a needle's eye than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God.” To open the door of hope, nevertheless, to even the rich, Jesus bids them deny self, and exercise a generous charity toward the poor; a brotherly service the poor so desperately need, and they can so easily grant. As if he would say, Loosen your hold of these earthly things. Share your abundance with the hungry and the naked. Show that you recognize your membership in the great brotherhood. Be the Good Samaritan to the suffering and the fallen around you. To one young man who had great possessions, and who thought he lacked nothing essential to either this life or the life to come, Jesus applied the tremendous test,—“Go, sell that thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven: and come, follow me.” Jesus thought of the rich as stewards, holding a place of peculiar temptation and

peculiar opportunity in the social economy, and under bonds to use their wealth for higher purposes than for personal gratification.

What was the attitude of this divine Man toward the poor?

He was a poor man himself. This is the first thing that strikes us. They call him the carpenter's son; sometimes the carpenter. He has the *entrée* of all ranks of society; mingles with nobleman and peasant, with Pharisee and Magdalen. But he never rises, and never seeks to rise, above the humble conditions into which he was born. It was not a palace, not even a cottage, in which he first saw the light. When his mother made the customary offering for purification in the temple, it is pathetic to read that it was the offering appointed for the poor. And throughout his ministry, though this princely visitant could have transmuted the penuries of earth into the glories of heaven, yet for himself he had not where to lay his head.

As we should expect, this poor man was the friend of the poor. His sympathies go out toward them everywhere and always. He is constantly doing for them. The crowds who flock to hear him are mainly the masses. "Not many mighty, not many noble are called." Seldom do any of the gentry appear in the throng, either to listen to his teachings or to be healed by his touch. We read that he restored the servant of a centurion, the son of a nobleman, the little daughter of Jairus the ruler of the synagogue; and that is all; and all three in Capernaum, his own home, where the citizens, even the officials, knew him well. But in the main his ministrations were to the poor, the working classes, the wage-earners—called in the simple language of the Gospels, "the multitude." The themes of his discourses and the plain figures of his parables were evidently designed for such hearers; and they would keenly appreciate his illustrations drawn from their own daily toil. It was their sick that he healed, it was

their children he blessed, it was their lepers he cleansed, their deaf and dumb who heard and spake, their dead who came back to them from the grave—all at a word from him. He loved the poor. He lived and labored and died for the poor. When John sent messengers from prison, Jesus sent them back with an account of wonderful miracles performed in their sight, and crowned the list with the highest gift of all,—“To the poor the gospel is preached.” His first sermon in the synagogue at Nazareth announced in the prophet’s words, “The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he hath anointed me to preach the gospel to the poor; he hath sent me to preach deliverance to the captives, and recovering of sight to the blind, to set at liberty them that are bruised, to preach the acceptable year of the Lord.” What a ministry to the suffering and the destitute this describes. So closely does he identify himself with his “little ones,” as he calls them, that he takes every kindness shown to them as shown to him; “Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these, my brethren, ye have done it unto me.”

And yet, with all his gentle sympathy for the feelings and the hardships of the poor, Jesus always speaks from a superior plane, as if, after all, it were a matter of trifling concern whether one possesses “things” or not. He carries about with him a tranquil consciousness that he can at any moment supply their wants; sometimes indeed he does, as in the two miracles of loaves and fishes. But generally he aims to lift them up on the same high level of simple content where he abides himself. “Take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink, nor yet for your body, what ye shall put on.” Trust your heavenly Father. Not a sparrow falls to the ground without his notice. Has he not an equal care for his children? “Fear not, little flock; for it is your Father’s good pleasure to give you the kingdom.” It is no cause for alarm—the mere absence of “things”; in the future abundance you will not remember the penury you en-

dured here below. Accordingly, "Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon the earth, . . . but lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven." Be not anxious. Think it a matter of small concern whether the riches of this world come trooping around you, bringing comforts and luxuries denied to others. Rise above selfish desire. There are matters of higher moment than food and clothing. You are under the care of One who arrays even the lily of the field more royally than Solomon in all his glory. He will see that you do not want. When Jesus sent out his disciples to preach, they were instructed to make no provision for even the simplest fare; "Take nothing for your journey, neither staff, nor wallet, nor bread, nor money; neither have two coats." Penniless pilgrims; but on an errand so august, the Master would see that all things should work together to supply their need. And a year later, on the very night of his betrayal, he confidently referred to their experience; "When I sent you forth without purse and wallet and shoes, lacked ye anything? And they said, Nothing." If we were to look for a final utterance on the subject, for a precept that should summarize all the rest, one that should contain the great Teacher's entire philosophy of daily life, it would be in these familiar words: "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness; and all these things shall be added unto you."

IV.

If now we rightly apprehend the idea on which Jesus founded his kingdom, we are in a position to look out upon society and observe what effects have been, or ought to be, produced by the presence of this kingdom among men. It is plain that Jesus felt the wrongs of society, and wanted them rectified. He was sensitive to all forms of suffering. If he did not begin his mission as a reformer of society, it was not that he was oblivious of the evils to be remedied.

But in applying the remedy he went to work indirectly. He did not, on the one hand, remand the whole matter to natural evolution, to let it work itself out. Nor, on the other hand, did he buckle on his armor and assault it, as Don Quixote stormed the windmill. His methods were not so startling, but they were wiser. He recognized the difficulty of the situation and the kind of material he had to deal with. Knowing the tenacity of selfishness in the human heart, he knew also that the process by which any motives, however divine, could loosen its hold, must be long and patient and slow. He must reckon therefore with the future as well as the present. And, adjusting his methods to conditions which he foresaw would be so persistent, he set causes in motion that would act down through the centuries with increasing force, and would slowly and surely transform the evil into good. He did not think best to disrupt society with explosions and upheavals; nor dissolve the common framework of humanity back to its ultimate atoms in order to reconstruct the whole mass. He relied on those more potent and enduring forces which are established in the individual soul by the Spirit of God. When winter holds our northern rivers in its grim toils, and every lake and stream is clamped in its bed with ice, no dynamite could free the imprisoned floods, nor any power known to man. But when spring draws near, those frozen masses will yield to the mere warmth of the invisible air. That which could not be torn asunder by force will melt away of itself, and lo, the river is free. In such wise comes the liberation of society. It is not in the earthquake nor in the tempest, but in the still small voice, that God speaks with power. What the sword can never accomplish, and what Socialism in any or all of its protean shapes can only touch on the surface, Christianity achieves by the slow, unseen, intangible but irresistible advance of its spiritual forces. This is coming to be recognized. It has been said recently of the English labor leader Tom Mann,—“He saw plainly that the labor move-

ment must ultimately fail unless it has a firmer foundation than that of a desire for increased wages. The social reconstruction for which he was working could only be based upon religious and economic principles. Indeed, in common with others, he sees that economics, rightly understood, is but the practical application of religion."¹ It is along this line that the kingdom pushes its way. Jesus well knew that no transformation of society can be permanent which does not transform the individual man. Instead of touching society, therefore, he went to work upon man. He expended his time and labor on the kingdom, knowing that the spiritual forces set in operation in that would in time bring order out of chaos.

His ideal is Love; an ideal for society as for the individual. Let that divine sentiment become the ruling instinct of the mind, and the man is moulded in the fashion of Jesus. The aims, the ethics, the character of Jesus become incarnated in him. His life is lived along those lines. His business is conducted on those principles. His relations to his fellow-men are governed by those motives. His place in the Christian church, his vote in the body politic, his methods in trade, his manner in his home, his care for his workmen, or his work for his own employer,—in these and all the other interdependencies of life he is controlled by the divine love within him. That divine love constrains him to be first of all loyal to God, and then loyal to his brother-man. And it has already taught him that the brother-man is not simply his friend, his partner, his peer in social life, but the operative in his mill, the truckman at his store, the day-laborer who digs in his garden. All are members of the great human family, and all are entitled to the benefit of the Golden Rule. The brotherhood of man becomes the fundamental idea in his philosophy of life. He looks out on a wider horizon. A new consciousness rises within him of a common interest with all the rest of the race. His half-dormant sympathies waken

¹ Review of Reviews, Dec. 1893, p. 662.

into life. A sense of human fellowship takes the place where selfishness had reigned before. He begins to notice with some concern the hard lot some of his fellow-mortals have to bear. He begins to speculate on the possibility of more of equity between man and man; he begins to wish for it; exerts his influence in that direction; tries experiments, suggestions, hopeful plans; becomes in his small way, and within the sphere of his own life, a social reformer. That is, by his character, by his personal life and example, by the force of the divine love within him, he is propagating in the community the spirit of his Master, who came into the world "not to be ministered unto, but to minister." And the more there are in the world of such bearers of the divine love, the more rapidly will the hardships of society disappear before the advancing brotherhood of man.

The hopes and plans of Jesus then were centred on the individual rather than on a system. He did not project some great sociological fabric. He did not found a new guild, to do its work in the world as an institution. He begins with the individual, as he did with Matthew, with John, with Nicodemus, with the woman of Samaria. His figure of the leaven represents the spiritual vitalizing force in his kingdom. A very choice figure; which shows how the spiritual life communicates itself not *en masse*, but from atom to atom. Every regenerate mind is a germ-cell of that leaven. It is alive; and can impart life to others. It is a new centre and source of goodness in the community. The gift it has to bestow is divine love; and therefore it always works in the direction of good morals and for the welfare of humanity. It is set in the world as a new point of light, and is bid to shine. It is, so to speak, a detached atom of Christ, placed where it shall live like Christ, and shall actively work in his name. Such a renewed heart will have influence; and that influence will be in the interests of righteousness; and just so far the average morality of the community will be lifted. It will be

found on the side of good citizenship, of obedience to law, of patriotism, sobriety, purity, honesty, and honor. The presence of such Christ-like souls in the community will add just so much to the forces that work for righteousness. The transformation of any one man from bad to good sets a new faculty of goodness in operation. It enlists another champion in the war with wrong. Where there are many such, it may be in many ways more convenient to organize them; but what they accomplish in the world is due not so much to the organization as to the vital force embodied in it. A general, hard pressed on the field of battle, would welcome a reinforcement, not as five or ten organizations called regiments, but as five or ten thousand fresh troops. What can be done, is done not by the system, but by the men who are in the system; a fact never forgotten in politics, but often quite overlooked in the work of the church. In our Lord's representations of his kingdom men are never handled in bulk, in droves, but in units.

The results are already great. In Christian lands the social forces are largely christianized. Set Christendom side by side with heathendom, and a glance is sufficient. In spite of its defects the splendid pre-eminence of Christian society shows what kind of forces are at work, and how they are slowly accomplishing the word of the Master. The elevation of a continent from the sea is a slow process; but as it rises, the new land, basking under the sunlight, clothes itself with verdure and life. The elevation of society is a slow process; but it takes on a higher life as it rises; and in all directions can be seen its splendid fruitage,—art, science, invention, machinery, railroads, telegraphs, cathedrals, universities, asylums, hospitals, museums, libraries, schools. The moral enlightenment may not have kept pace with the secular and commercial. But the results here also are enough to stir one's pulse with pride and praise. There is such a thing now as a national conscience. It is reflected in our

courts, in our halls of legislation, even in our newspapers and novels. Let a law be enacted whose principle is morally wrong, and the country rings with indignation. Platform and market, school-room and press, vie with the pulpit in sounding the alarm. It is the protest of conscience. Think of the irrepressible conflict between slavery and the moral sentiments of the people. Think how the Fugitive Slave Law was finally buried under an avalanche of national wrath. Could there be a sublimer spectacle of conscience than the emancipation of four millions of slaves in our Civil War? And what a brave fight is made by the conscientious against intemperance and impurity, against the lottery, in behalf of the Christian Sabbath and the Christian school, even for the prevention of cruelty to animals; not in the interest of political economy, but on moral grounds. The majority of our statutes doubtless are still working along the lines of self-preservation. Society must protect itself. If crime and vice went unscathed, if the saloon and brothel and gambling den were allowed free license, chaos would come again, and society drop to pieces from sheer putrefaction. But even protective laws now are shaped more and more in accordance with the principles of eternal right. The acts of government and the acts of legislation are held more and more strictly to moral standards. Laws that once embodied the will of the strong, or the schemes of the crafty, or the greed of the covetous, are now much more moulded by the national conscience. The passage of the Factory Acts of 1833 was a magnificent triumph of righteousness over avarice; they were passed under the pressure of conscience and against the stubborn opposition of the monied interest. And from that day to this every law which enforces justice between man and man, every law which protects the weak against the oppressor, every law which conserves the purity of the home, every law which compels the employer to provide proper sanitary conditions for his workmen, is an embodiment of the moral sense as well

as of the instinct of self-preservation. An English gentleman has left on record this striking testimony: "I have lived for more than sixty years, and I can remember the time when to have required employers to consider, in fixing wages, in arranging workshops, in building cottages, in determining the hours of labor, not only profits, but also, and more, the physical, moral, and spiritual welfare of workingmen, would have been looked upon as a kind of lunacy."¹ *Nous avons changé tout cela.* The iron hand of law has reached in among the factories and shops, the tenement traps and slums, and now men cannot be enslaved by the greed of their fellows to the extent they once could. Children are not allowed to work themselves to death so young. Women are provided now with better sanitary conditions for their work, cleaner rooms, with more light and air. Restrictions are placed around trades that handle poisonous material. In these and other directions a little has been done. Only a little; for the mass of wrong and suffering still untouched is appalling; and yet enough to show the spirit and the methods of the kingdom.

The spread of the principles of peace is another eloquent tribute to the influence of Christianity. In the savage state hostility would seem to be the normal condition. Let another tribe approach and instantly there is a collision. But in Christian nations the contrast already is world-wide. War is not the normal condition. The presumption is for peace. There must be overwhelming evidence, or overmastering passion, or a sense of desperate peril, before a Christian nation can be induced to take the sword. Once Christian England raised no protest against the buccaneering voyages of Raleigh and Cavendish and Drake; and it is reported that the Virgin Queen herself was not averse to sharing the bloody profits; but now such piracies are forevermore impossible. The moral sense of the world has grown. Christian communities are now up on a plane where they *prefer* right to wrong, where

¹ Bishop Moorhouse, *The Teaching of Christ*, p. 157.

they prefer peace to war, where they prefer justice and purity and truth; and would resent with horror any proposal to train their children in vice instead of virtue.

This latter half of the nineteenth century has been pervaded by a larger sense of human brotherhood than any other period of history. Christendom teems with hospitals, with missions, with schools and churches, with young men's and young women's Christian Associations, with associated charities, with free libraries and museums, with art galleries and evening classes, with numberless forms of philanthropy; and these are but the expression of that spirit of service which Jesus has introduced into humanity, namely, the desire to help the brother man. We cannot shut our eyes to the evils that curse the world; and yet we can see that with every passing century the ideals of life are set higher and higher, in the family, in the church, in the college, in public office, in the methods of business. Before the springtime of Christianity human selfishness is melting away and divine love is beginning to take its place. Christianity does make man love his neighbor as himself, and is the only power that can. Christianity does go to the heart of things and remove the cause of the misery, while Socialism is busy outside with the symptoms. Jesus saw clearly, and we are beginning to see, that this is the true and only solution of the social question. Men will not be dragooned even into peace and plenty. So long as they hold property and believe in the rights of property, they will guard it against all comers. They will not surrender their prerogative at the beck of anarchy, or nihilism, or communism, or chaos in any shape. They simply will not. And the attempt to force them to do it would only be war to the knife, as some of our American apostles of dynamite have discovered. The great strikes may deceive us into imagining that the fight is only begun. It may seem as though the passion were more bitter than ever, and the violence more bloody. In some cases that is true. Doubt-

less there is yet more blood to be shed. Labor and capital have many accounts to settle. But the field is wide, and the struggle fares differently at different points. Both masters and men are learning, at least some of them, that there is a better way. In some parts of the field there is an armistice. The combatants have halted. Experiments are going forward, and under a flag of truce they are watching the result. Whether it be arbitration, co-operation, profit-sharing, or whatever other special form of mediation, it is an acknowledgment of fraternity. The spirit of brotherhood has entered, if only in minute atoms; capital half-ready to concede to labor a larger share of the common product—labor clamoring for its dues, but more willing to get them by peaceable means. And when the time comes, as it surely will, when that spirit is at work among men fairly, freely, and universally, there will be no further conflict between capital and labor. Men will work for and with one another under the mutual covenant of the Golden Rule. The sunshine of Christianity will melt away the inhuman conditions of society, and we shall again hear on this planet the angels' song, "Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace toward men of good will."

ARTICLE V.

RESTRICTED COMMUNION.

BY THE REV. JAMES W. WILLMARTH, D. D., LL. D.

BAPTISTS, as is well known, do not think themselves at liberty to invite members of other denominations to unite with them in the Communion, or to accept such invitations when given in churches of other denominations. This is restricted or strict communion; popularly called "close communion," with a latent suggestion in that term of narrowness and bigotry. Sometimes the latent suggestion develops into open and bitter reproach.

It is the object of this article to present the facts and principles which furnish the reasons for restricted communion. It is commonly supposed, I think, that there is a radical difference between Baptists and evangelical pedobaptists in regard to the principles which underlie this question. This arises, of course, from an obvious difference in practice. In contrast with the practice of Baptists, evangelical pedobaptists invite all members of "orthodox and evangelical churches," intending to include Baptists. It is natural, therefore, for those who judge by appearances, to conclude that Baptist opinions as to the qualifications for communion must be altogether peculiar to themselves, and that the other denominations have a great superiority in respect of liberality and breadth of view. But I think that one who has not carefully examined the subject will be surprised in discovering how far Baptists and evangelical pedobaptists are in substantial agreement as to the principles which determine questions of intercommunion; and how far the actual difference in practice arises from a differ-

ence of views as to certain other and important matters, which, from their nature, must control in the practical application of the principles held in common.

In this discussion I shall assume that each denomination is properly represented by its own authentic statements of belief and by its general practice. There are instances of individual aberration. There are ministers and churches among pedobaptists, tinctured with prevailing looseness and lawlessness, who invite "all that love the Lord" or leave every one to judge of his own fitness. So there are a few nominal Baptists who advocate "open communion," openly or covertly; and, possibly, a few Baptist churches which encourage "open communion," without publicly avowing it. But we must look for denominational beliefs in authorized standards or statements and in the practice of the great mass of ministers and churches who are consistent and loyal to their denominational position. Let us then, first of all, look at certain

PRINCIPLES COMMON TO ALL,

i. e., accepted by both evangelical pedobaptists and Baptists.

1. *The communion is an ordinance of Christ*, established by him to be observed "till he come." The "Evangelical Alliance" voices the universal belief in recognizing baptism, the communion, and the ministry as divine institutions of permanent and binding authority.

There is one important *corollary* to this principle. An ordinance of Christ must be administered in all respects according to his revealed will. It is, primarily, his table that is spread, not ours; ours only because we are his; and if any error of administration occurs from a mistaken understanding of his will, the case calls for enlightenment, not reproach. Considerations of "liberality and courtesy" are ruled out, except in strict subordination to his authority. To cast reproach on those who are conscientiously carrying out the

Lord's will, as they understand it, is the very quintessence of narrowness and bigotry.

2. *The communion is a church ordinance*, i. e., an ordinance for the church, and to be administered by it and in it. That here and there loose practices prevail, and that a few persons regard the communion as a social Christian observance, proper whenever two or more Christian friends happen to meet, is doubtless true. But that all the religious bodies concerned in this discussion, by their standards and their practice, proclaim the communion to be strictly a church ordinance, is too well known to require quotations and proofs.

It is evident, however, that any serious divergence of views as to the nature, constitution, and membership of the church may seriously affect not only the matter of intercommunion, but other matters of practice as well. Thus Presbyterians can consistently administer the communion at meetings of presbyteries and general assemblies, for they consider the whole body as one great church, and this is done within and by the authority of the Presbyterian Church. Baptists have no such service at their associations and general anniversaries, because their idea of the church as a present and visible organization terminates with the local church. Episcopal clergymen carry the eucharist to the sick and dying, but they do it as ministers of the Protestant Episcopal Church and by its express direction. Baptist ministers do no such thing, because they consider their denomination to be only a community of individual churches, of like faith and practice, "distinct as the billows, but one as the sea." The way in which the end in view is occasionally reached is by the appointment of a special communion season, at an unusual time and place, by a local Baptist church. But evangelical pedobaptists and Baptists are agreed in the principle that the communion is a church ordinance, though other considerations may vary the application of the principle.

3. *The qualifications for occasional communion are the*

same as for constant communion, i. e., for membership in the local church.—Perhaps we may not find this principle commonly laid down in these exact words; but it is evident that the denominations concerned in this discussion are substantially agreed in holding it.

In each denomination—whether its theory be that of one corporate body or that of a union of many similar bodies—it is evident that the members of each local church are understood to possess all the qualifications for membership in any other local church, and could be received into it simply by letter or certificate. As Baptists go no farther in intercommunion than this, it is indisputable that they hold the principle now under consideration and act upon it strictly. But evangelical pedobaptists, in inviting members of all “orthodox and evangelical churches,” do not, from their own point of view, violate it. For it is well known that among them persons can pass from one denomination to another without the imposition of any essentially new requirement. Some private inquiries may be made, or public questions asked, in order to a reasonable assurance that the new member is willing to conform to the usages of the church he joins and will not be a disturber of the peace. Baptists have sometimes been known to unite with pedobaptist churches; and whatever may be thought of their consistency (unless their views have undergone a radical change), they are readily received. The Presbyterian Church avowedly acts on the policy of receiving members from other “evangelical churches” by letter, and in no pedobaptist denomination, so far as I know, is any one, not even a Baptist, required formally to repudiate his beliefs, or to acknowledge that his former church relationship involved a serious error. Evangelical pedobaptists do not intend, by “open communion,” as they practise it, to violate the principle that the terms of communion and of membership are, in essence, precisely the same. This principle is obviously correct; a church, in its invitations, ought not to

nullify its own teachings and discriminate against its own members. Serious differences of opinion as to what the terms of church-membership are, might, and I think must, seriously affect the question of denominational intercommunion. But the principle itself—whatever variations may arise in its application—will not, I am sure, be seriously questioned.

4. *Baptism is a prerequisite to church-membership, and so to communion.*—The Episcopal Church gives this direction in the Prayer-book, "And there shall none be admitted to the Holy Communion, until such time as he be confirmed, or be ready and desirous to be confirmed."¹ All such have been taught to say, in answer to the second question of the Catechism, "My sponsors in baptism; wherein I was made a member of Christ, the child of God, and an inheritor of the kingdom of heaven." Terrible as this answer seems to me in its teaching of delusion, it leaves no room for doubt that baptism is held to be indispensable to membership and communion. Presbyterians believe that baptism "is the initiatory rite of the Christian church." "Communicants [i. e., all Presbyterian church-members] in good and regular standing" are to be admitted to the communion. "It is customary to invite all Christians present . . . who are in good and regular standing in other evangelical churches," and who, of course, are considered as baptized. "But 'it is not in accordance with the spirit and usage of the Presbyterian Church to extend such invitations' to persons who are not members of

¹ This direction, literally interpreted, would seem to require strict communion of a very decided type, for it would shut out all but Episcopalians, and perhaps Romanists. But the questions, whether the great majority of Episcopalians can fairly be called "evangelical Christians," and whether the Episcopal Church is "open" or "close" on the communion question, does not affect in the least the force of my argument in respect to the general belief and practice of evangelical pedobaptists. Perhaps Episcopal clergymen do not refuse the communion to persons of other denominations, wishing to receive it and "meekly kneeling on their knees."

any evangelical church.”¹ The position of the Methodist Church is substantially the same.² Congregationalists hold that the communion is a privilege of baptized church-members; and in inviting other “evangelical Christians,” invite them as baptized persons. It is well known that Baptists insist that baptism is an essential, though not the only, prerequisite to church-membership and communion.

In fact, next to nobody takes any other ground except those who are called “open-communion Baptists.” As these cannot yet accept anything as baptism but immersion, and are determined to reject restricted communion, no course is open to them except to deny that baptism is prerequisite to communion. In doing this they are obliged to reject not only what is obviously New Testament teaching, but also what is universally received in Christendom—evangelical and unevangelical.

There may be latitudinarians among pedobaptists who do not scruple to depart from their own standards. But Christendom, as a whole, always has been, and is, univocal on this point. The belief that baptism is prerequisite to communion is no more a Baptist peculiarity than the belief in the forgiveness of sins.

It is clear, however, that a difference of opinion as to the act of baptism, its subjects or design—any or all of these—would necessarily affect in the gravest manner the question of intercommunion.

5. *An orderly walk in the church is prerequisite to the communion.*—An orderly walk is substantially the same thing as being a member in good and regular standing. Such a member is known or presumed to be living in accordance with the commands of Christ and the obligations of church-membership, and to be free from such derelictions of duty, or

¹ See Hodge's *What is Presbyterian Law*, pp. 82, 90, 91, and foot-notes.

² See *Methodist Discipline*, ¶¶ 17, 42, 47, 544.

such inconsistencies in doctrine or practice, as require censure from the church. A fair specimen of the general position is found in the rule of the Methodist Church: "No person shall be admitted to the Lord's Supper among us, who is guilty of any practice for which we would exclude a member of our church."¹

But it is important to notice that two questions are really involved in this matter of an orderly walk; viz.: (1) Does one walk orderly according to the standard of his own church? (2) Is that standard right?—in other words, Is the church itself in New Testament order? For if the church itself has departed from the commands of Christ, especially as to doctrine, constitution, terms of membership, and requirements, then a member may be orderly according to his church's standard, yet far from orderly according to the New Testament standard. Now all agree that some things are indispensable to New Testament order; the minimum would be, in the view of evangelical pedobaptists, whatever is implied in the expression "orthodox and evangelical churches." They would not, for example, accept as substantially in gospel order a body which denies all ordinances and a stated ministry (as the Quakers), or fundamental orthodox doctrines (as the Unitarians and Universalists), or which approves polygamy (as the Mormons). From this it appears evident that serious differences as to what constitutes gospel order and an orderly walk in the church must have a decisive influence on the question of intercommunion. For no church can consistently invite persons to the communion whose position and practice are such that they could not be received into its membership. But all are agreed in the general principle, though the application may vary according to the views held of what constitutes gospel order, of what is indispensable to it.

I think no one can doubt that if Baptists and evangelical pedobaptists had a community of belief in all respects as

¹ See Methodist Discipline, directions prefixed to ¶ 545; also ¶ 544.

complete as they have in respect to the five principles just stated, there could be no question about the propriety of unrestricted intercommunion; indeed fusion into one body would be only a question of time. Unfortunately this is far from being the case. It is necessary, therefore, next to consider three

PRINCIPLES PECULIAR TO BAPTISTS

which, as we shall see, must necessarily control the application of the principles above stated in determining the question of intercommunion with pedobaptists.

1. *The spirituality of the church.*—All who believe in supernatural Christianity and a divinely instituted church must believe in spiritual grace and blessings and in the working of the Holy Spirit; and so, to a certain extent, in the spiritual character of the church. But the Baptist principle under consideration is much more radical and thoroughgoing; and is, in reality, the one thing characteristic and determinative of the Baptist position in all respects. I am happy to have this opportunity of stating it.

We believe that every true Christian is such by virtue of a new life, in union with Christ, originated and sustained by the Holy Spirit. He is a regenerate, a spiritual man. This new life is not the old life, developed, reformed, modified, improved, or reconstructed. It is a *new* life, the work of the Holy Spirit in the use of the word of God; it will never be destroyed, though it may be dwarfed or perverted for a time. It will abide forever, it will be perfected in glory.

In like manner we believe that the church, according to the New Testament, is a purely spiritual body, created and energized by the Holy Spirit, existing on earth, but destined to be perfected in glory. It is not anything previously existing, as the Hebrew commonwealth, developed, reformed, modified, improved, or reconstructed. It would be a good statement to say, that the germ of the church is found in the identification of Christ with his people by his baptism followed

by the anointing with the Holy Spirit; its nucleus or embryo, in Christ and his apostles, and later in the waiting company in the upper chamber; its birth, on the day of Pentecost, when the Holy Spirit organized and fused old disciples and new into one living body. Before Christ there were pious men, in whom was the principle of a new life, developed so far as the existing stage of the history of redemption would permit, but there was no church. Israel was not a church, but type and shadow of the church. From this it follows that the church in its earthly manifestation should be absolutely spiritual; membership, ministry, ordinances, worship, polity, work,—all spiritual. The church cannot be evolved from a community of natural men, or from individuals, by education or any other means short of regeneration. The church has nothing to do with the state or with politics; no mission to rule, reform, or regenerate the world, in the present evil age. Its one mission is to serve Christ in the Spirit, to train its members for glory, to seek the salvation of sinners. It must pursue spiritual ends by spiritual means. All kinds of secular good follow its successes, but incidentally, not as part of its work. Those Baptists who have different conceptions of the mission of the church, and are uniting with others in secularizing the church and its activities, are lamentably ignorant or regardless of the foundation principle of their own denomination. Moreover no person is rightfully a member of the church unless he is spiritual, i. e., regenerated by the Holy Spirit; and no ordinance, observance, or act of worship can have any value except as it expresses and increases the knowledge, obedience, and holy emotions of regenerate souls. The preaching of the gospel can have no saving effect on the unregenerate, unless the Spirit of God opens their hearts to receive and obey. Ordinances and forms applied to them are unmeaning, misleading, and hurtful.

Therefore Baptists receive no one to membership, in any sense, except those who give evidence of regeneration by a

credible profession of faith in Christ, and submission to him. We cannot read the heart, are sometimes deceived, may sometimes be careless; but there is not a real Baptist church on earth which ever receives a member without what is considered sufficient or presumptive evidence that he is a regenerate soul. We know nothing of a church composed of believers and their children; of having the form and seeking the power of godliness; of coming into the church to find salvation or as probationers; of infants growing up to be church-members; of natural men receiving baptism in order to obtain forgiveness. We baptize believers in Christ, not to originate the new life, but to express, and in expressing to consummate, the commencement of a new life already begun in the heart by the Holy Spirit.

This explains our attitude towards infant baptism. It is not merely that we find no warrant for it in the New Testament. That would, indeed, be decisive with us against the practice. But it is abhorrent to us because we see in it a fearful violation of the fundamental idea of the church. Infants, incapable of faith and regeneration, are supposed by it to be made church-members or quasi church-members, or to be acknowledged as such. They are supposed to be regenerated in baptism, or, if not regenerated, to be brought into a covenant with God, which it will be their duty later to ratify. In its older and stronger form it fills the church with unconverted members, effaces the distinction between the church and the world, and leads millions blindfold to perdition. It has corrupted the church in every way, and is "the pillar and ground of popery." In its milder and modern form it dulls the sense of distinction between the natural and the spiritual; tends to the reception of "the baptized children of the church" to "full membership" more easily than is the case with others; obliterates the meaning of baptism as a symbol of death to the old life and rising to the new; nullifies the command to each new convert to arise and be baptized.

And it has an innate tendency to gravitate towards the other and more dangerous type. Therefore we bear unceasing testimony against it; we can give it no recognition as Christian baptism. This is just as true when infants are immersed (as in the Greek Church) as in any other case. The principle of the pure spirituality of the church puts a ban upon it.

Now, holding these convictions, Baptists must act upon them. We receive to membership only those who profess faith in Christ and a change of heart, and who submit to baptism, which, as the voluntary and spiritual act of the person baptized, expresses that faith and that change. But now, if we were to invite to the communion members of all evangelical pedobaptist churches, we should have to receive many baptized (as is alleged) in unconscious infancy; some, perhaps, who know no other regeneration but baptismal regeneration; many who, though regenerate, could not be received as members among us, because they have never expressed their spiritual character by being buried with Christ in baptism and raised to walk with him in newness of life. How possibly, then, can we practise this intercommunion? And, if restricted communion brings some unpleasant misconceptions and reproaches, we feel compensated for that by the testimony, known and felt by all men, which it enables us to give to the great, fundamental principle of New Testament Christianity.

2. *Baptism is immersion, and immersion only.*—We assert that the words used in the original Greek of the New Testament, and appearing transferred in the common English version as “baptize,” “baptism,” etc., are equivalent in meaning to “immerse,” “immersion,” etc., and were so understood, and correctly understood, by the primitive Christians.

In support of this assertion we call, as witnesses, the standard Greek lexicons; Greek usage, classic, patristic, and modern; the rituals and requirements of the ancient Greek and Latin churches, the earlier Anglican, the Greek down to the present day; ancient versions; ecclesiastical history and arch-

æology; and the general consensus of modern scholarship.¹ We also appeal to the fact, that, though the exact meaning of the original terms is veiled in the common English version by transfer instead of translation, and occasionally obscured by a misuse of prepositions, nevertheless the descriptions, circumstances, symbolisms, and allusions make it very plain, to an attentive reader, that baptism is immersion, and that sprinkling and pouring are out of the question. Hence the New Testament, even in this version, is the most powerful book in existence in sustaining our views of baptism.

We, then, regard the command to baptize and to be baptized as precisely equivalent to a command to immerse and to be immersed. Holding, in common with all Christendom, that baptism is prerequisite to church-membership and to communion, and perfectly convinced that nothing is baptism but immersion, we must of necessity hold that immersion is prerequisite to church-membership and to communion, and act accordingly. How any candid man can wonder at this, or ask Baptists to change their practice, unless he can convince them of error in their definition of baptism, passes my comprehension.

3. *Christ is supreme and sole lawgiver for the church.*—All Christians would probably agree that Christ's authority is supreme. We assert, also, that it is *sole*—there is no other. We find that authority in the New Testament, and the New Testament alone. We can admit no modification on the authority of popes, councils, creeds, church organizations, custom, courtesy, or convenience. Whatever was important enough for Christ to command is important enough for us to

¹ Much of this testimony, including Greek usage exhaustively, versions, rituals, concessions, etc., is compactly arranged in a little work of exceedingly great value, "Baptizein: its Meaning and Uses," by T. J. Conant, D. D. With patient research and scholarly impartiality, he gathers and classifies the original sources of information, and places them, with English translations, before the reader's eye, to speak for themselves.

obey; that, as far as we can ascertain, we must teach and do; that,—nothing more, nothing less, nothing else; even if this obedience should leave us alone among professing Christians.

In settling, then, for ourselves, the question of intercommunion, we can consult no human authority or general custom, nor swerve even to keep the good-will of Christian men. If the church of Christ is purely spiritual, if baptism is immersion, if Christ is the sole lawgiver, then fidelity to the faith once for all delivered to the saints, leaves us no option. And so we are prepared to formulate the

BAPTIST VIEW AS TO QUALIFICATIONS FOR COMMUNION.

These qualifications are:—

1. *Regeneration*; the evidence of regeneration being a credible profession of faith in Christ.
2. *Baptism*, i. e., the immersion of a believer in Jesus Christ.
3. *An orderly walk in the church*.—Members in good and regular standing in the local Baptist church, and in other churches of the same faith and order, are presumably walking orderly in the church.

Beyond this we cannot consistently go; for membership in evangelical pedobaptist churches is not *prima facie* evidence of possessing these qualifications. Many, we joyfully acknowledge, are regenerate; but most, in our view, are unbaptized; and none, in our view, are walking orderly in a church in gospel order. It is our conviction, that all Christians ought to believe and practise, strictly, according to the New Testament, and that, if this could be so, there would be no need of restricted communion. As it is, we are shut up to it; there is no other course open to us, unless we are prepared to violate our solemn convictions of truth and duty.

This will, possibly, appear in even a stronger form, if we notice

TWO SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVES.

1. *First Alternative: Relegating all responsibility to the communicant;* i. e., teaching our views, but inviting or encouraging all who judge themselves qualified to partake on their own responsibility.

To some this may seem an easy way out, and they may adopt it directly or by a significant silence. But, in the light of the preceding discussion, the objections are insuperable. (1) It nullifies our teachings. We might just as well proclaim immersion to be the only baptism, and then receive as members all who consider themselves as baptized. (2) It countervenes the principle that the qualifications for membership and for communion are the same, and (3) so discriminates against our own members. (4) It renders nugatory our testimony to the truth. (5) It makes church discipline a farce. Members excluded, even for heinous sins, would be at liberty to commune; excommunication would be a nullity. (6) It is abdication by the church of its rightful authority as custodian of the ordinances. (7) It would put Baptists in a unique position, unknown in Christendom, and perfectly preposterous, for the sake of a kind of "open communion" not likely, as I judge, to command the respect of evangelical pedo-baptists or anybody else.

2. *Second Alternative: Relaxing the terms of occasional communion on account of altered circumstances.*—The plea is that neglect of immersion, and failure to walk in gospel order, do not mean, in the present division and confusion, what they would have meant in primitive times, viz., wilful disobedience to Christ. Therefore Christian charity requires us not to debar from the table pious Christians honestly mistaken; while we must continue to teach the truth.

Conceding in large measure the correctness of the premises, the conclusion is seen to be untenable, in the light of the preceding discussion. The first four objections to the

First Alternative, and the sixth, have equal force against this course. And the following additional objections lie against it: (1) Soon, as the logical outcome, "honestly mistaken Christians" would be admitted to membership. (2) All this countervenes the principle that Christ is sole lawgiver for the church. (3) Instead of governing ourselves by the teachings of the New Testament, which is a plain and defensible rule, we should be compelled to sit in judgment on motives and as to the extent of aberration admissible; questions to the last degree perplexing, and which Christ has never authorized his churches to adjudicate. (4) We should find no stopping-place. Fatal error might be fellowshiped after a time. It is far more dangerous and demoralizing to put error on an equal footing with truth than it is to accept error as truth, by mistake of judgment. There is only one safe way for church or Christians, and that is to follow the truth unflinchingly, according to their best judgment of what the truth is and of what it requires. Nor is it probable that "open communion," on the plan just stated, would be altogether agreeable to those for whose sake it would be adopted. They might prefer our present practice to one in which they would be received as erring brethren covered by the mantle of charity, and needing to "be taught the way of the Lord more perfectly."

It is entirely clear that Baptists, so long as they hold those convictions that make them Baptists, are shut up to restricted communion. Restricted communion is inevitable and easily defensible, if Baptist principles are defensible.

But perhaps we might go further and consider—

THE ADVANTAGES OF RESTRICTED COMMUNION.

The suggestion of such an idea may startle and even shock the reader. It will startle those who, forced to confess that restricted communion is defensible and inevitable for Baptists, see in it an unfortunate emphasizing of differences, and deplore the fact that it separates regenerate persons

at the Lord's table and grieves many pious hearts. It will shock those who regard "close communion" as the one great fault and blemish of the Baptist denomination. Yet let us look at the matter candidly.

Restricted communion advantageous? No, not absolutely. If all who love the Lord could see eye to eye, there would be indeed "one Lord, one faith, one baptism," and so one communion, and presently one body; a consummation, so far as we can judge, devoutly to be wished for. Restricted communion advantageous? Yes, relatively, as things are now. In supporting this statement I shall, of course, assume that Baptist views, as set forth in this article, are correct.

1. Restricted communion is a *signal token of loyalty to Christ*. The practice is offensive to many, sometimes brings pain to ourselves. We adhere to it from a sense of duty to Christ. It is not a light thing that in this age of looseness and disloyalty, there should be given such an unmistakable exemplification of the principle of absolute loyalty to Christ and his word. I am happy to know that some eminent and candid pedobaptists take this view of the matter. They do not agree with our premises; but they appreciate our consistency and the example we set of abiding at all hazards by what we believe to be the teaching of the New Testament.

2. Restricted communion furnishes an *unmistakable and effective testimony to the truth*, especially to the spirituality of the church, the obligation to be immersed, and the sole authority of Christ in his church. I feel sure that in this fact really lies the offence of "close communion." Denominational intercommunion does not appear to be very highly prized (except as a matter of sentiment), or to be extensively practised, even among those bodies which can consistently allow it. Most persons are satisfied with the privileges of their own church. Professed Christians seem to account it no great evil to be divided as to baptism, doctrine, and polity, and to belong to different denominations. Why consider it so great

an evil not to be able to commune together? Why so great sensitiveness about restricted communion? I think the answer is obvious. If Baptists would only practise "open communion," their position would really and practically be this, "We prefer immersion, believe it to be primitive and expressive, we are not ready to practise infant baptism, we are not prepared to receive members except by immersion; but we are not thoroughly sure about all this; we do not deem it of vital importance, and we are willing to accept sprinkling and pouring as "modes¹ of baptism" virtually sufficient for others, and to waive our objections to infant baptism, at least so far as to admit that it does not seriously invalidate church order." We should thus place our peculiarities on about the same basis as that on which, e. g., the Presbyterian Church places its polity, as being most nearly scriptural, but not essential.² Other denominations would bear with our peculiarities, we with theirs, and all would go along comfortably together, according to the idea, so often expressed, that all denominational differences are matters of minor importance—all "evangelical" denominations being "regiments of the same army," in pretty good order, "the collective church," as it has been put.

But restricted communion proclaims to the world that the pure spirituality of the church is a vital principle; that infant baptism is itself a grievous corruption of Christianity,

¹ No Baptist, who knows and remembers what he is about, ever uses the expression "mode of baptism." It begs the very question at issue, which is: What *is* baptism? What is the *act* of baptism? If the answer be, Baptism is pouring, sprinkling, or immersion, then these can consistently enough be called "modes of baptism." But we deny the correctness of this answer *in toto*. The use of the expression "mode of baptism" is therefore an absurdity for a Baptist or in a discussion between Baptists and pedobaptists, unless one means the mode of immersion, as by dipping forward or backward. Equally foolish is it for a Baptist to speak of "baptism by immersion," i. e., immersion by immersion.

² See Hodge's *What is Presbyterian Law*, pp. 11, 12, 29.

and the prolific parent of many more; that there is no baptism but immersion; that Christ's teachings, as found in the New Testament, must not be altered, amended, or waived; that all churches that violate these principles are essentially out of gospel order, and that Baptists are, in many respects, "a people alone," and bound to be alone until these principles are generally accepted. This testimony is distasteful to others; hence the offence of "close communion"; but if it is a true testimony, it is valuable and must be given. And would evangelical pedobaptists like us better if we should show ourselves to be hypocrites and cowards?

3. *Restricted communion preserves the parity, meaning, and order of the ordinances.*—It has come about, as the result of the perversion of baptism and the controversy about "close communion," that the communion has been exalted in importance at the expense of baptism. It is not important that Christians should have the same baptism, if they can only commune together! It is not important to have the advantages of a true baptism, if we can only have the supreme privilege of communion, especially of communion together! And so the secondary function of the communion, viz., to express *joint* fellowship with Christ, has been exaggerated; the communion is distorted into an expression of fellowship with each other, as the principal thing, to the neglect of the main idea of *fellowship with Christ*. And then pedobaptist and also "open-communion" views belittle baptism, lose sight of its meaning, disturb or sever the relation of the two ordinances, completely obliterate the significance of their order. Immersion marks the beginning of a new life in Christ, communion its continuance and renewal. Immersion means *we in Christ*, communion *Christ in us*. Restricted communion restores the proper conception of all this; and emphasizes it.

4. *Restricted communion is useful in accentuating the distinction between church fellowship and Christian fellowship.*—I know that a labored attack on Baptist practice

has been made based on the denial of this distinction. But undeniable facts show that such a distinction exists. An orthodox Quaker and a strict Presbyterian, both being regenerate men, can and do have Christian fellowship in many things; in prayer for example. But they can have no church fellowship; not merely do not, but cannot. The Quaker rejects church, stated ministry, and ordinances. Fellowship is impossible without community. Christian fellowship, in a measure, exists; church fellowship cannot. So a converted person in my congregation, awaiting baptism, can have no church fellowship with me. He is not a church-member, not a communicant, has nothing to do with church affairs. Will any man, however, have the hardihood to deny that he and I can and do have Christian fellowship in prayer, love, and even in our views of church order? The distinction is a valid one. Accurately speaking, church fellowship is a part of Christian fellowship, real or presumptive; but all Christian fellowship is not church fellowship.

That Baptists are always consistent I do not affirm. They do not exchange letters of dismission with other denominations. This is consistent. But if pedobaptist ordination is ever accepted as all-sufficient for a Baptist minister; if pedobaptist ministers are ever invited to act officially in ecclesiastical matters, as ordinations or the constitution of a church; if Baptists ever engage in "evangelistic" or other "union" work on terms which imply suppression or sacrifice of the truth;—then they are so far inconsistent. But I think these things are not true of the mass of the Baptist denomination. I have myself lived for many years by the side of pedobaptist ministers in good neighborhood, sometimes in warm friendship. But I have always believed it best for Baptists to do their own work in their own way, with love and good wishes for all, but without those "entangling alliances" which seem to me unfavorable both to the truth and to peace. Certainly it is folly to argue in the face of obvious facts, that

there can be no recognized distinction between church fellowship and Christian fellowship, because Baptists may not in every instance accurately observe that distinction, while they make it, proclaim it, and generally act upon it.

The making of this distinction is of serious importance, apart from the communion question. The denial of it is akin to the belief that salvation is impossible without church-membership. This belief introduces unregenerate men into the church for salvation, and produces formalism and self-delusion. The importance of baptism and church-membership should not be undervalued. Men should not be encouraged in the hope of leading a Christian life outside the church. But it is good to emphasize the fact that piety is wrought in the soul by the Holy Spirit, and that Christian fellowship can exist in a large degree, especially in present circumstances, apart from church fellowship.

5. *Restricted communion is for the benefit of other Christians.*—The truth is just as important to them as to Baptists. Error with them has wrought great evils in the past, and is capable of working equal evils in the future. The influence of Baptist teachings has done good in partly neutralizing certain inherent tendencies, that have been fruitful for evil in the past, and are so now in many churches and countries. Why, for example, do so many evangelical pedobaptists, now and here, accept the separation of church and state, believe in religious liberty, and insist on some evidence of regeneration in order to "full membership"? How comes it that their church authorities are lamenting the growing neglect of infant baptism? We are doing them good, which would be mostly prevented but for our consistency in restricted communion. We show by that that we are in earnest in our Baptist principles; and are, at the same time, in Christian fellowship with all good men in the things wherein we are agreed. This attitude is best for the truth; best for harmony and peace.

6. *Restricted communion is favorable to Christian union.*—It puts an insuperable barrier in the way of a false and unprincipled “union” sentiment, which calls for union by compromise. Such union, dishonoring to Christ, destructive of principle, hollow, and sure to end in hopeless disruptions, must indefinitely postpone real union. All hope of real union—union in the truth—lies in the way of honest study of the word of God and straightforward fidelity in obeying it.

7. *Restricted communion is good for the world.*—Evils may result from divisions. But, while divisions exist, it is good that, in the practice of one denomination, this blind and self-deceiving world should see a positive and unmistakable testimony to the truth that nothing is of any value in religion but that which is spiritual—regeneration and its fruits, the obedience of a spiritual man to Christ, the new life, the authority of the New Testament, the work of the Holy Spirit. If the world asks, What means restricted communion? our answer is, that it means precisely that. This testimony deals a heavy blow to all carnal, ritualistic, hereditary, and formal religion, so acceptable to natural men, but so fatal to them.

8. *Restricted communion is good for Baptists.*—It keeps them in their true position, and when they abide there most strictly, then are they most prosperous. Whenever they falter or compromise, the result is decay and death. Indeed—

OPEN COMMUNION IS BAPTIST SUICIDE.

It is easy to trace the downward steps which would conduct the denomination or a church from a vigorous life to the grave.—The *first step* would be to invite to the communion “all immersed believers,” meaning to include the few immersed members of pedobaptist churches. But how invidious to make distinctions among members of the same church, all of whom, if any, are out of gospel order, because the church itself is out of gospel order! So comes the *second step*, “open communion,” in the full ordinary sense. But why receive to

occasional communion and debar from permanent communion, i. e., membership? So the *third step*, reception as members of persons not immersed. Now the Baptist church is dead—it has wholly abandoned its Baptist position—is Baptist only in name. Again, all adult male members should be held eligible for office, and so the *fourth step*, the election of unbaptized men as deacons and other church officers. By this time baptism (i. e., immersion) is no longer publicly taught and advocated, and it is administered rather quietly, on a week night, so as to avoid offence and reproof to the unbaptized members and officers. The *fifth step* is now easy, the election of a pedobaptist pastor; and then quickly follows the *sixth step*, the change of name and denominational affiliation. Now the burial, after a spiritual inquest, with the verdict: *suicide by open communion*. Lay the lifeless form of the dead Baptist church in the tomb, “unwept, unhonored, and unsung”! There is however a speedy resurrection; and the newly risen body is a full-fledged pedobaptist church.

This is not a fancy sketch. I have known at least one such case; probably others have occurred in this country. It would be easy, no doubt, to find this process in all stages and in its consummation in England, where a part of the Baptists have long practised “open communion.”

Equally fatal to all Baptist efficiency are “open-communion” sentiments in the case of individuals. If a man is brave, he advocates his belief, tries to change the position of his denomination, fails, re-examines his belief on other points, finds the heart of his Baptist faith eaten out, with amazing facility joins another denomination. If he is not brave, he advocates his sentiments cautiously, with abundant regard to the maxim, “discretion is the better part of valor,” accomplishes nothing, and is powerless to defend or advance that part of Baptist belief which he is supposed still feebly to hold.

Now I frankly say, that, agreeable to some as it might

be for the Baptist denomination to commit suicide, such an event is just now improbable. Should we ever become convinced that our distinguishing principles are untenable or unimportant, I hope we shall have grace to acknowledge it, to confess that inadvertently we have been guilty of causing schism in the body of Christ, and to abandon our separate existence. But as long as we believe that these principles are true and of immense importance, nay more, that they are of the very essence of New Testament Christianity, and that these truths are put in our trust for the honor of Christ and the good of all Christians and all men, it becomes us to maintain our Baptist attitude unflinchingly and evermore. Surely no good man can advisedly reproach us for doing this, or ask us to be faithless and false.

In this article I have used great plainness of speech, but I trust, in candor, courtesy, and Christian love. I present this defence of restricted communion with nothing of the elation characteristic of the neophyte in polemics. The lessons of history teach how hard it is to change long-established opinions and practices. Study of human nature prepares one properly to estimate the force of education, preconception, and prejudice. If there is ever to be a cordial and intelligent union of all true believers, it can only come by a slow process; by the melting away of error and misconception in a common view of the truth, through the candid study of the New Testament under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. It seems to me that the signs of the times are not propitious as to progress in this direction; on the contrary, ominous portents appear, increasing in number and intensity, of much greater evils than the differences hitherto separating Baptists and pedobaptists; and I am grieved to say that they appear to some extent in my own denomination as well as in others.

I see that among professed Christians generally the interest in knowing exactly what the Bible teaches, and the

rugged determination to obey that teaching, are rapidly declining. Commands on important matters, formerly accepted without question, are openly disregarded in the name of expediency and "progress," or for the sake of popular modern "fads"; while precepts of men are exalted to the position of divine requirements, often making void the commandments of God. Under the specious name of "higher criticism," the doctrine of infallible inspiration is denied, the authenticity of the Old Testament is questioned, its histories and laws are represented as myths and forgeries, its prophets are rated as little more than reformers and politicians. The indorsement of the ancient Scriptures, as the very word of God, by Christ and his apostles is discredited. In a "new theology," which has as its centre the incarnation of Christ and the "life of humanity," instead of the resurrection of Christ and a new life, the doctrines of law and justice, of man's fall, depravity, and ruined estate, of the atonement, of sovereign grace, of the second coming and kingdom of Christ, and of eternal retribution, are modified and emptied of their solemn significance as taught in the Bible. Christianity is thus diluted into a sentimental religion founded on "the universal fatherhood of God and brotherhood of man," and the distinction between the regenerate and the unregenerate is largely effaced. Evolutionary naturalism is taking the place of supernatural Christianity, and enthroning itself in theology; and in some quarters Hindu Pantheism, the oldest and deadliest foe, not only of Christianity, but of theism, now renamed Monism, masquerades as the philosophic ally and exponent of that Faith to which it is in absolute and unchangeable antagonism. Meantime ministers and churches are vying with each other in secularizing Christianity, as to its aims and activities, in the vain attempt to rule, reform, and regenerate the world, in this present evil age, by carnal means—politics, sociology, and even socialism. Many, in accord with the prevailing materialism of the day, "mind earthly things," and urge us to remit our supreme de-

votion to the salvation of souls, and to devote our Christian labor to the improvement of the temporal condition of men and of society. And that holy city, which is to descend from God out of heaven, for which good men have looked ever since the days of Abraham, is caricatured by a dream of better earthly municipalities and an improved condition of church and state for mortal men; the final outcome of redemption being a kingdom without a king, a kingdom where sin and death will still exist and funeral trains will pass over streets of gold, as "men die and go to heaven" from the New Jerusalem, where, as we had fondly thought, death is to be no more and the overcoming believer is to go no more out forever.

It is evident that a great defection from the faith is in the air, which, if unchecked, will bring on an apostasy worse than that of Rome. Whether after a time the Spirit of the Lord will raise up a standard against the enemy, or whether these are the "perilous times" so solemnly foretold in the New Testament, and we now see "the beginning of the end," it is impossible to say. But, beyond all doubt, worldliness and error are coming in like a flood, and in the same proportion the hope of a union of professed Christians in the truth is receding before our eyes like the mocking mirage of the desert.

It may be that in days to come the question discussed in this article will cease to be of interest to the mass of nominal Christians. Indeed, of what consequence is it with whom men commune, or whether they commune at all, if every thing that makes the communion significant and precious is abandoned? It is of little use to guard the casket after the resplendent and priceless jewel is gone.

Be this as it may, and whatever may be the future of my own or any other denomination, in one thing I am serenely confident, the foundation of God stands fast, having this seal: The Lord knows those that are his. He will have a faithful people to the end, even if it be a little flock. And the greater

the defection from the faith, the more separate must this people be, and the more emphatic their testimony to the truth. The greater the prevalence of error, and the more complete the perversion of Christianity, the more certain and necessary must it be that restricted communion shall remain, as a witness to the truth, until the Lord come.

Then restricted communion, like everything else that is "in part," will be done away. The church will embrace all the regenerate, purified from sin and error, beyond the possibility of misunderstanding or separation. It will be perfected, glorified, enthroned. For now we see as in a mirror, obscurely, but then face to face. Now we know in part, but then shall we know fully, even as we are fully known.

ARTICLE VI.

PRESIDENT HARPER'S LECTURES.

BY HOWARD OSGOOD.

PRESIDENT HARPER, of the Chicago University, delivered in Chicago, during the winter of 1894, a series of lectures on the earlier chapters of Genesis. They aroused a great deal of interest and some severe comments. These lectures have now been published in the issues in 1894 of the *Biblical World*, of which President Harper is the editor. They fill between 130 and 140 pages of the periodical, and are easily accessible to all who have an interest in learning his views on a very important part of the Bible.

By great natural abilities, indefatigable labor, and his un-failing geniality, President Harper has reached a high position among the educators of America. He has done a great work in arousing an interest in Semitic studies by his enthusiasm and power in teaching, and has won to his following large numbers of bright young men who have come within his influence. He stands at the head of the chief seat of learning in one of the greatest centres of the life and wealth of our land. In the boundless labor of directing and building up that new and promising university, he ought to have the sympathy and aid of all who believe in the higher education. The large generosity which founded and maintains the institution will be supplemented by untiring effort and all the resources of his fertile mind.

The ardor of his youthful professorship has not deserted him in his more mature years. In taking the high office he now fills, he could not consent to lay aside the work of

teaching, but to the work of President, enough for any man, he adds that of professor in the Semitic department. When such a man comes forth to give his thoroughly considered opinion on any subject, both his ability and his position lend all their influence to make that opinion of interest to thinkers; and when the subject on which he speaks is the most important that ever engages the attention of men,—the revelation of God, and man's relation to God,—both position and ability are enhanced by the dignity of the subject.

These lectures are set before the public for its calm judgment upon them. The appeal is constantly made to the reasonableness of the views maintained. "I have presented you a reasonable view. It is based upon scientific evidence. It has come from an examination of the facts. It covers the facts as does no other hypothesis" (Dec.). This is a call upon hearers and readers to prove that what is said, is reasonable, based upon scientific evidence, in accordance with and covering all the facts.

No scientific or critical student can logically object to criticism of himself. It is only by free discussion that the truth can be maintained. It is proposed in this article to examine the statements of these lectures only on what is said in them to be fundamental positions, that it may be clearly seen what are their teachings on these points. These lectures are not free from very severe strictures upon Dr. Green by name, and upon others, who do not agree with the views here set forth. If no answer is made, many may think that no answer can be made. But while criticism is exercised upon these lectures, there is not the first spark of heresy hunting. Sooner or later, only a fair, impartial, large decision will be accepted in matters of supreme moment. We are to consider the opinions, and not the man. If there is any special pleading, any misjudgment of a passage or the context or the thought, it is not intentional, and will be withdrawn when pointed out. It ought to be, and it is, pos-

sible to discuss the very foundations of faith without heat or malice.

These lectures follow the chapters (Gen. i.-xii.) in order, and comment upon special points as they occur in the text. The statements on what is said in them to be fundamental are scattered through the twelve discourses. To gain a clear view of the teaching on these fundamental questions, we must bring together the scattered statements.

GEN. I.-XII.—FUNDAMENTAL TO THE OLD AND NEW TESTAMENTS.

In summing up in the November lecture the previous discussion, it is said, "No one will deny the intimate relationship of these chapters with the remainder of the Pentateuch or Hexateuch. This relationship is not only literary but logical. . . . It is not the character of the earlier stories of Genesis that is in debate, but that of the entire Hexateuch. . . . This same line of argument applies also to the Old Testament as compared with the New. As has been said so many times, the two are inseparable; they are bound together by ties which may not be broken. . . . The material of Gen. i.-xii. is preparatory and fundamental to the whole plan of salvation as revealed by God in the Old and New Testaments." "It is only necessary to note that the plan which runs through the entire Bible would have no beginning, and would be utterly inexplicable without these earliest steps. . . . One need only to make the effort to conceive this plan without the earlier portion of it to understand how impossible is such a conception." We very fully agree with these statements.

THE DATES OF THE TEXT AND THE WRITERS.

None of the present text of the Old Testament, it is said, goes farther back than 950 B. C. (Mar.), for literary production was not possible in Israel until "the times following

those of Elijah, Elisha, and Jonah" (Dec.), i. e., after 900 B. C. (Dec.). The first writer following this period is called in these lectures, "the prophet," "the prophetic writer," and "J." After the prophet, at a date not specified, there follows "the priest," "the priestly writer," "P." These are the chief writers; though the prophetic writer incorporated into his work about twelve verses from another author (July). So that there are three writers (Sept.). Then following these three writers, there is one who is called "the author" (Jan., Feb., July); though "he is not the author; he is the compiler" (July), who, in the remaining lectures, is also called the redactor or editor. This editor unites these three writings into the present narrative.

THE INSPIRATION OF THE HISTORY AND THE RECORD,
FUNDAMENTAL.

"It ought to be clear that the more fundamental question is as to the inspiration of the history; in other words the presence in the history of a special supernatural element. For if this be true, the inspiration of the records which form a part of the history would naturally follow" (Nov.). On this point, which all will agree is fundamental to the whole discussion, there are many expressions equivalent to the quotations which follow. "The relation of the divine is fundamental." "The divine element is the force which regulates and controls the whole" (Nov.). "The divine element which overwhelms and controls the human, but without hiding it from view" (Sept.). Of the prophetic writer: "The spirit that directed the writer in gathering it [his material] together" (Mar.). "God who guided him in the writing of it," i. e., Gen. vi. 1-8 (June). The priestly writer, "led by the Spirit of God, is seeking to teach man certain truths which God would have man know." ". . . the wisdom which guided him was more than human" (Jan.). Of these two writers, and of the compiler, editor, author, it is specially said of each

one that he was "guided by the Divine Spirit," "guided by the Holy Spirit," "guided by the same Spirit" (Dec.). God is "the Author of the religious ideas which filled their hearts" (Oct.). "Prophets and priests acquainted with the principles of divine government undertake to illustrate these principles and in connection with the illustrations to formulate them. The truth imparted to them from on high is thus given objective form" (Dec.).

We understand from this that God overwhelmed and controlled all these writers; that he was the author of their religious ideas; that the Holy Spirit directed, guided, led the writers in gathering their material and in the writing of it; that the precious truths which God would have man know, they formulate and give to them objective form.

THE "OBJECTIVE FORM" OF THE DOCTRINE OF GOD.

"Each of these accounts was found to show . . . distinct theology" (July). "A change of style, matter, and theology." "Each division . . . has its own peculiar and widely different conception of God." "Their ideas of God, though communicated to them from heaven itself, were imperfect" (Sept.). "These differences relate . . . to the theological conceptions which characterize the writers" (Oct.). "Each division is marked also by a different conception of God, of man's relations to God, of the proper modes of worship, of God's action in history." "In one division a rigidly monotheistic spirit," "a lofty and dignified conception of God." "In the other a spirit which can scarcely be called monotheistic in the strictest sense"; and "which seems to border closely on polytheism. How is it possible for so low (this is the proper term) an idea of God to have been incorporated in the sacred Scriptures?" (Sept.) Of this writer it is said, "the anthropomorphic representations are many and very gross" (Feb.). "One writer represents" "sacrifices, altars, distinctions of clean and unclean, the name of Yah-

weh," as in existence; "the other does not. Both certainly cannot be right" (Sept., July).

The precious truth given these men by God, who is the author of their ideas and controls them wholly in gathering their material and in writing it down, when it receives objective form under their hands, appears in a widely different conception of God, of man's relations to God, of the proper modes of worship, of God in history. This difference is as great as between a rigid monotheism, with a lofty conception of God, and a low conception of God bordering on polytheism. Both of these writers cannot be right. The assertion of this fundamental difference and error is as bold and repeated as the assertion that these writers were given their ideas and truth by God, and were wholly controlled by him. We believe that the two representations, of God's controlling the authors, and of the different conceptions of God taught by these writers, form a fundamental contradiction of thought and statement. Were they not written down in these lectures we should say, as has often been said, that together they are absolutely inconceivable.

THE REVELATION OF GOD.

"God in his supreme wisdom saw fit to make to man a special revelation. This is found first of all in the history which was divinely conducted . . . and, still further, in the records which grow out of this history and which have in every respect the characteristics of the history. The history of [in?] the records of the book of Genesis . . . is part of this special revelation" (Jan., p. 4, Dec.). "The history of Israel is a specially ordered history in which God has manifested himself more clearly than in any other. . . . Is this premise capable of scientific demonstration? We answer, Yes. A careful study of the facts of Israelitish history, of the character of Israelitish people, and of a comparison of

this with other histories, furnishes data which, as we believe, are inexplicable upon any other hypothesis" (Nov.).

That is, God did make a special revelation, first in the divinely conducted, specially ordered history of Israel, and then in the records of that history, of which Genesis is a part. That God manifested himself more clearly in this history than in any other is capable of scientific demonstration.

THE SOURCES AND CHARACTER OF THE RECORDS.

"The great prehistoric events, among others, the fall, the deluge, and the stories of the beginnings of civilization, made so great an impression upon the primitive man as to have led to their transmission through many nations. . . . The Hebrews, among others, inherited these traditions" (Dec.). "The Hebrew and the outside stories are sisters from one source. . . . That source is not on the one hand a naturalistic myth . . . nor on the other hand is it an objective revelation from heaven. . . . That source in each case is an objective historical fact which impressed itself upon the minds of many nations" (Oct.). "These stories are not history, for the times are prehistoric times. . . . It is sacrilege to call them history. . . . They are stories, grand, inspiring, uplifting stories" (Feb.). These writers take, for the purpose of conveying religious truth (Feb.), the "stories common to all ancient nations." The writers were "ignorant of the real geographical and historical facts. It was not a part of the divine plan to reveal geography and history" (Mar.). "The sacred record can no longer be claimed to present a perfectly accurate account of these early times, for conflicting accounts stand side by side; changes have been arbitrarily introduced into the text; insertions and omissions have been made; the material cannot be called in a modern sense historical" (Sept.). "A total disregard of the common laws of history-writing in vogue to-day" (Dec.). Of the four chapters (vi.-ix.) on the deluge it is said, "Is it literal history?

No. Nor is the book of Job history, nor the books of Chronicles, nor the books of Kings, nor the books of Samuel" (Aug.).

God is said to have made a special revelation in the history contained in the records of Genesis, yet it is also said that the source of the writers was not revelation, and the records are so far from being history that it is a violation of sacred things, sacrilege, to call them history. If there is no recorded history, how did God reveal himself in recorded history? If God did reveal himself in recorded history, how can it be sacrilege to call it history? How can stories common to all nations be a revelation of God to one nation? These are fundamental contradictions, for which these lectures offer no solution, and for which no solution can be found, because they are exclusive of each other.

CHARACTERISTICS COVERING ALL THESE RECORDS.

"The writers of these chapters believed in a creative day of twenty-four hours; represent light before the luminaries; the creation of the luminaries as they appeared to the eye, [chap. i.]; seem to represent the serpent as of different form and character before the curse. Eden was ideal, not real" [chaps. ii. and iii.] (Oct.). "There was here no history, no geography" (Mar.). The names, ages, and numbers of the patriarchs [chap. v.] are not real (May), and the account of the nations in chap. x. is not scientific (Oct.). The whole account of the deluge (chaps. vi.-ix.) is filled with contradictions as to God; as to the cause of the deluge, one making it natural, the other miraculous; as to the form of the ark; the duration and extent of the flood, etc., etc. (July). "Really it is nothing short of blasphemy to attribute these things to the Holy Spirit" (Oct.). "Let us be very careful not to credit to the Holy Spirit, who kindled the fire of inspiration, the ignorance and superstition of those in whose hearts the fire was kindled" (Feb.).

The representations of the writers, their ignorance and superstition, which it is blasphemy to attribute to the Holy Spirit, cover the whole of the subject of these lectures, from Gen. i. 4 to the end of chapter xi. They are so thoroughly part and bone and marrow of the record, that to take them away would leave a boneless and mangled corpse. If this is the true character of these narratives, then, since God is Truth, he could not have been the author of their ideas, nor wholly controlled the writers, led and directed them by the Holy Spirit, in gathering their material and in writing. Truth cannot deal falsely. God cannot lie or deny himself. If God controlled the writers in idea and expression, then, this characterization of the narratives is utterly erroneous, and it cannot be blasphemy to attribute the whole narratives to the Holy Spirit, "the Spirit of Truth," who "led," "guided," "directed" the writers.

The story of Eden is said in the March lecture to be "the beginning of history, that to which all history points back; also the foundation of history, that upon which all history rests." It is "the shaper of history." "This story gives us the starting-point of religion, contains an epitome of all religious as well as irreligious life, and even furnishes us the goal of all religious thought. If this be true of the religions of the world, it is true in the strictest sense of Judaism and Christianity." And yet it is blasphemy to attribute to the Holy Spirit the description of Eden because we now cannot exactly locate it. By parity of reasoning would it not be equally wrong to attribute to the Holy Spirit the description of the Lord's Supper or of the crucifixion because both the day of the one and the place of the second are not universally acknowledged?

It is declared that these statements of these chapters are disproved by the science of the present day, and therefore it is blasphemy to attribute them to the Holy Spirit. But we know that "science" is a word to conjure with. Who knows

what it means? What is called science by one learned man is denied to be science by another equally or more learned. Its most frequent use is to lend support to an expressed opinion. What one higher critic calls scientific "interpretation," another higher critic declares is not scientific at all. It does not require much reading in any direction, and especially among the masters of any department of learning, to see that, unless an opinion is fortified by proof of agreement with the vast majority of similar investigators, it is mere assertion, in place of evidence, to say that it is upheld by science. For instance, "the day of twenty-four hours." "Those for whom the narrative was first prepared [i. e., after 900 B. C.], and, indeed, all men until recently, understood this day, including the night, to be one of twenty-four hours. Marcus Dods has truly said, that rationalism may twist Scripture into any meaning it pleases, if it may put a geologist's meaning into the word day" (Jan.). On the other side, let either the author of these lectures or Marcus Dods show before the time of the Reformation, A. D. 1500, one writer who "understood this day, including the night, to be twenty-four hours." The Old Testament prophets, the literature of Egypt and Babylonia, the New Testament, and the writings of Greeks and Latins, the classics and the "fathers," Migne's Patrology, Greek and Latin, are open before the authors of this assertion to prove that they have spoken correctly. There are hundreds of pages in Philo and the Greek fathers on the Hexaemeron; it was a favorite subject for the greatest minds. Show us one who believed in a creative day of twenty-four hours. There is not one. And even as late as A.D. 1693 Charles Blount, the deist, finds fault with believers in the Bible for thinking that each day was one thousand years. "To prescribe the divine creation so short an epoch as the limits of six thousand years is what I never durst."¹ The

¹ Letter to Gildon, p. 73.

fact is, that the belief in a creative day of twenty-four hours is not three hundred and fifty years old.

As the Old Testament (Isa. lx. 19, 20) and the New Testament (Rev. xxi. 23; xxii. 5) declare that there shall be light after sun and moon have disappeared, the fact of light before the luminaries would not stumble one who believes that, as the Old and New Testaments say, God spoke the light into being. On the opinions of learned men as to the question whether light is to be distinguished from the luminaries we must refer the reader to the works of the Youngs, Langley, Proctor, Lockyer, and others.

As to the age of the sun compared with that of the earth, Faye, Pfaff, Braun, and the works quoted, state the present theories of learned men, who believe the sun and moon to be younger than the earth.

On the extent of the deluge, these lectures refer the reader to an article by Perowne, in Smith's "Dictionary of the Bible," written thirty or more years ago, for full proof that the deluge was not universal. What men of solid acquirements and cool judgment now say of such proofs as were offered in that article, and what they say of a deluge co-extensive with man, will be found in works like those of Prestwich, Dawson, Wright, Howorth, and others.

Whether the ark could not have contained all the animals for want of space, any one can decide for himself, by calculation of the average size of all animals of the land, the space required for them, and the size of one deck of the ark. The ocean steamers of the first rank could carry on one deck two of all land animals, birds, reptiles, insects, and seven each of the ten clean animals, and have plenty of space to spare for the crew to work the ship. Only two-thirds of one deck of the ark would have sufficed, by actual measurement of animals, for two of all land animals ever known on earth.

These points are mentioned as types of what are said to be scientific errors which it is blasphemy to attribute to

the Holy Spirit. To assert that science finds an error is one thing; to prove the error is quite another. True science is, as Huxley says, only learning; others say it is nothing more than investigation. It is not yet a finality. It certainly is not perfect in any department. To prove or disprove the Bible by science to-day is, in either case, to make it the laughing-stock of to-morrow's better science. When the Bible and nature are perfectly interpreted, they will perfectly agree; for God made them both, and he does not contradict himself.

THE AUTHOR, COMPILER, EDITOR.

The descriptions already quoted concern principally the three assumed writers, P, J, and the unknown. We now turn to the description of the "compiler," "editor," "author" of these three writings. "It is true that in the Hebrew narrative there are fragments of three works . . . and there was an editor whom some great purpose or influence led to make these three already great, still greater by the union" (Sept., p. 187). "Manifestly if there were two [?] writers, and the work of both is now one piece, some one must have joined the two. In doing this he acted in accordance with the spirit of his times, as regulated by his purpose in making the combination. His spirit is far from being a critical one. He did not hesitate to use his material in any way which would best subserve his aim. He inserted and omitted; changed and arranged. He handled the sources used as freely as if he had been the author" (Sept.). This description of the editor is taken from *Hebraica*, vol. v. p. 68, word for word (whence also the most of these ten (Jan.-Oct.) lectures are taken and to which we are referred), and on page 70 this further description is given, "If it is composed of different stories of the same event, joined together by an editor who did not have insight sufficient to enable him to see that he was all the time committing grave blunders, and yet felt no hesitation in altering the originals with which he was working, it is not histor-

ical in the ordinary sense of that term." Of this editor we are told in the final lecture (Dec.) that he was "filled with the same general purpose and guided by the same spirit," i. e., the Holy Spirit (Dec., pp. 411, 412), as the prophet and priest. "There being two or more writers in the Pentateuch, the method of composition being therefore compilation, we have harmony as to method between this portion of Sacred Scripture and all other portions (e. g., Samuel, Kings, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and even the Gospels of the New Testament). It is true that compilation is to-day regarded as the lowest order of composition. The mere compiler is not treated as an author. . . . Now if this was the method employed as far down as New Testament times, it is difficult to believe that a higher method was employed so far back as the time in which the Pentateuch is asserted to have had its origin" (Sept.).

This editor, compiler, was guided by the Holy Spirit, some great purpose or influence, to unite the three writings. He acted in accordance with the spirit of his times. He inserted and omitted; changed and arranged as if he had been the author, which he was not. He did not have insight sufficient to enable him to see that he was all the time committing grave blunders, and yet felt no hesitation in altering the originals. His work was the lowest order of composition, but it was just the same work we find in the Gospels.

The insuperable difficulty in this is that the Holy Spirit is said to have guided him. Guided him in ideas? Then how could he be deficient in insight to perceive his immoral course? Guided him in writing? In acting as if he were author when he was not? This connection of the Holy Spirit with want of conscience and immoral action is such a confusion and contradiction of thought and words that it is stated without further remark. What possible value can attach to the result of this editor's work, not as a revelation from God, but as a mere human work? There are similar instances of

conscienceless editing in the Christian centuries, but no one attaches the least historical value to the result.

. THE MORAL IDEAS OF THE WRITERS.

"Just as there was a marked imperfection in their ideas of morality, an imperfection which could only be removed by degrees, so their ideas of God, though communicated to them from heaven itself, were imperfect, far short of what they afterwards attained; far different from the ideas taught in the New Testament. They could not comprehend the real truth. They were children in religious faith, and even God himself must deal with them as such and not as men. This removes the many 'moral difficulties' of the Old Testament." "We do not expect to find at this early period [i. e., after 900 B. C.] the highest standards of morality, or the highest conceptions of God" (Sept.).

Their morality was imperfect, and this removes the many moral difficulties of the Old Testament, but it can only do so by removing these so-called moral difficulties upon God, who, according to these lectures, was the author of their religious ideas, and led these authors in their writing by the Holy Spirit.

THE WORD OF GOD.

"The records are imperfect from a literary point of view; the histories, imperfect models for the writing of history. . . But it is true that the history given us here is perfect in the sense that it was the best literature which almighty power, acting in consistency with other divine attributes, could inspire in the hearts of people dragged down with sin, and the literature is perfect in the sense that it is the best literature almighty power, acting in consistency with other divine attributes, could inspire in the hearts and minds of a people of Semitic blood living at that period of the world's history" (Jan.). "It is true that to Israelitish history, God sustained a peculiar relation. As has been said, he entered

into this history in a unique way. It was in a true sense divine history; the best history Almighty Power, acting in consistency with other attributes, and working in the hearts of the people dragged down by sin, could inspire. The same may be said of Israelitish literature; God sustained to it a peculiar relation. It was the best literature Almighty Power, acting in consistency with other attributes, could inspire in the hearts of a people of Semitic blood, living in that period of the world's history; and yet it is imperfect, including different and differing accounts of the same event; what from the point of view of history and science are errors and inconsistencies; what is certainly a total disregard of the common laws of history-writing in vogue to-day. What now shall we say concerning these chapters and the others? That they contain the word of God? This is not sufficient. In the truest, fullest sense, they *are* the word of God. They are and constitute the word of God. . . . The history and the word, each considered as a manifestation of the divine purpose and action, and as a revelation of principles covering faith and duty, are perfect and infallible" (Dec.).

These records are imperfect as history and as literature, including different accounts of the same event, errors and inconsistencies, a total disregard of the common laws to-day of the writing of history. Yet they are perfect as history and literature because they were the best that God could do with the sinners and Semites of their day, that is, after 900 B. C., after David, Solomon, Elijah, Elisha, Jonah, and others. It is not sufficient to say that these imperfect-perfect records contain the word of God; in the truest sense they *are* the word of God. Both the history and the word, the records, as a revelation of principles covering faith and duty are perfect and infallible. How an imperfect history can be perfect simply because it was the best one could write; or how a perfect history filled with God, controlled by him in idea and

writing, can be imperfect, are propositions one would not care to waste time in discussing.

If God could do no better with the men he had made twenty-five hundred years ago, then he could not do as well with men who have continued for twenty five hundred years more in the deepest degradation of every vice and crime. But the cannibals of the Pacific, to whom no revelation has come till this century, have been by God, by the Holy Spirit, changed into the noblest missionaries of Jesus Christ. To say that God could do no better than this history which is not history, than these men of degraded morality and of contradictions of God and man, is to put God under the creature of his hand: he is not the almighty and all holy; but is conditioned by the sin of man. There is still one step beyond even this. It is to assert that this record which is imperfect in its teachings of God, of man's relation to God, imperfect in morals, i. e., in man's relation to his fellows, a warp and woof of ideas it is blasphemy to attribute to the Holy Spirit—this record, as a revelation of principles covering faith and duty, is perfect and infallible. Self-contradiction and contradiction of the Bible can go no further.

THE NEW TESTAMENT AND JESUS CHRIST.

Great as are the differences and discrepancies of the Old Testament, "a still more interesting field for comparison is that furnished by the Gospels of the New Testament. Here [in the New Test.] the difficulties and differences are even more numerous and more perplexing. It is evident to a candid student that in all this we see the human factor. It cannot be disguised, it ought not to be ignored. If we grant a large human element all is explained. If we deny it, we certainly assume a grave responsibility in attributing to the Holy Spirit that which is dishonorable and degrading" (Oct.). That is, whatever difficulties, and they have been overwhelming, have been asserted of the Old Testament, the New pre-

sents far greater; the very Gospels contain accounts dishonorable and degrading which must not be attributed to the Holy Spirit.

"The fact of the resurrection of Jesus Christ, not any record of it, is the foundation of the believer's belief in his own resurrection. The record of the transaction does not prove it to have taken place. Its occurrence without any written record may be satisfactorily proven" (Dec.). In other words, the New Testament is not a conclusive witness on the main facts asserted by it; and though there is no other record or witness of the resurrection, it is said, that it may be otherwise satisfactorily proven.

"If there is an analysis, and Moses did not write the Pentateuch [both of which are maintained in these lectures], the New Testament authorities, among others Jesus himself, who seem to say that Moses wrote the Pentateuch, or at any rate to imply this, either must have been ignorant of the facts in the case, or knowing them, must have consciously taught falsely, or accommodated themselves to the literary suppositions of their day. Each of these possibilities is attended with difficulties" (Sept.).

To sum up what has been said; the Gospels belong to "the lowest order of composition," compilation. The New Testament is more full of difficulties and discrepancies than the Old; it contains matter dishonorable and degrading and not to be attributed to the Holy Spirit. The record of the resurrection of Christ does not prove it. It is possible that Jesus Christ himself must have been ignorant of the facts of the Old Testament (the chief subject of his teaching), or consciously taught falsely, or accommodated himself to the literary suppositions of his day; though there are difficulties attending these possibilities. After nine hundred years the history and the record, according to these lectures, did not improve. The discrepancies of the New Testament are more perplexing than those of the Old. And the chief character

of the New Testament, our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, is left under a statement of adverse possibilities which, if true, would destroy the character of any intelligent teacher. The only reserve made respecting these possibilities is that difficulty attends them. There is no endeavor to clear away this cloud from him, who is all our salvation and desire.

This is the doctrine of these lectures on the most fundamental points of man's thinking. The complete self-contradiction of this doctrine is placed before intelligent readers. It is not asked that what has been here said shall be taken as final; but let each one interested in this subject compare this review with the lectures, and decide if it is not far within bounds of what might have been justly said.

In the preface to these lectures in the January *Biblical World* we are told that these lectures are to be "the work of higher criticism," and, "as every intelligent man to-day knows, without the methods of higher criticism no results of value may be secured." Higher criticism is perfectly well defined by its leaders; in Holland, Kuenen, Oort, Hooykaas, Knappert, Wildeboer; in Germany, Wellhausen, Dillmann, Kayser, Stade, Kautsch, Baudissin, Cornill, Budde, Riehm, Smend, Giesebrecht, Holzinger, Kittel, Schultz, König, Marti, *et al.*; in France, Reuss, Westphal, Bruston, Piepenbring; in England, Robertson Smith, Cheyne, Driver; in America, Toy, Bacon. There is not one of these men who would acknowledge the doctrine of inspiration of the writers and of Scripture set forth in these lectures as bearing any relation to higher criticism but contradiction. These lectures are as antagonistic to higher criticism as they are to the confessions of all Christian churches. Higher criticism teaches that Genesis is legend, myth, saga; that there is no revelation from God and certainly no supernatural inspiration in the Genesis stories. Dr. Toy, a very logical and self-consistent as well as learned writer, calls them legends. Dr. Bacon calls them "myths," "saga," "cosmogonic myths," "ætio-

logical folk-tales," "coarse clan-legends," "repulsive legend," "the dim region of cosmogonic, ethnological and ætiologic myth." "In the circles, from which the Priestly law-book comes to us, the spirituality of ethical religion, and the idea of direct relations of man to God, seem to have died out." That is the way higher criticism talks of Genesis and of all the parts it assigns to it. Higher criticism denies that there is the first sign of God's inspiration in Genesis.

If any one wishes to know in short compass what higher criticism is, what it teaches, whither it must and desires to go, let him read Crooker, "*The New Bible and its Newer Uses*" (Boston, 1894). It is a little book, but brimful of higher critical information, written with great spirit and force, in thoroughly good temper. It will be easy to compare the steady onward flow in logical nexus of that sound statement of higher criticism with the veering vane of these lectures. Mr. Crooker says, in accord with the great majority of higher critics, that there is not in any part of the Bible, or in Jesus Christ, supernatural revelation or inspiration.

That "science," "higher criticism," "modern scholarship," are often used to avoid the too frequent repetition of the capital I has frequently been surmised. But the author of these lectures acknowledges it fully in his case. "A specialist in any department regards as scholarly and scientific only what he himself accepts. The difficulty with this procedure is that the opinion of the individual in each case becomes synonymous with scholarship. . . . I accept the procedure, and in what I say, I shall give what in my opinion modern scholarship has established; in other words, what I think about the Old Testament."

These lectures give us not what science, or higher criticism, or modern scholarship, or the Bible, teaches of the Bible, but simply what their author thinks of the Bible.

ARTICLE VII.

SEMITIC AND ORIENTAL NOTES.

THE REAL MEANING OF SEMITIC SACRIFICE.

ONE of the most pressing needs of the hour is a sound History of Religious Ideas. To be sure, such a history is not the work of a moment; but there are so many problems of religion that seem to require for their solution, or at least reasonable understanding, a prior examination of the genesis of religious ideas, pure and simple, that it is unfortunate that there is not yet a thoroughly full, and withal sound, history of the fundamental ideas of religion. But this is not to be accounted a strange thing. While we are still in doubt as to whether religion is an acquired thing, that is, an invention by man himself to meet his social needs, or an implanted instinct or impulse, which sooner or later will manifest itself, it should not surprise us if we have not made progress faster in the direction indicated above.

But the need is imperative, and for the following very impressive reasons. In the first place, the criticism of the documents of the Old Testament, for example, has passed into a stage where we shall no longer be excited or frightened by anything that the critics may see fit to bring forth. It seems as if there can hardly be, in the armory of scientific (!) critical investigation, anything more startling or amusing than what we have already seen. Still there are some novelties in form, if not in substance, yet to be had. An example is the following, from Lefevre's "Race and Language," just issued in the International Scientific Series. In the chapter entitled "The Semitic World" he says:—

"The peoples whom we are accustomed to call Semitic have always ignored their relations with the biblical patriarch Shem, son of Noah. But if we disregard the letter of the precious record, compiled and recast many centuries after the events which are therein transformed into legendary fables, if we consider in themselves the names of Noah, Ham, Shem, and Cush, we shall readily overlook the inexactitude of the name given by the moderns to the Chaldeans, the Arameans, the Canaanites, and to the Arabs. For Noah is a Semitic god of great antiquity; Nouach, a genius with four outspread wings, god and saviour, the spouse of Ti-havti, the fecundity of the abyss; Ham was Khemos, the god of the Moabites, and perhaps identical with the Egyptian Khem; we find Cush among the Cossians or Kissians of the Euphrates and among the southern peoples among whom the Pharaohs fought on the two shores of the Red Sea;

'the vile Cush,' said the Egyptians; but they none the less gave to their royal princes the title Prince of Cush, which shows the importance which they attached to the subjugation of these Cush or Cushites, the Ethiopians of Herodotus, cut in two by Semitic expansion; as for Shem, it is not difficult not to recognize in him Samas, Samson, the sun-god of the Assyrian pantheon."¹

We are therefore not surprised to read, as the conclusion of this style of scientific investigation, that "such is the new conception of history which rejects, as a chimera, the divine plan and the biblical genealogies; it is the creation of philology." To be sure it is the creation of "philology"; and certainly after we have looked this "creation" in the face, we are reminded of the "behemoth of Holy Writ" as Mr. Barnum used to advertise it, "on the earth is not its like." If M. Lefevre could only take into his hand, for a few brief moments, Mr. Andrew Lang's little sketch, entitled the "Great Gladstone Myth," he would get a very vivid idea of the impression which this style of nonsense makes upon the sane, healthy and practically educated Anglo-Saxon mind; but he would doubtless follow the example of a certain famous philologist, still living, who, when a pet theory of his was received with unbounded merriment, exclaimed petulantly, "Well, it is a scientific view, at all events."

So there is no more room for surprise or wonder on that side of the discussion. But of far more significance and importance is it, that we shall get a proper insight into the rationale of the various rites which formed the practical side of Semitic religious life. The institutions are there, crystallized, and must be explained by some theory or other, and whether they are the result of ideas which preceded them, or whether the ideas which survive are mere attempts to explain them, is one of the questions which we must consider.

Chief among the institutions of Semitic worship and practice is that of sacrifice. And it is of imperative need, as affecting the immediate religious life of to-day, that some understanding of its inner history and meaning shall be spread abroad generally. This appears in the growing discussions of the self-consciousness of Jesus himself, as the Messiah, and the endeavor to obtain a picture of the Master's own conception of his mission as Saviour of the world. While it is exceedingly likely that he held, with his contemporaries, the commonly received ideas of the Jewish ceremonial and worship, there is still reason for believing that he must have had a deeper insight into the rationale of his own life and death, as these were brought to his consciousness, as the necessary elements in the accomplishment of his work.

It is customary still to make comparison between the sacrifices of the Old Testament and the death of Christ; there remains still a vast mass of literature and teaching which has for its express aim the demonstration of the completeness of the parallel between them. There are a

¹ Race and Language, pp. 201, 202.

large number of passages in the New Testament which seem to bear out this hypothesis, and there are not wanting passages in our Lord's own words which call attention to the similarity of the place which the sacrifices occupied in the old dispensation to the place which he is to occupy in the new. The very institution which of all others is the bond of the New Covenant—that of the Eucharist—has these same elements in its character. Whether the primary idea that moves the great bulk of the Christian church in the observance of the Lord's Supper to-day is expiatory or communal would be an interesting question for investigation.

It is therefore plain that a rationale of the sacrificial institutions of the Old Testament is not a matter for mere scholarly curiosity. It is intimately associated with the religious conceptions which move us to-day. But it must be evident that in the increasing body of material which pertains to the religion and habits of worship of other Semitic peoples than the Hebrews, the investigation cannot be confined to the Old Testament. The Phœnicians, the Assyrians, and the Arabs have all of them rites which in form and matter are very similar to those which are described in the Old Testament. There are among them, as among the Jews, sacrifices for special seasons, of animals and cereals, with a prescribed ritual for each. In the broad outlines it is possible to trace the racial characteristics in them all. Where similar conditions of life and climate prevail, it is not too much to say that they are substantially identical. The comparative method must therefore be employed, and that freely, and without regard to any preconceived notions as to the character of the acts themselves. So much of our Old Testament knowledge is made useless for scholarly purposes, in that we read into our interpretations of the Old Testament our religious life and knowledge as derived from the New Testament. This obviously tends to obscure the contemporary view of the matter. There are hindrances enough without this one added. The frequent redaction of most of the material of the Old Testament books has had the effect of removing the description of the ritual, especially of the earlier forms, so far from the time of its practice, that there is often insuperable difficulty in the way of satisfactory explanation.

Moreover, it is at this point that the severest tests of the permanent value of the Old Testament for our religious life will be made. The religion of the Hebrews does not, as it once did, stand to our thought as the only revelation which has interest for the world. Indeed, as early as the prophet Micah¹ this was clearly understood. So that we must find a somewhat different ground for the exclusive interest which we maintain in the religion of the Hebrews than that which has hitherto satisfied us. That our anxiety for light on the rites and ritual of the Hebrews will always exceed that which we shall have for any other, there is no doubt. The facts of Christianity, as in historical succession to Judaism, will always insure that. But that we may gain a clearer light upon Christianity,

¹ Micah iv. 4-5; cf. also Psalm lxxx. 7.

and the New Testament, we are forced to examine, and, if we can, to understand, the ideas of the Old. The better these are comprehended, the more we shall probably see the inseparableness of the two. In the interest then of an enduring and rational Christianity, we must investigate anew the Old Testament sacrifices with a view of determining, after having ascertained their precise meaning and office, their proper relation to the New Testament, and especially to its chief Person.

But where shall the study of sacrifices begin? It is obvious that sacrifices, even in their simplest stages, show already a highly developed sense of personality, both with respect to the worshipper and to the deity. The sacrifice marks a relation as already crystallized into a habit, whether it is in the form of a doctrine as yet or not. The practice is there, and the worshipper has a definite conception of both his deity and himself. Hence the sacrifice itself is to be approached in the light of the proper thought of the worshipper himself. This is hardly to be dignified with the name of belief. And Professor Smith is right in so far that the practice of religion offers a surer method of approach than its formulæ do. But neither the observance nor the explanation of the observance is essentially the primary phenomenon in the problem. The starting-point is the worshipper himself. This would be to say, practically, that the first approach to the question is psychological. And so it is. To this day, it is of far greater interest and enlightenment to know the mind of the devotee, as giving the key to his practices, than to simply record them, with or without his explanation attached. The question is not a little anthropological, with the religious nature and the philological evidence merely as adjuncts to the main question. We must discover the sources of the consciousness of personality, and in that consciousness find the spring of religion itself. If religion is the product of human thought, and develops merely as the human animal, after reaching a certain stage, finds himself in need of certain supplementary acts, which he afterward explains as best he may, it ought to be possible to show the course of that development, and indicate at what point the idea comes into view. Indeed it ought to be possible to trace to their starting-point the sensations which produced the idea.

It will possibly be answered to this demand for the study of personality in the primitive races, that we get light on that as we unfold their religious rites, and endeavor to get a simple and rational explanation of them. But this is not enough. The internal evidence is the most necessary. Without it, we are left absolutely in the region of conjecture; or, at least, so absolutely that we can never affirm anything with decisiveness. But can we secure the other? We think it is within the region of possible things, and some attempts have already been made. In the Bampton Lectures for 1894,¹ Mr. Illingworth has some very impressive words in this very connection. He says:—

“Personality is the gateway through which all knowledge must pass.

¹ Personality, Human and Divine, by J. R. Illingworth, M. A.

Matter, force, energy, ideas, time, space, law, freedom, cause, and the like are absolutely meaningless phrases, except in the light of our personal experience. They represent different departments of that experience which may be isolated for the purposes of special study, as we separate a word from its context, to trace its linguistic affinities, or pluck a flower from its roots, to examine the texture of its tissues. But when we come to discuss their ultimate relations to ourselves and one another, or in other words to philosophize about them, we must remember that they are only known to us in the last resort through the categories of our own personality, and can never be understood exhaustively till we know all that our personality implies. It follows that philosophy and science are, in the strict sense of the word, precisely as anthropomorphic as theology, since they are alike limited by the conditions of human personality and controlled by the forms of thought which human personality provides."

There is here a keynote which needs very much to be sounded in the literature of sacrificial investigation. It may make a difference, almost world-wide, in our conception, to approach it thus from the interior, as against the mere history of the expression of the inner life. The latter will not be less interesting or any less important, as showing the forms of the thought, but it is in the personality of the worshipper, as the same can be discovered by psychological investigation, that we shall find the true rationale of his acts. If it be objected that it is too far removed from the objects of our study, and connecting with too many variations in human circumstances since then, the reply is, that we must simply trace worship, and the instincts connected with it, to the bottom, and divest ourselves of every addition which time and civilization have made. If it be not possible to do this, in examining the emotions of the human mind, in its adoration of its deity, it certainly will be impossible to find out the meaning of sacrifices by analyzing the entrails of slain beasts.

It is plain, from what has already been said, that whatever result is reached in this inquiry, will necessarily have a large place in determining what the prevailing conception of sacrifices should be, as we examine them in the Old Testament. If it should be developed that the human spirit gives unequivocal testimony to the effect that the consciousness of sin is arrived at apart from a legal or tribal consciousness, the inference that sacrifices have a necessarily expiatory character is in a fair way of establishment. But if, on the other hand, the consciousness of guilt is developed only in connection with the social life, and in response to social claims, wherein the deity is a partaker, that of course makes expiatory sacrifice in the beginning an impossibility. Or whether the ideas of divine wrath and expiation are necessarily corollary, in the worshipping mind, is another question. At all events, if the meaning of sacrifice is ever to become clear, the psychology of worship must first be explored and certain results obtained.

A. A. BERLE.

BOSTON, MASS.

ARTICLE VIII.

GENERAL AND CRITICAL NOTES.

THE ISAIAH CONTROVERSY.

IF we are permitted to strike out "Cyrus" as a proper name, and insert, in lieu thereof, "K'ur'ush" or "Koresh" as a general term like Pharaoh, Tzar, or König, it would seem that the main argument for the plural theory of the authorship of Isaiah is removed.

But so to treat the term "Cyrus" is only to do what has already been done with "Tartan" and "Rabshakeh." They are not proper names, but designations of offices. The Revised Version so treats these names, and lays the foundation for similar treatment of "Cyrus" by its marginal reading "Koresh." Of course this argument cuts both ways. It not only overturns a main pillar of the hypothesis of discrete origin, but it gives the *coup de main* to the old argument for inspiration from the fact (asserted) that an individual Cyrus was called by name, by the prophet Isaiah, generations before he was born. But that was an inherently unworthy argument, since it put inspiration in the attitude of playing a game of historic bo-peep. Cyrus was not such a providential man, either generally or specifically, so far as the Jews were concerned, that he should be singled out as the solitary, or even the leading, instance of this sort of vaticination. On the face of the case Darius was as worthy of premonition as Cyrus.

If chapter xxxix. of Isaiah is good for anything as history, then, in the lifetime of the first Isaiah, Merodach-baladan, king of Babylon, made an alliance with Hezekiah, king of Judah. Sayce is authority for saying that at that time Merodach-baladan was in alliance with powers beyond the Tigris—(Kurushes?). Grant that the first Isaiah knew anything about the political combinations of his time, and you have a foundation laid for all that is said about a "Koresh." In his exaltation in God, Isaiah cries out: "He saith of the deep, Be dry!" "He saith of a Koresh, You are my shepherd." The philosophy is—"Man's extremity is God's opportunity"—a Koresh from beyond the Tigris can "perform all my pleasure." Out of general conditions special agencies will be found.

This treatment of the term "Cyrus" reduces the section xl.-lxxvi. to harmony with itself, for Cyrus is the solitary proper name in the whole section. Generalize this name, and you have taken away the force of the argument for a second Isaiah derived from the fact that the author seems personally acquainted with the historic Cyrus.

It is only necessary to suppose that Isaiah of Jerusalem, as Matthew Arnold calls him, knew what was going on about him to lay a foundation for this reference to a "Koresh," or for any other coloring in respect to time or event of seemingly later date. Is it not better to emphasize Isaiah's knowledge more, and his subjective psychosis or inspiration less? Isaiah ought to be regarded as the Edmund Burke, the Daniel Webster, or the James G. Blaine of his time—a man who knew the forces working in his own nation, and in the nations round about, and whereto they tended.

When the Turks had taken Adrianople and the adjacent territory in Europe, it would not have required extraordinary mental processes to come to the conclusion that Constantinople must also fall; though it was a hundred years before that event happened. The problem before Isaiah in respect to Jerusalem was substantially the same after the fall of Samaria as that of Constantinople after the fall of Adrianople. Jerusalem must go the same way Samaria had gone. The power is in the east; Jerusalem is foredoomed; it is only a question of time when the end will come.

As to the powers in Mesopotamia, or Babylonia, properly called, it is only a question of time, also, in regard to them, when their overthrow must come. East of the rivers was the coming power. The Persian stood to Nineveh and Babylon much as the Goth did to Greece and Rome when he was crowding on the Danube. The wild, strong men, in either case, stood facing the rivers, and it would scarcely take divine revelation, or even inspiration, to tell what would happen. The destiny was manifest. The strong son of the earth beyond the Tigris will bear sway over all. Jerusalem will fall, and Babylon will fall. Why not let Isaiah *know* something about these *prophetic conditions*, and let him speak out of his knowledge? So he may utter the decrees of God.

There are indications that Isaiah was a man of wide and close observation. "Ho, to the land rustling with wings, beyond the rivers of Ethiopia"—is a touch Isaiah could hardly have laid on his canvas had he not snared and speared fowl on the hills and in the lakes of Abyssinia, as they converge there for a winter home in their retreat from Europe and Armenia. If he had been to Abyssinia, there is no reason why he should not know about a Koresh beyond the Tigris, for probably he had ridden a camel in his retinue in Persia or Bactria. Widen out this man Isaiah—let him know something by observation and experience, and you have diminished the difficulty of interpreting the works that bear his name, and taken away the most of the force of the objections to their unity. We should make of him a greater man than we have hitherto allowed him to be. He was probably a cosmopolite in fact before he became such in theory. That is the natural order for development like his.

One objection raised by some of the higher critics to the assignment of the section xl.-lxxvi. to Isaiah of Jerusalem is so simple as to be

charming. The objection is that Isaiah in the time of Hezekiah could not have treated of a return when no captivity had taken place. It is even laid down as a canon that prophecy can speak only in the future tense, not in the future perfect.

But it seems a little strange that divine inspiration cannot do as much as the natural faculties of man can; a little strange that it could not run along the grooves of those faculties. We have a future perfect tense and we are all as voluble in it as we are in the future. We use not only the future tense, but a future perfect and a paulo-post future perfect in vista unlimited. There are few of us in the United States who have lived half a century that did not long before the war prophesy the destruction of slavery, and then try our powers on the problems which were sure subsequently to arise. There is a goodly number, I imagine, who have not been deprived of the comfort of saying, "I told you so," with reference to something on the line of these subsequent problems. Furthermore, the objection is not intelligent. "Salvation by the remnant" is a distinguishing element in the works of Isaiah of Jerusalem. To write the second section, xl.-lxxvi., he had only to elaborate a theme already burnt in upon his soul. The arguments for diversity of origin of the book of Isaiah from literary considerations, as style, etymology, are inconclusive. Three thousand years from this time it will probably be argued, from literary characteristics, that Tennyson could not have written "The Northern Farmer" and "In Memoriam."

But, no matter what the literary diversities may be, there is something that runs beneath them all and overcomes all their force. There is a *psychological* unity from i. to lxxvi. The essential ideas that underlie the works of the first Isaiah underlie the most of the second also. The scribes, if such there were, who put the works of these two men together and abolished one of them were certainly well witted. The essential ideas of the second Isaiah in the great Song of the Return are such as had been formulated over and over again by the first. The formula of the first Isaiah is,—captivity, return, consequences—universal righteousness. The formula of the second is,—captivity (assumed), return, consequences—universal righteousness. In both, the Messianic conception comes in as a means to the end involved in the universal ethical consequences. Suppose in one place the Messianic idea is of a king, in the other that of a servant—what of it? The two conceptions are not inherently inconsistent. It may be the function of a king sometimes to serve. "*Ich Dien*" is the motto of the Prince of Wales. A crown may be foredoomed to tragedy. There is no reason why the same mind might not have entertained even diverse ideas in different stages of its career, or developed now one function of a Messiah and now another. The conception of a king might suit "the fiery heart of youth"; something less forceful and strenuous, more spiritual, the pensiveness of mellow age. The two ideas are easily adjustable when viewed in the large indefinite

way in which they are treated by Isaiah. Why should not Isaiah of Jerusalem have sung the Song of the Return? He was so impenetrated with its idea that he named his son, "Shear-jashub," "Remnant shall return." Of all men of all time such a man was fittest to write this song. Section xl-lxxvi. is merely "Shear-jashub" expanded. Why does not the rule here apply, that, when you have a sufficient cause for an effect, one more natural than any other, you can rest? The Song of the Return is wrought in miniature again and again in the first section.

It may safely be asserted that it would be a psychological impossibility for the Song of the Return to have been written at the time the captivity was verging to its close, without more marks of time, place, manner, and condition being left upon it. The total work is contemplative, indefinite, philosophical—such a work as one would write for an exigency conceived to lie in the future, not for one then pressing. So indefinite is this poem, that there is not a mark about it to tell where it was written, whether in Jerusalem, Babylon, or Damascus. It would be impossible for an old man even, writing at the time of the return or on the eve of its activity, not to have caught up some thrill from the pulse of the time, and to have made a call on the Jews for some specific acts that would tend to secure the success of the return.

Read this section to a camp of overland pioneers of '48 on the plains bound for California, or of '59 bound for Pike's Peak, and tell them it was a call upon a people to execute a journey under circumstances similar to their own, and you would get the reply, "Go to, now! There is nothing natural in all this; nothing that sounds of teamsters driving in the oxen. There is not even the primitive call in it to organize a company." And your critics would be right. From beginning to end there is not a thing about the section adapted to a living, pressing exigency.

Given a time when an "enterprise of great pith and moment" was crowding to the front, or was actually on the field, in view of its demands the very splendor of the section makes it profound and melancholy. Instead of hitting the exigency of the return, the Song of the Return always ricochets over the return to come down on the great universal ethical effects beyond. The work is such as a man would write who was contemplating a disaster to his nation, and yet could not give up the thought that there was something about that nation that would survive and ultimately bless all mankind. Isaiah had optimism enough about him to believe

"That good shall fall
At last, far off, at last to all,
And every winter change to spring."

But just what distinguishes Isaiah is the "far-offness" of his contemplated events. No man would be writing in this way in Jerusalem beleaguered, or in Babylon with the invincible Cyrus bearing down upon or in possession of it. But a man would write in Isaiah's way who was contem-

plating disaster and discipline as a necessity for Jerusalem in the retributive and righteous government of God, out from which must still come blessing to Zion and to men.

It would take comment on the whole section in minuteness to bring out the force of the foregoing suggestion. But read chapter liii.—"Who hath believed our report," and chapter lv.—"Ho, every one that thirsteth," and chapter lviii.—"Cry aloud, spare not," and see how malapropos they are to a call to go up to Jerusalem and rebuild its walls. In such state of affairs, even the very first word in the section—"Comfort ye, my people," is a false note. The people with whom Zerubbabel, Ezra, and Nehemiah wrought did not need comfort, they needed a gad.

The generations on the stage with them had been born in Babylonia. What was Jerusalem to them or they to Jerusalem? They were adjusted to Babylonia. They had thrived there. The Jew has always been realistic enough to adapt himself to circumstances. To sacrifice himself by going back to Jerusalem must have seemed to him unpractical idealism. It is unthinkable that a great man living in the time of the captivity should not have uttered a call for some specific acts adapted to the return, even that he should not have appealed to specific men to have ideals worthy of their fathers. There is nothing of all this in the Song of the Return. It is as oblivious of particulars respecting the return as it is of those pertaining to the captivity. On the theory of the higher critics the greatest man of the day sails in the air over this crisis and never once touches the earth to adapt himself to it. *Credat Judæus Apella!*

When you come to the matter of the further disintegration of Isaiah so as to make his work a collection from various writers at different times, I can only say that I am not impressed with the soundness of the philosophy or scholarship which attributes the great literary results which mark history to "the fortuitous concourse" of intellects. "Every house is builded by some man." The masterpieces of literature are the outcome of the activity of the world's great minds, not the collected dribbling of an infinity of small ones. The majestic harmony of Isaiah throughout never tumbled together out of a tendency; it was born of the travail of one great soul. Isaiah of Jerusalem *could* write what passes under his name. There is not only no evidence to show that any one else *did* write anything attributed to him, but that there was any one in being who *could* write it.

C. CAVERNO.

BOULDER, COLO.

DRUMMOND'S "ASCENT OF MAN."

THIS latest work by Professor Drummond has already passed through several editions, and is being read by thousands of thoughtful youth.

Several combined causes account for his phenomenal success. He is bright, spicy, rhetorical, illustrative, clear, and a master in the art of put-

ting things. The subject-matter treats of the two most vital questions of the age—biological science and religion; not the religion of shibboleths and sibboleths, theories and Hebrew manuscripts, but a vital religion of every-day experience. He stands beside thinking young students who are debating between the two roads, the one leading to materialism, and the other to theistic philosophy. The earnest student fears to trust the mere scientist; he has been warned against the specialist as an unsafe guide, and yet this is a scientific age. He also knows that religion has power and value, and the tearing down of religion means the letting loose of nihilistic and anarchistic forces upon society. In such an hour Professor Drummond stands by the student's side and in words of consummate skill, in phraseology of the latest scientific theories, points him to the "*Everlasting Father and the Prince of peace.*" He assures him that he may run even in the advance ranks of the most progressive scientists, and yet need not join the cohorts of infidels in an anarchistic attack upon revealed religion. This is no small gain.

Some one asks, Is Professor Drummond's book a permanent contribution to human knowledge? It is too soon to answer, but Christians should hold him in grateful remembrance for his remarkable power in persuading young students to wait awhile ere they throw away personal faith in religion. His example of personal faith at the same time that he is an ardent believer in most advanced evolution theories is of great value in staying the tides. He in his own person is an illustration, that, despite the hue and cry of blatant infidels, the scientific doctrine of evolution does not read God out of his universe, but is a mere *modus operandi* of his marvellous workmanship.

In 1736 the thinking of the world had long been arrogated by infidels to themselves; religious foundations seemed to have sunk beneath authority and logic; intellect looked disdainfully upon piety as weak, ignorant, blind. What chance had a student in the universities of the world in those days? Bishop Butler in the above-mentioned year published a modest little volume which proved an epoch-making book. Men said, and still say, He proved nothing; analogy is no proof. But he turned the tide, and showed students how they could be men of thought and science, and yet earnest believers in God and active followers of Jesus of Nazareth. Drummond's book accomplishes a similar function in our own age. Readers by the thousands, not alone in colleges and universities but in homes, and shops, and factories, are held to faith by works of this class. These find comfort in Drummond's works—and more than comfort; for they turn with greater confidence to their Bible and their churches as fortresses over which the flag of faith is still waving unharmed. They are not driven to choose between their religion and the facts of science—there is no irreconcilable conflict between religion and science!

The most satisfactory part of the book is its introduction. He shows how the evolution of man has been studied,—

1. As to embryology, by His and Minot;
2. As to the animal body, by Darwin, Huxley, Hæckel, and Wallace;
3. As to the mind, by Romanes;
4. As to morals, by Herbert Spencer;
5. As to religion, by Edward Caird;
6. As to sociology, by Benjamin Kidd.

Professor Drummond seems perfectly in accord with Professor Henry Calderwood, who says: "Evolution *supposes* organic life; there was a lower form from which a higher had been evolved. . . . In natural history therefore life is taken as existing, a reality already present, given at some earlier stage in the world's history. Evolution cannot be a complete natural history; at most it is a scientific account of later stages in the history of the universe."¹

Of the opening chapters of existence, of the first verse in Genesis, evolution ought not and cannot speak. In reading histories we must clearly distinguish between a historian's facts and his interpretations of those facts. Professor Drummond boldly says: "At present there is not a chapter of the record that is wholly finished. The manuscript is already worn with erasures, the writing is often blurred, the very language is uncouth and strange." He quotes Mr. Herbert Spencer's famous and much ridiculed definition of evolution, and says it "*throws no light, though it is often supposed to do so, upon ultimate causes.*"

The chief force of Professor Drummond's book is reached in the statement of what he calls "*the missing factor in current theories.*" He lays at Darwin's door the charge of misleading the world in scientific thought by the exclusive use of the principle of "the Struggle for Life."

This principle Drummond allows, but says of it: "The Struggle for Life is the 'Villain' of the piece, *no more*; and, like the 'Villain' in the play, its chief function is to react upon the other players for higher ends" (p. 13).

Drummond maintains most earnestly, that along with the principle "*the Struggle for Life*" must go the second factor, *the Struggle for the Life of Others.*

It is by the neglect of this second factor that interpreters of nature have told a history whose pages are full of woe, have drawn "a picture so dark as to be a challenge to its Maker, an unanswered problem to philosophy, an abiding offence to the moral nature of Man. The world has been held up to us as one great battle-field heaped with the slain, an Inferno of infinite suffering, a slaughter-house resounding with the cries of a ceaseless agony" (p. 19). Drummond maintains that a consideration of the second factor, the struggle for the life of others, relieves the picture of nature, and makes the world not a selfish one of battle, but an altruistic home of love.

In ten long and interesting chapters Drummond applies his theories

¹ Calderwood's *Evolution and Man's Place in Nature.*

of evolution to the Ascent of Man. In these chapters many will find much that is unsatisfactory and at times even repulsive. The introduction carries conviction, but the main part of the book offends in attempted descriptions of how nature accomplished everything, and thereby the book becomes visionary in the extreme.

For example, take the first assertion: "The earliest home of Primitive Man was a cave in the rocks—the simplest and most unevolved form of human habitation. One day, perhaps driven by the want within his hunting-grounds of the natural cave, he made himself a hut—an artificial cave" (p. 59). To call such a statement science is a misnomer: it is only a theory, an imaginary algebraic " x " to test whether or not the equation can be made and solved.

He then proceeds to show how the one-roomed cave develops into the modern magnificent palace—the one-celled organism into the highly differentiated many-celled body. His rhetoric gets advantage over scientific facts, for biological "segmentation" must not be compared to the architect's "adding room to room." The process is antithetical to "*adding* room to room." Segmentation combines increase through division and subdivision and then growth. To call division addition is a strange figure of speech!

In his chapter on "The Ascent of the Body," our author vividly portrays from embryology the mysterious facts of man's relationships through the body to the lower creation. This is the most satisfactory of his chapters, and yet he admits: "In no case is the recapitulation of the past complete. Ancestral stages are constantly omitted, others are over-accentuated, condensed, distorted, or confused; while new and undecipherable characters occasionally appear" (p. 73). We might well adopt Goethe's words, as Hæckel has done:—

"Alle gestalten sind ähnlich doch keine gleichen der andern,
Und so deutet der Chor auf ein geheimes Gesetz."

"All forms have a resemblance; none is the same as another,
And their chorus complete points to a mystical law."

In his chapter on "The Scaffolding left in the Body," we meet with many interesting facts, the right interpretation of which is the question under discussion. The facts are unquestioned; the philosophy is quite another matter. Mention was especially made of the "gill-slits" found in the neck of the human embryo, slits which sometimes remain even at birth. Moreover the history of embryos shows that the ear is a development from one of those slits, and cases arise where the other slits develop into abnormal ears down the neck. In all vertebrate animals—man included—the most prominent features of the early embryo are the head, and then these gill-slits. In the early stages it is impossible to distinguish between the different embryos. Hæckel has a comparative set of figures showing this fact most convincingly. The fact of this likeness between

the embryos must be acknowledged. Does it necessarily follow that these appearances are mere stages of a development, "scaffoldings still remaining," "vestiges of former states"? The evolutionist demands credence in *his* philosophy of placing facts. He must not be impatient and contemptuous of others who have another philosophy of these same facts, a different grouping of them.

The difficulties are most seriously complicated because the champions on each side spend so much time and strength calling one another hard names—"atheist," "materialist," "infidel," "bigot," "religionist."

The most serious difficulty arises from the intense determination of so many evolutionists to rid the world of what they call the "teleological" purpose of nature, the doctrine of "final causes." They are determined to rule out of court any and all arguments which imply any supervising intelligence. Such a man as Hæckel disfigures his pages by contemptuous expressions against those who defend theories other than materialistic and mechanical. Such men not only leave God out of the account, but would drive him out of the account.

A scientific man's theories are his theories, and have value only in the ratio of truth in them. When he resents any teleological philosophy as unscientific, his assumptions must be repudiated and himself shown to be unscientific, because he refuses to consider all the possible working hypotheses in the case. If a teleological hypothesis can be made to answer the demands of the case, he is not scientific who refuses to accept it: he is ruled by a prejudice; he seeks not truth, but a predetermined theory.

Such an evolutionist is *not* Professor Drummond. He is a firm believer in God who accomplishes his purposes *via* evolutionary methods. No short review can give one any idea of his masterly presentation of the evolutionist's side of the argument. In Chapter I. he deals with the general evidences of man's ascent of body from the lower forms of life. Chapter II. shows how there still remain in our bodies traces of the forms through which they have been made to pass in previous ages—one of his most interesting and valuable chapters. In Chapter III. he treats of man as the finality, beyond which there can be no more physical development; reason, and not "natural selection," from here on takes the ruling hand. Evolution now changes its course from a physical to a psychical universe.

In Chapter IV. he deals with the evolution of mind, and acknowledges it as the great difficulty to be met. He starts with the given quantum of mental "elements," and then finds no further difficulty in developing present conditions.

The sources of information are the study of the child mind, brute mind, mind of man in early ages as evidenced in flints, potteries, weapons, etc.; study of savage races, and the study of primitive languages.

Some of the positions taken seem a strain upon science. He mentions twenty-three emotions manifested by animals, and asserts the definite

order in which they manifested themselves in the historic development—fear, surprise, affection, pugnacity, curiosity, jealousy, anger, play, sympathy, emulation, pride, resentment, love of the beautiful, hate, cruelty, benevolence, revenge, rage, shame, regret, deceitfulness, and the emotion of the ludicrous.

Most men will feel that this is a scientific refinement whose general lines may be accepted, but whose minutiae are far from being definitely ascertained. We feel ourselves on infirm postulates when we say a child at three weeks manifests fear followed at seven weeks by social affections, and at twelve weeks by jealousy and anger, and at five months by sympathy, and at eight months by pride, resentment, love of ornament; and at fifteen months by shame, remorse, and a sense of the ludicrous. His chief point, however, is emphasized, that these emotions are positively existent in the lower creation.

In Chapter V. he deals very interestingly with the growth of language, claiming that gesture and emphasis must be taken as factors, as well as enunciated speech.

Chapter VI. deals with objections drawn from the struggle for life against the very goodness of a divine originator and supporter of such a universe—an interesting chapter, but not a final and satisfactory explanation of agony and war.

From Chapter VII. onward, he endeavors to show how out of the principle of *the struggle for the life of others*, the altruistic principle, has grown love, maternity, and benevolence, these clustering around the feminine element, while around the masculine cling law, order, righteousness. The work done in these chapters is most painstaking and reveals the master hand, but one feels as when skating on thin ice, exhilarated, but rather doubtful as to the issue of the adventure. It may all be science—but can scarcely be an exact science.

The book seems to claim for itself special freshness and newness: but while Drummond has undoubtedly stated his principle, "*struggle for the life of others*," as with new emphasis, Darwin, Spencer, Hæckel, and others would be astounded to be told that they had left out the reproductive factor in the struggle for life. Darwin, for instance, explicitly states, "I use this term [struggle for existence] in a *large and metaphorical sense*, including dependence of one being on another, and including, which is more important, not only the life of the individual, but *success in leaving progeny*." The followers of Darwin will undoubtedly claim that Darwin's positions have been misapprehended and misstated. They, as well as Professor Drummond, will insist on both factors—nutrition and reproduction, and point to chapters by the hundred which treat on the reproductive element—the struggle for the life of others, "*success in leaving progeny*." It is not merely the individual life that is meant in the struggle for life, but the life of the species, and the struggle for life of the

individual at last resolves itself into species existence, and species implies constant reproduction.

In conclusion, we lay the book down, having been entranced by metaphors, dazzled with meteors of resplendent rhetoric, entertained by brilliant figures, instructed by the skilful statement of numerous biological facts, gladdened to find a thorough-going evolutionist who believes that He who made all things is God and in a special emphasis can repeat, "In the beginning *God* created,"—yet after all its learning, rhetoric, *belles-lettres*, and brilliant illustrations, one feels that there is much in it that, to say the least, bears the impress of special pleading.

Professor Drummond blames Darwin for using his principle of the struggle for life as if it were a ladder with only one upright, and urges the use of the other factor, the struggle for the life of others. It is a brilliant illustration, but the old illustration of a boat and the two oars would be better. The struggle for life would then be one oar, and the struggle for the life of others would be the other—yet there remains another factor; put the rudder to the boat, and all is well—the Rudder, "He who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will."

FRANCIS D. KELSEY.

OSHELIN, OHIO.

THE TRUE RENDERING OF ROMANS IX. 3.

Ἡθέλην γὰρ ἀνάθεμα εἶναι αὐτὸς ἐγὼ ἀπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ.

THE right explanation of Rom. ix. 3 involves more than one important principle of exegesis. One is this: *Theological inferences are of no account against the simple obvious meaning of a passage.* The theological pressure on this passage is well expressed by Mr. Hutchings in the BIBLIOTHECA SACRA for July, 1894: "The usual exegesis makes Paul willing to be excluded from all hope of salvation, including not only endless suffering, but also positive enmity toward Christ forever" (p. 512). This consideration is made to support the rendering, "For I myself did wish to be separated from Christ," the reference being to Paul's life before conversion.

Now against this pressure from without is the fact that the passage itself, if translated "I wished," etc., is not a natural reference to Paul's past life. He refers to that life more than once with a definiteness and warmth that leave no doubt as to his meaning. He could say, "I verily thought with myself that I ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth. . . . Being exceedingly mad against them, I persecuted them" (Acts xxvi. 9, 11). "Beyond measure I persecuted the church of God, and made havoc of it" (Gal. i. 13). He could humble himself to say "that am not meet to be called an apostle, because I persecuted the church of God" (1 Cor. xv. 9). It is incredible that such a bare uncir-

cumstantial statement as is proposed, should be Paul's confession as a persecutor. The obvious impression is against it. No one would think of it except under outside doctrinal pressure. And for this obvious impression there are at least two distinct reasons: 1. The expression "anathema *from* Christ" is appropriate only in the mouth of a Christian, or one who considers himself a Christian. It implies renunciation of Christ and banishment from him. 2. There is no adverb of past time which would make it read thus, "I myself *once* [πότε] wished." "But," one may say, "take heed to your grammar, and obey the imperfect tense, with or without πότε. This leads me to give as a second rule of exegesis: *Avoid what may be called a mechanical use of grammar.* A sentence is not a piece of dead mechanism, grinding out its meaning by the levers and wheels of mood and tense; it participates in the life and flexibility and sensitiveness of the mind that produces it. Grammar is corrective, not creative; a good servant, but a bad master. Formal grammar is ultimately derived from the meaning, and not the meaning from grammar.

All that has now been said implies, or half implies, that the theological pressure on this passage is valid and weighty; but it is not. If it were, it would be one's duty to resist it, but there is really nothing to resist. By a cool analysis some of us have found dreadful things in the passage, but cool analysis is here out of place. The words are a hot outburst of devotion and love. "Let Paul go down—down to everlasting destruction, if only Israel may be lifted up to salvation." The apostle did not stop to measure his words, and we shall get his meaning not by picking away at the syllables, but by catching the spirit and feeling. "Was Paul then a Hopkinsian, 'willing to be damned'? Was he willing to be an enemy of Christ? Willing to sin forever?" No; if you speak of deliberate choice. But he was not expressing deliberate choice, but the most undeliberate passion of love. The language of logic failed him, and the language of pain and agony took its place. "Did he, then, mean what he said?" Rather he meant what he *felt*. He did not mean all that we can possibly find in his words. He uncovered his throbbing heart; that was all, that was enough—too much for modern cool-headed analysis. Let us, then, set down a third rule of exegesis, which may, perhaps, be expressed thus: *When a writer does not measure his words, the reader should not.*

L. S. POTWIN.

ADELBERT COLLEGE.

ARTICLE IX.

SOCIOLOGICAL NOTES.

STRIKES.

As a remedy for poverty; or as a means of obtaining more than the market price for labor; and, in most instances, as a means of securing meager justice, it would seem as if the wage-earning classes must long ago have lost all confidence in strikes. The history of strikes is, in the main, a history of failures. The gain from a few questionable successes is not at all commensurate with the cost. The loss of money and the estrangements and suffering incidental to such modes of warfare will far outweigh any seeming advantages. It might be said that, as a remedy, a strike is admitted to be inadequate, but it is the only means of educating the public to the wrong inflicted upon the wage-earning classes by permitting the inexorable laws of supply and demand to have the same free play in the labor market as they have in the world of commodities.

But the sway of those laws has in no wise, as yet, been restricted, nor have strikes revealed any method of evading them, that appeals to the sober judgment and sense of justice of the American people. Whether great economic truths must be emphasized by principles of warfare or revealed only by violence, is rightly open to question. There must be some better method of procedure.

The real object of a strike is to compel an employer to conform to some assumed standard of justice which he has refused to adopt. It is well known that an employer will calculate the injury to his business resulting from the sudden stoppage of his works and the withdrawal absolutely of all laborers who have been especially trained to their duties; and the loss resulting from breaking in new men. The employer does consider carefully these things; but another consideration is, in these days, precipitated by labor organizations for the purpose of overcoming the employer's determination to run his business as he pleases even when he pleases to do right. That consideration is the fear of violence, or trespass upon his rights and property. It is the use of violence, which labor organizations calculate will compel an employer to pay more than the market price for labor. The only ground of justification for such a demand is the wants of the wage-earner and the abundance of the employer, which is assumed as a fact, and then acted upon as such. The spiritual law of stewardship is usually brought into play in place of the

economic law of ownership, and thus "justice" and benevolence get sadly mixed and confounded.

A strike is always a declaration of war. It is a failure from the start, unless it be an active, persistent war on the property and rights of the employer; for, with a labor market oversupplied, the eternal laws of supply and demand will defeat any strike at every point. Skilled workmen, like fine watchmakers or first-class carvers, corner the labor market in quite another way by their superior genius and skill in their trade, thus reducing competition to a minimum; but in the trades where little skill is required and little education,—but the use more of muscle than mind is involved,—strikes are always fiercest and the battle the most brutal, for it is not so simple a matter to corner such a labor market.

And such strikes, to be successful, involve not only attacks on property and life, but, more recently, call for the use of the State militia or of Federal troops. Thus the rights of the employer and of the employe are not the only ones involved, but the rights of the public and of the man who desires to work at lower wages (usually a non-union man) are at once involved. In all memorable strikes, thus far recorded, the struggle has quickly assumed a warfare not only between capitalist and laborer, but between laborer and laborer, and between union labor and the State. It is, in short, a struggle between the manual toiler and the simple law of supply and demand. Practically, the real question becomes, Has the non-union laborer any rights which the public and the labor organizations are bound to respect? Must the economic laws of supply and demand be suspended at the expense of the non-union man?

Theoretically, there is but one answer to that question. That answer was voiced by the Royal Labor Commission of England, early in 1894, when it recommended that "all the power of the State should be exercised to protect non-union men in their right to work without interference from union men." This was voiced again by the Congressional Committees appointed by the Senate and House to investigate the Homestead troubles. The Hon. William C. Oates, chairman of that committee, said: "The right of any man to labor upon whatever terms he and his employer agree, whether he belongs to a labor organization or not, and the right of a corporation or person to employ anyone to labor in a lawful business, is secured by the laws of the land. In this free country, these rights must not be denied or abridged. To do so would be to destroy that personal freedom which has ever been the just pride and boast of American citizens." The late Hon. George Ticknor Curtis, the able constitutional lawyer who wrote the History of the Constitution, said: "This coercion of non-union men, however attempted, and in whatever it ends, should be made a crime and be punished with severity. It is contrary to the fundamental principles of our institutions."

Although the laws of our land and the sentiment of the people are

wholly in favor of such a protection to non-union men, practically it is well-nigh impossible for non-union men to get employment in the cities, and, if they suffer violence, as they continually do, it is even more difficult to get justice from the courts.

The reason for all this is the affiliation of labor organizations with politics. A company of militia will awe a whole village, and can put an unorganized mob of a thousand to flight. Organized laborers as they are led in these times, though not numerically strong as compared with unorganized laborers, in too many instances use the power of organization, not to build up and benefit their number, in ways not now to be enumerated, but simply to overawe and bulldoze employers into paying more than market price for labor from fear of violence resulting from strikes.

Organized labor has thus the advantage over unorganized labor. It makes more noise, and causes a greater quaking among weak-kneed politicians and conscienceless demagogues, than its real power would warrant. The senseless fear which falls upon the pot-house politician when organized labor beats on the drum and pounds on the cymbal is amusing and pitiable. A drum major with a few fifes and snare drums makes a great show, but he wins no battles. The will of the American people is not so easily defeated. Many labor unions are, therefore, largely political organizations with whom the maintaining of wages is only a secondary object. They are used by their leaders for political and selfish ends.

What labor organizations should stand for, and what they should be commended and approved for, may be stated as follows:—

First,—To present and maintain a solid front against the encroachments of selfish and avaricious capitalists by acting in unison and in harmony. In other words, to secure the best market price for labor, the most reasonable number of hours for work, and all possible advantages which are due to laborers as human beings.

Second,—To improve the character of the members and to advance their knowledge of their trades by disseminating literature appropriate and helpful.

Third,—To improve the craft by clearing it of unworthy and dishonest members, thus supplying good and skilled men whenever such are needed, for whose character and efficiency the organization can vouch and become responsible.

Fourth,—To elect the wisest and best men for leaders to represent them and act for them in all contests for their rights. Such leaders should be men of conscience and ability with no political aspirations or affiliations.

Fifth,—To provide a form of accident and life insurance providing against loss of wages by injuries where "contributory negligence" releases the employer, and which provides for funeral expenses and even an additional weekly fund for a limited time for support of the family.

Sixth,—To provide legal means of enforcing rights for collecting wages or claims for injury.

Seventh,—To secure the necessities of life for its members at a fair price above wholesale cost, and to borrow money at fair rates of interest for its members on chattel security in case of emergency.

Labor organizations founded on such principles would have the sympathy and support of the public, and few struggles would arise with unjust employers. Such organizations would easily enroll the great majority of the worthy members of the craft. But the labor organizations, as at present constituted, with sufficient exceptions to prove the rule, are formed, like the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers, solely for strike purposes, and the leaders are not busy unless engaged in some sort of warfare that creates hatreds, awakens prejudices, widens the breach between employer and laborer, and imperils the positions and good name of the members. Too often the men are led unwittingly into acts of violence which make them outlaws and enemies of the public peace.

The object of too many labor organizations is not to get the best market price for labor, but by threats of violence and by intimidation to get better than market price for labor. Such an unnatural result is short-lived, for the inexorable laws of the economic world assert themselves in time, and the employer thus "held up" fails in his business; uses up his surplus and goes out of business, or joins some trust to keep up prices to the consumer and make him pay for the extra wages. Oftenest he quietly discharges the men and replaces with new hands. But the result is quite uniformly at the expense of the laborer or of the consumer.

To get more than a fair market price for wages involves a cornering of the labor market at some point, and an absolute suspension of the law of competition in the sphere of labor. The uniform result must be a failure, which, the longer it is delayed, comes only with greater momentum and loss in the end. Hence woman labor and child labor is unorganized, for it has no brute force to maintain a strike; and yet, of all labor, it is deserving the most of sympathy and support from the public. Even the State has been properly compelled to come to the relief of such labor by statutory enactments regulating hours and sanitary conditions. Is there not a future for labor organizations, along these or similar lines, and are not the old ideas of organized labor doomed in a free democratic Republic like our own.

THE MARQUETTE BUILDING STRIKE.

THE strike at the Marquette building in Chicago will illustrate forcibly some of the principles enunciated in the preceding note. Unlike the strikes at Homestead, Brooklyn, and other places where the battle waged

was between union and non-union laborers, the struggle here was between different organizations of union men. This war began in October, 1894, and culminated in December with the killing of one Donald Gruar, a union carpenter, by John Kemperman, a non-union carpenter; for, though it was a battle between unions, it involved the presence of some non-union men. The results were two killed and nearly fifty wounded. And this in the heart of Chicago—called by Archbishop Ireland the “Imperial City” of the United States;—opposite the Post Office, within a block of the First National Bank, in sight of the Federal Courts; in a Christian country, and under a free democratic Republic, in the year of our Lord 1894.

The trouble originally arose between what is known as the Building Trades Council and some men, employed by the Edison Company, who did not happen to belong to the union that was affiliated with the Building Trades Council,—the Electrical Workers’ Union.

The Building Trades Council is composed of representatives of several different unions of workmen in the building trades,—the Plumbers’ Union, Steam Heaters’ Union, Carpenters’ Union, Metal Workers’ Union, Plasterers’ Union, and many others. This Council objected not simply to non-union men’s working on any building with its members, but even to members of any union not affiliated with itself. In this way the Council could control the construction of large buildings and have the contractors and owners at its mercy. This was actually done at the Marshall Field building and at the Columbus building on State Street. Corporations and firms acquiring contracts for work were compelled to join the Council and pay a large fee for so doing. By this means a complete and perfect monopoly was created and the owners of the building were wholly powerless to act independently of the Council.

For instance, at the Columbus building one corporation that refused to join this Council was driven from the building, and it was compelled to relet its work to a member of the Council at an advanced figure, which it did rather than submit to the dictates of the Council.

The public has little conception of the crimes that are committed in the name of poverty and want, and that find justification only on grounds that the most sickly sentimentalism can invent.

It would seem as if the police and the courts would afford protection to men who desire to work; but it is simply impossible for such men to secure it. The forms of law are respected, and disturbers of the peace are put under bonds, but even if the bonds are forfeited, or fines imposed, the attorney for the organizations manages by some political “pull” to have the fines suspended and the bonds cancelled.

It is simply the affiliation of politics with labor organizations and with labor leaders that makes such a vicious and brutal strike as that at the Marquette building possible.

We record this strike in passing because though in one sense an obscure one, being unknown throughout the country, it is yet none the less

important as revealing vital principles and truths. It has come to pass that much of the so-called cruelty and disregard of capitalists for laborers is far outweighed by the cruelty and hatred of laborers one for another.

Is it not important to recognize the evils of a tyrannical monopoly and trust when it occurs among labor unions, as well as when it is fostered by selfish and avaricious capitalists?

THE BROOKLYN TROLLEY STRIKE.

ILLUSTRATIVE further of these principles was the strike in Brooklyn. It arose because of a most unjust and unreasonable reduction in wages proposed by the company. The sympathy of the public was at first with the strikers. If violence had not been used it would have remained so; but it is a question if the strikers could have secured the object for which they struck, for their places would have been quickly filled by men standing in the market place idle.

To strike at all was to be defeated in an overburdened labor market. What could be done? Let a company with watered stock, declaring large dividends and living like any other privileged paupers on the public, grind them in hours and wages, and if they protest fill their places with strangers and aliens at the expense and risk of the very public that granted the right of way? Such, unfortunately, was the only alternative, owing to the miserable custom of granting public franchises to private monopolies.

The attempt of Justice Gaynor of the New York Supreme Court, to compel the company to run their cars when 7,000 militia could not clear the streets for them was a practical injustice and a farce. But it was theoretical justice which should have been considered before the company secured its monopoly right.

The cure for such strikes is in municipal ownership or in state control of the natural monopolies. Large dividends, watered stocks, wealthy drones and paupers, who are willing to live at the public expense, will be followed by violence and strikes as a result of injustice and oppression if private greed is developed in place of a proper sense of the public good.

ARTICLE X.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

PAUL DE LAGARDE. *Erinnerungen aus seinem Leben zusammengestellt von Anna de Lagarde.* Göttingen: Dieterich'sche Universitäts-Buchhandlung. 1894. (Pp. 191. 6¼x3¾.)

To write the life of Lagarde would itself be a life task. His was a gigantic mind, his knowledge encyclopædic, his interests legion. Frau Lagarde does not attempt a biography. He must be a trained scholar who would estimate his literary and critical labors; a close student of school and church problems in Germany who would understand the value of his thought upon those matters. She does not even attempt to say the last word as to the personal life and qualities of her husband. With very modest pen she writes down for her friends and his, a few pages of reminiscences from his life. Waiving all claim to elegance of literary form, the book charms us by its artlessness. If the light cast on the life of Lagarde is not electric, it is also free from the caught-in-the-act effects of an electric light; enough appears to show that more might be revealed, and at the same time the reader does not feel as if he had been present at a post-mortem examination.

There was much of hardship in the life of Lagarde. The memory of his father's home was so painful that even the wife shrank from inquiry concerning it. The very name of his father, Bötticher, he was willing to discard later in order to assume that of the great-aunt Lagarde who adopted him. He was gifted musically, but he must not even touch the piano. This was typical of his lot through life; there was music in his soul, but stern necessity kept him busied with the coarser affairs of life. The grim, cheerless years of childhood passed into no less cheerless years of manhood. The world to him was "terribly cold and heartless," he says.

Intellectually his youth was full of promise. He secured various prizes from the schools, and in particular a travelling fellowship which enabled him to spend two years in London and Paris studying in the libraries there. In spite of this auspicious opening of his career, and its promise that he would receive recognition for the work he was doing, he was compelled to support himself for twelve years by teaching in Gymnasias and Realschulen, at a salary rising from 400 to 750 thaler. One scarcely dares conjecture what the loss to the world must have been from these years of work that others could have done as well. They were

years of hard work and real privation. At first dry bread was their fare morning and evening, later butter could be added, and still later cheese or meat. They were years of repeated disappointment. One and another position seemed almost within his reach, which would have made possible the prosecution of his investigations, but Halle, Giessen—even a better gymnasium appointment were decided against him. Finally an appeal to the king brought him in 1866 what he asked for, relief from teaching and a continuation of salary. He promptly withdrew to Schleusingen and applied himself to his study. Returning in 1868 to Berlin, he soon received an appointment to succeed Ewald in Göttingen, where he spent the rest of his life.

In the fall of 1891 he made a rapid trip to London, Paris, and Italy, whence he returned October 17th. By the first of December symptoms of a fatal malady were unmistakable; the only hope of recovery or of a continuation of life lay in a surgical operation itself very dangerous. The plans for this were laid with the greatest secrecy. The immediate literary work on hand was completed or provided for. On the appointed day he walked alone to the hospital and laid himself down under the surgeon's knife. The operation over, he seemed for a day or two to be rallying, but sank again and died on the 22d.

His youthful aspiration was to write a history of the Roman Empire from Cæsar to Constantine, to show the three religions at war—to trace the causes of the issue. An indispensable condition of this larger work was the editing of numerous patristic texts, itself a great undertaking, and beyond this he never went towards carrying out his historical plans. In 1865 he could say, "I have long since limited my plans to a critical edition of the Greek translation of the Old Testament, and to editing the patristic texts." Gradually he came to concentrate his researches upon the text of the Greek Old Testament, and here his best critical work was done.

It is not strange, in view of Lagarde's career, that the book before us takes on an apologetic character. The writer says: "My husband has been charged with serious moral faults; it is said that he was often harsh and unjust in his judgments; that he was full of boastings; that he sought strife; that he hated and persecuted; finally that he was embittered by lack of success, although his plans were impracticable." "Lagarde," she continues, "was far from considering himself to be perfect. He dealt with himself more severely than he did with others. He had weaknesses, but they grew out of the very goodness of his nature." The book owes its existence to the natural desire of the wife to refute the charges by means of facts that she of all others has in her possession. With admirable tact she does this by giving extracts from his letters to herself and to a few others, extracts which show Lagarde's great heart and gentle nature. She speaks of the simplicity of his life; of his openness and frankness in personal relations; of the friendships between him and his

pupils. In some cases her championship leads her to justify Lagarde's harsh judgments, by showing them to be none too harsh for the persons involved. This method is the least happy course to pursue, for we cannot be sure but that there is another side to these cases.

We are, however, convinced as we read the pages, that Lagarde was a gentle nature at heart, and that mellower tones were possible for him than the martial music that is still re-echoing now that he has ceased his labors. Men were agreeably surprised as they learned to know him personally, after knowing of his literary work.

Lagarde was a man of strong convictions, and that upon many subjects. Out of these, and we have not to seek far for similar results, sprang his vigor in condemnation of views less consistent. His views were matters of conscience; he could not oppose opinions without condemning their possessors. A wrong opinion was to him an offence against truth, and he who held it was at fault, not simply intellectually but morally also. "I mourn greatly over all the follies I have committed in my life, and over all the good that I have not done. This last book of mine, a really good one, will lose in influence through the sharpness of its criticisms, and that grieves me. Who would be happier than I if there were nothing to criticise!"

He who could write such words and think such thoughts as this about so prosaic a matter as the study of a language, must have been a sympathetic and appreciative man: "*Jede Sprache die der Mensch spricht und schreibt ist eine neue Seele in ihm.*"

OWEN H. GATES.

THE BIBLICAL DOCTRINE OF SIN. By Professor J. S. Candlish, D. D. (Handbooks for Bible Classes and Private Students.) Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1893.

This compact and pithy manual of a foundation topic in Christian theology belongs to a group of small books favorably known already by Dr. Stalker's *Lives of Christ and St. Paul*, by brief monographs on separate books of the Bible, and by others on Christian history. The authors are nearly all Scotch theologians. Professor Candlish, the present author, furnishes also the volumes on *The Sacraments*, *The Doctrine of God*, and *The Work of the Holy Spirit*. He bears a name revered in the Free Church. He enters at once upon his subject with a terse, clear style, and in twelve chapters sets forth *The Conception of Sin*, *Views of Other Religions*, *Truth of the Bible View*, *Guilt*, *Punishment*, *Universality of Sin*, *Explanations of this*, *The Fall of Man*, *Native Depravity*, *Inability of Man*, *Inheritance and Imputation*, and *Elements of Hope*. The scope of topics is large and full. The treatment of the first four is notably accurate and adequate; the only lack being in respect to the element of authority in "the commandment" as imparting a quality to that which without it would be only moral wrong; Rom. vii. 13. As he gathers from Scripture that "notions of law and sin are correlative, and it is

in the light of God's moral law that evil is *recognized as sin*," and yet that "the essence of sin lies in its not being regulated by conscience," he is obliged to add that "as the power of conscience lies in the divine authority speaking through it, sin would ultimately be traceable to ungodliness, want of regard to God and his law." This seems to make "the *work* of the law" just the law itself "written on the heart," so that sin through the conscience, rather than the commandment, becomes exceedingly sinful, and this with the "Gentiles who have no law."

American readers will note with interest that God's wrath for sin is not treated as a form or modification of love, but as flowing from justice, —not the broadest view, perhaps, for does not sin collide with more than justice in God?—while it leads to punishment by use of more than natural consequences; that he does not decide whether the punishment is everlasting penal suffering or extinction of conscious being, the latter implying natural immortality; that the universal phenomena of sin, acutely and closely thought out, are denied to be traceable to any one psychological principle, such as sensuality or selfishness, or explicable by the hypothesis of evolution. Of course, so conscientious a thinker and so able a student of the Bible does not see in the Fall an advance in moral progress, a fall uphill, or question the reality of Satan, or the permanent ongoing consequences of the first sin. "It is hard to conceive of any moral injury to human nature in any one part that would not somehow affect the whole." The view of moral inability so familiar to New England thought, along with natural ability to do right towards God, is maintained, and draws into discussion the will, freedom, "formal and real," heritable tendencies to wrong, while Realism, Creationism, Traducianism, Imputation, Mediate and Immediate,—marked by "exaggerated importance and overminute definition," are relegated to the limbo of extrabiblical and unsettled philosophy. Natural and necessary inferences from Scripture are recognized as properly doctrinal, while those founded on incidental statements in the Bible are discountenanced. The covenant with Abram is allowed only as tacit. "The transaction ('federal headship') is not perfectly analogous to those in which communities or nations have to bear the penalty of actions done by representatives chosen or commissioned by themselves. The notion of a covenant unity and representation of all mankind by the first man does not by itself remove the difficulty arising from their having to suffer the consequences of his sin." Some excellent remarks on the "elements of hope in man's sinful state" conclude this well-wrought and suggestive little treatise.

CHRESTOMATHY OF ARABIC PROSE-PIECES. By Dr. R. Brünnow. *Porta Linguarum Orientalium* edidit Herm. L. Strack. Pars XVI. Berlin: Reuther and Reichard. 1895. (Pp. x, 312. 5½x3¾.)

This is the fourth volume which the series offers upon the Arabic language. Socin's Arabic Grammar (vol. iv.) has been enlarged for its third edition, and the prose texts which had been included in earlier edi-

tions are omitted in consequence. This *Crestomathy* is prepared as an exercise book to be used in connection with the grammar. The selection which the compiler has made from the literature suitable for this philological purpose, has been with a view to introduce the student to Arabic prose literature, and also to furnish him with a summary of the important events of Arabian history. He has, therefore, covered the range of literature from legendary narratives down to the eighth century.

To these historical texts he adds three selections from the *Kitābu-l-Agānī*, which gives notices of their principal poets with selections from their writings, and three suras from the Koran.

There is a full glossary, an appendix giving the genealogy of the Kuraishites, and a chronological table from 622 to 749 A. D.

MANUAL OF GEOLOGY: Treating of the Principles of the Science, with Special Reference to American Geological History. By James D. Dana, Professor Emeritus of Geology and Mineralogy in Yale University. Illustrated by over Fifteen Hundred and Seventy-five Figures in the Text, and two Double-page Maps. Fourth edition. New York, Cincinnati, Chicago: American Book Company; London: Trübner & Co. 1895. (Pp. 1087. 7½x4½.) \$5.00.

The first edition of this great work was briefly reviewed in the *BIBLIOTHECA SACRA* for January, 1863, in which it was remarked, "This book forms an era in the progress of science, and we are the more pleased with it as an indication of returning vigor to the author after his recent illness." This fourth edition, entirely rewritten and brought down to date, no less distinctively marks an era in the progress of geology, and is a wonderful witness to the long-continued vigor and activity of the author's mind. For a long time to come, it would seem in vain to hope for a treatise upon this subject that should equal the present edition in clearness of statement, fullness of detail, orderliness of arrangement, and general soundness in the principles maintained; for it is scarcely to be hoped that many students will have at once the breadth of the author's knowledge of the subject, together with his wide acquaintance with investigators and long-continued experience in instructing others both in the classroom and through the press. The volume will be found equally valuable to the general reader and to the special student.

In the years 1856 and 1857, Professor Dana published four articles, in the *BIBLIOTHECA SACRA*, upon "Science and the Bible," in which were first enunciated some of the most important principles defended in the present volume. Now, as then, the author still infers, from the interpretation of Nature, "that the intervention of a Power above Nature was at the basis of Man's development," and "that the whole Universe is not merely dependent on, but actually is, the Will of one Supreme Intelligence," and that therefore "Nature, with Man as its culminant species, is no longer a mystery" (p. 1036). The whole volume, also, may be profitably read in justification of Professor Dana's views concerning the har-

mony of geology with the first chapter of Genesis, as published in the *BIBLIOTHECA SACRA* for April, 1885.

The author, while holding now to a system of evolution, places less reliance upon natural selection than Darwin did, and gives more prominence to the Lamarckian method:—

“The theory of natural selection is based on the assumption that variations come singly or nearly so, and that the selected are therefore few compared with the multitudes that disappear. The idea is derived from facts afforded by domesticated or cultivated races. But such races are in a large degree artificial products, selective methods carrying the individuals rapidly in the direction of the variation, and producing, in a few scores of generations, divergencies that in wild nature would require thousands of years.

“The structures are therefore in a strained or artificial state, and deteriorate when care ceases. But in wild nature variations are, in general, the slow and sure result of the conditions—the organic conditions on one side and the physical and biological on the other; they should occur, generally, in a large part of the associated individuals of a species; and being Nature-made, the results are permanent. When, therefore, a variation appears that admits of augmentation by continued interbreeding, progress should be general; and the unadaptable few should disappear, not the ‘multitudes.’

“Under such a system of evolution,—evolution by regional progress,—the causes of variation mentioned by Darwin are all real causes. But they act directly, after the Lamarckian method, without dependence for success on the principle of natural selection. Use and disuse, labor, strife, physical changes or conditions, and organic influences act as such, and have their direct effects” (pp. 1033–1034).

THE FIRST WORDS FROM GOD; or Truths made known in the First Two Chapters of His Holy Word, also, The Harmonizing of the Records of the Resurrection Morning. By Francis W. Upham, LL.D., author of “The Church and Science,” “The Wise Men,” “The Star of Our Lord,” “Thoughts on the Gospels,” and “St. Matthew’s Witness.” New York: Hunt & Eaton; Cincinnati: Cranston & Curtis. 1894. (Pp. 159. 5¼x3.) 85 cents.

Dr. Upham is a great admirer of the writings of the late Tayler Lewis, and presents in this little volume an interesting defense of that author’s interpretation of the first chapters of Genesis. Dr. Upham maintains that the Bible proves the unity of nature even more clearly than science is able to do. Out of “infinite formless force” he thinks there is described in Genesis the creation (which could only proceed from spirit) of force, which has form; light, which involves motion, and finally life, whose secret eludes the grasp of physical and metaphysical science. The volume is the result of much profound thinking, and well deserves perusal.

GENESIS AND SEMITIC TRADITION. By John D. Davis, Ph. D., Professor of Semitic Philosophy and Old Testament in the Theological Seminary at Princeton, N. J. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1894. (Pp. 150. $6\frac{1}{4} \times 3\frac{1}{2}$.) \$1.50.

These essays make a very useful volume, and deserve the attention of those who are strongly opposed to the doctrine of the inerrancy of the Scriptures as it is held by the dominant majority of the Presbyterian Church in America at the present time. The point to be specially noticed is, that those who maintain the doctrine of plenary inspiration do so by exercising great liberality in the interpretation of difficult passages. They are as far as possible from being mere literalists. To them, as to others, the Bible *is* what the Bible *means*.

Fourteen subjects are treated in the present volume, among which are "The Creation of the Universe," "The Sabbath," "The Creation of Man," "The Helpmeet for Man," "The Serpent of the Temptation," "The Deluge," and "The Tower of Babel." The essays are accompanied by thirteen elegant illustrations reproducing the most important Babylonian tablets bearing upon the texts. The reasonable liberality employed in interpretation appears notably in the chapter on "The Helpmeet for Man," which the author is inclined to think may be a vision like that which Paul had when he "knew not whether he was in the body or out of the body." Under this view the account is simply a "method employed by God to reveal to man those truths regarding woman upon which the moral relations rest. In a symbolic manner man is taught that woman is one blood with him, that she equally with him is the handiwork of God, that she was created for the man, was committed unto him by God, and has her place by inherent right at man's side as help and companion" (p. 53).

THE COMPREHENSIVE TEACHERS' BIBLE: with Revised Helps and a New Concordance, and an Indexed Bible Atlas. London: S. Bagster & Sons; New York: James Pott & Co. (Minion type, pp. 585, 188, 305. $7\frac{1}{2} \times 4\frac{1}{2}$.)

THE HOLY BIBLE: With The Cambridge Companion to the Bible. London: C. U. Clay & Sons; New York: James Pott & Co. (Minion type, pp. 998, 412. $7 \times 4\frac{1}{2}$.)

We welcome these new Teachers' Bibles. They are well printed and bound. Their maps are clear, and those of the Cambridge Bible are new. The type in the Bagster "Helps" is clear and large, and the helps have been revised and improved. Perhaps the most marked improvement is in the concordance, which in the previous editions of the Bagster, so excellent in other ways, was so condensed as to be a frequent disappointment. We have tested the new concordance with satisfactory results. The Bagster is a general favorite already, and will find increased popularity in view of these improvements. The Cambridge has a handsome page, is of convenient size, and has a new clasp, dispensing with the band.

Its helps are the work of such scholars as Drs. Ryle, Perowne, Lumby, Murray, Davidson, Robertson Smith, and Watson. Its maps show the results of the latest surveys. And with all these improvements, the scale of prices is low, when the quality of the work, both literary and mechanical, is considered.

STUDIES IN BIBLICAL ARCHÆOLOGY. By Joseph Jacobs, Corresponding Member of the Royal Academy of History, Madrid. New York: Macmillan & Co. 1894. (Pp. 184. 5½x3¾.) \$1.00.

This is a collection of Essays which have appeared from time to time during the past ten years. They show much learning, and well repay perusal. The author insists, with justice, that in biblical criticism more attention should be paid to what may be called "survivals," that is, to the customs which originated under conditions of society long since passed, and have survived amid the new conditions. What is called the Junior Right in Genesis, that is, the right of younger members of the family to inheritance, is believed by the author to "account for the existence in Genesis of almost all the so-called 'immoral' narratives of the book, and would thus throw more light on the composition of the latter part of the book than any amount of literary analysis" can do (p. 22).

CANONICAL AND UNCANONICAL GOSPELS. With a Translation of the Recently Discovered Fragment of the Gospel of Peter, and a Selection from the Sayings of Our Lord not found in the Four Gospels. By W. E. Barnes, B. D., Fellow of Peterhouse, and Theological Lecturer at Clare College, Cambridge. London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co. 1893. (Pp. xii, 112. 5x3.)

This is a very effective presentation of the documentary evidence for the genuineness and authority of the four Gospels. The argument proceeds in general upon the old lines so ably followed by Westcott, and presents with convincing force the new evidence from the "Gospel of Peter," giving proper attention also to the recent discussions concerning the uncanonical Gospels and the uncanonical sayings of our Lord. The conclusion arrived at by the author is that "we find no trace whatever of Gospels substantially different from our own" (p. 83). The work is worthy of highest commendation.

THE TRIAL AND DEATH OF JESUS CHRIST: A Devotional History of our Lord's Passion. By James Stalker, D. D. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1894. (Pp. xv, 321. 5½x3¾.) \$1.50.

The wide popularity of Dr. Stalker's small volume on "The Life of Jesus Christ" will make the present one specially acceptable to the reading public. It fully sustains his reputation for simple statement and clear discussion of the many questions relating to the personal life of Christ. It unites in a remarkable degree scholarly ability and devout appreciation of the deep meaning of all the details connected with the last hours of the Saviour's life on earth.

CHRISTIANITY AND EVOLUTION. By James Iverach, D. D., Professor of Apologetics and Exegesis of the Gospels in the Free Church College, Aberdeen. New York: Thomas Whittaker. 1894. (Pp. 232. 5½x3.) \$1.25.

This volume belongs to "The Theological Educator" series, which is edited by Rev. W. Robertson Nicoll, editor of *The Expositor*. It concedes the most essential claims of evolution, but declares the attempt to follow the development of mind from the lower animals up to man an impossible task. The work is critical rather than constructive, and cautions against rash and wholesale acceptance of theories in advance of proof. The work is well done; but a more positive treatment of the question, which assumed less previous familiarity with the subject, with less attention to controverted points, and more to what may fairly be considered as established, would have made a more serviceable volume for this excellent series.

CHRIST THE CENTRAL EVIDENCE OF CHRISTIANITY. By the Rev. Principal Cairns, D. D. New York, Chicago, and Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Co. (5½x3.) \$1.00.

This volume consists of six separate tracts, bound together, making altogether 294 pages. Their titles are: "Christianity and Miracles at the Present Day," "Christ, the Central Evidence of Christianity," "The Success of Christianity and Modern Explanations of It," "Present State of Christian Argument from Prophecy," "Is the Evolution of Christianity from Mere Natural Sources Credible?" "Argument for Christianity from the Experience of Christians." The tracts are all conservative in character, and contain a very clear and convincing presentation of the ordinary lines of argument in support of the supernatural claims of the Bible.

CHRISTIANITY AND THE CHRIST: A Study of Christian Evidences. By Bradford Paul Raymond, D. D., President of the Wesleyan University, Middletown, Conn. New York: Hunt & Eaton; Cincinnati: Cranston & Curtis. 1894. (Pp. x, 250. 4¾x2¾.) 85 cents.

Dr. Raymond's presentation of the Christian evidences is clear and convincing, taking into account all the most recent objections and presenting with much force the new external evidence which has been brought to light in recent years. The volume will be most helpful to the more inquiring minds among lay readers.

OUTLINE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OF THE BIBLE. By David Allen Reed, Instructor in the School for Christian Workers, Springfield, Mass. New York and Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Co. (Pp. 107. 5½x3.) 75 cents.

A concise, comprehensive, and most convenient handbook for the systematic instruction of Bible classes in the doctrines of the Bible. It is also recommended by the fact that it has proved itself successful by a long use previous to publication.

BIBLE CLASS EXPOSITIONS. By Alexander Maclaren, D.D. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1894. (5 $\frac{3}{4}$ x 3 $\frac{3}{4}$.) \$1.00 per volume. *The Gospel of St. Matthew*. In two volumes. (Pp. vii, 255; vii, 238.) *The Gospel of St. Mark*. (Pp. viii, 247.)

These volumes were written for the *Sunday-School Times* and form a very convenient and valuable commentary on the first two Gospels. They are evangelical in spirit and sufficiently thorough to be of permanent value.

NEW VOLUMES OF THE EXPOSITOR'S BIBLE.¹

Six new volumes of this series are before us. Dr. Watson's² point of view is well shown in the following extracts from his Introduction:—

"It has been said that 'the inspired condition would seem to be one which produces a generous indifference to pedantic accuracy in matters of fact, and a supreme absorbing concern about the moral and religious significance of facts.' If the former part of this statement were true, the historical books of the Bible, and, we may say, in particular the Book of Numbers would deserve no attention as history. But nothing is more striking in a survey of our book than the clear unhesitating way in which incidents are set forth, even where moral and religious ends could not be much served by the detail that is freely used. . . . No writer could be inspired and at the same time indifferent to accuracy. If there is one thing more than another on which we may rely, it is that the authors of these books of Scripture have done their very utmost by careful inquiry and recension to make their account of what took place in the wilderness full and precise. Absolute sincerity and scrupulous carefulness are essential conditions for dealing successfully with moral and religious themes; and we have all evidence that the compilers had these qualities" (pp. 13, 14, 15).

Canon Farrar's Second Kings³ next attracts attention. The vigor and directness of his volume on First Kings are not lacking here. In the first chapter he plunges into questions of criticism and Old Testament ethics quite up to the depth of the ordinary reader. David's smiting of the Moabites is characterized as "one of the horrible atrocities against which the ill-instructed conscience of men in those days of ignorance did not revolt." The statement that Elijah received his commands from "the angel of the Lord," he says, "may only be the recognized phrase of the prophetic schools, putting in a concrete and vivid form the voice of inward inspiration." The ethics of Elijah's calling down the fire to consume the host sent to apprehend him is treated from the standpoint of Christ's words with which he heads the chapter, "Ye know not what manner of

¹ Edited by the Rev. W. Robertson Nicoll. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. \$1.50 per volume.

² The Book of Numbers. By Robert A. Watson. 1894. Pp. 414.

³ The Second Book of Kings. By F. W. Farrar, D. D., F. R. S. Pp. 496.

spirit ye are of," and, finally, while the story is regarded as having an historic kernel, the commentator follows the opinions of "the great students and critics of Germany, to whom we are indebted for the flood of light which their researches have thrown on the sacred page" and who "with almost consentient voice regard these details of this story as legendary." This treatment certainly has the merit of not halting between two opinions, but the length to which it goes will surprise some readers.

Professor Bennett's exposition of Chronicles¹ is quite in line with Professor Adeney's work on Ezra and Nehemiah in the same series. It dates the work between 300 and 250 B. C., and says of its material that it "is of a very mixed character, partly borrowed from the older historical books, partly taken down from late tradition, and partly constructed according to the current philosophy of history."

Dr. Maclaren² finishes the Psalms with the same careful scholarship and deep sympathy with the book to which we have already called attention in noticing the previous two volumes.³

The reader will be somewhat surprised that Dr. Marcus Dods, who so sensibly treated of First Corinthians, does not also treat of the Second Epistle.⁴ However, Rev. James Denney, who writes this exposition, is already favorably known to the readers of this series from his treatment of Thessalonians, and has given here a careful and practical discussion of the subjects covered by this epistle.

Mr. Moule's exposition of Romans⁵ is more of a commentary than most of the volumes which have preceded it. The text is given in bold-faced type, and runs down the page, interspersed with comments which the eye at once separates from the text.

These volumes complete the New Testament, and bring the end of the Old into sight.

SERMONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL SUNDAY-SCHOOL LESSONS FOR 1895.
By the Monday Club. Twentieth Series. Boston and Chicago:
Congregational Sunday-School and Publishing Society. 1894. (Pp. 383.
6½x3¾.) \$1.25.

Notwithstanding frequent pastoral changes, the Monday Club maintains its continuity, and continues to present what we believe is really the most valuable series of commentaries upon the Sunday-school lessons. To the present volume twenty-four different persons have made contributions.

¹ The Books of Chronicles. By W. H. Bennett, M. A. Pp. 464.

² The Psalms. By A. Maclaren, D. D. Vol. III. Psalms xc.-cl. Pp. 461.

³ Bib. Sac., Vols. I. p. 557; li. pp. 716, 717.

⁴ The Second Epistle to the Corinthians. By Rev. James Denney, B.D. Pp. 387.

⁵ The Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans. By Handley C. G. Moule, M. A. Pp. 437.

MASTER AND MEN; or, The Sermon on the Mountain Practiced on the Plain. By William Burnet Wright; author of "Ancient Cities" and "The World to Come." Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1894. (Pp. 240. 5x2½.) \$1.25.

These brief discourses are models in style, and are full of good thought, sound doctrine, and generous sympathy with mankind. Having once begun to read the volume, one will find it difficult to lay it down until it is finished.

ST. PAUL AND WOMAN; or, Paul's Requirement of Woman's Silence in Churches Reconciled with Woman's Modern Practice of Speaking in Churches. By Rev. Wm. DeLoss Love, D. D., Hartford, Conn. Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Co. 1894. (Pp. 144. 5½x3.) 75 cents.

A considerable portion of this small volume appeared as an article in the *BIBLIOTHECA SACRA* for January, 1878. At that time it attracted much attention, and it has had much influence in shaping the opinion of Congregationalists upon the subject in recent years. We welcome it in its present enlarged and greatly enriched form. It deserves a wide circulation.

THE ONE RELIGION: Truth, Holiness and Peace Desired by the Nations and Revealed in Jesus Christ. By John Wordsworth, D. D., Bishop of Salisbury. Second edition. London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co. 1893. (Pp. 406. 5½x3½.)

The Bampton Lectures of 1881 were received with favor when first given to the public, and now appear in a new edition without essential change. They are strong, conservative lectures on comparative religion, and will continue to be read with profit.

PHILOSOPHY AND DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION: Being the Gifford Lectures delivered before the University of Edinburgh, 1894. By Otto Pfeiderer, D. D., Professor of Theology, University of Berlin. In two volumes. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons; Edinburgh: W. Blackwood & Sons. 1894. (Pp. 331, 356. 5½x3½.) \$5.00.

If these lectures were translated from the German, and had been delivered from the lecturer's own chair in Berlin, they would have attracted comparatively little attention; but their delivery in Edinburgh has occasioned no little surprise and the expression of more than one opinion. Principal Rainey, Professor Orr, Dr. A. A. Charteris, and Professor Marcus Dods have issued a small volume in reply to their naturalism, and many voices have been raised in tones of earnest dissent from some of the views which they contain.

Barring their elimination of the supernatural, there is much in the lectures that commands admiration. It is not every German who writes in as good English as Professor Pfeiderer uses. The style is pleasant. In spite of the dogmatism of his rationalism, he has a pleasant way of putting things. There is much that is suggestive in his treatment of the several topics which come up for consideration; and, withal, he is thor-

oughly loyal to Christianity, not as a supernatural system, but as the flower of what may be called—though Pfeiderer would not so call it—natural religion. His spirit is well illustrated by the following:—

"In obedience to God man finds his true freedom; out of the humility which overcomes itself there grows the courage of the trust which overcomes the world. The more, in any religion, these two sides of humility and trust, surrender and elevation, dependence and freedom, come to full and harmonious realization, so much the more does it correspond to the essence of religion, and so much the more does it realize fellowship with its infinite ideal implanted in the essence of human spirit. In this we have the criterion by which we are able to estimate the relative value of the historical religions, and by which we can understand the law of their teleological development. Hence we shall no longer seek 'natural religion' in the rude beginnings of history, and just as little in meager abstractions from actual religion, which have never been actual; but we shall find them where religion has historically unveiled its true nature, as it alone corresponds to the essence of man, namely, in Christianity."

There is much in these two volumes with which we find ourselves unable to agree. The author's thorough elimination of the supernatural seems to leave us with an effect greater than its immediate cause. Nor can we agree with the suppressed premise of rationalistic theology, that an investigation without presuppositions involves, of necessity, an assumption that the supernatural is to be discredited. But we commend the work for its candor, for its scholarship, and for its spirit. It is thoughtful and thorough, and will be quoted and discussed for a long while.

GOD'S CITY, AND THE COMING OF THE KINGDOM. By the Rev. Henry Scott Holland, M.A., Canon and Precentor of St. Paul's Cathedral. London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co. 1894. (Pp. 342. 5x3.)

This volume contains four sermons on the Church, and an appended series of discourses on the parables. It is the first four sermons that give to the book its title. The author recognizes all baptized Christians as in "God's City," yet deplors the fact that so few are within what he calls the original circuit of its walls; he would be glad to have them within, but the foundations of the city must not be changed. This and the tenor of the book seem to mean (for the constant use of the figure of a city makes him a trifle obscure) that the Episcopal Church invites a reunion of Christendom, and will wait where she is for it. We do not think it will come to her upon these terms.

We find no fault with the aim and spirit of the discourses. Their sectarianism is not offensively prominent. Their style is too rhetorical for a book, but may well have been effective when the lectures were delivered. Their matter, though it adds nothing important to what had

previously been written, no doubt proved edifying to the congregation that listened to them, but we see no special reason for their publication in book form. If such a reason existed, the lectures should have undergone a thorough revision, making the argument more concrete, and the objective points more apparent.

Theologically there are one or two rather startling things; such as "Faith is inconceivable as a lonely act of a solitary soul" (p. 21). This which is one reason given for the existence of a society of the faithful, is to us a most astounding statement. Faith is personal, always and of necessity, and the great examples of faith are those in which solitude has been a most conspicuous feature.

THE PURPOSE OF GOD. By Joseph Smith, M. D., D. D. Boston: Universalist Publishing House. 1894. (Pp. 257. 5½x3¼.) \$1.00.

This is a thoughtful, earnest attempt to set forth the teachings of the Universalists of the present time, not with respect to that in which they differ from other Christian bodies, but in the general spirit of their teachings. The effort is to exalt the character of God. It is reverent and conservative, and, barring that which is distinctly Universalistic, which forms no great portion of the book, will find a ready assent among Christians of many names but a common faith.

PROTESTANT MISSIONS: Their Rise and Early Progress. Lectures by A. C. Thompson, author of "Moravian Missions," etc., etc. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1894. (Pp. vii, 314. 5½x3¼.) \$1.75.

All students of missions will welcome this volume, both for its breadth of view and its fullness of information upon the subject treated. It forms a fitting supplement to the author's previous volumes on "Foreign Missions: Their Place in the Pastorate, in Prayer, in Conferences," and "Moravian Missions." No one is better fitted than Dr. Thompson to prepare such a volume, and the work has been done with rare skill and success.

THE CHRISTIAN MINISTRY: Its Present Claim and Attraction. By Theodore C. Pease, Bartlett Professor of Sacred Rhetoric in Andover Theological Seminary. With an Introduction by Prof. Egbert C. Smyth, D. D. Edited by "The Fortnightly Club." Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. (Pp. 190. 5½x3.) \$1.25.

A melancholy interest attaches to this handsome and attractive book, the tribute of a company of friends to the memory of a companion, a man of rare scholarship and spirit. Mr. Pease was called from his unusually successful pastorate at Malden, Mass., to the chair of Homiletics in Andover. He had hardly taken his seat when he was taken away by death. The address which he delivered at his inaugural, with an essay on Dante, is included in the contents. Quite apart from this personal reason, the contents of the volume amply justify its publication, and we wish it a large sale.

STUDIES IN ORIENTAL SOCIAL LIFE, and Gleams from the East on the Sacred Page. By H. Clay Trumbull, author of "Kadesh-Barnea," "The Blood Covenant," etc. Philadelphia: John D. Wattles & Co. 1894. (Pp. 437. 5¼x3½.) \$2.50.

In this volume, Dr. Trumbull has collected an immense mass of information concerning the social customs of the East, which shed light upon the interpretation of the Bible. It is written in simple and pleasing style, and is lightened up all along by anecdotes drawn from his own wide experience in Oriental travel. Few books of the season are at once more attractive and useful than this.

TRAVELS IN THREE CONTINENTS. Europe, Africa, Asia. By J. M. Buckley, LL.D. New York: Hunt & Eaton; Cincinnati: Cranston & Curtis. 1895. (Pp. xviii, 614. 6¾x3¾.) \$3.50.

In this sumptuous and highly illustrated volume, Dr. Buckley takes the reader from New York through Spain, Northern Africa, Italy, Egypt, Palestine, and Asia Minor to Constantinople. The volume is enriched by no less than eighty-five full-paged illustrations reproduced from excellent photographs. The plan of the author has been to introduce into the running narrative the information which the tourist most wishes to have at hand to appreciate the scenes through which he passes. The volume is written in a most interesting style, and is equally valuable for home reading and for a place in the traveler's hand bag. It is enriched by forty pages of index.

PAPERS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CHURCH HISTORY. Vol. VI. Report and Papers of the Annual Meeting, held in New York City, December 27 and 28, 1893. Edited by Rev. Samuel Macauley Jackson, M. A., Secretary. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1894. (Pp. xxx, 224. 6¾x3¾.)

The volumes of the American Church History Society form a serial of increasing value, and embody much material not elsewhere accessible. The present one is of special interest for its extended memorials of the late Dr. Philip Schaff, to which thirty-six pages are devoted. Among other important contributions there is one by Professor McGiffert upon the lately discovered "Gospel of Peter," with a very full bibliography of the discussions concerning it. The author does not agree with those who regard the work as "Docetic" in its character. His views upon this point are presented with much fullness and cogency.

RECORD BOOKS.

Not a few of our church officers are sadly negligent concerning the matter of records. Many clerks are inexperienced, and pastors remain, on an average, few years in a place. One who has had occasion to look over the history of a church of even twenty years' standing learns to place a new estimate upon the value of even the simplest records. Many who have occasion to keep records do not know how much they might be helped by the use of prepared record books, such as are available and in-

expensive. We take pleasure in calling attention to some of the best of which we know.

THE PILGRIM CHURCH REGISTER¹ is arranged for large and for small churches, with pages, more or less, according to the need of the church. It records the names of pastors, deacons, and other officers, with dates of beginning and close of service, delegates, baptisms, members received and dismissed, marriages, charities and expenses, with summaries of annual reports for twenty-four years. If the church clerk would keep such a book, aside from his record of church meetings, it would lighten his labors, and contribute to his efficiency.

The same publishers have just issued a book for the church treasurer. It is arranged to record the names of contributors with amounts pledged, and other information, and then in a separate list to keep an account by individuals and by Sundays, with weekly totals and quarterly balances. In this account, no names appear, but the numbers refer to names in the first list. The method is simple and free from all serious objection. It is especially designed for churches with the weekly offering system. It is the best book of its kind.

For Sunday-school work, the same publishers issue a convenient book in which the secretary tabulates the epitomized reports from teachers class-books, a complete and inexpensive book for one year's work, a roll-book, designed to last ten years or more and to furnish at once information concerning any scholar in the school, but not designed for weekly entries, and a library record arranged for libraries of small or large size, with a simple and effective system of keeping track of the books of the school for a year. We have examined these books with care, and commend them.

The minister also must have record books, and thereby hangs many a tale of disappointment and chagrin. Diaries soon bury an event so deeply under the *débris* of later happenings that to find it readily becomes almost impossible, and other plans have their disadvantages. Our experience is that it is impossible to combine a day-book and ledger so as to meet fully a pastor's needs. A vest-pocket diary with space for addresses and other memoranda is almost a necessity, and its items may be, and should be, given permanent record elsewhere. THE PASTOR'S LEDGER² is what its title claims for it. There is space for a complete record of sermons, number, date, text, title, with Scripture reading, hymns, psalm, and other information, prayer meetings, parish calls, miscellaneous addresses, benevolences, marriages, baptisms, funerals, important events, and church directory. It is very complete, and will give satisfaction to all who use it. The price is low, and the book will prove a good investment to any minister who has not already a satisfactory record.

¹ Boston and Chicago: Congregational Sunday-School and Publishing Society.

² By F. A. Blackmer. New York: E. B. Treat. \$2.50.

Finally, every man should keep a family record. Each generation owes it to those that are to follow to keep such facts as may be of service to them. With a little care and effort almost any man can make a worthy beginning of what will prove to him an interesting pastime, and to those that are to follow a most valuable source of information. Here, as elsewhere, a suitable book of record is almost a *sine qua non*. Some two years ago, the writer of this notice, after a careful examination of such books as were then published, discarded the one in which he had made his previous records, and used one arranged and published by Rev. F. W. Bailey. A new edition of this work¹ has just been issued, retaining all the advantages, and correcting the mistakes, of the first edition. One may here record, in regular and perfect order, whatever facts, few or many, he can obtain concerning seven generations of his ancestors in all lines, direct and collateral. For additional generations, in the case of those who are able to trace some lines farther, the supplementary pages are a great improvement over the first edition, as the added sheets do not cover the perforations in the pages. There is blank space for photographs, newspaper clippings, references to books, etc. The book is incomparably the best of its kind.

The writer has not attempted to speak of different books of a kind, but only to mention what he believes to be the best of each kind. This he believes to be true of each of the above-mentioned books.

SOME GOOD BOOKS FOR SUNDAY-SCHOOL LIBRARIES.

The Congregational Sunday-School and Publishing Society is doing much to raise the standard of Sunday-school literature, and is adding to its list of stories some of exceptional interest, as well as biographies and works of travel attractive and of solid value. Rev. C. C. Tracy's *TALKS ON THE VERANDA OF A FARAWAY LAND* is an excellent guide-book to Turkey. Mary O. Nutting's *THE LAST DAYS OF PRINCE MAURICE* is a very good history of the Netherland War, and is well timed in view of the increasing interest in the history of the Dutch, and the influence of the Netherlands upon early American life and thought. A biography of *FATHER EELLS* deserves more than the passing mention which we are able to give it, both for the character of the man, and the merit of the biography.

Cushing Eells was a man who was always held in high honor by his associates upon the Pacific coast, from his first crossing of the Rocky Mountains in 1838 until his death in 1892. He was a man of great vigor of body and mind, a shrewd Yankee in practical affairs, but, above all, a man of unstinting liberality and high Christian devotion. It was his character which made the greatest impress upon those for whom he labored, whether Indians or whites, whether as a teacher or as a preacher. The

¹ *The Record of My Ancestry*. By F. W. Bailey, New Haven, Conn. \$3.00.

story of his life has been told by his son in such a way as to bring out the marked traits of his character. Our country owes much to the band of missionaries who saved Oregon and Washington to the United States, both for their political and for their social services. Among these missionaries the name of Cushing Eells stands next to that of the martyr Whitman.

His life should become familiar to both young and old.

HISTORY FOR READY REFERENCE. From the Best Historians, Biographers, and Specialists. Their Own Words in a Complete System of History. By J. N. Larned. With Numerous Historical Maps by Alan C. Reiley. In five volumes. Springfield, Mass.: The C. A. Nichols Co.; Boston: Charles Jacobus. 1894. Vol. I, A—Elba, pp. xxxi, 768; Vol. II, El Dorado—Greaves, pp. 795; Vol. III, Greece—Nibelungen Lied, pp. 793. 8¼x5. Sold by Subscription only.

A new work of reference by an experienced librarian, whose plan has met, in advance of publication, the approval and commendation of some of the best historians in the country, may well attract the attention of students and librarians. The plan of the work differs little, at first glance, from that of an ordinary encyclopedia. The difference, however, is marked, and consists in this, that the articles are compilations from standard works of history, frequently abridged and rarely paraphrased, but usually in the exact language of the original writer, with reference to volume and page, the whole being woven, as a rule with better success than would seem possible, into a continuous narrative. The number of eminent authors who have consented to having their works thus used, is in itself much to the credit of the plan.

The space at our disposal is altogether too short to enable us to go into the work at length: but the plan of the work will appear if we indicate the sources of a portion of a single article,—*Christianity*. This contains thirty-six double-column pages and a double-page map, and closes with the tenth century, leaving the remaining history to be sought under cross-references. The periods are indicated by bold-faced type. The article begins with a quotation from H. W. Hurlbert's paper on "The Historical Geography of the Christian Church," from the papers of the American Church History Society, which is followed by a paragraph on the Jews in the time of Christ, quoted from Edersheim. The next is from Lechler's "Apostolic and Post-Apostolic Times," and following this are notes from Sabatier's "The Apostle Paul," Heard's "Alexandrian and Carthaginian Theology," Lightfoot's "Apostolic Age," and Harnack's "History of Dogma." This introduction brings us down to the period of Apostolic Christianity. The period 33–111 B. C. is treated with extracts from Lechler, Lightfoot, Moeller, De Pressensé, Wiltsch, Plummer, Dolinger, Ramsay, Fisher, Weiss, G. B. Brown, Sabatier, Neander, and Edersheim; fresh works like Ramsay's "The Church in the Roman Empire" being freely quoted, and the article throughout showing an acquaintance with a wide range of literature, recent and standard. In cementing to-

gether this mosaic, the author uses less than half a column of original matter. Thus the article becomes not a treatise merely, but a guide-book and a bibliography. It is good for ready reference, and will assist in guiding to the sources.

The maps and "logical outlines" which constitute the chief original feature of the work are, in these first three volumes, well suited to the articles which they accompany, and will add much to their value. The ingenuity of the plan, the success of its execution, and the rapidity with which the volumes issue from the press alike challenge admiration. It will find its way instantly into the best libraries, and will soon stand among the foremost of our standard works of reference.

THE HOME LIFE OF THE ANCIENT GREEKS. Translated from the German of Professor H. Blümner by Alice Zimmern. New York: The Cassell Publishing Co. (Pp. 548. 6x3½.)

THE PRIVATE LIFE OF THE ROMANS. By Harriet Waters Preston and Louise Dodge. Boston: Leach, Shewell & Sanborn. (Pp. 167. 5½ x3¼.)

Professor Blümner's work is one of the best aids to classical study in the German language, and there is good reason to be glad that it has been made available for English-speaking readers. The translator has done her work well,—the better that she has not slavishly followed the original, but has given us the thought in good readable English. The illustrations are numerous and excellent, and the whole work is admirably issued.

The essay on "The Private Life of the Romans" is an original work, but is based on the encyclopedic work of Marquardt and Mommsen, "Handbuch der Römischen Alterthümer; Siebenter Band, Privatleben der Römer," published in Leipzig in 1886. The material has been greatly condensed, and the book is a small one, but contains a large amount of information, and will be valuable to students. It is well illustrated.

That both these works should come to us from the pen of English women is a coincidence worth notice.

THE CHAUTAUQUA BOOKS FOR 1894-95.

The new set of Chautauqua books is already in the hands of a large number of readers.¹ The five volumes of this series are of uniform size, as well as binding, and make a much more handsome appearance on the shelf than in some previous years. The publishers are now happily at a stage of their work which permits the selection for republication, from year to year, of those books which have proved best adapted to the needs of their wide circle of readers. Professor Henry A. Beers' **FROM CHAUCER TO TENNYSON** is reissued without change, so far as we have noticed, excepting that illustrations are added. Professor Alexander Winchell's

¹ The Chautauqua-Century Press, Meadville, Pa. \$5.00 a set.

WALKS AND TALKS IN THE GEOLOGICAL FIELD comes out revised and edited by Professor Frederick Starr. Professor W. H. Goodyear, whose works on Art have proved so popular, contributes a volume on THE RENAISSANCE AND MODERN ART, with profuse illustrations, brought down to the close of the World's Fair. Professors Coman and Kendall of Wellesley give a clear narrative of THE GROWTH OF THE ENGLISH NATION, and Professor H. P. Judson has a vigorous and discriminating volume on EUROPE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. It is encouraging to learn that the year of hard times has affected but little the prosperity of the Chautauqua Course, and the fact is less surprising when the quality of the reading furnished is considered.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

- ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES: an Attempt to Treat Some Religious Questions in a Scientific Spirit. By the Ven. James M. Wilson, M. A., late Headmaster of Clifton College; Vicar of Rochdale; Archdeacon of Manchester. New York: Macmillan & Co. 1894. (Pp. 262. $5\frac{3}{4} \times 3\frac{3}{4}$.) \$1.00.
- LECTURES ON THE RELIGION OF THE SEMITES. By the late W. Robertson Smith, M. A., LL.D., Professor of Arabic in the University of Cambridge. New edition, revised throughout by the author. New York: Macmillan & Co. 1894. (Pp. xiv, 507. $6\frac{3}{4} \times 3\frac{3}{4}$.) \$4.00.
- A SHORT HISTORY OF SYRIAC LITERATURE. By the late William Wright, LL.D., Professor of Arabic in the University of Cambridge. New York: Macmillan & Co. 1894. (Pp. 296. $5\frac{1}{2} \times 3$.) \$2.25.
- THE PROBLEM OF RELIGIOUS PROGRESS. By Daniel Dorchester, D.D. Revised edition, with new tables and colored diagrams. New York: Hunt & Eaton; Cincinnati: Cranston & Curtis. 1895. (Pp. 768. $5\frac{3}{4} \times 3\frac{3}{4}$.) \$2.75.
- A SKETCH OF THE LIFE OF REV. JOSEPH HARDY NEESIMA, LL.D., President of Theology in Doshisha University. With many illustrations. New York, Chicago, and Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Co. 1894. (Pp. 156. $5\frac{3}{4} \times 3\frac{1}{2}$.) \$1.00.
- THE RELIGIONS OF JAPAN from the Dawn of History to the Era of Méiji. By William Elliot Griffis, D. D., formerly of the Imperial University of Tokio; author of "The Mikado's Empire" and "Corea, the Hermit Nation"; late lecturer on the Morse Foundation in Union Theological Seminary in New York. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1895. (Pp. xx, 457. $5\frac{3}{4} \times 3\frac{3}{4}$.) \$2.00.
- UNDER ORIENTAL SKIES; or, Asia Minor and Her Inhabitants. Descriptive, Historical, and Picturesque. By Antranig Azhderian. Cleveland: The Williams Publishing and Electric Co. 1894. (Pp. 277. 6×4 .)
- BACK TO THE OLD TESTAMENT FOR THE MESSAGE OF THE NEW: An Effort to connect more closely the Testaments; to which is added a series of Papers on Various Old Testament Books and Subjects. By Anson Bartie Curtis, B. D., Ph. D., Instructor in Hebrew in Tufts Divinity School. Boston: Universalist Publishing House. 1894 (Pp. 325. $5\frac{3}{4} \times 3\frac{3}{4}$.)

THE BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

CALVINISM: THE ORIGIN AND SAFEGUARD OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTIES.¹

BY THE REV. ABRAHAM KUYPER, D.D.

THE ability of a plant to live depends on the root from which it springs. He who would guarantee our liberty to us should know where it originated and be able to tell whence it came. This requires a simple knowledge of history; hence the character of this paper is purely scientific.

Our field of inquiry is determined by general and well-known facts. It needs no proof at our hand, that in com-

¹ Translated from the Dutch by the Rev. J. Hendrik de Vries, M.A., Bronxville, N. Y.

[The author here uses the word Calvinism in its broadest scope to signify the tendency, or life-principle, which makes the *Soli Deo Gloria* according to the Old and New Testament Scriptures comprehend all of life. This was the attitude assumed by the Church in Geneva; this is the attitude which the Reformed churches in the Netherlands strive to maintain in the face of the various isms of our times, all of which in lesser and greater degree tend to wrest the Scriptures away from under the feet of evangelical Christianity. And as natural outcome or consequence of this, there has been founded in Holland the Free University—1880—which claims the entire world of science (philosophy, medicine, law, and the arts) in willing and grateful subjection to the Absolute Authority of the Scriptures, by which the *Soli Deo Gloria* becomes the standard planted in every domain occupied by human research and thought. Of this whole tendency, Dr. Kuyper is the living exponent in our time.—TR.]

VOL. LII. NO. 207. 1

parison with Europe liberty has no name in Africa or Asia. In Europe no one will look for the cradle of liberty in Russia or in Turkey, in Spain or Austria. One would even hesitate to do this in Italy and the northern kingdoms, in Germany or France. Whoever, on the other hand, boasts of England, Holland, Switzerland, and America as being countries of political liberty, is assured of universal approval. These geographic lines coincide with the chronological. From Reformation times to the French Revolution, political liberty is claimed and tried almost exclusively by England, Holland, Switzerland, and America; and after the revolution of 1789 the acclimation of a still broader liberty has thus far been tried in vain outside of these four nations. There is good reason to extend to these four powers a special patent of fitness for political liberty. The origin of our liberty is not found outside of their domain.

Whence comes this favorable exception?

Bancroft, the celebrated historian of America, says: "The fanatic for Calvinism was a fanatic for liberty." De Tocqueville testifies: "America's liberty considers Christianity the guardian angel of her struggle and victory, the cradle of her life, the divine source of her right." In his recent work "*L'Angleterre politique et sociale*," Auguste Laugel declares, "The doctrinaires of France derived liberty from an idea. In England, however, religious liberty was mother of all political liberty. The Holy Bible has set the Englishman free, by making him submit to its Authority." Groen van Prinsteren, who also as an historian is a corypheus among us, wrote only recently that "In the Calvinistic Reformation according to the Holy Scriptures lies the origin and safeguard of these blessings, of which 1789 gave us the deceptive promise and the pitiable caricature."

Hence the origin of our liberty is found in Calvinism. This solution commends itself to us already by so much that in the four above-named countries the Reformation bore a se-

verely Calvinistic stamp, and was governed by Geneva. This is true of Switzerland and England, of Holland and America.

But this is not enough. The *propter hoc* may readily appear to differ from the *post hoc*, and our assertion will prove true only when the progress of Calvinism along the lines of its three stages—the French religious wars, the English Revolution, and the founding of America's Union, shows us indeed the development of those political liberties, of whose possession we are so justly proud. For this let us investigate.

But first a twofold observation.

Our Calvinists call themselves anti-revolutionists. How are we to understand this term? Is it right that this tendency be identified with the Prussian party of Stahl or the ultramontanic world party? In one way it certainly is. When the question is put: Whether the state can flourish without the root of the faith, our answer is the same with theirs. In opposition to the fundamental thought of the French Revolution, "to emancipate the creature from the Creator," they and we are one. If, on the other hand, it is held that from this common principle the self-same public law is derived by us all, then I insist on liquidation, and maintain for Calvinistic public law the independence which belongs to the Reformed life. Upon the basis of its Confession, Rome built a political system of its own, which, after the character of the hierarchy, was preponderantly monarchic. And Rome knew how to bring this system into practice. All the states of the Middle Ages were instituted in accordance with the theory of the two swords. It cannot be denied that in Rome was found the germ of a creative thought for public law. This was not the case with the Lutheran reformation, which reconstructed things, but which built nothing new. In Germany and in the northern empires the political life of the Middle Ages was simply continued after the Reformation, with Cæseropapism however, instead of the hierarchy, by the transposition

of spiritual authority from the Romish chair to the princely cabinet. Calvinism, on the other hand, was shown to possess the power, which the Lutheran reformation lacked, and has, even as Rome, derived from a principle of its own a system of its own for political life, which, even under the monarchic form, is always recognized by its republican character. Calvin achieved what Luther could not do: Calvin has founded nationalities. Our Union, the England of "the glorious revolution," the Scotland of the Covenant, the United States of America, are institutions of his spirit. Understand me well. I know that the Church of Rome, whenever it is required, is able to accommodate herself to every form of state; I know that before Reformation times the liberties of the people received homage in these countries; I know that learned Jesuits have been the advocates of democratic doctrines. At this moment, however, when the question in hand is not concerning abnormal utterances, but concerning the life-principle itself, the fundamental thought of Rome may not be designated as otherwise than being severely monarchical: over against which we have the definite utterance of Calvin in his "Institutes": "I shall by no means deny that the republican form of government, which consists either of pure aristocracy, or of a mixture of aristocracy and democracy, far excels all others." And this conviction was not founded on his notions of human excellency, but, on the contrary, was born of his profound interpretation of sin. For he adds: "The vice or imperfection of men renders it safer and more tolerable for the government to be in the hands of many, that they may afford each other mutual assistance and admonition, and if any one arrogate to himself more than is right, the many may act as censors and masters to restrain his ambition."

It is evident that this does not exclude constitutional monarchy. And this brings us to the point where we can show how we may recognize Stahl to be a great leader, and still refuse to be his followers. Stahl is, without question,

the most illustrious advocate of the anti-revolutionary principles of recent date; no one has made distinction between the useful and the objectionable in modern public law with greater decision of stroke and finer tact than he; he too is an adherent to a monarchy that is constitutional. But he who deems that, for this reason, Holland's anti-revolutionists have but to copy Stahl, offends our independence. Stahl desires a constitutional monarchy; and so do we. But while he is zealous for a monarchy which is constitutional, we are zealous for a constitution which shall be monarchic. He begins with monarchy and reaches the constitution: we begin with the constitution and reach the monarchy. Stahl is a Lutheran, we are Reformed, for this have we another state law. To elect him as our leader, without criterion, would betray our want of wisdom and of insight. Stahl admits this himself by saying that the character trait of Lutheranism is "the strongest foundation for monarchic loyalty"; and that Calvinism "tends towards republicanism, and encourages the importance of legal order to preponderate over personal authority and to be a check to it." Stahl is therefore no standard for us. In royal and aristocratic circles, where there is more religion by the reveille than by Calvinism, Stahl's un-Reformed and un-Holland-like forms, together with his eternal principles, may have been accepted by some, for reasons easily conceived, but Groen von Prinsteren was from the very beginning too good a Netherlander and too broadly a man of the people, not to have honored and loved our Puritanic and Calvinistic people. To this he owed his invincible strength in the face of one so congenial in mind with him as Van Zuylen. And is the question raised, with whom our Calvinistic people most gladly sympathize, provided the heaven wide difference in principle be in nowise sacrificed, then be it known, that it is not with the ultramontanes, nor with the conservatives, nor with the doctrinal liberals, but with those who are zealous for broader liberties still. The heart of our people,

—and I think I know it well—was never in the rear guard, but always under the colors in the van, in the struggle for liberty, the development of national traits, and the maintenance of law.

The second observation is added in briefer form. To guard against misunderstanding let us emphasize the assertion that the Calvinistic faith is the mother of our political liberty, and not of the French Revolution. If this were not our conviction, there would be no need of any further demonstration. On every hand it is proclaimed that our present-day revolution stands in close family relation with Calvinism. The Romish historian prefers to call Calvin the spiritual father of the French Revolution. Professor Alzog, of the Freiburg Romish University, declares that "the intended results of the Reformation came clearly to light, only when from religious interests they passed over to political platforms. In the root, the French Revolution and the Reformation are one." From Cousin's well-known utterance, "The sixteenth century began the revolution in philosophy, the eighteenth made it general and broadcast," it clearly appears that in the liberal camp equal reckonings are made with the factor of the Reformation. Stahl responds to this: "In their essential character Puritanism and Revolution are not allied, but antagonistic to one another." Why so? Are not both intent upon liberty as their prize? In very deed, but they strive to raise it from a different root. "Liberty from the philosophical *idée*" is the motto of the Encyclopedists; "Liberty of the faith" is the magic word of the Reformation. And our assertion is that the Revolution brought no liberty, while the Reformation did. Just consider facts. In Spain, Austria, and France the Reformation was rooted out, and the Revolution nursed, and how weak has their political liberty been ever since! In Switzerland and Holland, where, after the Reformation, the Revolution exerted its influence, the inner elasticity of liberty became debased rather than exalted. En-

gland, on the other hand, which allowed the Reformation to permeate it as a leaven, and not the Revolution of 1789, is still the guide of Europe's nations in the struggle against religious persecution and political tyranny.

Consider the proof from history, in which by preference the developmental stages of Calvinism are taken in their reverse order. Beginning with America, then England, we go, by the way of the French religious wars, and Beza, back to Calvin.

I.

We begin with America, since he who champions American liberties will certainly not be suspected of being reactionary. Not that the conditions in America appear altogether without spot or wrinkle; on the contrary, much might be said against the Yankee spirit in the seaport towns and among the money kings. But he who would criticise, should do so with fairness and justice, and not forget that America is still very young; that, more than any other nation, it had to receive within itself the degraded elements of other climes, and that, by its vast extent of territory, it stood readily exposed to a degeneration of its national character. But enough: the fact is above question that America lacks no single liberty for which in Europe we struggle. In America there is absolute liberty of conscience; liberty of trade and commerce; free participation by the citizens in all matters of public interest; a government which is responsible in all things; a small army; few onerous taxes; liberty of organization; liberty of the press; liberty of public worship; liberty of thought. The administration of justice is quick and cheap. No such thing as a privileged class is known. There is common equality before law without any reservation. In America modern liberties flourish without limitation. Complaint might be made about too much liberty; to complain of a want of it were surely an absurdity there. In order to determine whether

this abounding political liberty finds its origin in the French Revolution, or in the Genevan Reformation, we should know the attitude of the American Union towards France at the close of the last century. Did it manifest its unconcealed sympathies for France, and did it hasten to appropriate for itself the new findings of the National Convention? If so, then the plea for Calvinism is lost. If, on the other hand, it appears that the Federal government, supported by the best elements of the nation, and most clearly conscious of all its doings, turned with abhorrence from the France of the Mirabeaus, then every idea of affiliation between America and France of 1789 is readily dismissed.

We are prepared to treat with utmost consideration the current opinion, which represents the American and French revolutions as twin shoots on one stem. A striking similarity marks the demands of the New York mob and the Parisian commonalty. For a time the American press was as inflated with empty enthusiasm on abstractions and generalities as were the French pamphleteers. There was even a momentary danger that the Jacobinism of Montaigne would sweep across to the clubs of Charleston and Baltimore. An after-thrill of the French Revolution has undoubtedly been felt by the newly constituted Union. But how much does this prove? Could the assistance France had rendered in the revolution against England so quickly be forgotten? Or could the name of La Fayette have lost its magic power? Is it strange that the public mind could not grasp at once the vast difference between French phrases and Calvinistic liberty?

Granting this does by no means weaken our position; for if it can be shown, that, notwithstanding its attachment to France, in spite of England's refusal to execute the peace that had been made, and in spite of all that was enticing in the republican form of the French government, America deliberately deserted France, in order to seek England's friend-

ship, then the inference of America's liberty from France's revolution falls away.

This was done by the Federal government, and the best element of the nation supported Washington and Hamilton energetically in their politics, which were adverse to France, in direct opposition to Jefferson the demagogue, and his following from the Slave States, who were in sympathy with France. It needs scarcely be mentioned that New England and the North in general constituted the main strength of the Union, and not the South. The Southern States, with their stamp of aristocracy, and slave element in their economy, have never been amalgamated by the real, genuine people of the Union, not even to this day. From the very first they formed too sharp an antithesis with the real Union; they followed another political policy; they lived by another spirit. And this political antagonism made itself known upon the occasion of the very question we now deal with, when in 1793 the South, under Jefferson, took sides with France, and the real Union, under Washington, undertook to disarm Jefferson and render harmless his sympathies for France. The struggle was hot and violent. The apostles of the revolution—Genet and Adet—came over from Paris to Charleston to feed the fires of division. Washington writes: “To sum the whole up in a few words, I have never, since I have been in the administration of the government, seen a crisis which in my judgment has been so pregnant with interesting events, nor from which more is to be apprehended, whether viewed on one side or the other.” England and France were at war, England against, and France in favor of revolution. This question was likewise to be settled by the Union. It was readily seen that great principles were at stake. Would sides be taken with the historic government of Great Britain or with the revolutionary leadership of Paris? Thus the question stood, and Hamilton made answer, according to Jefferson's own testimony, saying: “That he considered the Brit-

ish constitution, with all the corruption of its administration, as the most perfect model of government." "The Federal government saw," writes Professor Holst from Strasburg, "that the hollow abstractions of Paris were altogether impracticable. Their politics were founded on real relations, and not on abstractions, and they knew that they could not deal with human beings as with dead numbers or logical ideas." Strong in this conviction, they were ready for action; Jay was deputed to London to assure the peace with England; the convention in Paris was ignored. The position, once taken, was maintained, though France severed its diplomatic connection, and tidings were wafted across the deep, that France in the exalted possession of her glory deemed it beneath herself to continue dealings with a Union that courted the favor of England and licked the dust off the feet of its former oppressors.

Whether the people favored this policy would be shown, as it always is in America, by the presidential election. This occurred in 1796. Adams and Jefferson were the candidates for office. Jefferson's candidacy implied a triumph for the France-loving South: Adams' name implied the approval of the policy of the government, and . . . Adams was elected, the foreign element had to lower its flag, the best elements of the nation took sides against the revolution, and that New England, the heart of the Union, stood strongly by the side of Washington, appears notably from the writings of Dwight to Wollcott: "Our good people of New England will never permit a war with Great Britain; sooner would ninety-nine out of a hundred of our inhabitants separate at once from the Union."

Is the question asked, whether the American Constitution of March, 1789, was copy of Rousseau literature, then Holst replies that, "It is folly to assert that the Rousseau writings exerted an influence on the development in America"; which opinion is supported by the following facts: that in a session of the committee charged with the framing of this

constitution, at a critical period Franklin arose and proposed prayer for light from the All-wise God, since he (Franklin) saw no way out by which to solve the problem;—that in the congress of 1797 the debates on the slave question were conducted not merely by religious but scriptural arguments;—and that in one of America's most widely-read periodicals appeared this statement: "Such a government we regard as more than the expression of calm wisdom and lofty enthusiasm, it has its distinctively providential element. It was God's saving gift to a distracted and imperiled people. It was his creative fiat over a weltering chaos, 'let a nation be born in a day.'"

If this is not sufficient proof, and the suggestion is made that the War of the Revolution against England was the prelude to the tearing down of the Bastille, and early fruit of the labors of the Encyclopedists, then we refer to Burke, that eminent anti-revolutionist who defended America's insurrection with loud enthusiasm; and better still, to have America speak for herself, we refer to Green's description of the attachment of the colonists to the mother country. "They loved England," he writes, "with the love of a child which, forced to leave home, remembers the past with self-reproach rather than with anger, as soon as the first bitterness is gone. A trip to old England was their ideal hope. To have been there gave celebrity and fame. They were proud of England's history, of England's literature, and of England's heroes. An Englishman was always welcome. Every door was open to him. No circle which opened not itself for him with enthusiasm." No: America's insurrection was as little a turning-upside-down of things, in the sense of the French Revolution, as was our insurrection against Spain, or England's "glorious revolution." The American insurrection tore nothing down; it replaced no ancient *régime* by a new order of things. Things remained as they were, only a congress appeared in the place of the royal commissary. America's insurrection was no eman-

cipation from the Creator, it was done by leaning on his help. Filled with gratitude for the mercies of our God, reads the preamble of the New York constitution, we, the citizens of New York, adopt this constitution.

One more protest may be entered. With Holst some one may say, that nothing was modified in America by the French Revolution, but that, far worse, as early as the founding of the New England colonies, the adder of unbelief was hissing in the grass. But against this, the Christian character which America exhibits to this day is witness conclusive, as well as the incontestable charter of the founding of its States.

Even now the people of the Union bear the Christian stamp with sharp incisiveness more than any nation of the world. This cannot be denied. With a small exception, the citizens of the United States, not merely in their lower and middle classes, but also in the ranks of their scholars and statesmen, are positive believers, Christian in a definite sense; what we call orthodox. And this is true, in spite of the fact that Christianity costs almost nothing in Europe, while in America it takes large fortunes to support it. Fifteen hundred dollars have been paid for a pew in church. So predominant is orthodoxy in free America, that the larger part of immigrants who arrive in its seaport towns with skeptical ideas and irreligious habits, quickly adopt America's supernatural life-view. Existing conditions there are the opposite from ours in Europe. If with us it has every appearance that the liberty of the people must be purchased at the sacrifice of the faith, there it is Calvinism which, according to the general conviction, offers the surest safeguard for the continued possession of those liberties. It is therefore a grave mistake to interpret America's separation of church and state after the rule of Cavour. It is much more sharply defined than in Europe, but starts from a different principle: not from the desire to be released from church duties; on the contrary, it starts from the consciousness that the welfare of the church and the

progress of Christianity demand this freedom and independence. This separation does not forbid, therefore, that the sessions of Congress should be opened with prayer, as well as all other political meetings; that the Sabbath should be inviolate; that thanksgiving days are appointed by the Cabinet at Washington; and that in plain English mention be made of the High God, in every important political message, with such reverence and devotion as becomes the creature in the presence of its Creator. Equal mistake is made when the common-school system of America is considered parallel to our theory of the neutral school. Read the bulky report on the common-school system in the United States, presented to English Parliament by Dr. Fraser, and the twofold fact appears: that the public school in America is a school *with the Bible*; and that since the Irish population has protested against the Bible in the schools, the downfall of the common-school system is foretold. A school of the state without Bible would simply be unthinkable in America. The influence exerted by Christianity is altogether too potent for this. Of the freest country in the world it is asserted by the man who knew it well, "that domestic morals there are much stricter than in Europe, and that Christianity reigns without opposition and is the common heritage of all."

In this threefold constellation of unlimited political liberty, strictness of morals, and faithful devotion to Christianity, the Union points back directly to its puritanical origin, to the invincible spirit of the Pilgrim fathers and to the spiritual descent from Calvin. New England has impressed its stamp upon the entire Union, and all New England's States were founded by martyrs to our Reformed faith. Robinson's followers went to New Plymouth, according to their own confession, not to organize a model state, but to find a spot where to worship God according to the dictates of their heart. They were no impoverished fortune hunters, but substantial and cultured representatives of the best classes of English society.

They were no ranting fanatics, but wise men of practical sense, impelled by the one motive, "the glory of the Most High," and impassioned by the one thought, "religious liberty for all men." On board of the *Mayflower* they wrote this preamble to their code of agreement, "We who have undertaken to plant a colony for the glory of God and the advancement of the Christian faith." And their oldest historian narrates, that "to enjoy religious liberty was the known end of their coming to this wilderness." According to Adams' solemn confession, New England is not a colony of commerce, not a colony of deportation, not a colony for oppression, but a colony of the free conscience. In this liberty of conscience lay concealed the secret of their strength. A Puritan is a born enemy of clericalism. "Clerical overruling," says Bancroft, "is of all tyranny the most grievous to bear, for it weakens every energy, extinguishes enthusiasm, and takes away all courage." Puritanism, on the other hand, is a vitalizing principle, which engenders vigor, activity, and wisdom; and as for courage, a Puritan and a coward are antipodes born. He who stands in fear of God fears not the creature. "He that prays best will fight best," wrote Cromwell, and Cromwell was the greatest general of his age.

II.

The founders of the American colonies were exiles from Great Britain; and we follow the development of Calvinism step by step, when, in the second place, we fix our eye upon its historic progress in England. Here it must needs appear in a different form. While in America it could freely unfold the character of its principle, this was not possible in the British Isles, where it had to deal with an historic past and with existing conditions. Calvinism is not a stark, intractable power which, during Calvin's lifetime, had discovered its ultimate possible development or attained its full completion. On the contrary, it is a principle which only gradually reveals

its inner strength, which has a thought of its own for every age; which is able to assume a form convenient for every land, and in these very series of transfigurations continues its progress of development. And the history of the English disturbances of the seventeenth century forms preëminently an important moment in this progress.

It is only lately that we have reached a more correct opinion on these troubles. Guizot has greatly helped us in this, by the publication of his *Memoirs*, and honor is due to Merle d'Aubigné, and Macaulay, for having sounded the deeply serious and interesting character of this powerful movement of the war of the Independents. This needs not, however, occasion surprise. The Independents were defeated, and never obtained a hearing for their cause. It was to be expected that Romish historians would antagonize them. On the strength of slanderous reports the Presbyterian churches have always misunderstood and misappreciated them, and in Lutheran countries knowledge and inclination both were wanting to fathom this anti-monarchical commotion. No one plead their cause for them; their own testimony was invalid; in America, public thought was busily making history, rather than writing it, and so it happened that the opinion concerning the Independents which was formulated by their enemies has been echoed, without question, by every later historian, until it was analyzed for the first time by Weingarten and thereby destroyed.

For, as it now appears, the struggle of the Independents aimed to solve the twofold question: first, the formal inquiry, hinted at above: Is Calvinism to degenerate into petrefaction, or prove itself a life-principle for future development, both for church and state? and, what is of more importance still, touching the root of all liberties: Is liberty of conscience, which Calvinism includes in its programme, to be realized or not? Let history show the meaning of the English disturbances touching these two inquiries.

For the first question: Is Calvinism petrefaction or a life-principle, we refer at once to Robinson, the fine thinker and gentle Christian, whose essays are still a literary delight, and who, as spiritual father of the Independency, far excels the silly renegade Brown, in vigor of intellect and greatness of soul. Robinson had fled from England, and lived first in Amsterdam, and afterward in Leyden, and was the leader of the Brownist church. We have in hand noteworthy words, spoken by him to the Pilgrim fathers as they embarked for America, which place us in the heart of the question better than broadest annals. "Brethren," said he to the departing pilgrims, "I charge you, before God and his blessed angels, that you follow me no further than you have seen me follow the Lord Jesus Christ. We have not reached the end. The Lord has more truth yet to break forth out of his holy word. I cannot sufficiently bewail the condition of the Reformed churches, who are come to a period in religion, and will go at present no further than the instruments of their reformation; the Lutheran halting with Luther, the Calvinists with Calvin. Luther and Calvin were great and shining lights in their times, but they penetrated not the whole council of God, and, were they now living, would be as willing to embrace further light as that which they first received. I beseech you to remember, it is an article of your church covenant, that you should be ready to receive whatever truth shall be made known to you from the written word of God. But I must here withal exhort you to take care what you receive as truth, for it is not possible that the Christian world should come so lately out of such thick antichristian darkness, and that perfection of knowledge should break forth at once."¹ Is not this manliness and nobility of speech, and does it occasion no surprise that such a man and his followers should have been persecuted with bitterest sarcasm, wildest anger, abuse, and disdain?

How, moreover, is it to be explained, that the Presby-

¹ Bancroft, Vol. i. pp. 306, 307.

terians in England, who also were Calvinists, were accessory to this evil? The justly celebrated masterpiece of Bunyan is well known, at least by name; this most beautiful allegory is but a single utterance of the deep spirituality of life, of the tenderness of heart, and of holiest mysticism, which comes to us from the circles of these Independents. How then explain the phenomenon that the Reformed churches, which boast of Bunyan to this day, and warm their hearts by the glow of his mysticism, have lived in relentless hostility to the Independency, and have transposed into its opposite the "*de mortuis nil nisi bonum*," when it concerned them? The antithesis alone between petrefaction and life-principle offers us the solution. Repristination or development was the issue at stake between Presbyterians and Independents.

In England the Reformation under Henry VIII. limited itself to a meaningless exchange of spiritual authority. Henceforth England's King, and not the Lord Bishop of Rome, was to be clothed with the spiritual authority of England's church, but the church itself remained almost wholly unchanged. The humiliation of John Londerland was revenged. Nothing was done beyond that. Edward VI. died young. During Mary's reign Rome was again preferred, and Elizabeth, "the maiden queen," was the first to infuse the old hierarchical and now national church form with the substance of the Reformed and very positive Calvinistic doctrine. So it continued to be a reformation beginning with the throne, and therefore met with no response from the heart of the people. Three-fourths of all England remained in sympathy with Rome. Not the sixteenth, but the seventeenth, century witnessed the energetic reformation of the English people. By far the larger part of the nation turned with heart and soul toward the Reformation, only during those later periods, under the combined influence of Scotland and Holland. Hence all the sorrows that came upon England. That twofold reformation—one having its rise with the throne, the other with the people; one of

the sixteenth, the other of the seventeenth century—must lead to collisions. In the cities especially, and in the north of England, the Reformed people resisted the Episcopal Church. They were Calvinists, and they demanded that their church form should be Calvinistic too. That church form had assumed its own outlines in Geneva, France, and Holland. As the Reformed church was there and in Scotland, their church in England should be. And this is the stand these Presbyterians took. Calvinism is petrification, they said; it is bound to the form it had assumed once. Reject it therefore on account of the form, or with that form take it.

And against this Robinson rebelled, and Milton hurled the bolts of his eloquence against this stand, and the uttermost efforts of the Independents were directed against this grievous error. And rightly so. They fought with Calvin on their side. He had emphatically denounced being bound to any one form. By pressing this claim the Independents saved the future of Calvinistic reformation. They spake after the heart of England's people, which could not bide the form of the French church government. And the outcome, even now, puts the seal upon their struggle, for there is still a Presbyterian Church in England, but, reduced to utter insignificance, it is small and of feeble spiritual power. It was not English, and in the French form it could not flourish on English soil.

This is what the Independents foresaw. They had no thought of rejecting Calvinism. In loyal attachment to the central dogma of the election they far excelled the Presbyterians, but they desired an idiomatic church form for England, which at the same time should be a development of Calvinism. They claimed separation of church and state; autonomy of the individual churches; free combination into synods, no compulsion; free suffrage of the laity and ecclesiastical gatherings with open doors,—virtually the same system which now prevails in Scotland and America, in France, Switzer-

land, and Holland. The Presbyterians suffered defeat. After Milton's rise they were scattered as chaff before the wind, and after a mechanical existence of nearly two centuries, their vitality is exhausted. But they have revenged themselves. When Hornius the historian came from Leyden to London, they gave him the most inane reports of the movement of the Independents. Hornius accepted them readily, and embodied them in his "*de statu ecclesiæ Britannicæ hodierno*." From this work Böhme drew his information, Tzschirner repeated it, Staüdlin copied it, even Arnold and Schrokch thought they could rely on his fictitious story; and so the tracks appear along which calumny pursued its course, to stigmatize one of the richest developments of Calvinism.

The second question at stake in the war of the Independents was of greater importance still: Is liberty of conscience a dead letter in the Calvinistic programme or not? The Inquisition tolerated not the slightest divergence from the confessions of Rome. Compared with this, Calvin's declaration in his "*Institutes*," "As long as the central truths of Christianity are held intact, difference of opinion is to be tolerated," was the first life-utterance of a glorious principle, but which, as shown by Servetus' judicial death, lay still enwrapped in the swaddling clothes of the old mother church. In Germany the question of the liberty of conscience was stifled by the "*Cujus regio, ejus religio*." In France, also, it appeared mixed up with other interests. Everywhere else it met with abuse. All honor to the Dutch, therefore; the union of the seven provinces took longest strides forward in the solution of this problem. Banished from London, Robinson found a safe shelter in Amsterdam; driven from Spain and Portugal, the Jews found quarters in Holland's capital; and diverging sects had liberty of worship, though within closed doors. Chief thanks for this, however, are due to practice rather than theory. Our Holland placards against Rome were anything but tolerant. The state church ruled

supreme. Difference of opinion might be tolerated, but liberty of conscience was not recognized as a principle. But matters were worse in England. The progress of episcopacy was identified more and more with the glory of the nation; the gates of the Tower admitted in turn Romanists and Presbyterians; and more than once the followers of Geneva and Rome faced each other on the scaffold. This state of things became more and more untenable by the people's reformation in the seventeenth century. Thousands could be oppressed and persecuted, but when these thousands became millions, and presently constituted half of the realm, the scourge became powerless in the hand of the chastiser.

Now the question of the liberty of conscience assumed a new phase. Quite unexpectedly the practical question was put: What is the claim of your principle, when exiles not merely seek your protection, and minor sects your toleration, but when half the nation despises your state church? The answer which the Presbyterians made, did not mend matters; on the contrary, it created more bitter grievances, and it became the spiritual cause of the death of King Charles. They said in substance: "Abandon episcopacy, and let our church be the state church, as it is in Scotland, Holland, and Geneva." This was but a shifting of the question. For then the episcopal portion of the nation would have been the aggrieved party, and liberty of conscience as far removed as ever from the people. It was not the Presbyterians, but their enthusiastic opponents, the Independents, who then found the answer that brought salvation. Their motto was: Separation of church and state; and, as outcome of this, Absolute liberty to worship God according to the dictates of the heart. Greatly has Barebone's Parliament been slandered; but the following statement, copied from its records, is its own justification: "As for the truth and power of religion, it being a matter intrinsical between God and the soul, we conceive there is no power of coercion thereunto." Liberty of con-

science "to all that profess Christ, without exception," was already then the cry of the Yorkshire farmers. Milton makes exception with the Romanists only, for the sake of their attachment to a foreign prince. Godwin went so far as to demand "a full liberty of conscience to all sects, even Turks, Jews, and papists." "It is the will and the law of God," wrote the compassionate Samaritan, that after the coming of Christ on the earth, fullest liberty should be conceded to every soul of every nation, of conscience as well as of public worship, to Christian and Jew, to Turk and heathen both. And is it asked on what grounds this claim was entered, then let it not be thought that it is, as held by the French revolutionists and by our doctrinaires: "that the State has nothing to do with religion"; but, on the contrary, in the very interest of religion and in the fear of sin is found the motive which induced them to honor the most absolute liberty. In 1649 appeared a pamphlet under the title of "The Liberty of Conscience asserted," by one who calls himself "A Well-wisher to the Kingdom of God." In this we read: "He who in matters of religion acts contrary to the dictates of his conscience, commits an accursed sin. Whoever, therefore, forces another by violence or trickery to do this thing, is cause of his sin." "Persecution for the sake of the faith," continues he, "is a spiritual murder, an assassination of the soul, it is a rage against God himself, the most horrible of sins." And what has the French Revolution done but taken the fruit from the Calvinistic stem, and placed it on its liberty tree, with the perversion however of its moral motives, in that it rejected every faith. This does not claim innocence for the Independents on every score. In the heat of battle they often tolerated "Levelers" in their ranks; and in their pamphlets they often desecrated their glorious ideals with Leveller theories; and some of the more enthusiastic among them became fanatical spiritualists, whereby the State was greatly endangered. Yes, some Quakers of the left fell away into a

radicalism which sneered at every practical claim of faith and life, and threatened the entire overthrow of society and of all Christendom besides; even Cromwell's notion of convoking the "saints" in a parliament was an unpardonable political mistake. But if, on the other hand, it can be shown that public safety in England was never as secure as it was under their rule; that Cromwell's army is almost the only example in history of a soldiery which was not profane, but devout; which did not rob, but doled out charities; which outraged no women, but punished the violator with the switch; that the demon of robbery and sensuality never lurked back of their pious features, to bring into question the honesty and the integrity of their convictions,—in all honesty, there is then no reason why, for the sake of the excesses of their enthusiastic partisans, their manly struggle for the highest ideal of liberty should be depreciated. Some concession is due to a company of heroes, such as they, who were the first to fathom and confess the deep thought and uttermost consequence of conscience liberty.

It goes without saying that this led to a modification of public law. Theocracy was maintained, but in a different form. There was no mention now of a church in the state, nor of a state united with the church. The church of Christ was the point of departure. Hers was the care to see that the principles of right and truth swayed the hearts of the people, and for the people the indispensable but free organization in the state lay in their social life. The liberty idea fully realized in the consciousness of the church, must also discover for itself civil right within the domain of the state. From the idea of conscience liberty, grasped in its deepest meaning, sprang of itself the development of political liberty. Of course, no mention was made of the sovereignty of the people by men who, as Christians and civilians both, honored Christ as their king. But the plea for other matters, such as the liberty of the press, is found with Milton, and with God-

win for official sittings with open doors, and for the holy and yet civil contract of marriage, it is found in the acts of Barebone's Parliament. And though it seems scarcely credible, it is nevertheless a fact that the first report of state care for science was made out by a committee appointed by that self-same parliament. They were the first to introduce our modern idea of one treasury for all revenues of state. The introduction of the Burgher class dates from their appearance. They simplified the process of the judicatory, they applied economy in the expenditures of state; and amelioration and lessening of corporal punishments were first advocated by Independents.

That in Great Britain, however, they should be worsted, was inevitable. The statesmen on whom England leaned were Episcopalians, and remained so, and even holiest enthusiasm is not able with a single stroke to turn industrious citizens into masters of state-craft. Their ideas were most excellent, but for reforming English economics they fell short in molding power and strength. This is what effected their defeat, says Guizot, and not their eccentricities. In America for the first time, and upon a smaller scale, the principle was to exhibit its vital power, the first unfoldings of which delight and enchant the readers of the memoirs of Mrs. Hutchinson. As exiles cast on American shores, they brought with them to the New World the spiritual fruit of their struggles and sufferings. Whatever of greatness and glory was wrought in America by the power of a liberty subject to God, was engendered by their spirit.

But it was not America alone that reaped benefit from them. England, the Reformed church, and all the nations of Europe are indebted to them for the moral strength which they developed.

It is well known that only with the accession to the throne of our Stadtholder William III. was political quiet re-

established in England, and that the "glorious revolution" marks the beginning of England's power and influence. This change of dynasty had nothing in common with the French Revolution, it laid no violent hand on the organism of the people, it broke not up the wheelwork of the state, it was no outcome of new and abstract notions, but an act of practical necessity, forced by the existing, universally valid and historic theory. The Stuarts wanted repristination. They wanted England back in old beaten tracks, as though its spirit had not been stirred in the Cromwell period. This was an anachronism, an effort, condemned from the start, to repress the stream in its bed, and which threatened Great Britain with political death. The nation had been plowed, and precious seed had been cast in the widely-opened furrows, and the people would not suffer itself to be robbed of the harvest of this activity. William of Orange, the brave king, heroic general, and clever statesman, was permitted to associate his noble name with the ripening of that harvest, and the Toleration Act, the liberation of the Reformed church in Scotland, the introduction of a yearly budget, the extension of the rights of parliament, and the abolishing of the secret judicature, offered the English nation the fruits obtained by the Independents, whose Utopia it had mocked, but whose spirit it had imbibed. The false theory of the wrongly-interpreted "divine right" was ended; the Whigs could safely introduce the ideal of the Independents into our constitutional public law. And is it asked: Whether the emancipated Great Britain, after a century of increasing greatness, greeted the French Revolution as a product of its spirit, or disdained it as a poisonous fruit of foreign origin, then read the Memoirs of Burke, the hero who opposed Hastings, in which he defended America, and bravely took the part of every victim of persecution, and branded France's revolution as the acme of human frenzy; or better still, look for an answer to the millions of pounds England freely gave, and the stream of blood she

freely shed, to redeem the exhausted continent from the violence of that revolution.

The Reformed church also was saved by the war of the Independents. She was threatened with petrefaction, desirous to enjoy the fruits of the Reformers' toils rather than continue labor in their spirit. In the Synod of Dort the last sign of life of the church in Holland was seen, when she introduced in the post-acta the obligation of continued reformation, but which obligation was never met. And England's and Scotland's churches were fast asleep; in Switzerland the church rested on laurels of the past; in France she was reduced to utter helplessness by the crafty cunning of the court, supported by the sword of the dragoons. But now, look at the great church in the United States, is not she a spiritual fruit of the Independency? Look at the influential group of the Dissenters in England, which gathers in its houses of prayer nearly half of the entire nation, is she not Wesley's trophy, and is not Wesley himself a spiritual descendant of the Robinsons and Godwins? Look at the Free Scotch Church, which, with the yoke cast from its shoulders by the heroic faith of Chalmers, has realized the ideal in a flourishing church life, after which the Puritans hungered with all their heart. Of the free churches in Switzerland, France, and Holland there is little to say. They are smaller and furnish less argument for proof. But when in our Reformed churches we pride ourselves on the right of vote by the laity, and demand separation from the state, and assemblies with open doors, what else then do we do but copy Robinson, letter by letter? What is Calvinism of the free churches other than the thing which in principle the Independents so greatly desired?

Finally, all Europe shared the blessing, even though it was extended at the hand of the most atrocious revolution; ever since the French Revolution political liberty has steadily gained ground in Europe, and much that is precious has been obtained by its means. Let not this confession cause sur-

prise. We are anti-revolutionists, not because we reject the fruits of the revolution period, but because we think ourselves able, with history in hand, to contest the fatherhood of that which is so precious. Together with great evil, the French Revolution brought Europe some good, but that good was stolen fruit, ripened on the stem of Calvinism under the fostering glow of the faith of our martyrs, first on our own soil, then in England, and presently in America. Proof for this assertion follows later on; it is sufficient here to say, that not from the September massacres, but from the blood-pools of our Spain defying towns; not from the guillotine, but from the stakes of the Backers and De Bressen; not from the libraries of the Encyclopedists, but from the prayer cells of the Independents; not from the fury of the *sans-cullottes*, but from the ruggedness of the Pilgrim fathers, arose that more beautiful dawn which now illuminates free Europe.

[*To be concluded.*]

ARTICLE II.

THE RELATIONS OF CAPITAL AND LABOR.¹

BY LUCIEN C. WARNER, M. D.

IF I understand the broad aim and purpose of Sociology it is to better the condition of mankind, especially the condition of the so-called working classes, by which is usually meant the wage-earners. One of the most prominent questions to consider, therefore, is the relations of capital and labor, of employer and workman. I shall not attempt an elaborate discussion on this topic, but shall indicate some of the practical difficulties to be overcome, and a few general principles which may be useful in guiding us to correct conclusions. If my treatment of the subject is in some points chaotic, it will not inaptly represent the present condition of the problem I am discussing.

The ideal of workmen, as voiced by their leaders, is on the one hand coöperation, and on the other, governmental paternalism. They would have coöperation in the ownership and management of mercantile and manufacturing enterprises, and governmental ownership and control of railroads, telegraphs, and all of the various corporations that are dependent upon special franchises from the public. On the latter subject I have no experience, and no special opportunities for observation, so I shall confine myself to the relations of labor to manufacturing and mercantile enterprises.

The reason for favoring coöperation is chiefly that the workman may receive larger emoluments for his labor, or, in other words, a larger share of the profits. This necessarily

¹ Paper read at the Oberlin Institute of Christian Sociology held November 14 and 15, 1894.

presupposes that there are profits to divide. The first difficulty that confronts us is that as a matter of fact a large number of business operations result in loss and not profit. It has been estimated that one-half of the men who go into mercantile or manufacturing business fail at some time during their business career. It is difficult to get accurate statistics on this point, but an examination of the failures reported through mercantile agencies will give us approximate results. The failures among the customers of the carefully conducted wholesale mercantile houses are about one-half of one per cent each year. Their risks, however, are selected with great care, and the merchants most likely to fail are refused credit. The report of Bradstreet and Company shows that the average failures of all mercantile and manufacturing houses for one year represents from one and one-fourth to one and one-half per cent of the actual number doing business. Allowing that the average business career of a man covers twenty-five years, it will be seen that during that time about one-third of the number fail in business. The importance of this factor in our discussion is perhaps better shown by the statement that the total number of failures reported each year in this country alone is from twelve to fifteen thousand.

The ratio of failures in railroads is much larger than that of merchants and manufacturers. This is due, however, not so much to the greater hazard of the railroad business as to the fact that railroads are often bonded for a much larger amount than their actual cost, and are, therefore, unable to earn the interest and dividends on their watered capital. This seems also to be a specially tempting field to the unprincipled speculator, and railroads are often wrecked for the profit to be made out of the reorganization.

In order to judge understandingly of coöperation we must carry our inquiry a little further, and ask, Why some succeed in business while others fail. If I were to give the

reason in a single sentence, it would be this: It is the difference between good management and bad management. There are some instances where conditions arise which no management can foresee or overcome, but such instances are rare and do not disprove the general rule. The so-called bad luck that many business men complain of is only another name for bad management. Their factory burns down when they discover that their insurance has just expired the week previous; or they buy too many goods, or at too high prices; or they sell to those who cannot pay their debts. Another difficulty more common than either is that they find their expenses are too heavy for the volume of their business, and so the profits are all consumed in expenses. Providence receives a large amount of blame for which it is in no way responsible, and which should be attributed to incompetent management. People are not willing to acknowledge their own shortcomings, and so in a cowardly manner they shift the fault upon Providence.

The question of profits in business is then largely a question of how to secure good management. Experience shows that this is more often accomplished by one man or by a small group of men with good judgment, than by many men. Our banks are among our most substantial business concerns, and these are chiefly managed by the president and cashier, though with the advice of a board of directors who meet from time to time. Our insurance companies, gas companies, mines, and many other large corporations are also managed in the same manner. The most successful mercantile and manufacturing enterprises have been managed either by one man, or at most by two or three men. The case of A. T. Stewart and Company, H. B. Claflin and Company, Marshall Field and Company, the Singer Sewing Machine Company, the McCormick Reaper, and the Standard Oil Company are marked illustrations of this principle.

Coöperation in this country has generally failed because

of the difficulty of securing wise and competent management. Men with ability to manage a large business successfully are very rare and are difficult to obtain, and when found they generally prefer to conduct a business for themselves rather than for others. They always command a high price in the market of the world, and coöperative societies are rarely willing to pay what is necessary to secure such a manager. The feeling of equality among workmen makes them opposed to any wide discrimination in wages, and they will not pay a salary of five or six times their own average wages, as they would have to do to secure a really competent manager.

Coöperative stores and manufacturing concerns are brought into direct competition with other large establishments owned by one individual, or by a company managed with all the skill that keen business shrewdness can command, and unless skill is matched against skill, the coöperative company as the weaker must go to the wall. There are a few successful coöperative stores and factories in this country, but it is where the conditions are exceptionally favorable, and when these are compared with the very large number of failures, they do not disprove the rule that the chances of success at the present time are against coöperation.

That success is possible with coöperation is proven by the experience of banks and stock companies, which are in reality coöperative corporations, and differ from labor coöperative companies chiefly in the fact that the stock is mostly held and controlled by business men, and not by inexperienced workmen. The ownership of the stock may be widely scattered, but the control is in the hands of those who know what good management is and are willing to pay liberally to secure those competent to direct their affairs successfully. The success of these corporations shows that the trouble is not with the broad principle of coöperation, but with the special difficulty of securing good management when the control of the company is in the hands of those who have

not the skill and experience necessary to direct its affairs wisely.

Coöperative shops in London, and I think in some other parts of England, have been more successful than in this country. This would lead to the belief that they may ultimately succeed here when the general principles necessary for success are better understood by the working classes, and when they are more willing to comply with them.

The large risk and doubtful profits of coöperation have led many to advocate in its place what is known as profit-sharing. In schemes of profit-sharing the management and the greater part of the capital is in the hands of one, or at most two or three persons. Regular wages are paid to the employees, and then at the end of the year a per cent of profits over and above the expense of conducting the business and paying interest on the capital, is divided among the employees, usually in proportion to the amount of their respective wages. This is in my opinion the best of the various plans which have been devised for giving to workmen an interest in the profits of the business. It is entirely consistent with independent and efficient management, and it has the advantage over the ordinary wage system that it gives the employee an interest in the business, and is an incentive to him to do his best work.

Profit-sharing, however, is not a principle which can be universally applied in business, for, as we have before stated, business is often run at a loss, and the workman is neither able nor willing to share with the capitalist in this loss. Profit-sharing, therefore, is only applicable to well established forms of business where at least a moderate profit may be confidently expected each year. Every new enterprise is an experiment for the first year or two; and workmen will not and ought not to be asked to share in this experiment. The right of the workman to his full wages cannot well be abridged. In fact these claims are so well recognized and established

that in most States wages are made a lien upon property to be paid in preference to all other debts.

The tendency of the times is towards large corporations. The smaller manufacturer with hand work or incomplete machinery cannot compete with the large manufacturer with his elaborate machinery and thoroughly organized plant. So also in all the large cities the smaller merchant is driven out by the large store with its numerous departments. The result is to be regretted on many accounts. It largely substitutes unskilled for skilled labor, and so deprives the workman of the higher wages and the opportunities of improvement which come from labor which calls the mental faculties into greater activity. It lessens the chances of individual effort and success, and so discourages the workman. It also tends to the concentration of capital in a few hands. Commercial success, however, is in its favor, and before this, all obstacles must give way.

The great factory and store are not, however, altogether without their compensation. It is the most economical method of doing the world's work, and therefore it makes commodities cheaper. It brings to the homes of the laboring classes as well as to all other classes many comforts and luxuries which they could not otherwise enjoy. The large store or manufactory also increases the chances of good management, and so lessens the proportions of failures in business.

The large mercantile and manufacturing establishments are the ones which are most suitable for the introduction of profit-sharing. There is more stability to the business and more uniformity in the yearly returns. There is ability and strength to compete with other large establishments. The presumption is also that the past management has been wise or so large a business could not have been built up, and it is easier to continue a successful business than to establish a new one, or to revive a waning one.

Profit-sharing in order to be successful must be put on an economic basis and not on a benevolent basis. It must bring positive advantages to the business, or it will not be generally adopted. If two factories are working side by side in the manufacture of the same article, one on the principle of individual ownership, and the other on the principle of profit-sharing, and the one with the individual ownership can put its goods upon the market five per cent cheaper than the other, then profit-sharing will be abandoned. The experience of profit-sharing, however, seems to indicate that in many lines of business it possesses advantages which will make it a commercial success. Workmen will perform more labor, use greater economy, and in many ways promote the interest of the business where they have a financial interest, more than where they have not.

Some plan of profit-sharing is already in operation in many forms of business both in Europe and America, and I should judge that it is making steady increase. It must not, however, be expected that it will speedily become of universal application, nor do I believe it is possible to hasten the introduction of profit-sharing, or any other system of coöperation by legislation, or by forcible interference of any kind. If it is better than the old plan, it will gradually win its way on its own merits. Haste is neither possible nor desirable. One pound of experience is worth more than a ton of theories. We have been six thousand years, at least, in arriving at the present advanced state of the capital and labor question, and we need not be discouraged if it takes several centuries more to reach that degree of perfection which we shall no doubt ultimately attain. In the meantime the greater part of those who find employment in the large firms and corporations of the country must continue on the wage system with all of its faults and shortcomings.

So far I have considered the interests of the workman only from the standpoint of increased wages. A larger share

of the profits of business is without doubt the chief object sought for by the wage-earning classes. But it is not the only thing needed, and I venture the assertion that it is not the most important. The cultivation of thrift, of economy, of the habit of saving, is even more important than the mere matter of the amount of wages. This subject is largely distinct from the question of wages; for my observation is that the desire and ability to save money is but slightly influenced by the amount of the wages received. If you talk with a person receiving four hundred dollars a year about saving, he will say he cannot possibly save on his present wages, but if it were increased to five hundred dollars a year he might lay up one hundred dollars. But when the increase comes his wants increase in the same proportion, and the whole amount is spent just the same. From my observation in the city of New York I am satisfied that among those receiving salaries of from one to two thousand dollars a year the proportion who lay by a part of their earnings, is no larger than among those receiving salaries from five hundred to one thousand dollars. Economy is dependent upon the training and mental make-up of the individual, and not upon the amount of salary.

Unfortunately the system of wage-earning does not tend to cultivate thrift and economy. Among our farming population, and among all classes who do business for themselves, the general rule is that they are thrifty and try to save a little money each year. On the other hand with the wage-earning class almost the contrary rule prevails. Any effort therefore to improve the condition of workingmen should look especially to training them in habits of thrift and economy. It is not the danger of their becoming paupers which is of the most consequence, though that is an important matter, but the danger is that they will become a menace to the state and country. There is nothing which contributes so much to good citizenship, self-respect, and all that makes for manhood as a bank account, or the ownership of property. If

every workman in the land owned his own home, or had one hundred dollars laid by as an investment, anarchy would be effectually stamped out of the country.

Another subject no less important is the education and broadening of the minds of the working classes, the filling of their lives with something besides the details of their daily tasks, with something more elevating than the current gossip of neighborhood quarrels and personal discomforts. Life is more correctly measured by the fullness of our minds and hearts than by the fullness of our pockets. Modern conditions of labor, as I have already explained, tend to impoverish the lives of the workman. With the introduction of machinery the work of the laborer is often little more than a part of the machine. We no longer have weavers, spinners, shoemakers, tailors, wagonmakers, and blacksmiths, but this work is subdivided into many parts, and a man learns to do a single portion only. The result is that there is little in his daily employment to educate and develop his higher nature. The whole practice of working in our factories or mercantile establishments tends to narrow the thoughts. The individual workman knows almost nothing about the policy of the house or its general business management. He has no responsibility except for the task assigned him. This condition of things will train up a very different class of men from those which have grown up during the past history of our country. The individual farmer, blacksmith, shoemaker, and wagonmaker is a man of affairs, who does his own buying and selling, who makes his own plans, and is an independent business man and business manager. In doing this he gets an experience and breadth of thought largely wanting in those who work in our factories, our mines, our railroads, or even in our counting houses. This is one of the inevitable evils of our modern economic system, and unless something can be done to counteract this tendency, the influence on coming generations will be unfortunate in the extreme.

So far as I can see, the corrective of this condition must be sought largely in the occupations of the workmen outside of business hours. Debating societies, men's clubs, girls' clubs, labor unions, when intelligently conducted, Chautauqua circles, reading clubs, art clubs, and the university extension movement, are a few of the agencies which may be used to develop the workingman, and to counteract the belittling influence of piecework. As the business man finds rest from his engrossing cares by some outside avocation which gives a new direction to his thoughts, so the workers in our factories must be interested in those things which will fill up the blank in their lives that is left by the routine of their daily toil.

In the suggestions which I have made, I have not directly mentioned Christian duty or moral principles as affecting the relations of employer and employee. This has not been because I lightly esteemed Christian obligation, but because I wished to show the natural workings of economic causes in the relations of capital and labor. Any reform that is not based on sound economic principles will bring disappointment and disaster alike to the employer and the workman, to the philanthropist and the general public. On the other hand I believe that there is perfect accord between economic laws and the principles of Christianity and philanthropy. The same Divine Creator is the author of both, and there can be no discord in his works. Christianity teaches honesty as a moral duty. Sound business principles teach it with equal emphasis because "honesty is the best policy." No permanent business can be established on any other basis than that of honesty. This is so well understood that many men of bad personal character establish and carry on a business on the principles of strict honesty because it is the surest way to permanent success.

I know that a different impression from this often prevails. We even sometimes hear it said of a man who fails in

business that "he is too honest to succeed." It is not his honesty but his lack of foresight, prudence, and good judgment that has caused his downfall. On the other hand we see men who are tricky and dishonest acquiring great wealth and apparently living in prosperity. We recognize the dishonesty and so attribute their success to this, while we overlook the remarkable business tact and foresight which they also possess, and which are the real causes of their prosperity. They are successful in spite of their dishonesty, and not because of it. It is true that dishonesty may bring temporary advantage, but this is more than counterbalanced in the long run by the loss of the confidence of the community and the consequent loss of opportunity for acquiring new business. This is particularly true in manufacturing and mercantile affairs. The man who furnishes honest goods and sells them at a fair value and uniform price, if he also possesses foresight and business judgment, is almost sure to outdistance his competitor who is striving to overreach and swindle his customers.

What is true of honesty is also true of liberality and generosity. "There is that scattereth and yet increaseth, and there is that withholdeth more than is meet, but it tendeth to poverty." The employer who treats his employees not only with fairness, but with liberality, who pays the full market price for wages, who supplies every needed appliance for their health and comfort during the hours of labor, who encourages among them habits of thrift and economy by which they become independent and self-respecting citizens, who assists and stimulates them in every possible way to use their spare hours in self-culture and improvement, will secure for himself direct returns in improved service which will more than repay him for the outlay.

On the other hand the workman who does all he can to develop his skill and perfect himself in the knowledge of his craft, whose heart is in his work and who is ever on the alert

to advance the interest of his employer, will find his daily work has become a pleasure instead of a burden, and will greatly advance his own interests by the more efficient service which he is able to render.

The existing feeling of distrust and animosity between employer and workman is to be exceedingly regretted. The solution of this difficulty is not to be found in mutual hatred and recrimination, but rather in an honest effort of each individual to do his own duty in the responsibilities which are laid upon him. This is the economic solution and is also the Christian solution. Individual responsibility for his own acts is the basis of Christian obligation. The reign of good will upon earth is to be brought about, not by each one neglecting his own duty and criticizing the acts of his neighbor, but rather by charity for our neighbor and the rigid holding of ourselves to responsibility for our own actions. When Christ shall reign supreme in the hearts of all men, the labor problem will disappear, and all will work together for the common good of mankind and for the glory of the Master's kingdom.

ARTICLE III.

IDEAS OF THE FUTURE LIFE IN THE PENTATEUCH.

BY THE REV. THOMAS STOUGHTON POTWIN.

DR. L. H. MILLS, the learned Orientalist of Oxford, has thrown the great weight of his authority in support of the view that the early religion of Israel was "Sadducaic," and indeed hardly allows that the Hebrews before the exile had any real belief in immortality.¹ In Sanscrit studies Dr. Mills stands for a high antiquity of the literature and profound views in the authors; but when he turns his face toward the Hebrew, he seems to lose his happy power of insight and worthy appreciation.

It is not strange, perhaps, that the average reader of the English Bible, when he meets the words that the patriarchs "were gathered unto their people" (Gen. xlix. 29, 33), gets little, if any, idea beyond that they died as their fathers had died before them. Our modern notions of the future state are so inextricably interwoven with conceptions of reward and punishment, that any language which does not make account of these seems to be almost meaningless and unimportant. Men immersed in the life of to-day are insensibly drawn to interpret all literature by current ideas. But ignorance and confusion are quite sure to result. The whole matter of making Old Testament criticism seem rational and intelligible to men and women who are not scholars strikes upon this obstacle. But learned commentators and students of the world's primitive literatures ought to be able to free themselves from such

¹ Nineteenth Century, January, 1894.

limitations, and present us broad and liberal views. I hardly need say, however, that such has not always been the case.

It is conceded, of course, that the moral and religious discipline of the Hebrews was not based directly on sanctions drawn from the life after death. That was conducted theocratically in the present life under promises of present blessings or punitive judgments. This no doubt tended somewhat to limit speculation and minimize controversy regarding the future. But we shall make a great mistake if we infer from this the absence of opinions and expectations for the coming state. This is the first point to fix, the separation, in our search for beliefs in regard to future immortality, of all connection with direct promises and threatenings. What then are our sources of information as to these beliefs?

First, we have the direct sources, in what is said in the Pentateuch of the relations of God to man, what is said of the close of the lives of individuals, and what is said of Sheol as a place of the dead. Then we get indirect but most important evidence by a comparative study of the ideas of other peoples contemporary with, or antecedent to, the Hebrews.

Interpreters of the Old Testament have not denied generally that the Pentateuch contains intimations of the immortality of man, but their conclusions have almost without exception been vitiated by their understanding of Sheol. They put everything under its shadow, and a dreadful shadow it is. Thus Lange says (Gen. xv. 15): "They must then still live upon the other side of death, in another state and life; the continued existence after death is here evident, and, indeed, as the word *in peace* intimates, a blessed existence for the pious"; but (under Gen. xxv. 8) he adds: The expression (gathered to his people) "designates especially the being gathered into *Sheol*." In fairness we must also say that he believes that it "also points without doubt, to a communion in a deeper sense with the pious fathers on the other side of death." Lange seems to have made an advance upon the

ideas of Delitzsch, Knobel, and Oehler. Oehler says of Sheol: "Man exists only as a weak shadow which wanders into the kingdom of the dead." "This kingdom is supposed to be in the depths of the earth . . . deeper even than the waters and their inhabitants"—"a region of the thickest darkness, where the light is as midnight"—"where every experience of communion with God is wanting to those resting there."¹—"The condition in the realm of death is supposed to be the privation of all that belongs to life in the full sense, and so the realm of death is also called simply destruction." He bases his view on such Scripture as Job x. 22; Ps. lxxxviii. 3-6; Job xxvi. 6; Prov. xv. 11. But to explain the state of the dead in this way is a plain case of building dogma out of elegiac poetry.

THE INDIRECT EVIDENCE.

Let us now look, first, at the indirect evidence of ancient Hebrew opinion as derived from a comparison of the opinions of surrounding peoples.

The earliest literature of the East reveals the conception of *a blessed life in the spirit world with ancestors* as common to Oriental nations. The Vedas show this for the early inhabitants of India. We quote from selections given in the fifth volume of Muir's "Ancient Sanscrit Texts": "By thy guidance, O Soma, our sage ancestors have obtained riches among the gods" (page 284). "The liberal man abides placed upon the summit of the sky; he goes to the gods" (page 285). "May I with my offspring attain immortality" (page 285). "They were the gods, those ancient righteous sages" (page 286). "I have heard of two paths for mortals, that of the fathers and that of the gods" (page 287). "Yama was the first who found for us the way. This home is not to be taken from us. Those who are now born follow by their own paths to the place whither our ancient fathers have departed" (page 292). "Meet with the fathers, meet with Yama. Throwing

¹Theology of the Old Testament, Vol. i. p. 246f.

off all imperfection again go to thy home. Become united to a body and clothed in a shining form"; "The fathers have made for him this place. . . . Approach the benevolent fathers who dwell in festivity with Yama. . . . May he grant us to live a long life among the gods" (page 293).¹

There was also a Vedic doctrine of the worship of ancestors.

Muir sums up thus the ideas of the Vedic age regarding the future life: "Yama the first of mortals, who died and discovered the way to the other world, guides other men thither and assembles them in a home which is secured to them for ever."

We find the same idea in the Zoroastrian system. Whatever dispute there may be about the date of the Avesta in its present form, there is no dispute as to the antiquity of the generic conceptions which lie at the base of it. And Darmesteter says: "Yama is replaced in the Avesta by Yima who gathers the good together in 'Var' or paradise" (page 75). Again, "The man of Asha (or righteousness) who has lived for Ahura Mazda will have a seat near him in heaven, the same way as in India the man of Rita (the faithful) goes to the palace of Varuna, there to live with the forefathers a life of everlasting happiness" (page 74).

In China the belief that ancestors were gathered in conscious life in the world beyond the grave is very ancient. Dr. Legge, in his "Religions of China," refers this idea to the period preceding the twenty-third century before Christ. Of this early period, he says: "Methods of worship had been instituted; a worship of God for all, but in which the ruler of the state should be the only officiator, and a worship of ancestors by all, or at least by the heads of families, for them-

¹ In respect to the doctrine of the resurrection in this citation, see Muir's summary after page 300; also Roth in *Journal of American Oriental Society*, Vol. iii. p. 343; compare also Professor Jackson in *Biblical World*, June, 1893.

selves and all the members in their relative circle" (page 23).

All know that the Egyptians believed that their dead were gathered together in immortal life, and an eternal home for the fathers could not fail to have been a familiar idea to the Hebrews, who had been put to school in Egypt. But the manifest connection of the early Hebrew literature with the Chaldean makes it of prime importance to learn, if possible, the ideas of the Assyro-Babylonians in this matter. Recent discoveries have opened up the subject somewhat, but the monumental literature, i. e., inscriptions on statues and clay tablets, which has been deciphered is still so fragmentary and incomplete that no one feels that we have reached anything finished and systematic. Our principal sources of information are the stories of the deluge, of Ishtar's descent into Hades, and the penitential psalms. In regard to the first two it must be ever kept in mind that they are simply poetry of the most imaginative kind, and are not to be taken as giving the dicta of calm reason in that age, any more than the poetry of Dante gives the everyday ideas of his time. The penitential psalms are, from a religious point of view, the most remarkable monuments of ancient thought that have come down to us from any people save the Hebrews.

There is one point of negative evidence of agreement between the Babylonians and the Hebrews which is of considerable importance, viz. the absence of any ancestor-worship. Dr. Sayce says: "I can find no trail of ancestor-worship in the early literature of Chaldea which has survived to us." In this the ideas of the Babylonians were more lofty and worthy than those of other Oriental peoples. They worshiped only deities. And so far as they had an influence upon the Hebrew mind it must have been in this sober and rational direction.

Their gloomy ideas of death and the grave we have fully pictured for us in the Ishtar legend. The opening lines, as Dr. Sayce gives them, are:—

"To the land whence none return, the region of (darkness),
Istar, the daughter of Sin, (inclined) her ear,
Yea, Istar herself, the daughter of Sin, inclined (her) ear
To the house of darkness, the seat of the god Irkalla,
To the house from whose entrance there is no exit;
To the road from whose passage there is no return;
To the house from whose visitors the light is excluded,
The place where dust is their bread and their food is mud.
The light they behold not, in darkness they dwell,
. . . Over the door and the bolt the dust is scattered."¹

It is not difficult to see here the Sheol of the Hebrews, which, as will be shown farther on, is also confined mainly to poetic passages in the Old Testament.

When we inquire for any brighter views of the future, the evidence is meager, but perhaps only because the spade has not yet turned up the tablets which may contain such views, or the decipherer has not reached them in the thousands which are now awaiting translation. There is not, however, an entire lack of evidence that they held such views, and a real doctrine of rewards in immortal life.

Jensen introduces his discussion of the Babylonian "World of the Dead"² with the remark, that the ever-present view of the grave, in which the body is deposited in the earth, has led various peoples to the natural representation of a kingdom of the dead under the earth. But he goes on to show that the poets point out "the islands of the blessed" as an abode of the gods and of such men as are rescued from death. Thus the Noah of Chaldean deluge is translated thither. And, according to Dr. Sayce, Gisdubar (Nimrod) and Heabani enjoy the same fate.

Some of the penitential psalms strongly imply a belief in a future life of joy with the gods as a common aspiration. Thus Dr. Sayce says: "Some at least of the Assyro-Babylonian people asked their deities for something more than merely temporal blessings. . . . They prayed also that they

¹ Hibbert Lectures, p. 221.

² Kosmologie der Babylonier, p. 225.

themselves might live '*for ever*' hereafter in '*the land of the silver sky*.' The invisible 'heaven of Anu' had vanished into the deep blue of the visible firmament; above and beyond all was the true home of the gods and *the spirits of the blest* [italics ours]; a home toward which the smoke of the altar might ascend, but into whose mysteries none could penetrate till death and the grace of Baal has freed him from the shackles of the flesh."¹

Dr. W. St. Chad Boscawen says of these Babylonian psalms: "These ancient documents serve to bring out more clearly the true theory of Semitic perfectionism, 'a walking with God.' It is this we find in the life of Enoch who walked with God—an expression which may be illustrated by the Assyrian expression for perfect agreement, 'foot and foot' or 'step and step.' It was this trusting, filial relationship which constituted the perfect life rewarded not by death but by 'a going to God,' as in the case of Enoch or the Chaldean Noah, or Elijah whose end was an absorption into the immortal."² "It is the remarkable conception of the 'fatherhood of God' which forms one of the most beautiful features of the sacred literature of Babylonia. In no literature, except that of Israel, do we find so high an ethical conception of the relation of man to his god, or of the true nature of sin, as in this religion of Babylonia. In most religions of the ancient world sin is associated with pain, but to the Babylonian, as to the Hebrew Psalmist, it is a moral alienation from God—in fact, a rupture of the filial relationship."³

In these psalms, Merodach is often described as "the merciful one among the gods who raises the dead to life," or as "the merciful one who loveth to give life to the dead." Dr. Sayce claims that this refers only to life in this world, but the way in which it is distinguished from the healing of

¹ Hibbert Lectures, pp. 365, 366.

² Expository Times, February, 1893, p. 207.

³ *Ibid*, page 206.

disease, and the sober, matter-of-fact petitions among which the language occurs, would lead one to think that much more must be meant—i. e., nothing short of a future life. In these psalms we find, also, all the associated ideas of the Hebrew religion. Creation, judgment, and mercy are attributed to the deity, and confession of sin with supplication for forgiveness and its removal are put in the mouths of men.

Now, although scholars have not yet found any distinct statements in the tablets so far deciphered of a heaven of the fathers, yet the intimations referred to, and the demands of consistency with the known religious thought, will probably convince most minds that the Babylonians did believe in such a home for mortals beyond the grave, and cause us to expect yet to find clear evidence of it in future readings of their literature.

But the decipherers have found in the monumental literature of still nearer neighbors to the Hebrews evidence of a belief in immortality with the gods. These are the Hittites, whose inscriptions have been discovered at Sindjirli. M. Halévy has given a translation and discussion of these in the *Revue Semitique* for 1893 and 1894.¹ A part of the inscriptions runs thus: "In the future Panammu, my son. . . will mention the name of Hadad (god) . . . will say: 'Let the soul of Panammu drink with thee' and the soul of Pamammu will drink with thee. And at once he will again mention the soul of Panammu with Hadad and Rekubel (gods) . . . in this sacrifice and make him acceptable thereby to Hadad, Rekubel, El, Shemesh."

M. Halévy strongly maintains that there is here a confirmation of his previous opinion of a belief in the immortality of the soul among the Semites. More than twenty years ago he had a controversy on this point with Messrs. Renan and Derenbourg, who contended that the belief in the immortality of the soul was of Platonic origin, and was incompatible with

¹ See American Journal of Archæology, Vol. ix. No. 3.

the unadulterated Semitic genius, and could not have existed among the Semites until the time of Alexander. Halévy's conclusions, as to the belief when and where these inscriptions were made are: (1) that the place of the soul is with Hadad; (2) that the soul accompanies the supreme god even in the sacrifices to him, and acts as intercessor; (3) that souls "participate in the nature and privileges of the gods whose habitual *cortége* they form." Halévy had previously maintained, in regard to the *Phœnicians*, (1) their belief that the soul is immortal; (2) that the souls of the just inhabit heaven in company with the gods. And he now claims "the essential agreement in this belief of the four great peoples, the Assyro-Babylonians, Hittites, Phœnicians, and Hebrews."

In this survey of Gentile opinion the literature to which we have referred belongs, for the most part, to a period preceding Moses and the Exodus, or at least the traditions upon which it has been founded are of this high antiquity.

The Hebrews, therefore, were encompassed by these conceptions on every side. And the Tel-el-Amarna tablets, unearthed in Egypt, have proved that literary communication between Babylonia, Palestine, and Egypt was an everyday occurrence in this early time. Hence the theology of none of these eastern countries could have remained unknown in the others. And we are compelled in interpreting the literature of one people to take into account the ideas of the others. Darmesteter, in his last work on the Gathas, emphasizes this in determining the sources of the ideas of the Avesta. He even suggests the Babylonian psalms as a possible source of the Avestan doctrine of the resurrection. And if there is any probability of this, there is no need of any incredulity respecting the presence of this doctrine in Jerusalem in Isaiah's time. Indeed it is clear, that, if the Hebrews had no belief in a future of blessedness for the righteous, they were much more benighted than their neighbors—a condition to which few would assign them. For a definite belief in immortality is

proved by all history to have been the concomitant of worthy ideas of the deity and high moral standards of action.

Darmesteter affirms the borrowing of much in the Avesta from Judaism. True, he puts this indebtedness late historically. But the early date of the Gathas, which Mills still maintains in his last great work on the "Five Gathas," would not remove them from the probability of this borrowing, nor the Zoroastrian system generally; for what we have said above of intercommunication in the ancient East holds true doubtless of Media, as well as Babylon. It would have been an impossibility, we may now say, for monotheism to have come out of Egypt with Israel and been established in Palestine and not have become known where Zoroastrianism arose. And it is much simpler to refer the points of agreement between Mosaism and Zoroastrianism to a Hebrew origin than to maintain that there were two independent parallel developments. Even if we admit the coming of Persian ideas into Judaism at and after the exile, as well we may, it will then be but the payment of an old debt. Streams of thought which had been one at an earlier date, became one again after a more or less independent course for centuries.

In the Magian system we find wonderfully clear ideas of immortality and personal accountability to God under the sanction of future rewards and punishments; and we are entitled to avail ourselves of this fact, i. e. the presumptions flowing from it, in explaining everything in the Pentateuch which touches upon these ideas. And, as I have already intimated, the associated ideas of human relations to God must be given great weight in interpreting whatever is said of the future. Pertinent to this is an article of Dr. Sellin in the *Neue Kirchliche Zeitschrift* (1894-96), in which he proves that *the individual in his relations to God* was quite as important an element in the early Hebrew religion as the nation considered as a whole; and that personal moral accountability to God was never absent from the Jewish system. It

is impossible, therefore, not to admit a presumption that they held to some belief in future blessing from and with God for the good after death.

THE DIRECT EVIDENCE.

We come now to the direct evidence in Hebrew literature of opinion regarding the state of the dead. And to begin with, the Hebrews were taught that man "became a living soul" by the *breath of God*, and that, being thus created, he was in the *image of God*. Man thus partook, to them, of the nature of the spiritual and eternal God. And we find here the basis of the developed doctrine of a later time that at death "the spirit shall return to God who gave it" (Eccl. xii. 7).

Their next lesson was in the life and departure of Enoch. "Enoch walked with God, and was not, for God took him." His method of closing life was designed as a reward; but they cannot have imagined for a moment that God dropped him, for a reward, into an underworld of shadows and gloom. No: he walked with God here upon earth, and God took him where he could continue to enjoy that communion. And the fact was placed here at the beginning of the Hebrew revelation, in order to point the thoughts of all coming after in the same direction.

And this is the use the Epistle to the Hebrews makes of it. "*By faith* Enoch was translated . . . *for before his translation* he had witness borne to him that he had been well-pleasing unto God."

The accounts of the deaths of Moses and Aaron are related to that of Enoch. At a particular time they are called to a mountain-top, and there die in a special manner, according to the word of the Lord. Nothing about it certainly suggests a falling into darkness "where no experience of communion with God is possible." On the contrary, the whole suggestiveness of the scene is that of ascending into a pres-

ence and life with God. Jacob's vision of the ladder also points in the same direction.

In the case of Abraham, God enters into a covenant of promise for himself and his descendants (Gen. xv.). As an introduction to that covenant, he says: "I am thy *exceeding great reward*"; and, as a part of it: "Thou shalt go to thy fathers *in peace*." It is impossible, without violence, to interpret these words of a death clouded with uncertainty and gloom as to the future. Abraham was to die *in peace* and find in God his *exceeding great reward*. He was to die *in covenant with God*, and the great emphasis in all God's covenant promises was on life. In this way God comes to meet and undo the incoming of death by the first sin. He restores man to his original enduement of life. His original life was not that of the body alone, but of his whole nature. The very idea, therefore, of a redeeming covenant was an assurance to the Hebrews of noble life in the future in the care of God their Creator. Reflective minds capable of giving us the earliest literature of Israel must have reached the belief of a future in communion with God as a necessary progress of thought.

But they did not stop with this. They must have believed in a "heaven" with their fathers who had kept their covenant with God. The inspired language which indicates this is the phrase used of the patriarchs—"was gathered unto his people." These words are specifically distinguished from death. Thus of Abraham (Gen. xxv. 8): "Then Abraham gave up the ghost, and died . . . *and* was gathered unto his people." So of Isaac: "And Isaac gave up the ghost, and died, *and* was gathered unto his people." So also of Jacob and Aaron. Here we have the future life in the society of ancestors, which was the common expectation of primitive Oriental peoples. What we call "heaven" was to them *life with God and their fathers*. If any one ask objectingly, Why was not this glorious idea of society with God more dis-

tinctly set forth to the Hebrews? we may perhaps find that they were guarded at this point against the polytheistic notions of surrounding peoples. Familiar association in the heavens with the gods belonged to ideas in heathen corruptions. But in the line of revelation the idea of familiarity with God was reserved for the incarnation and the ascension to the right hand of God, of the Son of God and Son of man. "Through him we have boldness to enter into the holiest."

THE MEANING OF SHEOL.

It remains then to determine what we should understand by what is said of Sheol. The word occurs six times in the Pentateuch—four times from the mouths of Jacob and Judah regarding the effect upon the father of the fate of Joseph and Benjamin, and twice of the destruction of Korah and his company. In the case of Jacob it is a part of his "mourning for his son many days" and his feeling that the sad event must cause the end of his own days in disappointment and darkness. In the case of Korah it is used to describe a death of judgment for sin, and of visible engulfing by earthquake. It has been said that Jacob is speaking of going to the usual abode of the dead, because he says: "I will go down into Sheol *unto my son*." But it must be remembered that he supposes that Joseph had died a calamitous death and been denied burial. Sheol then, in all these passages, stands for the mournful side of death and the grave, as the negation of life, its joyousness and blessing, including the coming to one's end in peace. It is precisely similar to our own language of death and the grave when looked at from this negative point of view, which, however, is never thought of as implying any doubt of a happy future of the spirit.

This explanation is borne out by the use of Sheol in the other Hebrew scriptures. It occurs in the prayer of Hannah and the Song of David (1 Sam. ii. 6; 2 Sam. xxii. 6), both lyrics, and so giving poetic views. It is found in 1 Kings

ii. 6-9 in threatenings of violent death. In Job, the Psalms, and the Prophets it has a constant poetic, elegiac use, so that we may sum up by saying, that it is confined to poetry or visions of calamity, and *never used of any prose conception of the rational thought regarding the future life*. It leaves us at full liberty to believe all the evidence that happy hopes for the future coexisted with mournful views of death, precisely as the two sets of ideas have coexisted under the Christian system. Who has spoken more darkly of death than our own poets? Death, as the negation of life in the present, must always be so spoken of; but faith and hope are not made doubtful thereby.

Some, as Tayler Lewis in Lange (English edition), say that Sheol must be distinguished from the "grave" because the Hebrew has another word (*kereb*) for "tomb." But those who will look at the use of this word will see that it is limited generally, if not always, to the visible sepulcher, and not employed in ideal relations, as is Sheol. And we do not contend that Sheol indicates "the grave" narrowly, but the world of death and the grave as the antithesis of life in this world. The Chaldean legend of Istar's descent to Hades is apparently the original of all the "journeys to the dead," and was a sufficient warrant for all the Hebrew poets have said of Sheol, but was no actual or proper source of dogma for the future life to such as were capable of thinking for themselves.

We have said nothing thus far of any belief among the early Hebrews of the future for the wicked. But we find language in the Pentateuch which certainly forms an indication that opinion on this matter was not wanting. The sinner is threatened with death in a most emphatic manner: "He shall surely die" (Heb. dying he shall die). Again it is frequently said of him: "He shall bear his sin." And more dreadful still are the words: "That soul shall be cut off from his people." This phrase is used thirteen times in the

Pentateuch. In Lev. xx. 2-3 and xvii. 10 it is distinguished from death, and made the culmination of divine threatening. It is denounced in various connections, as of ritual disobedience, violation of the Sabbath, and of abominable vices. But in every case it is of definite disobedience to a divine command. It did not involve the execution of the death penalty except in the case of a civil offense. In other cases, commentators, as Knobel, say that God himself completed the excommunication or rejection. But what was this rejection by God when "He set his face against the sinner"? The thoughtful Hebrew, who saw the prospect of blessing in the future from the covenant of God under which he lived, and from the doctrine of life as a gift restored by God, what could he infer from the cutting off of souls from the people of God? What, but the loss of promise and hope for the future, and the antithesis of the great promise of life which was ever sounding in his ears? To be shut out from the covenant of Jehovah was the end of all vision of blessing for life here or hereafter. And to see this was a sufficient belief of future chastisement. And there was a noble dignity in this, as compared with the wild polytheistic notions of the nations by whom the Jews were surrounded; and also as compared with the horrors of apocalyptic imagination, which were so abundantly developed in the later days of cruel persecutions of the Jews by relentless enemies. No transgressor, therefore, could come to his death feeling that he had not been abundantly warned of possible judgment to come.

LATER JEWISH VIEWS.

The development, in later Jewish literature, of a more distinct doctrine of a future life, and the words of Christ himself imply such views in the early days as we have supposed. In Ps. xlix. the author shows a clear sense of the difference between Sheol and the abode of the blessed, and so in Ps. xvi. and lxxiii. Talmudic and apocryphal writings make

Adam and Abraham to preside over their pious descendants. Abraham's bosom is paradise; and Fourth Maccabees associates Isaac and Jacob with Abraham in this, using the plural, εἰς τοὺς κόλπους. And in the closing lines of this book the martyrs are said to be gathered into the company (εἰς πατέρων χορόν) of the fathers and to receive from God pure and immortal lives (ψυχάς). Christ takes up this tradition when he makes Lazarus to be received to Abraham's bosom; and, again, when he makes the saved to come from the east and the west and sit down with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. When asked if there were few that were saved, he replied: "There shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth when ye shall see Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, and all the prophets in the kingdom of God, and yourselves thrust out." In regard to the resurrection, he said: "God said, I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. He is not the God of the dead, but the God of the living." We have here Christ's authority for saying that God spake to Moses as having the "living" patriarchs in his holy keeping, and we must take it for granted that Moses so understood him. Certainly this does not mean Sheol as the exegetes have conceived it.

The home of the fathers, therefore, in the keeping of their covenant God was the heaven of the Hebrews.

ARTICLE IV.

PAUL'S PHRASEOLOGY AND ROMAN LAW.

BY THE REV. GEORGE F. MAGOUN, D. D.

LOYALTY to the inspiration of the New Testament, and to the divine origin of Old Testament truths reproduced and exalted in it, does not forbid studious inquiry into the mould of its language. The dress of religious thought may be human, historic, ethnic, individual, while the body is from God. The New Testament differs from the Old in that it was not produced in purely Oriental surroundings. When revelation struck the Greek language and the institutions of the Roman Empire, it struck modes of expression and forms of diction entirely novel to an Asiatic Jew.

There is more evidence of the Apostle Paul's familiarity with Roman law than there is of his acquaintance with Greek literature; at least with such literature at large, other than the writings of Aratus and Cleanthes, natives of Southern Asia Minor like himself. That his education and mental habits should lead him, in conveying ideas and truths more profound and spiritual than his hearers and readers had yet grasped, to clothe them with a "costume"—to use Professor Stuart's favorite term—drawn from sources well known to them as to him, was altogether natural. How, indeed, could he help it? Why should the Holy Spirit prevent his doing so? He evidently did not. It is a growing impression among scholars that Paul's great difficulties and obscurities would largely disappear if we knew better the sources of that figurative diction of his, which, it has been observed with dis-

crimination, is never poetical or ornamental, but always logical and legal. How could it have been otherwise, indeed, with his cast of mind and training?

But a judicious appreciation of what has just been mentioned will not ascribe every comparison the Apostle makes of spiritual to secular things to the ready influence of Roman law. Some things in a lax way attributed to this influence the present writer has shown elsewhere¹ are independent of it. The more common error, however, has not been on that side, but the opposite. We may, perhaps, find in the former the best starting point for an investigation of the latter.

I. Assuming that Paul wrote Heb. ix., it is clear that he *might* have alluded to a divine "will" or "testament" had he been addressing Roman Christians. If neither of these is true, we should then need to see—in order to be satisfied of any such allusion—that the subject-matter required such a reference to the peculiar, the exclusively Roman, legal instrument; that *διαθήκη* is the Greek equivalent for *testamentum*; that this peculiar Roman form in the disposal of heritable property had become as much Greek as Roman, and that all this was familiar to the (unknown) writer of this epistle—a Hebrew convert to Christianity, it is agreed. But this nowhere appears. Indeed at Athens, only a child-

¹ In an article on "Roman Law and Contemporary Revelation" to appear in the *Green Bag* (Boston, law monthly) in 1895. As that paper is in a sense preliminary to this, it ought to be read first, in order to a "large, sound, roundabout," and just judgment of what is here said. To avoid crossing from the border land between law and revelation into the field of biblical interpretation, the former paper was confined to cases in which it is a mistake to regard the Apostle's form of expression or of thought as shaped by his knowledge of Roman law. The prominence of the topic first touched there is due to such facts as these: Succession to an estate was one of the three great principles at Rome of the early *jus civile*; and the title "de testimonio" was one of the four *libri singulares* studied in the first year of a law student's four years' course, along with the Institutes of Gaius. But that Paul knew all this and pursued such a course of study does not of itself prove the presence of law phraseology in any particular passage of his writings.

less father could make a will; while there never was a time when any Roman could not. (Sand. Just.)

There are two New Testament passages where the Roman meaning of "testament" is crudely possible, being our Lord's words as He gave the cup anticipating the speedy "pouring out" of His blood. But curiously enough the Revision does not say "testament" here, where it should, if ever, but "covenant."¹ A richer meaning, and free from embarrassment would be the rendering, "This is my blood of the new dispensation poured out [Luke in R. V.] unto remission of sins." In Heb. ix. the allusions to blood and death are plainly drawn into the writer's exposition of the remission of sins through Christ, not from the necessity of a Greek word, but from the ratification of the dispensation by offering His life "without blemish unto God," and from almost all things "cleansed with blood" in the old "dispensation"—which is even expressly noted. Moreover (ver. 12, 18), the Roman *testamentum* did not require "the death of the testator" at all, as both dispensations did that of the ratifying victim.² Is it not in every way inadmissible here?

¹ The word for this, *συνθήκη*, is *never* used in the New Testament; for inspiration would hardly recognize equality in contracts between God and man, as objectionable an idea as inheritance of salvation by men from God. Our Authorized Version says "covenant" nineteen times ("testament" thirteen); the Revision says "covenant" thirty-one times, admitting "testament" twice in Heb. ix. 16, 17, though not in eleven instances of *διαθήκη* before and after them. The Greek word in question occurs in the whole New Testament in three Gospels, six Epistles, in Acts, and the Apocalypse. A Roman will after death is a facile analogy to resort to; but did the apostle do it? Cf. *συνθήκη* and *συνάλλαγμα* with *compactus* and *contractus*. Luther goes so far as to render the first by "testament" twenty-nine times, which he could not have done had he known Roman law as Paul did; why should our Revisers render it by "covenant" twice more?

² In this Review for April, 1894, pp. 263, 264, Dr. W. H. Ward treats the two verses under discussion (16, 17) as a "tortuous bit of argument," by the author, an "extraordinary side-tracking of his illustration on another sense of the Greek word." (Argument by illustration?) One can no more accept this description in view of the facts given above, than he

In his Commentary on Galatians, Luther says that the Pauline "similitude of our heritage is familiar and well-known to all men." But surely it could not be as it was known to Paul. Some fifteen times, each, are used the terms for heir and inheritance, and ten times the corresponding verb, meaning to be heirs or to inherit. Nine of these occur in the Epistle to the Hebrews, where, indeed, the meaning must be that common to their way of thinking and that of the Gentiles, and to the ancients and moderns.¹ Is there, now, any peculiar feature of Roman law which must have shaped exceptional phraseology of Paul's?

II. Such phraseology occurs in Rom. viii. 17: "if children, then heirs; heirs of God and *joint heirs with Christ*." Meyer's commentary on this is as follows:—

"Not something *greater* than κληρον. θεοῦ, on the contrary in substance the *same*, but *specifically characterized* from the standpoint of our fellowship with Christ, whose *co-heirs* we must be as κληρον. θεοῦ, since having entered into can the averment that our Lord's death had no "relation to the Old Testament Sacrificial System" in view of 'the words here about His offering His blood "without blemish unto God" (ver. 14; cf. Matt. xxvi. 28), and those in Eph. v. 2, "and gave Himself up for us, an offering and a *sacrifice to God* for an odour of a sweet smell." Cf. Gesenius on Isa. liiii.

Since the above text was written, recent German scholarship has given a similar judgment in the German *Christian World* (No. 30, 1894, art. by Von Dobschütz; abstract in *The Thinker* of Oct.). "The Greek word διαθήκη, which Luther rendered mostly (twenty-nine times) by 'testament,' only four times by 'covenant' (Luke i. 72; Acts iii. 25, vii. 8; Rom. ix. 4), has certainly in profane authors always the meaning of a last disposition; *but in Old Testament language* [see Gen. vi. 18 and more than two hundred and fifty later passages in the Septuagint] *it is always 'covenant' without any reference to death*, and is therefore only chosen instead of the usual Greek word (συνθήκη), in order to make it plain that the question is not one of an agreement with equals, but a compact in which the covenant God takes the supreme initiative, and the covenant people are subordinate. The same applies to 'inheritance' and 'inherit.' Only in isolated passages does this refer in the New Testament to the legacy of a dead man (Matt. xxi. 38; Mark xii. 7; Luke xii.; Gal. iv.)."

¹ So in Apoc. xxi. 7; Jas. ii. 5; and 1 Pet. i. 4,–iii. 7, 9. Neither of these three apostolic writers knew Rome and her laws as Pau. did.

sonship through the *υιοθεσία*, we have become Christ's *brethren* (ver. 29). Moreover, that Paul has here in view, not the analogy of the Hebrew law of inheritance that conferred a man's intestate heritage only on sons of his body, if there were such, but that of the *Roman* law (Fritzsche, Tholuck, van Hengel) is the historically necessary supposition, which can least of all seem foreign and inappropriate in an Epistle to the *Romans*."

Just this and all this Luther on Galatians and Hodge on Romans missed. Shedd on Romans at one point antagonized it; needlessly, it would seem. He says: "To have the Roman law particularly in his eye would be utterly incongruous with St. Paul's feelings." Tholuck merely quotes Grotius as remarking that the Apostle's words tally not only with Israelitish law, but *also* [?] with that of the Gentiles.

More appreciative, it seems to me, is a writer in the *Contemporary Review* (Aug. 1891), who styles Rom. viii. 17, "*the most daring of theological conceptions*." "If we were not so thoroughly familiar with [it], would [it] not strike us as peculiarly forced and unhappy? If these words had not been used by St. Paul, would any modern divine have ventured to use them as explanatory of the relation between God and the human soul? To our minds, heirship involves no more than the idea of the acquisition of property by succession, and *the idea of succession is manifestly inapplicable to the Eternal God*. [Can the conclusion, then, be avoided?] That the heirship to which St. Paul alludes is Roman and not Hebrew heirship, is evident not merely from the accompanying reference to adoption (*υιοθεσία*), but also from the fact that it is a joint and equal heirship."

It was indeed a copartnership, not only between the heirs in common,¹ but also between them, and each of them,

¹ "No distinct traces of primogeniture appear in our authorities." (Clark, *Early Roman Law*, 28. So too, Coulanges, *The City*, p. 110; Gibbon, iv. 360.) "Neither barbarian nor Roman was accustomed to give

and the parent. "He was in law the same person with them." (Maine.) Certain heirs were "called self-successors (*sui heredes*), because they are members of the family; and even in the lifetime of the parent are deemed to a certain extent coproprietors." (Gaius ii. 157.) In the Code of Justinian the theory of Paul's time openly appears: "father and son are by nature almost understood to be one and the same person." (2 C. vi. 26.) Justinian remodelled long after Paul the system of intestate inheritance; but the theory of the identity of all the members of the family, which was not affected by the death of parents, and was "much older than any phase of testamentary jurisprudence," was how much earlier in original legal ideas or in philosophy than all forms of inheritance? One of the later statements of it is by Julius Paulus (third cent.)—the next largest contributor after Ulpian (both contemporaries of his) to the Digest of Justinian—2,080 fragments—who said: "when the father dies it is not so correct to say that [the children] succeed to his property, as that they acquire the free control of their own." Estates being indeed by the Romans held to be permanent, so was the legal personality of the first owner, in which he and his successors were thus blended together. It was a relation "inter vivos," and not a succession "mortis causa," as inheritance is with us, and is everywhere outside Roman law. And Paul's *Roman* readers would see the point of his extraordinary and otherwise inexplicable idiom at once. The idea of "the death of the testator" or that of a will as "of no strength at all while the testator liveth," being impossible, therefore, even unthinkable here, as it is improbable in Heb. ix., they took home to their believing hearts the strong consolation that any preference to the eldest son or his line." (Maine, 222.) The relation of the Roman theory of coheirship to wills would take us too far. A remark of Dr. Shedd here is important: "Fellowship in the inheritance, and not equality in it, is the chief thing." The *nature* of Christ settles this. (Cf. Tholuck.) But such fellowship between us and Christ is a very wonderful thing, as marvellous as sonship to God. (1 John iii. 1.)

their inheritance of eternal life, besides being a glorious futurity, was also a present participation and possession. Their associations relieved them from looking after the present tense in connection with eternal life as we do.

It is easy to believe now that the Apostle had these things familiar to him in mind when he wrote also to the churches of Galatia: "thou art no longer a bond servant, but a son; and, if a son, then an heir through God." The Greek text used by the revisers omits here *χριστοῦ*, and places *διὰ* before *θεοῦ*. We shall see presently the divine method of conferring through Christ spiritual sonship and heirship. Meyer says here:—

"With respect to the *legal* aspect of the conclusion, *ἐὶ δὲ υἱὸς καὶ κληρ*—in which, by the way, the father is conceived as dividing his inheritance during his lifetime,—the idea is not based on the *Jewish* law of inheritance according to which the (legitimately born) *sons* alone,—so Grotius, [but cf. quotation from him in Tholuck], if there were such, were, as a rule, intestate heirs. The apostle's idea is founded on the intestate succession of the *Roman law*, with which Paul as a Roman citizen was acquainted, as in fact it was well known in the provinces and applied there as regarded Roman citizens. According to the Roman law sons and daughters whether born in marriage or adopted children (and Paul conceived Christians as belonging to the latter class)¹

¹ If so, how could he mean the Jewish heirship? Godet on Romans well says here: "To be an heir of God is identical with being a possessor of life. . . . To be an heir with Christ is not to inherit in the second instance, to inherit *from* Him; it is to be put in the same rank as Himself; it is to share the divine possession *with* Him." And Christ was God to Paul. Gibbon (ch. xlv.) says of the first proprietor, "his children [were] the *partners* of his wealth" (vol. iv. 359). Cf. remark of Dobschütz quoted on page 442. No Jewish son was "clothed with the person of his father," or inherited such family power. "All the descendants through the male line were in the power of the same person (*pater familias*). And it was this that constituted the link of family relationship between them. Not the natural tie of blood." (Sandars' Introd. to Inst. Justinian, p. 29.)

were intestate heirs." So likewise Ellicott on Galatians.¹

That in the Roman Empire the owner of property could alienate part of it from the natural heirs by legacies, or make others his heirs, or some one *in solido*, was a familiar fact. Also that he could bestow it upon a slave, who was thereby emancipated, though otherwise he was part of the *familia* which passed by inheritance, and, as a chattel, denied the title of a person. If made an heir also, he became *hueres necessarius*, i. e., powerless to reject the inheritance bestowed upon him. So, if the testator doubted what would become of his estate, he commonly named a slave as coheir with others. The after condition of the freedman differed from his previous one as much as that in Israel of the son of the bondmaid, Ishmael, from that of Isaac, the son of the free-woman. Now Roman sons were under a *patria potestas*, fearfully despotic, from the time of Romulus down to the two hundredth year of the Empire (Becker); even to "very late days in the history of the Empire" (Amos). So Paul was led to say (Gal. iv. 1), "so long as the heir is a child, he differeth nothing from a bond servant, though he is lord of all." Gaius thus describes the status: "A man has power over his own children begotten in civil wedlock, a right peculiar to citizens of Rome, for there is scarcely any other nation where fathers are invested with such power over their children as at Rome." This extended to life and death, as it gave all its peculiar character to the Roman family, and was just as valid as to children by adoption as to children by descent. "Sui heredes," says Justinian, "even in the father's lifetime, are considered owners of the inheritance in a certain degree." (Ed. Sand. p. 290.)

¹ "Where the Greek education was unknown, the new religion seems to have made no progress at all. The regions where it spread most rapidly were those where the people were becoming aware of the beauty of Greek letters and the grandeur of Roman government, . . . St. Paul came into South Galatia just at the time when the Roman spirit was beginning to permeate the country, and the four places where he is recorded to have founded churches were the four centres of Roman influence." (Ramsay, Church in the Roman Empire, p. 147.)

all readers of history may have gathered from the slaying of Virginia by her father in the Forum. Gaius adds—what is specially pertinent here, “I am aware that among the *Galatians* parents are invested with power over their children.” (Comm. i. § 55.) From these Galatian Gentiles Paul had gathered converts into Galatian churches.

And it is very plain at a glance that the rest of Paul's language is of a like Roman cast: “but is under guardians and stewards (R. V.) until the time appointed of the father.” The first of these terms is in Greek, *ἐπιτρόπους*, Thayer's definition of which is, “one who has the care and tutelage of children, either where the father is dead, or where the father still lives.” The other term is *οἰκονόμους*, “the manager of a household or of household affairs,” for “the children not of age.” They are nearly synonymous terms of office; but Roman or Galatian in place of Jewish. The “guardian” was the “*tutor*” of Roman law,¹ that is, the protector of his person and estate. The “steward” was the slave of the “tutor,” appointed by him, when necessary, “as a bailiff to manage some distant portion of the infant's property.” Poste on Gaius says that the ward was called *infans*, *fari non protere* up to the age of seven. The law of tutelage was minute and careful, and abounds, says Phillimore, in “admirable proofs of wisdom.” The expression “until the time appointed by the father,” would be better rendered “until the time of the father's appointing”—i. e., the period

¹ Not to be confounded with *παιδαγωγός* of chap. iii. 25, whose office was so different and inferior, though the R. V. translates this “tutor.” The writer in the *Contemporary Review*, to whom we owe much, differs with Professor Thayer as to tutelage of a child whose father was living. It was “a device for artificially prolonging the *patria potestas*, notwithstanding the decease of the father.” “If the father when he died was *sui juris*, the child, young as he was, became *sui juris* also; for he was no longer subject to a *patria potestas*. He should be placed at once under the charge of a guardian.” (Hadley, 148.) The pedagogue was a later servant, employed after Romans and Greeks mingled. (Becker's Gallus, p. 188.)

over which the father's power of appointing a guardian extended. The period was arbitrarily fixed, and could not be extended by the father's testamentary directions. The child, "so long as he was a *filius familias*—that is, so long as his father lived—was not less in the condition of a bond servant at forty than at fourteen." (Cont. Rev.) By what analogy then known could the inspired writer have more vividly portrayed the being aforesaid under the divine law?

III. But the most important of Paul's uses of language-forms taken from Roman law is found in his phraseology about Christians as children of God by adoption. It seems to have been his habit, along with his view of Father and Son in the Godhead, to regard the former as relatively the spiritual father of all spiritual persons—as all natural persons are naturally his offspring—and the great saving change in them he conceived not only as a renewing by the Spirit, but as a reception by its Head into the spiritual family of God. The latter view seems generally to take the place with him of the New Birth.¹ But his Jewish education and theology and the language of the Old Testament supplied him with no such idea. Adoption into a family in which one was not born was unknown to the Jews. As a legal proceeding, recognized by its own peculiar and notable usages, it was as

¹ Titus iii. 5-7 cannot be regarded as an exception, but rather as an explanation of the source of heirship, "that we might be made heirs." This one instance of recognition of regeneration is in strong contrast to the frequently recurring language of John, which ran steadily in so different a channel from Paul's. Had "new birth" been a Latin expression akin to *adoptio*, could the origin of the latter in Roman law be missed? "The adoption of children," says Professor Sheldon Amos, "in the broader sense which included the form of adoption (*arrogatio*) by which a son who was no longer under his father's power was brought under the power of a new father, fictitiously so called, was at all times a prominent feature in Roman law, and the rules regulating it vacillated very slightly during the thousand years which the true history of that law covers" (p. 275). From its metaphorical use in the New Testament the element of fiction is excluded by such declarations as those in John i. 13; 1 Pet. i. 23. See Smith, above.

much an invention of the Romans as a written and witnessed will. The usage regulated by it was so common that it originated new family names, like Scipio *Emilianus* (adopted by E.). Julius Cæsar adopted his nephew Augustus, and half a dozen other emperors became such in the same way, e. g., Nerva, Trajan, Hadrian, and Marcus Aurelius. In Judæa this usage "would have been inconsistent with the law of the inheritance of property." (Smith, Dict. Bib.)¹ "In a juridic sense absolutely unknown. The family records of the chosen people were kept with scrupulous care in order that the lineage of the Deliverer might be identified. Fictitious kinship could manifestly find no recognition in Hebrew genealogies." In one of his smaller works Dr. Edersheim observes that "the relationship between parents and children was especially tender and close, widely differing from the state of absolute possession as property,—body and soul,—in Greece² and Rome." (Laws and Polity, Jew.)

It was impossible, therefore, that Jewish life could have suggested to Paul the phraseology or the idea even, which he applied to the new spiritual relation of Christians. Turn-

¹ "The instances [in O. T.] occasionally adduced as referring to the custom (Gen. xv. 3; xvi. 2; xxx. 5, 9) are evidently not cases of adoption proper." (*Ibid.*) A radical difference between the Roman and the German family is maintained. In the latter, "Parental authority was not a *jus*, as *patria potestas*." Though adoption of some sort, therefore, existed in Anglo-Saxon and ancient German law—an example in Beowulf is cited—it "did not even place the one adopted under the parental authority of the adopter." (Mr. Earnest Young on Anglo-Saxon Law.) Of this, however, and of early Hindoo usages, referred to by Mr. Maine, probably Gaius, and certainly Paul, knew nothing. Mr. Austin ascribes the scantiness of Roman criminal law to the reach and extent of the *patria potestas*. (Lect. Jurisp. xlv.) Cf. Gibbon, iv. 374, and Mommsen's Hist. Rome.

² Less always in Greece than in Rome. And Justinian entirely changed adoption in an age later than Paul's. So Paul could not have then used it figuratively. The adopted son did not pass into the family of the adopter, but only into the succession of the estate. How unlike Christian adoption this of Justinian! Cf. the Apostle's namesake, Julius Paulus, for the softening of the *patria potestas*.

ing, however, to Roman custom and law we discover at once the mould of his conception. The *patria potestas*, says Professor Hadley, "was so momentous a thing, it affected so long and so deeply the interests of the person subject to it, that adoption, the creation of a new *patria potestas*,¹ could not fail to be an important institute of Roman law. The effect on the adopted person was to sever all legal ties which bound him to his original family.² He lost all rights of inheritance which before belonged to him. By the law he was regarded and treated exactly as if he had always been a member of the family into which he had come by adoption." (125-126. Cf. p. 279 on change of right of a nation.) He was "loosed from the law" of his real father,—something abhorrent to Jewish feeling. "He assumed the new family name, partook in its mystic sacrificial rites, and became to all intents and purposes, a member of the house; nor could the tie thus formed be broken save through the ceremony of emancipation. . . . It constituted as complete a bar to intermarriage as relation by blood." (Cont. Rev.) Justinian reduced very much the formalities and the effects of adoption, as he reduced its correlate institution *patria potestas*; but this was four hundred years after Paul, who knew both, instead, as they were known to Gaius. (See Poste and Clark.) Nor are *any* ceremonial forms, more or less elaborate, essential to the apostolic metaphor. The gist of it was that *an adopted child was in Roman law, as to his fam-*

¹ For "in the primitive view, relationship is exactly limited by *patria potestas*." (Maine.)

² Free persons are meant. Conybeare and Howson are in error (ii. 175, note) in implying that the transaction concerned slaves alone. These were only adopted if manumitted. A glance at the ten paragraphs of Gaius, de Adoptionibus, i. 97-107, would have prevented mistake, but these able and learned authors wrote twenty years before Poste issued his English edition of Gaius. Gibbon (Decline and Fall, i. 776-778) observes in his well-known forty-fourth chapter, "the claims of adoption were not less sacred or less rigorous than those of nature." (iv. 343, ed. 1850, Bost.)

ily status, born again, a new creature. From this, by analogy, came the phrases as to his new heirship through God and coheirship with Christ, and from this alone.

The word by which Paul designates metaphorically this entirely new relation to God was *υιοθεσία* (*υιός-τίθημι*, the putting one in place of a son). Yet the thing was Roman rather than Greek, for while, as Thayer observes (Gr. Eng. Lexicon, N. T.), the phrase, adopted son, comes down from Pindar and Herodotus, yet no Greek formalities, it may be suggested, appear corresponding to the Roman *adoptio* and *adrogatio*. It was very natural then that Paul, magnifying in a letter to those familiar with these national and exclusively Roman usages, the spiritual advantages of Israelites, should say, "*whose is the adoption.*" Nor that he should say to "all that are in Rome, beloved of God, called to be saints," "but ye received the spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father"; and should portray the looking forward to its full fruition—"the revealing of the sons of God"—at the resurrection, as "waiting for the adoption, *to-wit*, the redemption of our body. For by *hope* were we saved." It is well said by Conybeare and Howson: "this adoption is not perfect during the present life; there is still a higher sense in which it is future, and the object of earnest longing." Writing to "the faithful in Christ Jesus" in the proconsular capital beyond the Ægean Sea, of the spiritual blessings to which they were chosen in Christ before the foundation of the world, the almost inevitable language of an apostle who was born a Roman citizen is, "having foreordained us unto adoption as sons through Jesus Christ unto himself." Once more, setting forth to Galatian Christians, a little farther east (whither the Roman *prætor* (*peregrinus*) had borne the same law-concepts and usages that have been employed in these passages), how all races are one in Christ, and are Abraham's spiritual seed, he referred to Christ as "born under the law, that he might redeem them which were under the law, that

we might receive the adoption of sons." Wherever, then, Christians are spoken of as sons, the meaning is strictly adopted sons; wherever they are exalted as heirs, it is as adoptive, not natural heirs. That which is born of the flesh is flesh; and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit. But we received not the spirit of the world, but the spirit which is from God. For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God. And because ye are sons, God sent forth the Spirit of His Son into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father. "By the aid of this figure the Gentile convert was enabled to realize in a vivid manner the fatherhood of God, the brotherhood of the faithful, the obliteration of past penalties, the right to the mystic inheritance." (Cont. Rev.) "The word *υιοθεσία* is used by Paul alone.¹ It signifies acceptance to the state of children, and presupposes, therefore, that those accepted had *not been God's children*. Hence it is clear that the expression has no reference to physical existence, by which all natural men also are children of God, but to the inward life only." (Ols. on Rom.) "The possibility of the *υιοθεσία* is entirely brought about through Christ's atonement." (Ols. on Eph.) Says Meyer on Romans: "Not sonship in general; it does not represent believers as children of God by birth, but as those who by God's grace have been *assumed* into the place of children, and as brethren of Christ." (Cf. Id. on Eph. i. 5.) "Before Christ men never possessed the *υιοθεσία* here referred to, although the old theocratic adoption of the Jews was never lost" (Meyer.) The reference here is to the chosen people as a people. (Rom. ix. 4.) "The term reminds us of the fact," observes Godet on Romans, "that Jesus alone is *Son* in essence (*υἱος μενομένης*, only Son). To become sons of God we must become incorporated into Him by faith." Lightfoot and Ellicott agree that the word never means simple sonship; "*always adoption, no other interpretation*," says

¹Cf. Thayer. Greek-English Lexicon, p. 706.

Meyer. These citations are sufficient as to the word. Elliott adds that the texts in Galatians and Romans, so decisive, must appropriately be explained "*on the principles of the Roman, and not of the Hebrew law.*"¹ It must be overwhelmingly evident that these scholars, essayists, and thinkers are all untouched by the whim, lately creeping in among us from over the sea, that all human beings are created children of God at the outset, spite of the broad and firm New Testament distinction between *υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ* or *τέκνον τ. θ.* in the ethico-religious sense, and *γένος τ. θ.* in the natural one.² And is it not quite as evident that the Scripture writers could not have been forced to entertain the fancy that the spiritual man is derived from the natural man by evolution?³ And

¹ Nothing need be made here, specially, of the fact that to the Romans "the family tie meant, not common blood, but communion in the same family cultus"; "without a religious bond it was inconceivable." (Ramsay, p. 190.) Something far higher affirmed by our Lord in Matt. xxiii. 8, 9.

² Paul's discrimination in the words for mere offspring and the true filial relation has been overlooked. Perhaps the pressing need in our land of emphasizing the common creative origin of Southern slaves with white men has led to it. A single sentence added to his address on Mars Hill, Acts xvii. 28, would have conveyed the modern idea (ancient, also, but then obsolete) of the method of creation had it been true. His speculatively religious (*δαισιδαίμονεστέροις*) Athenian hearers might have thought their time well spent in hearing and talking over *this* "new thing," and would have never "mocked" in the sequel, his "new teaching." But would Gal. iv. 5, and Eph. i. 5, in this case, have ever been written? or the inference from adoption to heirship, so thoroughly Roman, in Ep. Rom. viii. 14, 17? Indeed, would Scripture instruction as to the New Birth, including our Lord's doctrine, asserting a supernatural as against a natural process, have ever been given?

³ No one has yet had the hardihood to propound this as a comprehensive hypothesis of our becoming children of God. But discrete spiritual qualities have often been confounded with or traced to natural and non-spiritual ones. Indeed, the Unitarian philosophy of religion steadily does this. And if it be true, as some think of late, that mere physical altruism evolves, or creates, intelligent love, by "resident forces," in the material antecedent, why should not this developed altruism in turn (though non-holy) create by such forces the holy affection towards God required in the Scriptures? In this and adjacent regions of thought the

how can this notion ever "break forth from God's holy word"?

Full well the Apostle knew that neither Greek nor Jewish habits of mind could furnish exact and correct expression of the deep Christian truths with the revelation of which by epistle he was charged. Equally well he knew that Roman habits and institutions offered the perfect basis of figure which he needed. Why, then, should we hesitate to see and to say that Divine Inspiration guided and prompted him in choosing the figures of speech he did?

If some reader wonders that Bible expositors have not generally made clear this significant Latin mould or costume of Paul's teachings, let me hasten to say that it was not till 1816 that Niebuhr, exploring the library of the cathedral chapter of Verona, Italy, for something else, came upon a palimpsest which, underneath certain writings of St. Jerome, contained the long-lost elementary treatise of Gaius, one of the five great Roman lawyers. Writing of the early law of the Republic, Gaius gives it as it was in Paul's time. It was not, however, till 1861 that Sir Henry I. S. Maine's¹ "epoch-making book" made even English legal scholars aware of the wealth which had come into their hands. Ten years later came Mr. Poste's invaluable edition of Gaius with elucidations. The only monogram yet in English on our subject helpful to New Testament students that we have heard of is that in the *Contemporary Review* for August, 1891, quoted above. These publications will richly repay the attention of American exegetes and theologians. Why not that of any preacher?

"The Fathers derived many illustrations from Roman jurisprudence"; but modern Protestant commentators have "universal hypothesis" is notably weakening. The "ascent of man" in that direction is impossible.

¹ His essay on Roman Law came out in 1856; his *Ancient Law*, here referred to, in 1861.

not done so.¹ Calvin and Luther lived some three centuries before the Institutes of Gaius were recovered; the former was for his time well trained in Roman law before he turned to theology. The latter was not.² Lord Mackenzie quotes Melanchthon and Leibnitz on the high value of Roman law as a professional study. The historians note the influence of Christianity upon it and upon the life of the Empire, but not the influence the other way so clearly.³ The religious cyclopædias are unsatisfactory. Kitto's first edition—to go no farther back—(1845) drew some light from the neglected source, and hinted that “a more minute investigation might

¹ Olshausen clearly saw the point of the Apostle's figurative language, but does not note its origin. If the word of God had explicitly affirmed that men are God's holy spiritual children *by nature*, or had not explicitly and with emphasis and repetition denied it, no able expositor would have known what to do with such language; nor would it have occurred in Scripture. Nor the revelation of the Son as Propitiation, or of the Spirit as Author of the New Birth. That is, *the whole revelation of the Trinity* would have been lacking, and that of Christian Redemption as well.

² The absence of all allusion to the Roman law, both its language and its concepts, is as complete and marked in Calvin as in Luther. Very wide is the mistake of those who suspect the Genevan of importing his theology in any respect from his law studies. But as to forms of language there was surely time between his day and that of Meyer for that progress in interpretation which the expositions of the latter disclose. As to the *spiritual sense*, however, of Paul's ideas underneath their Roman costume, no one surpasses Calvin in insight and vigor. Cf. Com. on Rom. viii. 17, “Si vero filii,” etc.

³ “If we compare the Institutes of Justinian with those of Gaius, we find changes in the law of marriage, of succession, and many other branches of law, in which it is not difficult to recognize the spirit of humanity and reverence for natural ties which Christianity had inspired. The disposition to get rid of many of the more peculiar features of the old Roman law, observable in the later legislation, was partly indeed the fruit of secular causes; but it was also due in a great measure to the alteration of thought and feeling to which the new religion had given birth.” (Sandars' Justin. Intr. pp. 21, 22.) “Justinian achieved the final triumph of the natural over the legal family . . . all rights of succession to the property of an adopted child being reserved for the natural parent just as if no adoption had taken place.” (Amos, 275.)

discover" more. McClintock and Strong merely compile Kitto's matter, but follow it with a paper contradicting it, and with sketches of modern Mohammedan usage that throw no light on Roman ones. The writer in Smith ventures the general remark that "to illustrate the position of the Christianized Jew or Gentile, Paul aptly transfers well-known feelings and customs." Schaff-Herzog (1891) looks for "the opening of new treasures of theological science" from that quarter. So exhaustive a work as Conybeare and Howson on "The Life and Epistles of St. Paul"—issued in the sixties, and needing now annotation from Gaius and the learning his Institutes have begotten—has but this sentence (i. 12): "The idea of law had grown up with the growth of the Romans, and wherever they went they carried it with them." Before Niebuhr's rare "find," all that was known of Gaius, the second in rank of the great Roman five who embalmed for posterity the products of the peculiar genius of their nation, was five hundred and thirty extracts in the Digest of Justinian.¹ Yet history tells us that "for three hundred and fifty years the *élite* of the youth of Rome were initiated in the mysteries of jurisprudence by the manual of Gaius"—as Justinian called him—"Gaius noster." He probably published his treatise before the death of Marcus Aurelius,² A.D. 180.

¹ "The era of those who may be called the classical jurists cannot be sharply defined, except by saying that it began—so far as any monuments of it remain—with Gaius and ended with Modestinus. (A. D. 245. Justinian died A. D. 563.) Gaius must have been born after the accession of Hadrian, A. D. 117, and probably wrote up to the times of Marcus Aurelius." (Amos, Hist. and Prin. of the Civil Law of Rome.) The rescript of Theodosius II. and Valentinian III., A. D. 436, directed "the same authority to be accorded to the writings of Gaius as to the writings of Papinian, Paulus, Ulpian, and Modestinus." (Amos.)

² Cicero, who often disclaimed legal learning, had less advantages as a law student than those of after centuries, but he must have been impressed with its importance by each Scævola whose pupil he was, one of whom was "the first juris-consult who applied a scientific method to the treatment of the law." (Hadley, Lect.) His sense of the value of the

It may soften our sense of the shortcomings of Christian expositors, if we notice those of Gibbon and his great editor, Milman. The latter praised "the profound knowledge of the laws" of the Empire shown by the historian in his "Decline and Fall," while he placed at the head of his "most temperate and skillful guides on civil law," Heineccius, who died at Halle, 1741, seventy-five years before Gaius was recovered by Niebuhr. But Phillemore (54 note) says of Milman, this admiring editor, he "knows little of Roman law, and nothing of jurisprudence." The year before Gaius reappeared, however, Savigny (Middle Ages, 1815) supplied the churchman with some corrections of the historian,¹ while Warnkonig (1821), Gaius (Berlin ed., 1824), Hugo (Hist. Rom. Lan. 1825), and Walker (1834) furnished many more. Gibbon's forty-fourth chapter now bristles with editorial footnotes that quite transform the statements of the text. Heineccius comes in for a liberal share of contradiction by Milman's new authorities.

Those who love both secular and sacred learning may then well rejoice in the statement of Poste, the accomplished translator and editor of Gaius, that now "knowledge of the laws under which Horace and Cicero lived, is almost as accessible as is the knowledge of the laws of England of the present day to the English layman."

law in his day to the orator and the statesman is vigorously given in De Oratore. St. Augustine, A. D. 372, resorted to Rome to study it, where Gaius was the first author used. (Amos.)

¹ Starting, however, with Gibbon's account of the status of a son and a daughter under the *patria potestas* (Bost. ed., Vol. iv. 341, 346) and taking in the qualifications that are authorized, we can see how Galatian Christians, knowing all this better than we moderns do, would be struck with Paul's words (Gal. iv. 1-9) and realize the wondrous change from bondage under the rudiments of the world, and natural birth under law to the liberty of children and heirs of God through regeneration.

ARTICLE V.

WHAT IS SOCIOLOGY.

BY MR. Z. SWIFT HOLBROOK.

I.

THE following letter, which explains itself, was sent to a large number of the leading thinkers in the United States. The replies which have been received speak for themselves:—

OBERLIN, OHIO, Jan. 15, 1895.

Dear Sir:—Owing to the wide diversity of opinions upon the propriety of using the word "Christian" as applied to "Sociology" in the phrase "Christian Sociology," we desire a concise statement of your views upon the question on the enclosed postal card with permission to publish the same in the BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

Thanking you in advance, we are,

Respectfully yours,

THE EDITORS.

Rev. Lyman Abbott, D.D., *Pastor of the Plymouth Church, Brooklyn, N. Y.*:—While the phrase Christian Sociology is not strictly accurate, it seems to me to be on the whole not inapt to define a school of thought, namely, that of those who hold that Jesus Christ taught not merely principles of individual character, but also those of social order, and that on his teachings a true and scientific order of society can be based.

E. Benjamin Andrews, D.D., LL.D., *President of Brown University, Providence, R. I.*:—If we mean sociology objectively considered, as the science of society,

the adjective "Christian" is clearly not in place. The use of this adjective indicates that we mean social science according to Christian ideas or as urged by Christian writers, in distinction from the science of society as held by those who deny the possibility of improving the race. This last distinction is *very real*, vital even, and I see no better brief way to signalize it than to use the word "Christian Sociology," adding some title for the other sort of thinking (as "Devil's Sociology"), a good deal of which gets itself aired.

James B. Angell, LL.D., *President of Michigan University,*

Ann Arbor, Mich.:—In a strictly scientific use of language I should question the use of the phrase "Christian Sociology." One may say it as one may say Christian Political Economy, Christian Politics, etc. But it is in that popular and general use of terms that it would seem to me to be allowable.

W. J. Ashley, *Professor in Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.*:—I have grave objections—scientific and literary—to the current use of "Sociology"; and still graver to the adjective "Christian" as applied to it. But these objections can scarcely be stated on a postal card.

Rev. James Atkins, D. D., *President of Asheville College, Asheville, N. C.*:—The word "Christian" as applied to Sociology is eminently proper. The sociological principles of Christianity are distinct, unique. No other adjective is so scientifically accurate and yet so broad in its place here. Dr. Gregory in naming his work on Ethics used it, and Dr. Albert Taylor Bledsoe, one of the greatest of American review editors, especially commended the author for his discernment and discretion in styling his work "Christian Ethics." The distinguishing adjective applied to the included sciences, cannot be rejected from the including science without confusion and error.

Hon. Simeon E. Baldwin, LL. D., *Judge of the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, New Haven, Conn.*:—It is to be regretted

that we have no better term than Sociology, a word barbarously compounded out of two languages, to denote the science treating of human society: but it has acquired as definite a meaning as Geology has, and I see no propriety in assuming that it can be divided into a Christian branch and a non-Christian branch. Sociology can be treated from the standpoint of Christianity; but it cannot be identified with it or differentiated by it. Religion exists for man, not man for religion.

Rev. W. G. Ballantine, D. D., LL. D., *President of Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio*:—We say "Christian Ethics" and by analogy should say *Christian Sociology* in acknowledgment that the clearest light in each science comes from Christ.

If Christ came to regenerate society, and if he is the sole source of the vital forces that are regenerating it, and if he is to be eternally the Head of the human race, and if the evils of society arise mainly, not from ignorance nor from poverty, but from sin, and if Jesus alone can save his people from their sins,—then the principles of Christianity are the fundamentals of Sociology. This does not mean that sociology does not derive its *facts* from a wide range of inductive sciences.

Rev. John Henry Barrows, D. D., *Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, Chicago, Ill.*:—I do not perceive any good reasons for criticizing the use of "Christian" as applied to "Sociology."

Rev. S. C. Bartlett, D.D., LL.D., *Lecturer in Dartmouth College, Hanover, N. H.*:—Sociology, so-called, may be Christian, or it may not. A true Christian sociology lies imbedded in the "second great commandment," especially as expounded by our Saviour, and is involved in the whole spirit and maxims of Christ's religion, and true Christians have always been engaged in efforts, organized or unorganized, for the benefit of the oppressed and depressed. The benign influence of Christianity through every stratum of society has been in proportion to its power over its followers. Whether it is best for the church to endeavor to absorb all these efforts directly into its own hands as an "institutional church" or to continue its co-operation largely as a leavening force with other legitimate, established agencies and channels of influence, is another question.

Ex-President John Bascom, D. D., LL. D., *Williamstown, Mass.*:—I do not like the phrase Christian Sociology. It implies that there is more than one kind of Sociology, and that one kind at least is not Christian. Christian principles correctly applied to society and a correct Sociology are identical.

Edward W. Bemis, Ph. D., *Professor in Chicago University, Chicago, Ill.*:—I see no sufficient reason for prefixing the term Christian to Sociology any more than to Biology or Political Economy, though I believe the soundest Sociology is in harmony with Christ's life and teaching.

Rev. W. F. Blackman, Ph. D., *Professor in Yale University, New Haven, Conn.*:—There can be no objection to the term "Christian Sociology" that does not apply equally to the terms "Christian Ethics" and "Christian Theology." I believe all three are legitimate. "The Sociology of Christ" is as correct a phrase as is "the Philosophy of Plato," or "the Politics of Aristotle," or "the Ethics of Kant," or "the Sociology of Comte." But I must add that much that passes for "Christian Sociology" appears to me to be a mischievous misinterpretation of a certain fraction of our Lord's teachings.

Charles A. Blanchard, President of Wheaton College, Wheaton, Ill.:—I suppose "Sociology" to be a designation of science, actual and embryonic. All science is of God in the sense that all truth is from Him; that all facts and relations are in His plan. Strictly speaking, I suppose that there is no more reason for saying "Christian Sociology" than "Christian Biology," yet because we find so many unchristian arrangements in society there may be an advantage in using the expression, illogical though it be, for a time.

Rev. George Dana Boardman, D.D., *Professorial Lecturer in the University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.*:—I cannot understand why there should be any "diversity of opinion upon the propriety of the phrase 'Christian Sociology.'" While Sociology is largely a matter of observation, statistics, induction, etc., yet the altogether su-

- preme factor is the voluntary element, and therefore the Ethical or Christian. Accordingly, a Sociology which leaves out this prime element of Christian motive is itself unscientific, for it omits the chief factor in the case.

John E. Bradley, Ph. D., LL. D., *President of Illinois College, Jacksonville, Ill.*:—Sociology is a term employed to designate a very comprehensive field of study. I can see no impropriety in limiting the field of discussion to any branch of the general subject. "Christian Sociology" seems to me to embrace many very important topics.

Rev. James Brand, D. D., *Pastor of the First Church, Oberlin, Ohio*:—1. The evils from which society is suffering arise from selfishness and ignorance. The aim and end of Christianity is to eliminate both of these. Christ furnishes the only perfect ideal standard of social life. 2. Christ's conception of man gives the principle and motive, his sociology gives the method for improving society. 3. Sociology, apart from Christianity, is speculative rather than practical. At best it will remove ignorance without removing selfishness, therefore must fail. 4. Christ's two great commands embodying Theology and Sociology have practically the same end and aim, and cannot be separated without crippling both. 5. Any sociology, whether as a philosophy or a science, which rejects the Christian principle, ignores the moral nature of man and must be barren. 6. The use of the adjective "Christian" is

not tautological, for there are unchristian sociologies which are constantly drifting toward anti-Christian sociologies.

- **Wm. M. Brooks, President of Tabor College, Tabor, Iowa**:—Socialist as ordinarily used does not mean Christian, but there may be a community of interest without a community of property.

There is such a science as "Christian Sociology," meaning the science of society organized on a Christian basis, but no one has a right to teach the principles of so-called "socialists" and attach to them the name Christian. Society must be lifted individually, not in the mass.

Rev. Charles O. Brown, D. D., *Pastor of the First Church, San Francisco, Cal.*:—We must use the word "Christian" as applied to "Sociology" if we are to discuss sociological questions on a Christian basis, to distinguish from much that goes under the name of "Sociology" that is manifestly not Christian. To me this appears every way as consistent as to speak of "Christian Ethics" to distinguish from systems of ethics that are not Christian, or "Christian doctrine" to distinguish from other than Christian doctrine.

James H. Canfield, LL. D., *Chancellor of University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Neb., and President-elect of Ohio State University*:—When I use the word "Christian" I mean that which possesses and is dominated by the spirit (teachings and life) of Christ.

Christian Sociology, therefore, would mean to me that branch of philosophy which treats of the phenomena of human society, with a clear recognition of the *fact* that the spirit of Christ is and must be the cardinal principle, the power preservative. I say "fact," because the conscious or unconscious acceptance of Christ's spirit is no longer a mere theory in human society. By all means *use* the expression.

H. K. Carroll, LL. D., *New York Independent*.:—I see no impropriety in defining as Christian Sociology that philosophy of explaining and conducting the business of Society which, while dealing with economic questions, shall be directly controlled by the broad principles of humanity which the *religion* of Christ inculcates.

Franklin Carter, LL. D., *President of Williams College, Williamstown, Mass.*:—Christianity allows such variety of opinion on public questions that I can see no difficulty in admitting that one who favors the principle of association instead of competition as the basis of social activities may be a Christian. Is not such a one fairly described as a Christian Socialist?

Robert C. Chapin, Professor in Beloit College, Beloit, Wis.:—If Sociology is a descriptive science, the adjective "Christian" hardly seems to belong before it; if it is an art, the art of improving social conditions, it is fitting to call the application of Christian ethics to these relations "Christian Sociology." This latter task is so impor-

tant that I could wish for it a name more free from the ambiguity that now attaches to every use of the word Sociology.

George C. Chase, President of Bates Collège, Lewiston, Me.:—The words "Christian Sociology" seem to me warranted by usage and analogy. They are a natural implication of the truth that all social problems find their solution in the application of the enduring principles of Christianity. The current use of these words shows that Christian scholars have not forgotten that the founder of their religion loved to call himself the "Son of man."

John B. Clark, Ph. D., Professor in Amherst College, Amherst, Mass.:—In my judgment the term "Christian" may be properly used in connection with the practical art that corresponds to Sociology. I do not favor using it in connection with the title of the science as such.

Rev. Joshua Coit, Boston, Mass.:—Believing in "Christian Sociology," I approve of the phrase.

J. R. Commons, Professor in Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind.:—Sociology is the study of man in his Social relations. These relations depend upon his wants, his physical surroundings, his beliefs. Brahman Sociology is based on the belief that men are unequal—that the Sudra born from the feet of God shall forever be the slave of the Brahman who proceeds from the head of God. Christian Sociology is based on the be-

lief that men though unequal physically and mentally are equal in the sight of God—are all his children and brothers whom he equally loves. How social relations have developed from primitive inequality, that these relations are yet developing and may still further be promoted towards the Christian's ideal, is the field, the faith and the aim of Christian Sociology.

Joseph Cook, LL. D., Boston, Mass.—*Christian Sociology* and *applied Christianity* are to me nearly synonymous phrases. I prefer the latter, but have no serious objection to the former. *Christian Socialism*, however, appears to me to be a highly objectionable phrase, there are so many mischievous kinds of socialism. I am a co-operationist, not a socialist.

J. M. Coulter, LL. D., President of Lake Forest University, Lake Forest, Ill.—If Sociology is a study of society, I see no more reason why we should have "Christian sociology" than "Christian biology." It is surely a science without any reference to the kind of people who study it or proclaim it. In my judgment, therefore, I would regard the expression "Christian Sociology" as objectionable, just on the same grounds, as I would "Christian Astronomy."

E. M. Cravath, D. D., President of Fisk University, Nashville, Tenn.—It strikes me that Sociology as a science cannot properly have the term Christian prefixed to it. I firmly believe that true Sociology will be found to include the Christian system of mo-

rality and the evangelical conceptions of God and His relations to men and society as revealed in Jesus, the Christ. This is because religion is a vital element in human society and must be taken account of, and the true religion must become a part of Sociology.

Rev. Samuel W. Dike, LL. D., Secretary of National Divorce Reform League, Auburndale, Mass.—

Sociology must sooner or later be restricted to substantially the following definition: It is the *scientific* knowledge of the phenomena, forms and forces of associated human life or society, considered in their relation to society as a whole. This makes sociology a science, and not a social philosophy, or a practical art, or the equivalent of one or all the social sciences. It makes full provision for attention to all that Christianity has contributed in fact, form or power to society, *but as a part of the content of the material of the science.* It thus escapes the charge of being unscientific, that lies against "Christian Sociology," "Christian Geology" and like phrases, which mislead the people and really belittle our faith.

Edward D. Eaton, D. D., LL. D., President of Beloit College, Beloit, Wis.—Why should we not say "Christian Sociology"? We speak of "Christian Ethics," because the facts and principles of Christianity furnish essential data, and clarify the conceptions and enlarge the scope of the science. For like reasons we may regard "Christian Sociology" as the broadest

and profoundest study of human relations.

Rev. Brother Fabrician, President of St. John's College, Washington, D. C.—There is a philosophy both Christian and Anti-Christian, the principles of each ramify all sub-divisions; and as sociology is logically a sub-division of philosophy, it must of necessity partake of the influences of either school; hence I regard "Christian" as applied to sociology as clearly proper.

Rev. Arthur Fairbanks, Ph. D., Instructor in the Yale Divinity School, New Haven, Conn.—Outside of theological seminaries students of social phenomena are all but agreed that sociology is the proper name for the *science* of social phenomena. Believing that sociology should receive scientific form and scientific treatment, such as astronomy or psychology or economics have received, I feel that the word "Christian" in the phrase Christian Sociology is misleading and even absurd. A science is neither Christian nor un-Christian, even when it fulfils a true mission in helping the scientist to a larger Christian faith. Christian Sociology means *either* the science of Christian society,—in which case the name is incorrect and unwise,—*or* the ethics of Christian life in society, and in this case Christian *ethics* and not Christian Sociology is what is really meant.

Charles G. Fairchild, President of Rollin College, Winter Park, Fla.—The teachings of Christ

from the beginning have influenced profoundly the thoughts and practices of men in sociological matters. That influence was never so potent as it is to-day. The term *Christian Sociology* seems to me eminently appropriate.

Rev. Edm. B. Fairfield, D. D., LL. D., Grand Rapids, Mich.—It seems to me that it is a mere matter of definition. If "Sociology" is understood to mean "the philosophy of human society," then it would be entirely proper to use the prefix "Christian"; but if we accept the definition of "The Imperial Dictionary":—"The science which investigates the laws or forces which regulate human society in all its grades, existing and historical, savage and civilized"—then such a prefix seems out of place. And "The Standard Dictionary" defines thus: "The science that treats of the origin and history of human society and social phenomena, the progress of civilization, and the laws controlling human intercourse." To neither of these definitions can I prefix "Christian" with any satisfaction. As well say "Christian Astronomy."

A. H. Fetterolf, Ph. D., LL. D., President of Girard College, Philadelphia, Pa.—*Sociology* as defined by Webster is "that branch of philosophy which treats of human society." We speak of Christian Philosophy, and I see no reason why we may not with equal propriety speak of Christian Sociology.

D. W. Fisher, D. D., LL. D., President of Hanover College,

Hanover, Ind.:—I do not like the term "Christian Sociology." Sociology is the *science*, and is no more Christian than Political Economy or History.

I see no objections, on the other hand, to "Christian Socialism" as describing a certain conception of the application of Christianity to the social organization.

Rev. Rufus C. Flagg, D. D., *President of Ripon College, Ripon, Wis.*:—Your note of inquiry with regard to the propriety of speaking of "*Christian*" Sociology is received. I confess I do not like this manner of speaking. We surely cannot properly speak of Christian Political Economy, or Christian Psychology. The word does not seem to belong with any of the other sciences; then why with this? The implication it bears is that Sociology is not a science but an art, like the art of government, or the art of bestowing charity. If this be the nature of sociology we can prefix "*Christian*," not otherwise.

Rev. F. H. Foster, D. D., *Professor in Pacific Theological Seminary, Oakland, Cal.*:—The use of the term "Christian Sociology" to indicate Sociology studied for Christian purposes and by Christian men seems to me natural and appropriate. Not every sociological problem is of immediate value to the Christian church.

Rev. Wm. G. Frost, Ph. D., *President of Berea College, Berea, Ky.*:—The term "Christian Sociology" seems of doubtful propriety, and has no supporting analo-

gies. "Christian Philosophy" means a history of the philosophy held by Christian thinkers; "Christian Astronomy" would be an evident impropriety.

The temptation to use the term comes from two sources: the desire to present certain specific theories under a distinctive name, and the impulse to justify the introduction of this science in theological schools. Analogous to the latter are the now obsolete terms "sacred music" and "sacred rhetoric."

As a science Sociology stands on its own basis of observation and belongs in the college course. Special courses adapted to candidates for the ministry are to be justified like similar courses in rhetoric, but it is safer to find some other designation than the one proposed. A good description might be: "Sociology, and its relations to Christian work."

Henry B. Gardner, Ph. D., *Associate Professor in Brown University, Providence, R. I.*:—If by sociology is understood one division of the science which deals with the life of men in organized societies "Christian Sociology" would mean the division of sociology which deals with peoples who accept Christianity, and I see no impropriety in using the term in that sense, though I should doubt the advantage of making such a division of the subject. If by "Christian Sociology" is meant a body of doctrine looking to the improvement of social conditions on the basis of Christian principles, it seems to me the phrase is undesirable because it involves an unscientific and confusing idea of sociology.

Rev. Owen H. Gates, Ph. D., *Professor in Oberlin Theological Seminary, Oberlin, Ohio*.:—So long as there is taught and studied in our schools a Sociology which ignores religion, and especially the Christian religion as a power in the determination of social institutions, refuses to see in Bible teachings the ideal of social as of individual life, and omits the teachings and spirit of Christ from the list of reforming influences, there will be ample justification of the term "Christian Sociology."

Franklin H. Giddings, Professor *in Columbia College, New York City*.:—The term "Christian Sociology" confounds "Sociology" with "Social Ethics": a science of society as it is and has been with an effort to determine what social relations ought to be. Sociology is the natural history and natural philosophy of society; a descriptive, historical and explanatory account of natural communities, of animals and of men, savage, barbarian and civilized, as they have actually been, as they actually are. It affords data to Social Ethics. There can be a Christian Society. There can be a Christian Social Ethics, but a "Christian Sociology" is as absurd as a Christian Chemistry or a Christian Astronomy.

Rev. Washington Gladden, D.D., *Pastor of First Church of Columbus, Ohio*.:—If the use of "Christian" as applied to Sociology implies that there is more than one Sociology, or that Christian Sociology is not scientific, then I would not use it. My own belief is that

Sociology is Christian; that a complete induction—including the facts of historical Christianity—will establish the Christian law—"thou shall love thy neighbor as thyself"—as the fundamental law of society. But I want the induction made without prejudice for or against the Christian revelation; and therefore I would not insist, at the outset, upon calling sociology "Christian." The word expresses my faith, but I do not wish to impose it upon others.

A. T. Hadley, Professor in Yale College, New Haven, Conn.:—To those who use the name Sociology in the *descriptive* sense, as the science which describes the growth of social institutions, Christian Sociology naturally means that part of the science which describes the growth of institutions under the influence of Christianity.

To those who regard Sociology as a science in the higher sense, giving explanations rather than descriptions, the combination "Christian Sociology" seems an unfortunate one, which may readily lead to errors not unlike those of the alleged Galileo Astronomy, against which Galileo uttered his historic protest.

Thomas C. Hall, D.D., Pastor of the Fourth Presbyterian Church, Chicago, Ill.:—I can think of no sociology that ought not to be Christian, and although sociology is a science, because it is a science that relates to human conduct it is perfectly proper to characterize it as Christian, anti-Christian or material sociology. Ethics is also a

science, but there is a distinct science of Christian ethics. The main difficulty with our sociology heretofore has been the fact that it is essentially atheistic and anti-Christian, and that few Christians have any real faith in the social teachings of our Saviour. The denial of his real kingship is the heresy of to-day.

P. A. Halpin, Professor in St. Francis Xavier's College, New York City:—As Sociology means Social Science, Christian Sociology can mean nothing else but Social Science starting from Christian principles and building all its conclusions thereon. Consequently any sociology which would neglect the great principles for all sociology laid down by Christ, e. g. Matthew xxii. 21; Mark xii. 17; Luke xx. 25; Romans xiii. 7, or any tenet thereunto relating and taught by the Divine Christ is a misnomer, if not a caricature.

Rev. George Harris, D. D., Professor in Andover Theological Seminary, Andover, Mass.:—If the term Sociology is limited to the science of the actual structure and relations of society, it is not defined as Christian. If it is used in the wider sense of Social Ethics, the rights and duties of man, what ought to be, the ideal state—the term Christian may be employed. For, although the complete social morality can be of only one kind and that Christian, yet it is definite as Christian in contrast with other incomplete types which are advocated. The expression "Christian Sociology" is not tautological. Ex-

cept for convenience in use, however, some other term than sociology is preferable, as that is appropriated to scientific purposes. As theology has surrendered "Anthropology" to science, so ethics will surrender "Sociology."

Albert Bushnell Hart, Professor in Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.:—For the phrase "Christian Sociology" there is the same justification as for "Christian History" or "Christian Botany." Every question ought to be examined with that spirit of truth which is the essence of Christianity. I deprecate the use of the term because it seems to suggest that there can be a Sociology in which Christianity has no part.

George D. Herron, Professor in Iowa College, Grinnell, Iowa:—The recent dogma that there can be no Christian science of society any more than a Christian astronomy or a Christian biology is as unworthy of respect as intellectual honesty can make it; it is the scientific cant that covers a multitude of sins against social knowledge, and is as reprehensible as the old religious cant for which the scientific cant has such contempt. We all know that Christianity has been the chief factor in the constant development and change of modern civilization. Every honest mind knows that the social revolution now upon us is due to a widening and deepening faith in the applicability of the altruism of Jesus' teachings. The words of Christ are altogether the chief force and fact in society to-day. Christianity has not been

the chief force and fact in the development of the toad, the star, the plant, the rock. Though there be, as I always insist, but one universal life force and element, there has been no volition, no choice, no morality, in the development of the plant, the rock, the animal. It was not by faith in a certain person, or in certain principles, that the rock became the kind of a rock it is; that the sheep became what it is instead of becoming a horse; that the tree is not a plant instead of a tree. It is by the choice of men, or the apprehension of certain forces having their revelation in Jesus, that modern came forth from Roman civilization. Then it is simply untrue, it is supercilious and evasive, to say that we have as much reason for a Christian geology, or Christian botany, as for a Christian sociology. The teachings of Jesus are essentially a science of society, and I know of no other. And it is certainly unscientific, if we are to observe and indicate the actual and important processes and phenomena of society, to treat as incidental, or ignore, the chief factor of society, which Christianity has been, and is more fully coming to be.

Society is the creation of the forces which issue from the faiths of the people. The interpretation of these forces, with some judgment of their effect upon present economies and institutions, with some outline of the living structure the forces are building, is the first service not only of the Christian apostle, but of any true science of society. Without this knowledge of

the forces at work, and a vision of the social end for which they are working, the keenest analysis of social facts and conditions may but intensify the social pain, and the best constructive efforts work against the divine evolution.

Alvah Hovey, D. D., LL. D., *President of Newton Theological Seminary, Newton Centre, Mass.:*—It seems to me that the use of the word Christian with Sociology is unfavorable to clearness of thought. For Sociology is supposed to be the science of social phenomena. It is inductive more than deductive in its processes. It hopes to ascertain and explain all the facts, tendencies, and laws of social life, dealing first with what is, and then perhaps to some extent with what may be, or ought to be. But it is yet in its infancy. Its teachers do not yet agree in their definitions of its comprehensiveness or purpose. I do not therefore see why there should be a Christian Sociology any more than a Christian pathology.

William I. Hull, Professor in Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pa.:—The phrase "Christian Sociology" seems to me to be either a tautologous or a too restrictive one. Any system of Sociology which neglects Christianity as either a static or dynamic element in the life of society cannot properly be called the science of Sociology. On the other hand, to limit Sociology by the term Christian would be to exclude from that science individual and social traits which it is Christianity's chief mission to combat or transform.

Wm. DeW. Hyde, D. D., President of Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Me.:—There is no more inherent objection to the term "Christian Sociology" than there is to the term "Christian Ethics." Inasmuch as the general science of sociology is still in its infancy there is of course great danger that an attempt to treat a special phase of it will prove premature.

Rev. George H. Ide, D. D., Pastor of Grand Avenue Church, Milwaukee, Wis.:—Using the word Sociology in its strict meaning, there is no more propriety in speaking of "Christian Sociology" than of Christian Geology or Chemistry. Sociology is the science that investigates the laws regulating human society. There is no special reason for calling the investigation of a phenomenon *Christian*. Still as Christianity is interwoven with all this phenomenon, and perhaps is the cause of much of it, and should control it, it does not seem far out of the way to speak of "Christian Sociology."

J. W. Jenks, Professor in Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y.:—I believe Sociology to be a science dealing with definite facts and principles. I fear that the use of the expression, "Christian Sociology," may mislead many people regarding the nature of the science, and will thus do harm, while I see no good that can come from its use.

The expression "Christian Biology" would, in my judgment, be as fit for current use as is "Christian Sociology."

Rev. Herrick Johnson, D. D., McCormick Theological Seminary, Chicago, Ill.:—The word "Christian" is made to cover almost as great a multitude of "ologies" as the multitude of sins covered by "Charity." When "Sociology" gets its inspiration and glory and fundamental law from *Calvary* it is "Christian." Otherwise, not.

Rev. James Gibson Johnson, D. D., Pastor of New England Church, Chicago, Ill.:—I believe that there is such a thing, possibly not yet satisfactorily formulated, as a science of society. It consists of the laws of social life and progress. That science is Sociology. I also believe that the Christian theory of life and progress is the true one; that as Mr. Kidd shows, it is the only one. The true science of society is Christian. It may be tautology to speak of Christian Sociology, but I see no other objection.

W. P. Johnston, D. D., President of Geneva College, Beaver Falls, Pa.:—If Sociology has to do with man's social nature and deals with all social forces and evils, then it ought to be a Christian Sociology and ought to be named that. If the law of Christ is to be studied and applied anywhere under heaven, surely it must be in this domain.

David S. Jordan, LL.D., President of Leland Stanford Junior University, Palo Alto, Cal.:—Sociology as I understand it is the science which treats of the social relations of men. I know of no

other sense in which it can be properly used. I believe that the teachings of Christ contain very much that is most true and valuable in regard to Sociology. Independent of any theological question every one must admit that Christ's words as recorded show a wonderful insight into the laws of human nature. I do not think, however, that the term "Christian Sociology" has any ground of justification. The word "Christian" prefixed to the name of any science is a species of venerable quackery. Sociology is a science because its facts and inferences are true, not because they are the teaching of any authority.

M. Kellogg, LL. D., President of University of California, Berkeley, Cal.:—Sociology treats of the phenomena of human society. Its facts are drawn from the development of our civilization, which is largely a Christian civilization. It implies duties as well as facts, and duties are Christian.

Sociology is a hybrid word; but it can not be displaced, and the adjective "Christian" is its best modifier.

David Kinley, Professor in the University of Illinois, Champaign, Ill.:—I regard Christian Sociology as that body of doctrine whose application to social forces will, it is thought, strengthen those of them which are in harmony with Christian principles, and so tend to evolve a social condition in conformity with the Christian ideal.

J. H. Kirkland, Chancellor of Vanderbilt University, Nashville,

Tenn.:—I do not regard the term "Christian Sociology" as scientific, but still it indicates a certain phase of the subject and has therefore, in my opinion, a right to exist.

George Trumbull Ladd, D. D., Professor in Yale College, New Haven, Conn.:—I am opposed to using the word "Christian" in such connections as the phrase "Christian Sociology." By "Sociology" we understand the science, or would-be science, of the phenomena of human social life. That this life ought to be Christian—that is, pervaded with the principles of Christianity—there is no doubt. This is, however, a discussion of an ethico theological character. It can only result in a series of homilies which may be profitable for instruction in righteousness, or otherwise. It certainly is not science; nor is it sociology, which deals with the facts and laws of actual social development.

Henry M. McCracken, Chancellor of University of New York City:—A question similar to the one you ask has arisen in reference to the advisability of retaining the word Christian in the title of the American Institute of Christian Philosophy founded by the late Dr. Charles F. Deems, of which I am now President. Either phrase Christian Philosophy or Christian Sociology implies that there are certain postulates in philosophy and science which are settled for adherents of the Christian faith, albeit they may be rejected by others. It seems entirely appropriate for either a quarterly magazine or an Institute to

limit its own field of inquiry by saying *we have settled some propositions*. Large room for discussion is left beyond this limitation.

W. F. McDowell, *Chancellor of University of Denver, Denver, Colo.*:—The use of the word Christian as applied to Sociology seems to me exactly as appropriate as when applied to theology. We went all over that ground when organizing the American Institute.

Rev. Alexander McKenzie, D. D., *Pastor of First Church, Cambridge, Mass.*:—In the interest of clear thought there should be some limitation to the use of the word Christian which has a definite meaning. It should not be used where e. g. Mohammedan or American would be as appropriate. If the Sociology has a distinct connection with Christ and his teachings the term Christian is properly applied to it. Accuracy is required.

Peter McVicar, D. D., *President of Washburn College, Topeka, Kan.*:—Christian Sociology is the science of applying the teachings of the Christian religion to social conditions and problems. The term "Christian" denotes, that the principles applied in the solution of all social problems, in the family, church, municipality, state and nation, shall conform to the teachings of Christ.

Rev. George F. Magoun, D. D., *Ex-President of Iowa College, Grinnell, Iowa*:—As a convenient, conventional, and popular designation I do not see much objection to the phrase "Christian Sociology." If either term of it was

a scientific name the comparison with Methodist Mathematics, Baptist Botany, or Presbyterian Physiology would have some point. But nobody claims that the Christian Religion is a science, and no discriminating person will assert that Sociology, as such, is *yet*. Some of us can remember when what is now Scientific Physics bore the loose and vague name of "Natural Philosophy,"—and "Sociology" is still even more loose and vague. If it ever becomes really a title for distinctive and rigidly co-ordinated facts, with definite and unquestionable laws running through them, it will be more clearly seen than now, even, that "Christian Sociology" is an inexact synthetic phrase,—Christianity not being drawn analytically from social facts, or social science,—or what is chiefly called "social science," from the facts of Christianity.

Meantime the conventional association of the two terms may stand—usefully—for the study of society in a Christian spirit, under Christian guidance, and for the maintenance of Christian ends. This allows the understanding that there is a sort of natural philosophy of society that has nothing to do with what is characteristically Christian, and in co-ordinating and systematizing social facts has no place for the agency of the Christian religion in producing any of them. This is "of course hostile to the spirit of Christian Sociology,"—as Dr. Stuckenberg said fifteen years ago,—along with many other true things. When Comte devised the name "to designate Social Phys-

ics," it was that sort of natural philosophy of society which he plainly meant. Dr. Stuckenberg refers to "recent works on Sociology [which] as a rule, do not claim to be Christian or even theistic. Their relation to Christian Sociology is, of course, very remote,"—naming Spencer particularly. I do not see that the proportion of such works to the whole is to-day any less, and this gives importance largely to the teachings of Dr. Stuckenberg, Professor Holbrook, and others. There is amazing laxity, however, and consequent confusion along the dividing lines, in other cases, and many things said and printed are just a bizarre, absurd, or fanatical mixture of rationalism and socialism. They come from lack of education, incapacity for logic, and hostility to ancient Bible truths, on which all real Christian Sociology must be founded.

T. P. Marsh, D. D., LL. D., *President of Mt. Union College, Alliance, Ohio*.:—My sympathy favors "Christian Sociology." My judgment does not. The word Christian may be misleading to those who are indifferent to or prejudiced against Christian thought. Sociology as a permanent and reliable science must be based upon truth and right. So far as it is so based, it becomes invincible and of necessity acceptable to all thought without awakening suspicion or questioning or antagonism. However, truth and right, and Christian are coincident. Sociology will never reach its true basis or right development unless it is along the lines of Christian teaching. Moral Phi-

losophy is as acceptable a term to Christian thought as Christian Ethics.

Rev. C. M. Mead, D. D., Ph. D., *Professor in Hartford Theological Seminary, Hartford, Conn.*:—Although no one definition of "Sociology" has received universal approval, I suppose that it may be, in a general way, defined as the science of correct social living. If this is so, then inasmuch as Christianity professes to determine what the right kind of life is, it is obvious that a *correct* sociology *must*, in the Christian mind, be a *Christian* sociology. The science of social life being a form of general ethics, the propriety of the term "Christian Sociology" can be no more disputed than that of "Christian Ethics."

A. R. Merriam, Professor in Hartford Theological Seminary, Hartford, Conn.:—The reasons which seem to me strongest against the use of the expression "Christian Sociology" are: 1. That in speaking of what aspires to be a science, there should be no more room for the prefix than in speaking of any other science, like Geology e. g. 2. That the term unnecessarily and timorously indicates a disharmony between Christianity and the fullest scientific research. 3. That the prefix still further confuses the many meanings which Sociology is burdened to carry.

On the other hand, it should be said:—1. That Sociology is by no means as yet a science in the strict sense of the word: and cannot be, on account of human nature, placed

in the same category with the natural sciences. 2. There is special need of emphasizing certain great ethical laws of Christ which are often ignored in current scientific discussion, and certain facts of human will which affect social obligations. 3. The difficulty of finding another term which sufficiently recognizes these facts and principles in a scientific study of social problems.

There is not, however, in my opinion, the same necessity for differentiating Sociology from a scientific extreme that there was some years ago; and there is now the danger of identifying the term Christian Sociology with another extreme school of religious thought.

Bishop S. M. Merrill, D. D., LL.D., Chicago, Ill.—The word Christian is probably of pagan origin, derived from what was supposed by its authors to be the name of a person, but was in fact an official title. By appropriation or adoption, it became a descriptive epithet properly applied to the disciples of Christ, and to whatever of doctrine or spirit is a part of the system of religion produced by the Gospel. From being an epithet of reproach, as in its origin, it has become an honorable title, and should not be degraded in its use by application to anything merely ethical, theoretical, or secular.

Rev. Richard Montague, D. D., Newton Centre, Mass.—"Christian Socialism" is to me an objectionable phrase. "Socialism" is a definite economic theory, a plan of industry, a scheme of production,

an offered substitute for the present economic system. It is a question of economics, of science, of expediency. Christianity has nothing to say about "Socialism" as such. Not a word in the New Testament refers to it. The system has moral aspects, and so spiritual bearings, and upon these Christianity may fitly speak. But to use the phrase "Christian Socialism" is to raise a fog where we need clear skies.

Henry Morton, Ph. D., President of Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, N. J.—I consider the use of the phrase "Christian Sociology," when appropriately applied, as entirely proper and correctly suggestive of the essential connection between Christianity and social development.

Bishop John P. Newman, D. D., LL. D., Omaha, Neb.—Christianity sanctifies and glorifies humanity—personal, domestic, social, national, racial. The term "Christian" is expressive of the truest and the best in anthropology, and appropriately characterizes true Sociology; but it is a prostituted term when applied to social phenomena segregated from the authority and beneficence of the Christian Religion.

Cyrus Northrop, President of University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.—The expression "Christian Sociology" is sometimes convenient, doubtless, for advertising the particular views of a writer or speaker who treats of Sociology, but otherwise it has no more propriety than Christian Po-

litical Economy, or Free Trade Political Science, or Protective Political Science, or Free Silver Finance. Sociology *is* Sociology. Into it, Christian principles enter as they do into any other science affecting human action.

S. A. Ort, D. D., *President of Wittenberg College, Springfield, Ohio.*—Sociology is the science of social facts. Christian Sociology is the science of the facts of Christian Society. Special sense. In higher Christian education, social facts are viewed and their right relations determined in the light of the principles of Christianity. In this sense any science may be Christian. It is the true sense of higher Christian education. Hence the word Christian should qualify Sociology no more than Zoölogy.

Dr. Simon N. Patten, Professor in University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.—I do not like the term "Christian Sociology." It implies that Sociology proper is not Christian but agnostic, atheistic, or something else as bad. I heartily sympathize with the movement to interest Christian workers in Sociology, but it would be a mistake to inculcate the idea that they as Christians are not interested in the general problems affecting human welfare, but only in those problems affecting religious progress.

Francis G. Peabody, D. D., LL. D., *Professor in Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.*—I think the title Christian Sociology ill-judged. It is like the phrase "Christian science." Sociology is

a science, and a science is the same in its principles whether studied by Christians or Unbelievers. Christianity is a spirit of life and the same spirit, whether applied to Sociology or any other pursuit.

J. A. Peters, D. D., *President of Heidelberg College, Tiffin, Ohio.*—In my judgment "Sociology" and "Christian Sociology" are not synonymous terms. Hence I deem the retention of the attribute "Christian," in the treatment of the subject, as appropriate for definiteness and differentiation. *Christian Sociology* is a branch of theology: as the title indicates, it proposes to give a scientific exposition of the origin and laws, purpose and influence of society under the moulding power of the presence of the Christ in human history.

Rev. Arthur Piper, S. T. D., *Warden of Racine College, Racine, Wis.*—It is hard to conceive of any *true* Sociology that is not Christian.

Eliphalet Nott Potter, S. T. D., LL. D., *President of Hobart College, Geneva, N. Y.*—The term "Christian Sociology" is admissible as indicating the relation of Christianity to Society. Doctors of Divinity differ as to dogma, but agree that Christ said, "I will draw all men unto me;" and taught human brotherhood (his followers once having all things in common) that thus Christianity is essentially Social. Like Christianity, Sociology has had to struggle for recognition. As Sociology is not an exact science, so the Christian, or let us say Christendom, is not exactly Christ-

like. But to convert the soul, and to permeate society with the Christianity of Christ, is to make it Christ-like. In this view I am of the Council of the Church Social Union, and of the officers of the Christian Social Union. To make life Christian on this planet being the mission here of Christ and His followers; the sooner Christianity and Sociology are married in thought and act beyond the possibility of divorce, the more certainly can we name the result of their happy union "Christian Sociology."

D. B. Purinton, LL. D., President of Denison University, Granville, Ohio:—I see no more impropriety in the term "Christian Sociology" than in such terms as "Christian Ethics," "Christian Theism," "Christian Civilization," "Christian Education," etc. In each case, I take it, the adjective indicates, not an inherent quality of the Science named, but rather a school of philosophy inculcating the science. It is sociology, ethics, etc., according to the Christian view, and as modified by Christian principles and practices. In this sense, I deem the combination perfectly legitimate and intelligible.

B. P. Raymond, D. D., LL. D., President of Wesleyan University, Middletown, Conn.:—I think there is reason for the use of the word Christian as applied to Sociology, on precisely the same ground as for the use of *Christian Ethics*. Philosophical ethics starts from the rational consciousness; Christian ethics presupposes a religious process, and starts from the Christian con-

sciousness. The same distinction obtains in Sociology. In general, sociology starts from the social consciousness, or from the consciousness of the individual as related to his fellows. Its study could be prosecuted from the Brahministic, or Buddhistic point of view, or in a purely empirical way, without any religious postulates. Christian Socialism has a point of view quite unique, in the Christian consciousness, and the use of the term seems to me to be justified.

P. B. Reynolds, D. D., President of West Virginia University, Morgantown, W. Va.:—If "Christian Sociology" means, as I think it does, the principles of society furnished by, and recognized by, the Christian religion, the term is used with entire propriety.

Rev. William Salter, D. D., Burlington, Iowa:—If by "Christian Sociology" is meant what our fathers called "the mutual edification of one another in the fellowship of the Lord Jesus," and the principles and rules appertaining thereto, after the spirit of Bishop Butler's sermon on "The Social Nature of Man," I approve the use of the word "Christian" as applied to "Sociology"; but if the term "Christian Sociology" is used to cover what is commonly understood by socialism as a revolutionary system, after the ideas of the French and "the Commune," sacrificing the individual man and absorbing or doing away with personal rights and duties, and handing over mankind to the whims of "society" and the rule of the mob, I

deem it a misnomer and another instance of "the imposture of words."

T. J. Sanders, Ph. D., *President of Otterbein University, Westerville, Ohio*.—Having in mind the laws regulating human society as Christian, I think the term "Christian Sociology" is correct.

Of course "Sociology," the broader term, will always include specific phases of it.

Charles A. Schaeffer, Ph. D., LL. D., *President of Iowa State University, Iowa City, Iowa*.—In reply to your inquiry, I have never heard any objection to the term "Christian community" or "a Christian people," and therefore cannot see why the phrase "Christian Sociology" should provoke any criticism.

J. G. Schurman, LL. D., *President of Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y.*.—The single word "Sociology" has as yet no accepted meaning. Why adopt the phrase "Christian Sociology" until scholars have come to some agreement on the subject of a social science, or the social sciences?

Sylvester F. Scovel, President of the University of Wooster, Wooster, Ohio.—It seems to me that we not only may, but must, use the phrase "Christian Sociology" just as we say Christian life or Christian Church. Sociology without Christ is one thing, and a bad thing; with Christ it is another, and a good thing. The term Christian in the phrase tells a long story in a very brief way. It cuts away the whole system it repre-

sents, from a biological or a materialistic or a pessimistic origin or tendency.

L. Clark Seelye, D. D., *President of Smith College, Northampton, Mass.*.—If sociology be a science, then it seems to me the term "Christian" can strictly be applied to it with no more propriety than to other sciences; at the same time I believe Christ's life reveals the only life out of which a perfect society can be formed.

John S. Sewall, D. D., *Professor in Bangor Theological Seminary, Bangor, Me.*.—Thinking of sociology as a science, there would be no more propriety in speaking of a Christian sociology than of a pagan, a Mohammedan, a Buddhist sociology. But in studying the forces that are at work in social evolution, and forecasting the results that are manifestly coming, the term is a convenient one, easily intelligible to the student, and not likely to be misinterpreted. In that way I have no hesitation in using it.

J. B. Shearer, D. D., LL. D., *President of Davidson College, Davidson, N. C.*.—Sociology is a Biblical Science. Its foundation facts and principles are Divinely attested. Just and fair inference from these facts and principles are not excluded from the science. Mere human postulates have no more place in sociology than in theology. Christ added nothing either of facts or principles to previous utterances in the Scriptures. He only re-expounded and vindicated the "Old" against the heresies of his day. I

therefore prefer the name "Sociology." "Christian Sociology" is misleading.

William F. Slocum, Jr., LL.D., *President of Colorado College, Colorado Springs, Col.*:—I see no objection in using the term *Christian Sociology*. The social aspect of the Christian movement is an important one, and Sociology may be considered from an almost exclusively Christian stand-point.

Albion W. Small, Professor in the University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.:—I object to the phrase "Christian Sociology" because it seems to me either pleonastic or fraudulently pretentious. In the latter case it is offensive both to taste and morals in the airs which men give themselves under its shelter. I object to its use to conceal ignorance of social facts and of the processes by which ignorance must be informed. I object to it as a device for dignifying incompetence and laziness. I object to the humbuggery of reading irresponsible opinions into the New Testament, and then reading them out again in the name of Christ. New Testament Theology is not changed in its content by labeling it "Christian Sociology." It is the self-same truth, which does not include the desideratum of Sociology any more than it contains a treatise on mathematics. Sociology is not a substitute for Christian truth, but it is a body of inquiries about subjects which the New Testament does not expound any more than it elaborates Physics or Chemistry or the theory of medicine. A man who has no

special knowledge of society no more deserves to rank as a prophet for calling himself a "Christian Sociologist" than any other species of ignoramus would be entitled to a teacher's certificate by distinguishing himself as a "Christian Ignoramus." I heartily agree with the men who believe that no Sociology can be permanent that is not radically Christian, and I appreciate their motive in coining and uttering the phrase to convey that truth. I believe, however, that its service in impressing the conclusions of Christian scholarship is more than offset by the popular influence which it lends to unscholarly Christians.

Dr. J. H. Smart, President of Purdue University, La Fayette, Ind.:—That depends upon definition. From one view point sociology may be either heathen or Christian; with another definition sociology must necessarily be Christian. If we wish to distinguish the Christian view of sociology from the heathen view of sociology, I think we may properly use the term "Christian Sociology." I have as yet been unable to see any serious mischief in the use of the term "Christian Sociology."

Goldwin Smith, Emeritus Professor in Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y.:—In answer to the question you submit to me, I would say that strict science of any kind must be independent of religious belief, and can therefore hardly be called "Christian." But I suppose the phrase would pass muster as denoting the science of society studied from a Christian point of view.

Rev. Henry T. Spangler, D. D., *President of Ursinus College, Collegeville, Pa.*:—In reply to your inquiry of 15th inst. I would say: Make "Sociology" "Christian" in name and in fact. Speak of it as "Christian" and make it "Christian" in reality. For the principles which underlie the development of history are those revealed by Christ. The social life of man is best understood when studied in the light of these principles. Christianity is the only panacea for social, as well as all other, ills.

Rev. John L. Steffan, Ph. D., D. D., *President of St. Mary's College, St. Mary's, Ky.*:—Since Christian principles can be applied to all questions of Sociology and the Christian view of them is the only correct one, we see no objection to the application and meaning of the phrase "Christian Sociology."

Theo. Sterling M., D., LL. D., *President of Kenyon College, Gambier, Ohio*:—*Sociology* is based on facts derived from History and experience, interpreted by our knowledge of human nature. *Christian Sociology* is sociology modified by the principles of conduct given in the teachings of Christ. It seems to me that both terms should be used, each in its proper place.

Rev. Henry A. Stimson, D. D., *Pastor of Broadway Tabernacle, New York City*:—Sociology must embrace Christian facts and therefore is so far Christian of necessity. The same is true of metaphysics and psychology. If any of these sciences should ignore Christian or any other group of facts it would

in time be corrected not in the name of Christianity, but of the science itself. If Sociology is, or is to be, a science, the single name is enough. "Christian Sociology" suggests sentimentalism and special pleading.

Rev. Josiah Strong, S. T. D., *General Secretary of Evangelical Alliance, New York City*:—It is said that as Sociology is a science there is no more propriety in saying *Christian* sociology than there would be in saying Christian chemistry or Christian mathematics. But neither between particles of matter nor between numbers are there moral relations. Such relations between men constitute a basis for a Christian science of society; and it is as fit to say Christian Sociology as to say Christian ethics, which expression has gained general currency. Christian sociology might be called the science of society as it ought to be and is to be. The science of society as it is can be only partially Christian because society is only partially Christian as yet.

Dr. M. W. Stryker, President of Hamilton College, Clinton, N. Y.:—By Christian Sociology I understand the study of Social law as contained in, or implied or warranted by, the law which we are under to Christ. Its ideal is a society built upon the fullest application of the teaching of Christ. Its realization would be the answer to the petition, "Thy will be done on earth," etc. I like the term and pray for the thing which is its theme. The only other Sociology is (in some degree) Demonology.

Rev. J. H. W. Stuckenberg, D. D., *formerly Pastor of the American Church, Berlin, Germany*.—In 1880 my book on "Christian Sociology" appeared, and thus the use of that term was introduced. At first it aroused suspicion because it seemed to savor of scepticism, Sociology having till then been used for works which either ignored or rejected the claims of Christianity. I used it because I found while lecturing to theological students that the New Testament contains such principles of Christian society as need but be properly developed in order to form a complete system of that society. I quote from my book, but substitute system for science as being less liable to misunderstanding: "Christian Sociology is the system of Christian Society, or the system of that society which is controlled by Christian principles. Its aim is to describe this society; to explain its origin, nature, laws, relations and purposes." We might say that Christian Sociology aims to give the philosophy of Christian Society. This use is legitimate and it designates a most important and well-defined sphere of human thought.

In Christian Sociology use can be made of history, of philosophy, of science, and of all departments of learning in order to interpret Christian society, just as in dogmatics all thought is made contributory to the explanation and defence of the Christian system. If a scientific or philosophical sociology is ever developed, Christian Sociology can use it freely. Such a system of Christian Society is no unwarranted

assumption; it really exists and ought to be recognized.

Whatever opposition the term "Christian Sociology" may meet with, it is evidently here to remain.

Charles W. Super, LL. D., *President of Ohio University, Athens, Ohio*.—By Christian Socialism I understand the use of the facts and principles of sociology to prove that the fundamental doctrines of Christianity, if put in practice in the body politic, would conduce to the highest good of the greatest number; and I understand its champions to maintain that these doctrines should be embodied in legislation to promote the prosperity of all citizens in the widest sense, somewhat as the champions of Protection would have their tenets enforced to promote the material well-being of the State.

Rev. Albert Temple Swing, *Professor in Oberlin Theological Seminary, Oberlin, Ohio*.—When anarchistic socialism has succeeded in stirring up class hatred as never before in this country, there is need of something more than mere technical sociology as a remedy. The one hundred and twenty-five thousand Christian ministers, who come regularly into personal contact with more than twenty-five million persons, need in addition to all practical social facts, also correct principles of Moral Philosophy, and Christian Ethics, in order to meet properly the problems before them. If this is not entitled to the name "Christian Sociology" then retain the "Christian" and drop the "Sociology."

Charles E. Taylor, D. D., President of Wake Forest College, Wake Forest, N. C.:—I believe that the expression "Christian Sociology" is entirely defensible both on grounds of inherent fitness and of analogy.

J. M. Taylor, D. D., LL. D., President of Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, N. Y.:—I know of no valid reason for objecting to the word Christian in connection with Sociology. It conveys the idea of a Sociology permeated by Christian theories, and as Sociology may be viewed from a non-Christian standpoint, the adjective is justified. So we speak also of a Christian Pantheism—a Pantheism modified by the peculiar conceptions of Christianity.

Rev. Henry M. Tenney, D. D., Pastor of the Second Church, Oberlin, Ohio.:—Sociology as a mere scientific study is one thing. Sociology as a school of positive thought is another thing. To a mere historic and scientific study of the origin and development of social conditions there is no fitness in applying the adjective Christian.

If Sociology stands for a school of positive thought, and is an attempt at the exposition of the philosophy of society, the propriety of the use of the adjective Christian will be determined manifestly by the philosophy which is held and taught. If we hold to the materialistic philosophy, and regard social conditions as the result of the evolution of blind matter or force, denying human freedom and responsibility, and claiming that

"ethics is the science of psychological mechanics," the use of the term Christian Sociology is a manifest misnomer.

On the contrary if we hold to the Christian philosophy of a personal God revealed in Christ, and revealing through his life and teachings the divine ideals and principles of society to responsible men, the Sociology in which we believe and which we wish to promote can be nothing else than Christian, and it should be so named. Holding to the Christian philosophy, I believe in and wish to stand for a Christian Sociology, and for nothing else.

Rev. Reuen Thomas, D. D., Pastor of Harvard Church, Brookline, Mass.:—I see no particular objection to the use of the phrase "Christian Sociology" if it is simply intended thereby to indicate that society can be organized on Christian principles and that this fact should be put as scientifically as possible before the mind. If, however, it is assumed that mere organization of unchristianized men into a certain kind of externally righteous condition, so as to prevent some men becoming inordinately rich and others pitifully poor is all that is necessary to make society what it should be, then I should be disposed to "forbid the banns" and keep these words apart.

Rev. R. E. Thompson, D. D., Philadelphia, Pa.:—I confess I always have been prejudiced against the qualifying term "Christian" when prefixed to "Sociology," and

yet cannot justify the prejudice to myself. We do not want a Christian Chemistry or a Christian Geology. Why then a Christian Sociology?

Yet sociology deals with the three natural forms of society, family, state, and church; and as we speak rightly of Christian households, Christian nations, and the Christian church, must not the sociology which recognizes this quality in them be a Christian sociology? Especially is this true of sociology in dealing with the church, the institute of humanity. The idea of a universal brotherhood, transcending natural and local bounds, is not confined to Christianity. The old empires and Islam tried to realize the idea in the sphere of political life. Since Christianity alone works toward its independent realization of it, it must be a Christian Sociology which deals with the Christian Church.

Rev. Charles F. Thwing, D.D., LL. D., *President of Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio:*—In my humble opinion the answer is determined by the simple definition we give sociology. When Sociology is defined simply as a science, I think that the epithet Christian would be a no more proper epithet to be applied to Sociology than to be applied to Mathematics. If, however, Sociology is used to express a general movement, the epithet Christian might properly be applied to it.

Bishop John H. Vincent, D.D., LL. D., *Topeka, Kan.:*—May it not be well to distinguish carefully

between Sociology as a science and the Christian *use* of Sociology.

As a science it attempts to formulate scientific laws of social development, structure and activity. Having studied these with scientific care, should not Christians make a Christian use of the science? How would it do therefore to speak of "The Christian Application of Sociology." I do not, however, forget that Sociology deals scientifically with the subject-matter of Christian revelation concerning character and conduct.

Henry Randall Waite, Ph. D., *President of American Institute of Civics, New York City:*—If it be thought wise to encourage the idea that Sociology, as it is, ignores or insufficiently recognizes that in it which is "Christian," it may be desirable to formulate its facts under this title.

But is there in truth, reason or need for this assumption where the mass of citizens are agreed as to the justice and propriety of regarding their country as a Christian land?

Certainly to the extent that this agreement represents truth, Christian ideas may be regarded as imbedded in society, and therefore in Sociology; thus warranting the postulate that Sociology, from the point of view of the average American citizen, is theoretically Christian from base to cap-stone.

Shall we, then, assume that the fort is not ours and that we must organize for its capture, or that it is ours and that we must not permit its capture by others?

The American Institute of Civics,

as whose representative I am asked to present these thoughts, assumes that we are citizens of a Christian Commonwealth; that those who represent the essential ideas of Christianity, using the word in its largest sense, are now in possession of the fort; and that there is no ammunition in the arsenal of Sociology (or Applied Sociology as represented in Civics) which requires the stamp of "Christian" to identify it as ours. It is ALL ours and ours already. Instead of presenting any statement calculated to encourage the belief that conditions in this country warrant a distinctive school in Sociology defined as "Christian," I am inclined to believe that we should avoid even the appearance of a surrender of the properly tenable position that where we have a people professedly Christian, we already have, in theory, a Christian Sociology; and if the facts do not properly correspond with the theory, we should endeavor to make them do so, not by giving Sociology a new definition or qualification, but by simply making it in reality what putatively it is already.

F. A. Walker, Ph. D., LL. D.,
President of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Boston, Mass.:
—If *Sociology* is a name given to a science, then the expression "Christian Sociology" is as improper as would be the title "Christian Geology" or "Christian Thermodynamics."

Professor Lester F. Ward,
Washington, D. C.:—I am in the habit of considering Sociol-

ogy to be a science, not a religion, cult, or programme of action, and therefore "Christian Sociology" sounds to me about as would Christian Mathematics, Mohammedan Biology, or Buddistic Chemistry. If it is no better than Christian Astronomy, Geology, and Geography used to be in the days when such things were recognized, it is a rather poor article.

Rev. B. B. Warfield, D. D., LL. D.,
Professor in the Theological Seminary at Princeton, N. J.:—If "Sociology" be taken as meaning "that branch of philosophy which treats of human society," as Webster defines it after Herbert Spencer, then the prefixing of the word "Christian," it would seem, can properly mean only one of two things. It either ought to designate that branch of the science of society which treats of organizations purely Christian; in which case it is another way of speaking of organized Christianity, or of the Church and its modes of organized life. Or else it ought to designate Science of Society which rests on a revealed as distinguished from a purely natural basis: in which case it is a term analogous to such titles as "Christian Ethics," "Christian Cosmogony" and the like. It is to be feared, however, that, as currently used, it is often little better than the salt which Socialism is seeking to put on the tails of the birds it would fain catch.

Ethelbert D. Warfield, LL. D.,
President of Lafayette College, Easton, Pa.:—If we are to retain

the older view that Sociology is the philosophy of the development of human society, I can see no propriety in the use of the term "Christian Sociology." If, however, we are to fall in with the tendency to regard Sociology as the science of the mutual rights and duties of men in society, I think we may have a distinct field for Christian Sociology. In this case we have a parallel in Natural Ethics and Christian Ethics. As every department of human knowledge has a philosophical, a scientific, and a practical aspect, the real difficulty is to secure a recognition of the method employed in any given discussion.

William F. Warren, S. T. D., LL. D., *President of Boston University, Boston, Mass.*:—The term "Christian Sociology" seems to me as appropriate, and as little in need of defence, as "Christian Ethics," or "Christian Anthropology," or even "Christian Theology." I should not like to live in any society in which the propriety of any one of the three was generally questioned.

W. E. Waters, Ph. D., *President of Wells College, Aurora, N. Y.*:—Sociology is the science of social life in all of its departments. It has to do with the religious life of society as well as with its industrial, or political, or domestic life. The phrase "Christian Sociology," the study of society from the standpoint of Christianity, is therefore, it seems to me, thoroughly correct.

James Riley Weaver, Professor
in De Pauw University, Green-

castle, Ind.:—The scope of sociology being so much broader than that of *socialism*, the expression "Christian Sociology" would seem to be useful as showing that special phase of the general subject, while the definite contents of socialism as now advocated by its leading apostles is so specific and distinct from, if not antagonistic to, the Christian Church, that *Christian Socialism* is confusion of terms, misleading if not contradictory. On the other hand "*Christian Sociology*," it would appear, implies no such antagonism but that social reform must largely depend on the christianization of society, through the individual heart, for success.

Rev. Joshua W. Wellman, D.D., *Malden, Mass.*:—This question cannot be definitely answered until sociology has been clearly defined. It is said to be "the science of human society." But science is not necessarily Christian, we do not speak of Christian geology, or of Christian physiology. Why should we speak of Christian sociology if it be merely a science? It has been said that "sociology is more of a philosophy than a science." But the philosophies of human society are numerous. There is a philosophy of human society back of French socialism. So of anarchism, shakerism, monasticism. The Andover House (so called) in Boston is founded upon a philosophy of human society. If that philosophy is hostile to evangelical faith and all evangelistic effort—we do not say it is now—but if it is, if it avowedly excludes all Christian evangelism, it cannot with truth be

called Christian. So if the philosophy which is back of sociology excludes the gospel of Christ, or even ignores it, deeming itself all-sufficient for the reformation and salvation of men, how can it be called Christian? But if sociology is an honest investigation and a truthful setting forth of the pattern of holy society shown in the Christian scriptures, and of the divinely appointed means by which that holy society can be established on earth, it may properly be called Christian. Yet how would such a sociology differ from Christian theology? There is a great rage of late, on the part of certain minds, to call old things by new names, and then to imagine that because the name is new the thing is new.

Rev. B. L. Whitman, D. D., *President of Colby University, Waterville, Me.:*—To me Christian Sociology is the attempt to reconstruct society along the lines of the spirit and teaching of Christ. Of course the first step is study of present social conditions. I see no objection to the use of "Christian" as indicating the end proposed by workers who seek the christianizing of society.

Rev. J. L. Withrow, D. D., *Pastor of Third Presbyterian Church, Chicago, Ill.:*—It seems to me that "christian" has been joined with "Sociology" as "theistic" was with "Evolution"; to give it the best standing and introduction to good company.

Theistic Evolution is only the old doctrine of *Second Causes*; and Christian Sociology is only the

Good Samaritan principle at work as it has been for nearly two thousand years.

Hon. Carroll D. Wright, United States Commissioner of Labor, Washington, D. C.:—We speak of the Christian religion because it is a religion founded by Christ, and, therefore, thoroughly, emphatically, and positively Christian. A man might deny Christ and yet adopt all the particular precepts of his religion. He would not, as I understand it, be a Christian, although he might be a religious, a moral, a philosophical man, and one deeply imbued with the importance of everything that Christ taught; but if he does not accept Christ in the full sense as of Divine Sonship, he is not, as I understand it, a Christian. I do not see, therefore, how the term "Christian" can be applied to any science of sociology, admitting for the moment that there is such a science; it can have no relation whatever to what is distinctively understood as "Christian." If, on the other hand, the word "Christian" is applied to all religion which follows in any way the precepts taught by Christ, sociology must certainly come under the general designation, because any science of sociology must seek the amelioration of the human race, and along (as I contend) ethical as well as economic lines. Sociology generally embraces everything that relates to society, to the interests of man, to man in his relations to other men and to all men. Such a science or such a doctrine or such a department of human knowledge has always existed, but has not

been developed until within recent years. If the science itself does not recognize Christ as its founder, and Christ as the Son of God for the founder, is it not a misnomer to call it "Christian Sociology"? Believing, as I do, in the broad application of the Christian religion to all things,—that economics can not succeed fully without the most earnest application or influence of moral forces and that Christ taught in the best way possible the application of such forces,—I should not object, without stopping to discuss the question of Divine Sonship, to the term "Christian sociology." But I think much harm would be done if those who advocate the use of the term "Christian sociology" attempted to convey thereby the idea that sociology, as such, was founded by Christ himself, and that it is for that reason called "Christian." You very clearly say that you do not mean simply a Christian view of Society; but your great query is,

Are the forces in our civilization such as to characterize them as Christian, and does a philosophy or a plan or a science of such society warrant the use of the word "Christian"? In this sense, and with this sense clearly understood, I most thoroughly believe that the forces in our Western civilization are such (and are growing more in this direction) as to characterize them as "Christian"; so on this broad basis, the term "Christian sociology," if it can be so used as to convey this meaning, may be appropriate.

E. V. Zollars, LL.D., President of Hiram College, Hiram, Ohio:—I see no objection to the use of the word "Christian" as applied to "Sociology." It may not be the best term to use as a designation of the science in its broadest sense, but as limiting the application of the term to a particular field it seems to me to be entirely appropriate and adequate.

II.

In the symposium which precedes, sociology is defined from so many different points of view, and there is such a diversity of opinions expressed, that one may be pardoned for concluding that sociology stands for no well-defined science; that clouds and darkness are round about it, even if righteousness and judgment are the habitation of its throne. This is emphasized the more clearly from the fact that the symposium represents the ablest thinkers in America. Sociology is viewed as science, philosophy, and art; as descriptive, statistical, or dynamic; upon its subjective or objective sides. The varying opinions as to the propriety of using the word Chris-

tian in connection with it may largely be accounted for under this generalization. The task of reconciling such a variety of opinions would appear, at first sight, to be hopeless.

Sociology is to-day divided into two clearly defined schools,—the speculative and the practical. Speculative sociology is reaching out in the direction of an exact science, and for that reason would claim the right to the name scientific. And yet it is largely empiricism. It illustrates aptly Emerson's saying, that empirical science is apt to cloud the sight, and, by the very knowledge of functions and processes, to bereave the student of the manly contemplation of the whole.¹ It is largely a speculative philosophy and is worthy of being called an exact science only so far as it has borrowed its terminology and its analogies from biology and the sub-sciences. This, of itself, is a confession of weakness and an admission that it cannot walk alone. It observes animal and vegetable organisms, assumes society to be an organism, mistakes analogies for identities, borrows its terminology instead of creating one of its own, and then proceeds to discover the value of *x* deductively. The result is that society is proved to be an organism and one whose phenomena can be observed, discriminated, and so classified that safe generalizations can be deduced. Hence the Spencerian law of evolution applies, and social evolution becomes the admitted fact.

And sociology becomes the study of one thing,—the universe, or of two things—matter and mind. It is modest: it aims at the unification of all knowledge; and the first textbook for students' use is a mixture of physiology, pathology, psychology, biology, and anthropology. It tells of advertising, book agents, banks, botany, chemistry, friendship, geology, gambling; but the great forces that move men, like the desire to acquire, love of home, offspring, reputation, and the religious motive, are quite forgotten in the mad haste to appear and become scientific. Monopolies and trusts (having

¹ Essay on Nature, p. 80.

their origin in a perverted sense of the desire to acquire, in other words, in greed), the despotism of fashion, and, in fact, most of the spiritual forces that mould and move society, are quite overlooked.

Practical sociology frankly confesses itself to be more of a philosophy than a science. It is even willing to be ranked as an art,—the general art of social control, as Professor Bernard Moses defines it. It makes use of the scientific conclusions of the social sciences, but its end is practical, and it does not attain to the unattainable. It does not admit such a mass and medley of knowledge into the equation that the solution becomes impossible, so that the multitudinous facts overpower the mind, ending in a hopeless jumble. Professor Powers well says¹ that the facts of sociology are commonplace, but its conclusions should not be. It causes society to pass before it, and photographs the view. This is called Descriptive Sociology. It presents an ideal social condition which is a picture of society as it ought to be. This is called Statical Sociology. It then inventories the forces which would make society what it ought to be, and this is Dynamic Sociology. Descriptive sociology reveals, therefore, the doctrine of sin. The voluntary element in the unit of society, the individual, has resulted practically in so universal a tendency to do evil that society's ills can be accounted for on no other ground. Statical sociology borrows from Christianity its ideal unit,—the perfect man. From Plato down, ideal units have been admitted to be all that the world needs to insure an ideal social condition. Its social ideal is the coming kingdom. Dynamic sociology reveals the greatest reforming force in the world to be some Power operating with the truth through human agents, the units of society, to regenerate, transform, and purify society. This is a scientific and philosophical no less than a historical truth, and no enumeration of the forces that are transforming society can be complete without the

¹ *Annals of the American Academy*, March, 1895.

frank and full acknowledgment of the reality of this Power to move and regenerate men by acting through these agencies.

There is no such thing as an exact science of human society viewed as an organism. The phenomena of society are largely the unseen forces of the spiritual or the soul world; and of the mind no less than of the material world. Or, as the sociologists would say, they are the psychical no less than the psycho-physical phenomena; the subjective realities no less than objective phenomena.

But we cannot observe all the forces that move men, we cannot discriminate between them accurately, we cannot classify them, hence we cannot generalize with precision.

The first great force that observation teaches us moves many men is one which we hear the sound thereof but cannot tell whence it cometh or whither it goeth. So is every one that is born of the Spirit. We can assume the value of x and use it for a working hypothesis, but that is not inductive. The presence of the free will of man in the midst of objective realities, or the physical universe, makes prediction impossible. It is an old saying, that even divine foreknowledge cannot predict what a petit jury will decide. The presence of conscience, or the want of it, or of any of the perverted traits of human nature in place of the noble traits,—such as superstition in place of religion, or credulity in the place of faith, or greed in the place of the desire to acquire, or wilfulness in the place of will, renders prediction impossible as to man's action in view of given objective conditions. Christ may have meat to eat that we know not of. And entire communities will often follow a lead in uncertain directions, as in the case of witchcraft or of a tulip or real-estate craze. Great waves of influence and power which we can with difficulty account for seem at times to overcome entire communities, and lead them they know not whither. These are invariably ultra-rational and oftentimes contra-rational.

The motives cannot be always determined. Hence after viewing the efforts of men to make an exact science out of sociology we are led to exclaim, "Art thou a master in Israel and knowest not these things?"

In one of her charming letters, George Eliot says:—

"You will see by the *Fortnightly*, which you have not read, that Mr. Herbert Spencer is very anxious to vindicate himself from neglect of the logical necessity that the abstraction, 'Society,' is dependent on the modified action of the units; indeed he is very sensitive on the point of being supposed to teach an enervating fatalism. Consider what the human mind *en masse* would have been if there had been no such combination of elements in it as has produced poets. All the philosophers and savants would not have sufficed to supply that deficiency. And how can the life of nations be understood without the inward light of poetry, that is, of emotion, blending with thought."

Plato said poetry comes nearer to vital truth than history. George Eliot says further, and she speaks as the intimate friend of Mr. Herbert Spencer:—

"But the consideration of molecular physics is not the direct ground of human love and moral action any more than it is the direct means of composing a noble picture or of enjoying great music. . . . That every study has its bearing on every other is true; but pain and relief, love and sorrow, have their peculiar history, which make an experience and knowledge over and above the swing of atoms."

Dr. W. F. Poole said that fiction was nearer to truth than history.

The efforts that have been put forth to make of sociology an exact science excite our admiration for their erudition, for their persistence, and their optimistic spirit; but they call forth equally our pity for their futility, and awaken our sense of the ludicrous at the practical results. The data required to make of sociology an exact science would simply be infinite, and we are not surprised to read that Mr. G. H. Lewes, the first husband of George Eliot, wrote in his journal as follows:—

"Jan 28, 1859. Walked along the Thames towards Kew to meet Herbert Spencer, who was to spend the day with us, and we chatted with him on matters personal and philosophical. . . . His intense *theorizing*

tendency was contagious, and it was only the stimulus of a *theory* which could then have induced me to work."¹

If by scientific sociology one supposes that a complete system of exact scientific knowledge has been attained or is attainable, the words are a misnomer. Viewed in that light, there is no such thing as scientific sociology. The mind of man cannot circumscribe the subject. It can think at it, and about it, but not around it. Knowledge that is obtained by some general observations of the working of society as a unit, and then some striking and apt analogies between it and other organisms, such as vegetable or animal organisms, does not prove that society is an organism. Such a process of reasoning is simply to plead guilty to ignorance of one of the first laws of logic,—the undistributed middle. Man is an organism, society presents analogies similar to man, therefore society is an organism. To define the workings of society in terms of science does not necessarily give scientific sociology. Society grows like a plant, unfolds like a flower, viewed in some aspects is analogous to man. It has a head, heart, hands, a nervous system, arteries, veins; it is subject to ills, sickness, disease, death. We diagnose society's ills. We speak of the birth of nations, of their infancy, of their decline, old age, and death. But these are similes. But similes and analogies are not exact, and must not be pressed, as Herbert Spencer admits, until they go on all fours. For society has not hair or skin or a liver; it has not teeth or finger nails.

August Comte is called the Father of Sociology, because he first used the word and made some valuable suggestions as to how it should be studied. But he did not systematize it, or come to any conclusions beyond some analogies and similes. He pointed the way, like a signboard, and many have followed his directions; but not one who has done so, including Herbert Spencer himself, has ever reached the

¹ Life of George Eliot, p. 15.

journey's end. Comte himself did not do it for two reasons. He was a bald materialist and could cognize no phenomena of the spiritual world. He thought of sociology as social physics. The second reason why he accomplished nothing was that he died. Students in sociology have the habit of dying, the same as other mortals, and this has a tendency to cut short their investigations into the infinite data of human society.

In his "Data of Ethics," Herbert Spencer says, in the preface, that his reason for hastening on to write the "Data" and leaving certain intermediate work untouched, was the constant premonition, occasioned by certain bodily infirmities, that his work might be cut short and thus the world be deprived of his conclusions,—the most valuable part of it. His life was spared, and he turned back after writing the "Data of Ethics" to do the intermediate part, but he has not yet completed it. And not one other of the sociologists agrees with him in his conclusions. Professor Simon N. Patten says of the very attempt to view society as an organism:—

"It is a common sociological concept to think of a society as an organism. This concept is, however, defective. The members of a society act together not because they are parts of an organism having an independent *vital force*, but because they project and visualize the same subjective environment."¹

Small and Vincent say of Spencer's sociology, that it ends precisely where sociology proper should begin. In other words, he talked up to his subject and then stopped. Like a man who started so far back to run before jumping the gate he had no strength left to get over it. Where is the strictly scientific sociologist who has yet come up to the gate and opened it so that we may go in and see the garden with its flowers and fruits? Small and Vincent's text-book is called an introduction to the study of society. Aside from some striking similes and deep analogies, and an attempt to

¹ Annals of the American Academy.

clothe the commonest concepts in scientific terms, it has introduced us to some postal routes, some ordinary information about a rural community that any farmer's boy knows, some phases of a village that any grocer's clerk is familiar with. Such a book necessarily misses the deeper truth and comes to no practical conclusions. It is a hand pointing the way again. It talks about the psycho-physical communicating apparatus, about the pathology of social organs, the phenomena of social psychology and of social consciousness. We have social anatomy, physiology and pathology. And the conclusion which follows some ponderous propositions is that the telephone girl may be both a "communicating cell" and an "end organ." We are then warned that ordinary minds must not meddle with such deep themes. It is the exclusive province of scholarship to arrive at such weighty conclusions.

Our thought is not that sociology is to do more than end where social reform begins. Its province is not to Christianize society by preaching the gospel or present a plan of salvation, or to cure intemperance; but it does furnish the data for every social reform, and Christian Sociology does give the objective reasons for every Christian effort, and its investigations have this end in view. Professor Giddings says that Spencerian sociology, in general, whether formulated by Mr. Spencer or by other writers under the influence of his thought, is essentially a physical philosophy of society, notwithstanding its liberal use of biological and psychological data. In the words of Professor Giddings,—

"These theorems [of Mr. Spencer in his "First Principles"], taken together, are an interpretation of social changes in terms of those laws of the persistence of force, the direction and rhythm of motion, the integration of matter and the differentiation of form, that, together, make up Mr. Spencer's well-known formula of universal evolution."¹

Small and Vincent view sociology as a science, a philosophy, and an art. On page 25 it is a science. "Sociology is a

¹ Theory of Sociology, p. 9.

science less than fifty years old." On page 32 it is a philosophy. "The philosophy of human welfare." On page 77 it is an art. "It was born of the modern ardor to improve society." Professor Giddings asks:—

"Is it not as nearly certain as anything can be that sociology must abandon the biological terminology?"¹ adding, "It is the superficial aspects of social organization that are described, not the deeper relations and hidden forces."²

Professor H. H. Powers, speaking of Small and Vincent's book, says:—

"The sentences are involved and cumbersome, and there is a suggestion that the author places too great confidence in the scientific value of mere terminology."³

"The result of this headlong haste to be first is never a science—only a book. There must certainly be a science of sociology, but it will not come in a day, and its advent will be hastened more by the moderation and self-restraint than by the impetuosity of its devotees." "Superficial and misleading methods."⁴

In like manner Professor Bernard Moses gives it as his opinion that,—

"Although it may be true that sociology deals with society generally, yet its purpose does not appear to be scientific but practical."⁵

Writing at greater length, Kidd says:—

"One of the monumental works of our time is the 'Synthetic Philosophy' of Mr. Herbert Spencer begun early in the second half of the century, and not yet completed. It is a stupendous attempt not only at the unification of knowledge, but at the explanation in terms of evolutionary science of the development which human society is undergoing, and towards the elucidation of which development it is rightly recognized that all the work of science in lower fields should be preliminary. Yet so little practical light has the author apparently succeeded in throwing on the nature of the social problems of our time, that his investigations and conclusions are, according as they are dealt with by one side or the other, held to lead up to the opinions of the two diametrically opposite camps of individualists and collectivists into which society is slowly becoming organized."⁶

¹ Yale Review, Nov. 1894, p. 327. ² *Ibid.*, p. 328.

³ Annals of the American Academy, March, 1895, p. 121.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 123, 122.

⁵ Journal of Political Economy, December, 1894, p. 38.

⁶ Social Evolution, p. 2.

With this agrees the Professor of Political Economy in the University of Montpellier, France, Charles Gide, who affirms that,—

"All workers at sociology, whether they be of the school of Comte or of the school of Herbert Spencer, apply their main efforts to the formation of a huge synthesis of all the social sciences; but the field is so vast that it is easy to miss the right road."¹

In 1818 Fourier wrote: "To-day, Good Friday, I have found the secret of universal association." But Gide says: "Association is not one of those phenomena that require discovery." The bees, the ants, the beavers, no less than worlds in the solar system, follow such a law which seems to be a universal and general law.² Emerson says that manners is the secret of association; another says sympathy, and the play of self-interest seems to many to govern it.

Upon this point Richard T. Ely speaks as follows:—

"Sociology as a whole is so vast a subject that comparatively little progress, it must be confessed, has been made in its prosecution. . . ."

"Herbert Spencer is the best known English sociologist, and in his various works, *Study of Sociology*, *Social Statics*, *Principles of Biology*, he has covered a wide field, but for the most part superficially. . . ."

" . . . in reading the works of sociologists, while making full and frank acknowledgment of their erudition, patient research, and ability, it must be confessed that the impression left by all is that of work unfinished, of work, in fact, scarcely more than begun. . . . They are men who are feeling their way, and who, like other explorers, often stumble and fall. Suggestion and impulse describe the debt we owe to sociologists."³

As late as March, 1892, Mr. Leslie Stephen said that—

"There is no science of sociology properly scientific—merely a heap of vague empirical observations, too flimsy to be useful in strict logical inference."⁴

Mr. Kidd says:—

"So far, the larger part of the most useful work of the century in the department of sociology appears to have been merely destructive."

" . . . There is at the present time no science of human society. Many of the spokesmen of science who concern themselves with social problems continue to speak and act as if they conceived that their duty

¹ Political Economy, p. 4.

² *Ibid.*, p. 145.

³ Political Economy, pp. 16, 17.

⁴ Quoted by Kidd, p. 5.

to society was to take away its religious beliefs. But it is not that they have any faith of their own to offer instead; they apparently have themselves no grasp of the problem with which the world is struggling as best it can. Science has obviously herself no clear perception of the nature of the social evolution we are undergoing. She has made no serious attempt to explain the phenomenon of our Western civilisation. We are without any real knowledge of the laws of its life and development or of the principles which underlie the process of social evolution which is proceeding around us."¹

The foremost names in so-called scientific sociology are Comte, Spencer, Schäffle, and Ward, but not one of them has a single practical suggestion to offer upon the social evolution that is going on about us. As a protest against all attempts to define society in terms of biology and of science, Kidd's "Social Evolution" has emphasized the service of the religious motive, the function of idealism and of supernatural sanction in social progress.

Hence our proposition, that the science of human society, as an organism, so far from being exact, is merely an ideal, a theory, and is nearer the domain of speculative philosophy, unless we use the word scientific in a loose sense to express a method rather than a definite body of knowledge. It is not practical nor attainable because the data are infinite, and the mind is too limited to know such infinite data with sufficient exactness. Professor Giddings says:—

"No science is at this moment in greater need of theoretical organization than sociology. [On page 13 he says sociology is not a science.] A rapidly growing body of coördinated knowledge is called by this name. An increasing number of earnest thinkers in England, Germany, France, Belgium, Italy and the United States are known as sociologists. Several universities in Europe and America have introduced courses in sociology. Yet there is no definite agreement among scientific men as to what the word shall be understood to mean.

"In some of the university courses it stands for a philosophy of society. In others it denominates a study of the institutions of tribal communities. In yet others it is applied to highly special studies of pauperism, crime and philanthropy. In the literature of sociology, also, an equally varied usage may be found. Special investigators employ the word in senses that are unrecognized by the systematic writers."²

¹ Social Evolution, p. 5.

² Theory of Sociology, p. 7.

And yet Small and Vincent say that sociology is fifty years old. For all these reasons we have said that sociology is more of a philosophy than a science. It is a philosophy of society defined in terms of science or in a scientific mood.

Social organisms are not hatched out by machinery like chickens. They lie outside of the sphere of observable and positive knowledge. Has scientific sociology, falsely so-called, then, any patent on this department of thought so that it has acquired the right to the exclusive exercise of investigation and can warn Christian thinkers off as trespassers, as Professor Small has essayed to do? We answer, It has no such exclusive monopoly. It never had it, in the first place, and, if it had, fifty years is long enough for the patent to have expired; and especially because science has accomplished nothing practical. It has put out some ponderous volumes full of scholastic pedantry and metaphysical jugglery and intellectual gymnastics, but it has not found a remedy for a single social malady. It has so far been a blind leader of the blind.

At the opening of the University of Brussels, the rector, M. Van der Rest, took for his subject "*La Sociologie*," and refused to institute a special chair for it, saying it was—

"a badly determined science, that presents no well-defined line of demarcation from the moral and political sciences and that touches the most varied questions, all of which nevertheless are comprised within the limits of the studies of existing chairs."

Many leaders of sociological thought deny that the use of the word Christian as applied to sociology means anything. The Hartford School of Sociology connected with the Seminary has recently dropped the use of the word. Professor Small maintains that we cannot be Christian sociologists until we have become sociologists, thus using the word Christian subjectively, which very few have any thought of doing. These warnings to Christian teachers and preachers not to confound sociology with social reforms, or with applied Chris-

tianity, or with the Christianization of society; and, much more, not to confuse sociology with Utopian dreams, and define it in terms of the emotions instead of the intellect; and to be very careful about confounding piety and pity with scientific knowledge are forcibly stated by such writers as Professor Small, Professor Giddings, and Dr. Dike. Notwithstanding, we are told that sociology has no other task and no other evidence than the task and the evidence which the facts of associated life contain, and that the problems of society are not in some social *terra incognita* constructed by the kaleidoscope of abstract reasoning and visible only in imagination; that the terms of social problems are the most commonplace facts of social experiences: yet we are told that there is a fashionable social sciolism which assumes ability to perform large social generalization without precise knowledge of any contained particular. We are told by Small and Vincent that Christian purpose and aspiration cannot furnish technical skill or information; that piety without knowledge of facts would work disaster in politics and economics just as in navigation or in pharmacy. Professor Small covers the ground more plainly when he says that many people are dabbling with sociology who lack both the talent and the training requisite for the investigation of social principles.

When theoretical sociologists claim that the study of sociology is less than fifty years old, we answer, that Amos, Joel, Hosea, and Isaiah were sociologists. Amos lived about 750 B. C. Two and a half centuries before Plato, therefore, he preached justice and righteousness and a sound ethics,—treating the nation as an organic unity in all of God's dealing with it. He agrees with President Fairchild as to the true source of right conduct. His mission was not to individuals, but to the nation. "Seek Jehovah; seek good, that ye may live." Hosea also treats the nation as an organism. He sees with true sociological instinct that Jehovah has a controversy with the nation. Loving kindness and not sac-

rifice is what he desires; a knowledge of God more than burnt offerings.

And Isaiah is full of sociology. His book is a warning not to grind the face of the poor. He warns against injustice to the poor, against acquiring vast estates by dispossessing small holders; against splendid palaces with their sumptuous banquets and riotous revels; against extravagant wardrobes, costly jewels; against materialism in all its forms. He deals with society as an organic unity. This antedates August Comte and Herbert Spencer by about twenty-five hundred years. And Micah and Habakkuk lay down principles of life and death for a nation; likewise Jeremiah and Zechariah. Professor Edward L. Curtis, of Yale College, has well remarked, that the Old Testament mainly reveals God's dealing with nations, while the New Testament dwells especially upon his relations to the individual.

The study of society as a unit or an organism is, therefore, not new. It is older than Plato's Republic or Cicero's Commonwealth. It antedates Moses and Confucius, for aught we know. That human beings are moved by common impulses, actuated by similar motives, and in their associated capacity present phenomena analogous and similar to other organisms, is no new discovery. The twelfth chapter of Romans and the twelfth chapter of First Corinthians are in evidence. But the remarkable advances made in the sciences; the increase of striking analogies found, especially in the study of biology; *and more particularly the practical need of solving some burning social questions which are vital issues in our national life*,—these have all combined to bring sociology to the front as seemingly a new philosophy or a new science. Kidd says that the triumphs of society over nature are the prominent facts of the present century. "The influence of machinery, steam transportation, and electrical communication upon social structures and activities has been so great that the contrast between the old and the new is al-

most startling. But the task is not complete. Exploring expeditions, surveying parties, physical and chemical laboratories, agricultural experiment stations, and countless individuals in virtual co-operation with each other and with those whose work they inherit, are constantly engaged in the great task of finding out more of nature's secrets and putting them at the service of society."¹

Professor Bascom says:—

"Sociology is a discussion of the conditions and laws of combination and growth in society."

"Indirectly sociology involves every force that touches human life, and so may be said to spread out into all knowledge. It ought, however, directly to include only those departments of action whose immediate and primary office it is to organize society. . . . We confine, then, our attention to those agencies which are directly formative forces in society, and by which society is understood.

"There are, in social phenomena, five modes of action sufficiently distinct and organic to be termed departments of sociology. They are customs, laws, economics, religion and ethics."

"Customs may be divided into social, religious and civil customs. Social customs may be divided into those which pertain to the family, to classes and to general intercourse. Religious customs are rites and observances. Civil customs appertain to economic action, to methods in civil procedure and to law."²

If sociology is to be traced to August Comte because he first used the word, and in 1830 said that positive philosophy could be completed by bringing social phenomena within its comprehension and consolidating the whole into one body of homogeneous doctrine, then sociology is less than fifty years of age. But may not Comte's service in this sphere be likened to Bacon's in philosophy in this particular, that, as Lord Macaulay says, Bacon discovered nothing, he only stated a principle that was as old as man and revealed its bearings and importance. Comte said it is time to complete the vast intellectual operations begun by Bacon, Descartes, and Galileo by constructing the system of *general* ideas, which must henceforth prevail among the human race.

¹ Social Evolution, p. 266. ² Sociology, pp. 2, 6, 7.

And the end was surely Baconian, for this is the way, Comte said, to put an end to the revolutionary crisis which is tormenting the civilized nations of the world. Comte was not the first to imagine that what man needed was simply a way and the truth, but not the life. If in all ages men had acted as he imagined they would,—follow the truth when they see it, Plato's Republic might have been a reality long since, instead of a dream. It is a very common mistake that is made in every age by some of the best thinkers, that man's intellect instead of his will needs converting. Paul knew better. "For we know that the law is spiritual: but I am carnal, sold under sin," etc. (Rom. vii. 14-25).

While universities in Europe and in America have introduced courses in sociology, there is no agreement yet as to what the word shall be understood to mean. Professor Giddings says:—

"Sociology is an attempt to account for the origin, growth, structure, and activities of human society by the operation of physical, vital and psychical causes, working together in a process of evolution."

Hence he finds in Spencer, Darwin, and Hæckel suggestions of an evolutionist account of social relations. He says a sociologist must be historian, economist, statistician, biologist, psychologist.

Small and Vincent claim that sociology in its historical and analytical department, or descriptive sociology, is the organization of all the positive knowledge of man and of society furnished by the sciences and sub-sciences now designated and included under the titles Biology, Anthropology, Psychology, Ethnology, Demography, History, Political and Economic Science, and Ethics. Descriptive Sociology attempts to combine the testimony of these special sciences into a revelation of the accidental and the permanent factors in social combinations, and thus of the forces to be taken into calculation in all doctrines or policies of social progress. Nearly fifty years ago Herbert Spencer enumerated the re-

quirements of descriptive sociology, which he called the Natural History of Society, to be knowledge of government, political and ecclesiastical; customs, usages, industrial systems, superstitions, myths, labor guilds, organizations, the agencies for distribution, communication, circulating medium; all the arts, the intellectual condition, the sciences, architecture, sculpture, painting, music, poetry and literature, æsthetic culture, the daily lives of the people, their food, homes and amusements, and finally the morals, theoretical and practical, laws, habits, proverbs, etc. These must all be grouped and arranged and comprehended in their *ensemble* and contemplated as mutually dependent parts of a great whole. The task of the sociologist, if all this were necessary, is therefore not light. We are not surprised, therefore, that no man has yet arisen who can be called the leader in sociological thought. Giddings says, that Aristotle in the *Politics*, that Montesquieu and the physiocrats gave objective explanation of society in terms of race, soil, climate, heredity, and historical conditions. They were followed by Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Bentham, Berkeley, Kant, and Hegel with subjective interpretations in terms of human nature, utility, ethical inspirations and ideals. And Professor Giddings reasons that a definite, coherent, theoretical sociology must unite the subjective and objective explanations.

Accordingly, the sociologist has three main quests. "First, he must try to discover the conditions that determine mere aggregation and concourse. Secondly, he must try to discover the law that governs social choices, the law, that is, of the subjective process. Thirdly, he must try to discover also the law that governs the natural selection and survival of choices, the law, that is, of the objective process." Hence Professor Giddings concludes that sociology of itself is not a science. So says Professor Bascom. Is there any science of the infinite, or is it at the best a speculative philosophy? Sociology viewed in some aspects reminds one, therefore, of

the museum where, Washington Irving says, was combined in the highest degree those things of rarity and uselessness. Every special philosopher claims to be a sociologist, and defines sociology in terms of those forces which are the object of his own investigations. Political economy enlarged is sociology; so is the study of crime, of pauperism, intemperance. Ethnology becomes sociology.

But a living science is like the poet, *nascitur, non fit*. Its origin is practical,—its end is to add somewhat to the sum of human happiness. True science, like true philosophy, as Bacon showed, must be enlisted in the service of mankind. It must justify its existence by its very usefulness.

Now, is sociology to become a living thing, justified in its existence by its usefulness and by positive service to mankind, adding to the welfare of human happiness, and an earnest seeker for truth, not as an end, but as a means to a higher end,—the betterment of mankind? If society is an organism, then Christian Sociology is scientific in this, that it recognizes the necessity of perfecting the individual units, namely the individuals that make up the organic whole. This was what Plato said was all that society needed,—justice in the individual. As Paul said: "That we may grow up into him in all things which is the head, even Christ: from whom the whole body fitly joined together, and compacted by that which every joint supplieth, according to the effectual working in the measure of every part, maketh increase of the body, unto the edifying of itself in love." (Eph. iv. 15, 16.) That Christianity does perfect the individual can be proved both inductively and deductively. It puts character in the will, it moves upon that stronghold through both the emotions and the intellect. And Christian Sociology clearly defines the relations of these units in the organism, for there is no proper conception of altruism in science. The altruism of science is natural, and not spiritual. The tiger has it, the

wild geese, the Newfoundland dog, the bees. But that is not the love commended because it is born of God. Theoretical sociology is like the warehouse where are a lot of machines. Its duty is to take them all and make one machine of them. But practical sociology melts up the iron before making one machine of all. Sociology must cognize all forces at work in society. Practical sociology puts its depth of thought in the concept, and not in the words that image the concept. It is free from that curse of the dialecticians,—scholastic pedantry, the menace to-day to American scholarship. It assumes that simplicity is the soul of culture. Clearness of thought is a first requisite; as Lincoln's speech at Gettysburg lives when Everett's is forgotten.

Sociology is not to be an Edward Casaubon, spending a life on some impracticable investigations which are like Jay Gould's road that begins nowhere and ends nowhere. Christian Sociology is modest. It asks questions of other departments of thought, like ethics, philosophy, exegetical theology, psychology. It builds upon the conclusions of other departments of Christian thought. It asks of moral philosophy, What is the *summum bonum*? It does not assume to know all things, and when all knowledge has brought its conclusions, it asks of all, *Cui bono*? Its end is practical,—to add to the sum of human happiness. Christian Sociology recognizes *sin* in the world and looks for it in the home of the rich and in the hovel of the poor,—among capitalists no less than in labor organizations. Any view of the world that fails to discover sin is superficial. Sin is a matter of proportions and of relations, and not necessarily of definite acts. Christian Sociology, therefore, takes cognizance of all of the forces that play any part in shaping society. It views the material, mental, moral, and spiritual phenomena only in their social aspects. It is scientific in method, philosophic in spirit, and zealous for wise conclusions, because it is a condition, and not a theory, that confronts us; and because

Christian Sociology aims primarily at the betterment of mankind and to add to the sum of human happiness. It brings its fruit to market, and not the machinery by the help of which the fruit was raised. The world wants results more than it wants learned disquisitions on methods; it wants sense rather than sound; wisdom of thought rather than words.

Christian Sociology learns its lessons of evolution from biology; its laws of the mind from psychology. It derives its definition of duty from ethics, and its religious teachings from biblical and exegetical theology, but is not concerned with purely speculative questions. It enters into no discussion with ethics as to the *summum bonum*; it will not even dispute that society is evolved, provided such a theory does not logically end in fatalism. Hence Christian Sociology is descriptive, it is statical, it is dynamic. It is inductive, scientific, philosophical. It is simple, practical. Its end is not to prove a theory, but to ameliorate the condition of mankind, and in this it is like the Divine Master, who went about doing good, for only thus can it justify its right to the respect of the thinking world and to be supported by the endowments of Christian philanthropy.

ARTICLE VI.

THE PASSING OF AGNOSTICISM.

BY THE REV. A. A. BERLE, D. D.

"BEAUTIFUL without doubt is the world, excelling, as well in its magnitude as in the arrangement of its parts, both those in the oblique circle and those about the north, and also in its spherical form. Yet it is not this, but its Artificer that we must worship. For when any of your subjects come to you, they do not neglect to pay their homage to you, their rulers and lords, from whom they will obtain whatever they need, and address themselves to the magnificence of your palace; but, if they chance to come upon the royal residence, they bestow a passing glance of admiration on its beautiful structure; but it is to you yourselves that they show honor, as being 'all in all.' You sovereigns, indeed, rear and adorn your palaces for yourselves; but the world was not created because God needed it; for God is Himself everything to Himself,—light unapproachable, a perfect world, spirit, power, reason. If, therefore, the world is an instrument in tune, and moving in well-measured time, I adore the Being who gave its harmony, and strikes its notes and sings the accordant strain, and not the instrument."

So wrote Athenagoras, the Athenian Christian and philosopher in the second century after Christ,—a splendid prefiguration of the type of thought which centuries after should produce when the marvels of the wonderful creation of God should have ceased to dazzle the mind of man for themselves alone, but also, and more, for their Creator and Governor, in fact the transition from the rule of world worship to the wor-

ship of Almighty God. Even in that early period the inadequacy of the Greek mode of thought was perceived and felt, and the search for that larger view of the world, wherein its true relation to the universe and to God should be more justly and fully expressed, was begun. The passionate admiration which was in its essence the Greek substitute for worship, by which the enamoured minds of the Greeks revelled in the beautiful forms and entrancing images which a highly cultivated æsthetic sense and a highly developed artistic energy produced, did not still the feeling after the God who made these aspirations and confirmed the permanent power of the beautiful in human life and experience. From the beauty of form and color to the beauty of thought and the pleasurable in sense was but a natural and onward development. But when the step from beauty of feeling and thought to beauty in life and service needed to be made, the impulsive force of the æsthetic idea spent itself, and failed to meet the ethical and spiritual necessities which the very worship of the beautiful had created. And thus the Athenian must ever be seeking to hear some new thing, and to erect altars to unknown gods, and live in the dreamland of aspiration, as it was in the beginning, and die in the wastes of agnosticism, as it finally proved.

Our race has a singular habit, the proper force of which has never been adequately recognized by the historians of human progress. It is the habit of verification. No matter how powerful the logic, or how severe the practical admonitions of experience, succeeding generations try the same experiments, and thresh over the same straw, and reach the same conclusions, and revolt from them, just as regularly as they come on. And by this means, though it would seem to be idle, and wasteful of human thought-power and energy, it strengthens itself, however unconsciously, in certain forms of belief and brings to itself a certain confidence in itself, the world, the universe, and human thought, which is it-

self a most sublime defiance to its own dicta and laws. It establishes, beyond reasonable doubt, the uncertainty of human conclusions with respect to any question whatsoever, and then honors its dogmatists and specialists and narrow-minded, determined leaders, just as heartily and reverently as though it had not proved the utter futility of their teachings. It erects great empires, and equips them with all the pageantry and splendor that boundless sacrifice of time, strength, wealth, and life can give, and glorifies itself for its achievement, and yet in the next mood these empires are crushed to the dust, literally wiped from the earth, and almost annihilated from the memory of the race. A few generations pass and it sends expeditions to exhume those very remains, if haply they survive, and canonizes the expositors of the thought-feeling or art of the age, and rears anew costly and marvelous mausoleums for the rescued relics of its bygone follies. It creates a literature, sublime in its outlook and simply astounding in its depiction of the subtle influences which move men in love and in war. It builds vast libraries and stores them with all the wealth of human thought that the ages have produced, but scarcely is this laborious task accomplished when the heyday of destruction begins again, and merrily the torch is applied, and we see an Alexandrian bonfire making the world bright with its dire illumination. But the moment the flame is out, it begins again, with an earnestness hardly less than terrible, to gather up the sacred ashes, and ransack creation to see how it may reproduce the lost treasures. And so well has this habit been established that the moods of any age can be found in every age. The types of thought, the awakened feeling, the passionate admiration, the insane destruction, and the anxious regathering—all are present and always present; so that, while one part destroys, the other slyly keeps back enough to tell us how we may find the lost part when the mood changes, and in the midst of the most triumphant blare of trumpets announcing

a feat of destruction we may hear a sort of consoling assurance that all may yet be well.

How often has the human mind been resolved into a mere collection of reacting molecules; which by some curious conspiracy have brought forth what we know as the mental life of the world; how often has the will been annihilated, except as a delightful invention by which we could perform our little automatic parts with somewhat more of enthusiasm and interest, yet all the while conscious that behind the scenes that huge Thing called Natural Law was pulling the string; how often have we seen our noblest emotions shown to us, bare and devoid of their poetry, as the mere sensational results of excited motor nerves; how often have the beneficent coincidences of prayer been shown to be simply the accidental happenings in the vast realms of space; how often have we been convinced that the parental love, the nurture of the young, and the solicitude for offspring were only the developed utilitarian fancies of evolved anthropoids! Times innumerable, and as often as the generations of the race have come upon the scene. But, alas, the race has not heeded its own philosophy, and has spewed its own logic out of its mouth. Molecules the mind may be, but none the less we increase yearly its productive power and pay vast revenues to those who work their molecules the hardest; the world may be automatic, and yet we organize North Pole expeditions, and create weather bureaus, work our mines, experiment in electricity, and to harness our motive power build steamships, railroads, and other conveyances, just as if we were doing these things as real lords of creation, bringing the world under subjection to ourselves, and it looks and acts and feels, all things considered, very like a real world; we still marry and are given in marriage and make love, we suffer, fear, hate and are angry, have hopes and despairs, and they give us nervous prostration and produce realistic literature, just as if our emotions were something more than mere sen-

sations which can be produced at will; and when weary and worn, and the battle has gone against us, we pray just as though it were something else than mere mental reaction of some sort, thrust out into space with no particular aim or landing place; and we hold endless meetings, and give innumerable dinners, and develop myriads of new sciences about child nurture, and talk of the coming new generations, with a frightful altruism, just as though the sins of the fathers *were* visited upon the third and fourth generation of them that hate God, and He was yet showing mercy to thousands of them that love Him and keep his commandments. Yes, the race does all these things. The highest and the lowest alike join in these pursuits, and from the university to the hovel human nature is still one and the same thing, and moves in accordance with the established lines which the centuries have verified for us, the appropriate lines, whether proper or not, we do not venture to say, for a human race to follow.

STRIFE OR ORDER THE WORLD'S LAW.

That the world is a harmonious world, and one in which there is a proper adjustment of forces and proper balancing of the various agencies by which motion and action and coöperation are produced, would seem at this stage of civilization to be somewhat settled. That it has much in it that is beautiful and wonderful goes without saying; that in the centuries of which we have any record it has been behaving with a reasonable regularity and uniformity seems also to be pretty well established; that we have been able to proceed as though certain fixed results would not be disturbed, and in this belief have proceeded and builded all that we have, is also beyond doubt; but the vexatious question still remains as to the harmony of the whole. We know in part,—that is, we act as though we knew in part, but whether we have the harmony and the uniform relation of forces and parts which warrants us in saying that it is a harmonious world, opens a vast

field of discussion. In the first place, we have before us the evidences of the natural and steady development of species, and the differentiation and distribution of those species. We have a certain amount of reproductive energy upon which we rely for the perpetuation of these species; and we are much disposed to regard man as at the pinnacle of this development, with a certain relation to all that is below and behind him, even though the processes are yet, for the essential parts of the development, obscure and doubtful. But, side by side with this apparent harmony, we have a doctrine of the survival of the fittest which seems to indicate that the progress is inseparably linked with the regular and wholesale destruction of a large part of the created world. In some scales of organic life more, in some less, but present in all, is this fierce struggle going on which we call the struggle for existence. The evolution seems to be regular enough, and we find the types merging into higher and more advanced, as the case may be, with the new conditions, but in the midst of it all—struggle. Even if we take the modification of the struggle idea, as suggested by the neo-scientific orthodoxy, and discuss the struggle as for others, it is still struggle. The world organically viewed, under this theory, is simply a kind of huge fighting arena, where the gladiators come on at regular intervals, and rule until the next set of slayers is brought into fighting trim. It is said, in extenuation of this slaughtering process, that it is the unfittest that are destroyed, and that those most worthy to survive do survive, and this is thought to take off the keen edge of the doctrine. Be that as it may, the point still holds, that it is a struggle, and one that must persist unto the death; its keynote is, Fight for your life, or die. And the requisite, apparently the first requisite, seems to be a fighting capacity. It can mean nothing else. If it means something else, the doctrine as such disappears.

This "Struggle Doctrine" certainly is a dominant one in the scientific thought of to-day. It is universally accepted,

and it would be considered reactionary, or worse, to doubt it. But side by side with this doctrine there is another which is equally well established scientifically. It is the doctrine of uniformity. Miracles we are told do not happen. The operations of nature are regular and uniform. There are indeed upheavals and catastrophes, but even these are regular, in that they have a place provided for them in the operation of natural law. Under this form of thought, it is indeed hard to see how there can be anything resembling the Christian doctrine of Providence, or what place there can be in the universe for prayer. The world is uniform, and the movements of natural law become each year more easily predictable than the last. When we know perfectly, we shall be able to adjust ourselves to every change which nature makes, readily and promptly, and shall be in perfect harmony and fellowship, so to speak, with the conditions under which we live. In fact, doubt will disappear, because the enlightened vision will see everything that it cares or needs to see. There can be no anxieties, for the uncertainties which produce them have become transformed into absolutely fixed conditions. It is become a new world wherein dwells perfect order. Now these two doctrines are held and advanced with equal force, and have been for many years, because they were understood to simplify the conception of the world and man's relation to it. The evidence was regarded as indisputable, and there was no room for argument, as indeed there seems to be none.

But the average mind will at once begin to inquire, how can the "Struggle Doctrine" and the "Order Doctrine" live side by side, or is the prize ring an orderly affair because there happen to be a couple of referees in the ring? Order suggests harmonious relationship, and, even though it has a little suggestion of the ethical, we must say it also suggests coöperation. It seems to be committed against waste, and seems to see in every part something that makes it coherent with the whole. This is what order means if it means anything.

The wanton destruction of any part of the whole it regards with repulsion, even when this destruction is dictated by the interests of the whole. It seems to be the only bulwark in thought against wild and licentious destruction. It is wholly antagonistic to systematic destruction, since by its own creation destruction ceases. And yet if there be such a process as the struggle for existence, and the struggle for the survival of the fittest, these must be directly opposed to the orderly world, which we have been persuaded we have. The ordinary reasoning human being cannot see that it helps the problem any by simply bringing in referees in the shape of natural laws, which say, in effect, Pound the life out of each other, only remember that you must be governed by Queensberry rules. It is destruction that stands in the way. It is the invasion of the right of being *per se* which makes our conception of an orderly world require that if things are destroyed that destruction must be distinctly and unquestionably vicarious. And unless the vicarious element is not only present but overrulingly present, the world is not one of order but of disorder, in spite of all protestations of regularity and uniformity.

As a matter of fact, the average human being, while conscious that there is a definite battle to be fought, wherein his own destiny is the stake, fully recognizes that that battle is not fought out in the "world," at all, but in himself, as a sort of microcosm, determining for itself what place it shall take in the larger world around him. The doctrine of order is in the main right, and justified both by the intelligence and the spiritual nature of mankind. It lies at the root of all activity. But the doctrine of the struggle either for self or for others, except in a sense wholly at variance with the recognized forms of the doctrine, is repulsive to the nature of man, wherever he is found. The world for the most part is harmonious enough, just as, in the beautiful illustration of Athanagoras, the palace is beautiful, but men admire the palace

because of the rulers, not the rulers because of the palace; so they have ever revolted from the notion that beings stand in essential antagonism to each other. Destruction they have recognized from time to time as needful; but such destruction was justly or mistakenly recognized under some form of the vicarious notion, by which alone destruction of any kind can ever be rationally justified.

In practical affairs this is never doubted. When have revolutionists paused in their efforts against tyranny because of the palatial splendor or the æsthetic traditions of the oppressor? When has the solid demand for human right and justice ever yielded to picturesque power? When has there been a time when the human spirit has not responded to the idea of helpful coöperation as against individual prerogative and usurpation? Has not alliance been the keyword of national progress and defence? Has not protection been the mightiest of weapons for mutual upbuilding and aid? Why do we talk of the "fatherland" or the "mother country"? Because these best express the necessities and the helps which the land of birth imposes and offers. And they have in them the essence of the vicarious doctrine, and are thought of only in connection with that idea. The struggle is not in the world, it is in the men; and not primarily with each other but each with himself.

"Men at some times are masters of their fates;
The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars,
But in ourselves, that we are underlings."

REVELATION AND KNOWLEDGE.

It is not necessary for our purpose to discuss the rise of the various modern theories of knowledge. It is not with the theories themselves that we have to do: it is rather with knowledge, as an instrument considered in itself, as capable or incapable of meeting the spiritual necessities of mankind. Now with the growth of knowledge of one kind and another

we have gradually widened our horizon to a degree that is hardly comprehensible on the old theory of the relation of things. Knowledge has, in our day, become nearly, if not quite identified with the so-called scientific knowledge; that is, the vast domain of experimental and theoretical science which has grown up from the sensational theories of the early experience philosophies of England. Never was there a bondage more complete than that of modern science to the eighteenth-century materialists. How complete that bondage is, and how futile as answering the needs of a philosophy of religion, or of the ethical basis of life and intercourse, has been pointed out recently in a most entertaining manner.¹ But the matter is not with the form of our scientific knowledge, it is with the knowledge itself. With the Gnosticism which has developed under the immense scientific activity of recent years has come a kind of fashion to make knowledge the basis, or at least the alleged basis, of our life and thought. At the same time it is the custom to meet all reference to revelation, especially the Christian revelation, with a sort of sneering pity.

But while knowledge has been uppermost in the thought of the time, and while the age-spirit has been one of knowing, at the same time there has been more activity along the lines of non-rational religious activity than ever before, and apparently in utter abandonment of the first precepts of a scientific age. A few illustrations will suffice to prove this assertion. In the first place, take the question of physical restoration from the effects of disease. It is well known that the varieties of mind cure, faith cure, Christian science, hypnotism, magic, mesmerism, magnetic healing, thought transference, pain absorption, and other theories are far beyond the power of enumeration. To these must be added, astral influence, theosophy, kindred communion, mental dieting, and others. And the singular fact about all these is that

¹ Balfour's Foundations of Belief.

their votaries cannot be ridiculed out of existence by the imputation of mild lunacy or similar aberrations. They are people of the highest culture and exceptional character, that is, apart from these particular things. They are reputable citizens, honorable fathers and mothers, nay more, they establish mighty temples, and build costly tabernacles. They gather together great congregations, and at least one of them was compelled, in the work of building a splendid house of worship, to make public announcement that no more funds were desired or needed. This in the face of the frantic appeals of missionary societies and humane propaganda of every description, clamoring for relief from the stringency of the hard times. Most of these beliefs pass with their votaries for religion of some kind. But their great power is the resultant from real or supposed physical effects in the matter of healing or restoration. Leaving their truth or falsehood out of the discussion, what shall we say of the scientific age which produces and sustains at once an immense coterie of scientists who are proving that nothing is certain, and that faith is absolutely untenable, and, if tenable, useless, and at the same time crowds a spiritual temple, where a deceased bishop materializes weekly to pronounce a benediction, and where a short cut to health can be secured without the medical college and the practicing physician. Surely here is faith of a kind which defies even the most destructive blows, in an age which delights to call itself an age of science. And the paralyzed professor, waiting anxiously for endowment funds, says, with the priests of old, "and we cannot deny it."

As an illustration of a different form of the similar activity, take the various theories of psychic science and influence. We have even books now on the "law" of psychic phenomena; so strong is the power of a scientific nomenclature that the ludicrous combination of terms involved in this expression is given to us in perfect sincerity. It reminds us of Fichte's attempt to define the necessary characteristics of

"all" revelation. But here again we have a range of belief and mental movement which is simply enormous, a reaction from extreme unbelief, or rather from the extreme scientific temper, to the utter antipodes of mental habit and procedure. And so on through the list, spiritism and manifestations, mental imagery, mental telegraphy, ideal suggestion, and a host of kindred ideas, for all of which the orthodox science of to-day would say there is not the slightest foundation in reason and experience, not only find acceptance, full, abject, and self-sacrificing, but what in this money-loving age is peculiarly significant, an acceptance which is furnishing ample funds for further investigation and propagation. In vain are exposures and protestations. In vain the appeal is to "reason." In vain is the cry of ridicule and fraud raised. In vain are the fixed laws of science quoted and explained. They simply find no response whatever, and the belief in these tenets gains in vitality and strength daily.

Now the interesting thing about all these manifestations is, that they are attributed to a common source. That source is what we should have to call, in the scientific thought of to-day, the impossible, that is, the supernatural. If it is not so called, it is simply that the realm of the natural is enlarged to take in these exceptional demonstrations, which amounts to the same thing. But it is none the less a thoroughgoing and more or less devout acceptance of a new form of supernaturalism. It is a statement of theory and an avowal of faith by the side of which the mildest of Christian creeds is the rankest rationalism. And what is more amazing is, that all these believers are absolutely unconscious of the effect, which, according to orthodox science, these beliefs ought to have upon themselves, their world, and their associations. They keep on paying their debts, buying and selling, and getting gain. They meet the ordinary man with the full recognition of the ordinary needs for rational intercourse. Scientifically they are, and ought to be, lunatics or knaves.

They are neither. They are simply believers in supernaturalism, more or less revealed, as they believe, to themselves and their associates.

But what is really at the bottom of all this activity with all its grotesqueness and admixture of folly and foolishness? The real thing at the bottom of it all is the ineradicable belief of men in revelation. Either it is a spurious revelation, or the Christian revelation, or a personal "vision," or what not, but it is the solid, well-grounded belief in revelation of some kind, that makes all these things possible. And nothing touches its temper and conviction less than the attitude toward life, the world, and God which has passed among us as agnosticism. These "revelations," of course, command no intellectual assent from the vast majority, but the activity which they engender is no less in evidence than the same amount of zeal in the work of Christian missions or the same labor if expended in humanitarian effort.

Meanwhile the great body of the Christian world moves on in the even tenor of its way, and carries on its vast philanthropic enterprises. The fact that the practical life of Christendom remains unmoved in the midst of all its theological agitation and its alleged scientific annihilation is in itself a great commentary upon the common sense of the race. But this has been in evidence so long that it has ceased to have the weight that it should as mere argument. But from these other and newer sources the failure of the doctrine of knowledge, which results in agnosticism, is even more clearly demonstrated, while faith in revelation of some kind gains new strength, and is affirmed with added impressiveness.

SIMILAR MOVEMENTS IN SCIENCE.

One is reminded at this stage of the inquiry of the attitude of mind which the agnostic unbeliever is likely to assume, by the attitude of Jeremiah the prophet when running to and fro in the streets of Jerusalem in search of a man.

"Surely these are poor; they are foolish: for they know not the way of the Lord nor the judgment of their God." We can fancy the contempt with which the evidences cited in the foregoing section will be received, and the passage from Jeremiah fitly represents its spirit. But, like Jeremiah, we will betake ourselves to the ranks of the scientists themselves. "I will get me unto the great men and will speak unto them, for they *have* known the way of the Lord, and the judgment of their God: but these have altogether broken the yoke and burst the bonds." We will see what contemporary science is saying on the question, and whether it has any testimony similar to that of the foolish and unlearned mob.

It has been one of the curious characteristics of the theological discussions of the half century now closing that they have been so largely engaged in by men who, according to their own statements, were not theologians at all. That they were perfectly truthful in this statement was often painfully manifest to their readers. But that this fact should operate as begetting a kind of modesty which should be natural to a tyro in a field where there are present highly trained experts was the vain wish of many who, valuing their knowledge in their own chosen fields of scientific investigation, looked for a truce to the misrepresentation and abuse which have generally been the accompaniments of the scientific man's advent into the theological field. And these additions to the number of those who were striving to enlighten the world on problems of theological thought, were not content to bring with them the vices of their own methods of discussion. They adopted those of the theologians as well, and with the increased vehemence and virulence of new converts; so that the best model of theological vituperation and unfairness is not some hidebound ecclesiastic who is still thinking in the fourth century, but our accomplished and eminently respected theologian Mr. Huxley. He would probably scorn being styled a theologian, but he has all the arts of

what he thinks peculiar to theological controversy so well cultivated that it would be unjust to deny him the title.

This increase in the ranks of theological investigators and disputants was not however an intrusion. Far from it. It has been a genuine gain to the science, and has been of immeasurable advantage to the cause of truth. It has brought to the surface elements which in the natural order of things would certainly have been neglected. It has lifted theology into the fellowship of the other sciences. It has enriched it with illustrations and suggestions, as well as new truth, which more than ever makes it the most majestic of all branches of human knowledge and research. It has led to a temper in the thought of the time which cannot be regarded as other than reverent. It has revealed in their true light the mere ranters and railers, and produced for them the disgust which is their proper heritage. It has both broadened the minds of the theological scientists and extended the horizon of the others. It has produced a respect for thought along theological lines which could have been secured in certain types of mind in no other way. It has actually established a *modus vivendi* between religion and science. It has been thoroughly helpful for all concerned, and should be a matter of congratulation by scientific men of all ranks and creeds.

What these laymen probably meant when they said that they were not theologians was that they were not ecclesiastics, as that term is commonly used, that is, they were not in the body of the organized and representative leaders of the church. But it would be vain to deny that they were, and are, in a proper sense theologians. If Mr. Balfour's book is not a truly theological work, then it would be hard to find one; and yet, as he truly says, it is not an introduction to the study of theology in the conventional form or with the conventional content. It consists of "Notes Introductory" to the study of theology, but it is really much more.

The expansion of theological literature which has thus

been described is due to the cause which is evident on the very surface of the inquiry. All questions which have the human species as a part of the subject-matter of the investigation are forced, at some stage of the research, to consider the motives and beliefs which move men in the thoughts and the endeavors which make the sum of human history. This provokes the study of anthropology. And anthropology, pursued faithfully, must consider a large variety of topics, in which it is soon seen that questions of religion, of faith, of sin, of holiness, of providence, of chance and accident, of birth and environment, and a hundred other things are indissolubly involved. Moreover the quest for character and the tremendous activities growing out of its attainment and preservation add to the need for investigating that side of human life which begins, not with the habits of anthropoid apes, but with the first conscious transgression of a known law of righteousness. In other words, a history of the human conscience is desired. It is seen to be absolutely necessary before further progress can be made.

At the same time the social agitations of the world supplied a further incentive. From the study of men the world is becoming scientifically anxious about man. And any inclination to defer the inquiry is sharply reproved by significant demonstrations of unrest which are not merely awakening in themselves, but very unhappy prophecies of what may come in the near future. The great strike of the miners in England, with the aid and coöperation of their fellow-workmen in France and Belgium, and the promise of similar assistance by those in Germany, was a kind of argument which was worth any number of volumes on the question of supply and demand. It was nothing more or less than the highwayman's argument. And it was as effective. But this was only one of many similar occurrences. And when these continued multiplying for a decade or two, it occurred even to the pagan gentry, amid the classic shades of Oxford, whom

the late Thorold Rogers so aptly described as "the army of the unemployed in England," that the thoughts and feelings and beliefs of these men must be looked into and understood. The glamour of the well-behaved and easily regulated "economic man" faded away, and the real man of flesh and blood and feeling came to the front. Naturally enough all the discussions which had to do with the amelioration of the needy and unfortunate classes of society took on a tone which seemed to approach the language of those engaged in the habitual philanthropic work of the church. With wider knowledge this harmony of tone grew more and more pronounced and gradually the pure humanitarian and the pure religionist found themselves together by the necessities forced upon them in the study of their respective problems. Mr. Huxley,¹ no less than General Booth, is working at the problem of the "submerged tenth." The diverse methods or antagonism of these to each other is the least significant thing about it. They are both busy with the same question. This is the impressive fact. Thus the horizon of theological discussion has continually broadened, and, one after another, the various sciences which could have any possible bearing on the past, present, or future of man have been annexed, and have become more or less infected with the theological spirit of the times. And never in the history of the world as to-day were scientific results regarded with so much interest as concerning their human effect and consequence. The result has been that the study of theology has become enlarged in extent, and diversified by method and material, to a degree which makes it the most comprehensive and interesting of all fields of investigation. And this the scientists have now begun to discover.

One of the most impressive of recent works has already been alluded to, namely, Mr. Arthur Balfour's "Foundations of Belief." This author has already achieved distinction in

¹ See Collected Essays, Vols. vii. and viii.

the field of philosophic discussion by his "Defence of Philosophic Doubt," a book of seriousness and power. In the present work, among other things which he undertakes, he surely, and with a rare sense of humor, punctures the huge bubble of naturalism which has been the outgrowth of the type of scientific thought which we have already presented. Mr. Balfour sees very clearly that the present foundations of science are no less unstable than those of theology as these are understood by the scientists. And for naturalism as a finality he has only an amused contempt which sees at once the utter absurdity of the position. One single passage will make his temper clear. Discussing naturalism and reason, and criticising Mr. Spencer's prophecy that the ultimate result of natural development will be full accord between man and his environment, which will produce perfect righteousness, he says: "Mr. Spencer, who pierces the future with a surer gaze than I can make the least pretence to, looks confidently forward to the time when the relation of man to his surroundings will be so happily contrived that the reign of absolute righteousness will prevail; conscience, grown unnecessary, will be dispensed with; the path of least resistance will be the path of virtue; and not the 'broad,' but the 'narrow way' will 'lead to destruction.' These excellent consequences seem to me to flow very smoothly and satisfactorily from his particular doctrine of evolution, combined with his particular doctrine of morals. But I confess that my own personal gratification at the prospect is somewhat dimmed by the reflection that the same kind of causes which make conscience superfluous will relieve us from the necessity of intellectual effort, and that by the time we are all perfectly good we shall also be all perfectly idiotic."¹

In this passage the author finds the core of the naturalistic theory in a single stroke. It is made perfectly clear to us, therefore, what we have to expect, and here we have not

¹ The Foundations of Belief, p. 75.

a poor and unlearned fanatic, but a clear-headed and astute publicist, with a scientific mind piercing the error through, and impaling it upon the sharp point of utter absurdity. The book abounds in passages of this same kind, and our author has no less contempt, though somewhat more delicately expressed, for that class of thinkers who seek to retain the naturalistic philosophy without accepting the naturalistic results. Moreover he shows with exacting clearness that the hypotheses of the scientific investigator of to-day are no more tenable, if at all so, than those of the most *a priori* theologian. Certitude in science is no more obtainable in the last analysis than certitude in theology, when the fundamental propositions of both are compared, and it seems to be established that the foundation of both lies somewhat deeper than in the mere hand-to-hand experiments which mean something to-day and nothing to-morrow. Mr. Balfour also recognizes that, sooner or later, there must come a certain congruity between opinions and practical ideals. That the ethical ideals prevailing to-day certainly on their practical side are preëminently Christian, will hardly be denied. But these have rested for centuries upon the supposition of the possibility and the reality of revelation. And in this confidence the most difficult moral undertakings as required by the ethical code of the New Testament have been cheerfully and successfully carried out. Of the ethical results which the absence of faith in revelation would bring about, we can have no idea at all, except that we are morally certain that one of the strongest incentives to virtue is withdrawn, with nothing to take its place. And that authority has gradually gathered around those precepts and that life which is apparently best sustained by revelation, is also clear; so that the naturalistic hypothesis not only leaves us without proper ethical footing, but with it destroys probably the strongest bulwark of authority, and that without substitute or regard for consequences. This Mr. Balfour holds, and properly, to be practical lunacy and phil-

osophic insanity. Nothing can be more significant than that so eminent a public man should at this stage of thought bring before us this contribution to the discussion.

For a very different reason, but in much the same spirit, comes Mr. Benjamin Kidd in his now famous book on "Social Evolution," and also shows the inadequacy of the present scientific standpoint, and questions whether the primary facts of human existence have not been entirely overlooked in rounding out the theory of life and the ends of existence and the method of their attainment. After proving that there is no rational sanction for human progress, that is, that the ordinary rational dicta do not supply us with sufficient dynamic for the world, as we know it, he says, in his chapter on the "Central Feature of Human History": "One of the most remarkable features which the observer [from another planet] could not fail to notice in connection with these religions, would be, that under their influence man would seem to be possessed of an instinct, the like of which he would not encounter anywhere else. This instinct, under all its forms, would be seen to have one invariable characteristic. Moved by it, man would appear to be always possessed by the desire to set up sanctions for his individual conduct, which would appear to be *super*-natural against those which were natural, sanctions which would appear to be *ultra*-rational against those that were simply rational. Everywhere he would find him clinging with the most extraordinary persistence to ideas and ideals which regulated his life under the influence of these religions, and ruthlessly persecuting all those who endeavored to convince him that these conceptions had no foundation in fact. At many periods in human history, also, he would have to observe that the opinion had been entertained by considerable numbers of persons, that a point had at length been reached, at which it was only a question of time, until the human reason finally dispelled the belief in those unseen powers which man held in control over him-

self. But he would find this anticipation never realised. Dislodged from one position, the human mind, he would observe, had only taken up another of the same kind, which it continued once more to hold with the same unreasoning, dogged, and desperate persistence."¹

This is, indeed, the fact, and it is more remarkable in our century, indeed in this decade of the century, than ever before, as we have already shown. With all our pride of scientific achievement the race continues to defy its most cherished logical convictions and to build temples to the most outlandish fetiches of irrationalism. It is singular that it is so. But the facts are before us, and to find the real cause, the *vera causa*, for this phenomenon, is the actual problem before us at this point. Mr. Kidd has been more frank than other scientific observers, and has said, and said bravely, what has been held to be one of the strongest arguments against the agnostic-naturalistic theory of life. Again and again the church affirmed substantially what is here so powerfully stated, and, presumptively, without theological interest or bias. And this is merely giving scientific statement for the same movement, the grosser form of which we have already presented. The populus simply defy the logic, the scientist re-examines the premises. But both are engaged in the same undertaking substantially. Here the social scientist joins hands with the publicist in the revolt against satisfied ignorance and scientific helplessness.

But there remains a stronger witness still. There is probably no name among scientists that will command reader homage to his splendid genius and candid thoroughness than that of the late Professor George J. Romanes. In his little posthumous work, entitled "Thoughts on Religion," after an elaborate statement of his view of the present status of the doctrine of causality and its necessary consequents, he says, in a chapter on "Faith in Christianity": "Moreover, in

¹ Social Evolution, p. 98 *seq.*

those days [when he held the agnostic position], I took it for granted that Christianity was played out, and never considered it at all as having any rational bearing on the question of Theism. And, though this was doubtless inexcusable, I still think that the rational standing of Christianity has materially improved since then. For then it seemed that Christianity was destined to succumb as a rational system before the double assault of Darwin from without and the negative school of criticism from within. Not only the book of organic nature, but likewise its own sacred documents, seemed to be declaring against it. But now all this has been very materially changed. We have all more or less grown to see that Darwinism is like Copernicanism, etc., in this respect; while the outcome of the great textual battle is impartially considered a signal victory for Christianity. Prior to the new [Biblical] science, there was really no rational basis in thoughtful minds, either for the date of any one of the New Testament books, or, consequently, for the historical truth of any one of the events narrated in them. Gospels, Acts and Epistles were all alike shrouded in this uncertainty. Hence the validity of the eighteenth-century scepticism. But now all this kind of scepticism has been rendered obsolete, and forever impossible; while the certainty of enough of St. Paul's writings for the practical purpose of displaying the belief of the apostles has been established, as well as the certainty of the publication of the Synoptics within the first century. An enormous gain has thus accrued to the objective evidences of Christianity. . . . But, as in any other science, experts are apt to lose sight of the importance of the main results agreed upon, in their fighting over lesser points still in dispute. Now it is enough for us that the Epistles to the Romans, Galatians and Corinthians, have been agreed upon as genuine, and that the same is true of the Synoptics so far as concerns the main doctrine of Christ Himself." ¹

¹ *Thoughts on Religion*, p. 154 *seq.*

Such is the verdict of an impartial scientist who has himself wandered in the byways of agnosticism, and fully tested what the reality of that position is, and we cannot forbear to add his closing words on the pure agnostic position, as contained in the same section from which we have already quoted: "Observe, when we become honestly pure agnostics the whole scene changes by the change in our point of view. We may then read the records impartially, or on their own merits, without any antecedent conviction that they must be false. It is then an open question whether they are not true as history. There is so much to be said in objective evidence for Christianity that were the central doctrines thus testified to anything short of miraculous, no one would doubt. But we are not competent judges *a priori* of what a revelation should be. If our agnosticism be *pure*, we have no right to prejudice the case on *prima facie* grounds."¹ This is possibly the strongest recent word that has been said for Christianity in the contest with agnostic science, and it is a striking tribute to their author that they come with such dignified clearness after all these years of a habit of thought which would make such an utterance strange at least.

Thus we have not only the testimony of the modern excrescences of faith and confidence in revelation, but, as we now see, a parallel movement among the scientists themselves, which gives the promise of a renaissance of faith, and not only of faith, but of supernatural Christianity. To be sure there are discordant elements in this group of opinions, and these there will possibly always be. But on the main fact the note sounds clear and strong from all, namely, the hour of agnosticism has struck, and this too at length will be laid away in the sepulcher of its fathers of unbelief until some new specter is evolved to supply the necessities of the godless and to terrify the faithless.

¹ Thoughts on Religion, pp. 156-157.

THE REAFFIRMATION OF THE SUPERNATURAL.

These and similar manifestations of a new era in religious thought which is approaching, suggest both the opportunity and the duty of apologetic writers with reference to the evidences of Christianity. For the fifteen years past the tone of thoughtful writers on the evidences has for the most part been one of doubt and caution. Even the most fundamental doctrines of the Christian religion were uttered in a manner that could hardly be called other than half-hearted. Where the old ring of certainty prevailed, it was generally joined with obscurantism that only added to the burden of the serious and the thoughtful. Resistance to the new truths of critical science tended more than ever to alienate the scientific mind from the temper required for a fair examination of the evidences. Violent handling of the most fixed truths of nature did the rest. But happily there is now an opportunity when the newest truths of science and the oldest doctrines of Christianity may be examined with a view to their absolute and permanent harmony. That such is the case must be clear from what we have already stated. But there is one fact to be borne in mind in this new era of positive declarations of the faith. That one fact is that the stress must be laid upon the supernatural, not only as a possibility but as a reality, and as a permanent part of the divine activity in the world. The form in which this can be done most effectively probably is by the recasting of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit along the lines laid down in the New Testament. With a doctrine of the Spirit which is broad enough and inclusive enough, there must be a certain recognition of the supernatural character of the divine life of believers, and persistence in it will add to the evidential strength of the doctrine. At the same time emphasis is to be placed upon life as the medium for the expression of the Holy Spirit's activity. And the gathering of the illustrations of divine power in the experience and practice of the race at large, and of the

church in particular, must develop what, of course, cannot be a scientific statement of the Christian doctrine of the Holy Spirit, for this is manifestly an impossibility, but such a statement as will have the convincing clearness of science, as well as the impulsive power of a genuine spiritual force. The ethical life also can be thus directly linked to the Spirit's power which was promised to his church by Christ. And the science of ethics can be made to feel the thrill of this new element as it has not felt it for generations past. It may lead to a return to the intuitionist school, but possibly the return will be without the difficulties which have made intuitionist ethics philosophically untenable. The ethical life and the power of the Holy Spirit will be seen thus to be inseparably joined together. This will, of course, not be a new doctrine, but it will be based on entirely new premises and have the force of an entirely new truth.

From the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, as affirmed in life and the practice of the church, it will be but a single step, and a perfectly legitimate one, to the reaffirmation of a supernatural Bible. With the recognition and acceptance of the universality of the activity of the Spirit, grounded upon the reality of revelation, the evidences for a particular revelation will be immeasurably strengthened. Professor Romanes has already indicated this. Thus will be given a double impulse to the authority of the Divine Word for the rule and guidance of life, which it never had before except upon the theory of verbal and plenary inspiration. Moreover the doctrine is not left in the mists of definition and explanation of the limits of inspiration, but is affirmed by the direct appeal to the consciousness of the reality of revelation itself. All the evidences of the past which have value will stand. The new evidences will more than compensate for the loss of those which will have to be abandoned. Supernaturalism will be seen not in the light of a stupid, mechanical defiance of the known laws of the Almighty, but rather

a recognition of the power of Him who setteth up whom he will and putteth down whom he will. In fact the antithesis between the supernatural and the natural will disappear, and the dictum "miracles do not happen" will be as silly as the dictum that "fishes do not fly." It will be simply a statement of the experience of the speaker. Fishes do fly, and miracles will be seen to be happening in the divinely appointed order, and that their form changes, will not change the fact. The age of miracles will be seen to be the continuous age of the divine activity in the world, and the power of the Spirit of God upon the hearts of men. The proof will be given in the one case, as in the other, and will rest as genuinely upon the authority of the spirit of man, when it shall have witness borne to it of the Holy Spirit, that we are the sons of God.

Thus supernaturalism will have a new birth. But it will be the supernaturalism which will have its strongest affirmation in the spirit of man, rather than in the objective evidences of divine revelation. But these two will be so closely united that they will be inseparable in the thought of all. A supernatural life will mean a supernatural church, resting upon a supernatural revelation, and the oppositions of science falsely so called, will have made another epoch of victory for the gospel of Christ.

ARTICLE VII.

STUDIES IN CHRISTOLOGY.

BY PROFESSOR FRANK HUGH FOSTER, D. D.

IV.

IN resuming, after so long a time, the "Studies in Christology" which he began in this Review in 1892, the writer will take the liberty of changing somewhat the purpose of the studies. Occupying at that time the chair of Church History, he was mainly concerned with the historical problems of the subject, and particularly with the subtle attack which Professor Harnack, of Berlin, is making upon historical Christianity by the introduction of rationalistic dogmatic principles among the canons of historical investigation. Transferred, as he now is, to the department of Systematic Theology, he wishes to consider the problem more in its dogmatic aspects. The purpose of these studies shall no longer be chiefly historical, though the basis afforded by a review of the historical origin of the Chalcedon doctrine will be essential to a proper understanding of the problem of our own day and of what is to be offered in solution of the same; but the questions raised by Harnack will be left to the professional historians for the most part,—to whom they are commended as constituting a large part of the historical *Aufgabe* of the day, and quite as important for history as the questions of biblical criticism are for exegesis. The refutation of Harnack's mistakes in instance after instance, by a thorough discussion of the original authorities, would seem to one observer, at least, to be the imperative duty of the times. *Monendo satisfeci officio meo.* These more technic-

ally historical disputations therefore aside, it will now be the writer's purpose to set forth what the problem in respect to christology really is, and to exhibit what the best modern thought has to offer by way of solution.¹

Y.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE BEFORE CHALCEDON.

The problem discussed in the church under the name of "christology" is, precisely defined, this: How is it that Jesus Christ is both God and man? What is the relation of the divine and human in Christ; that is, in the person of the incarnate, suffering, dying, risen, and living Christ?

Evidently before such a question could arise at all, there must have been considerable progress made in the church in dogmatic knowledge. The great discussions which resulted in the formulation of the doctrine of the trinity at Nice (325) and at Constantinople (381) precede chronologically, as they do logically, the Council of Chalcedon (451), for it is only when men are firmly convinced that Christ is God that the problem suggested by his human nature will press upon their minds and demand consideration. Yet, as the elements of the doctrine of the trinity were in the general feeling of the church long before careful thinking, brought out by particular exigencies, had led to precise formulation, so the elements of christology far antedated the discussions culminating at Chalcedon. In a sense the church always had a christology; and in a still larger sense, it was gaining a definite christology at the same time it was gaining the doctrine of the trinity. The study of our subject begins, therefore, in the ante-Nicene period.

¹ I shall drop also the elaborate citation of authorities which I began in the former article, since historical proof is not now my chief point of interest. That I have written with constant reference to the original authorities and that these essays spring out of original studies will, I hope, be sufficiently evident.

The fundamental thought of the church from the beginning was that deity and humanity were united in Christ. This is plain upon the most hasty reading of Justin, Ignatius, and Irenæus, but we find in such writers as they no trace of philosophical reflection upon the theme, no evidence of difficulty in connection with its problems. The contest with Gnosticism was, however, calculated to stir up thought, and it did this. Tertullian, particularly, has much to say about the cause of the incarnation, which he always views as the divine act of the Logos in taking flesh upon himself. Since Gnosticism put so great a chasm between the divine and human, making the body in consequence of its material nature essentially evil and so hostile to the divine, the Gnostics were driven to the denial of the reality of the human body of Christ. He could not have a body because he would thus have been defiled and essentially disqualified for the office of Saviour. But he seemed to have a body, and it must, therefore, be explained, which was done by making it mere "seeming" (*δόκησις*), a phantom without reality. This was the view called Docetism. Tertullian, therefore, and the other polemics, declared in reply that the body of Christ was a real body. By this was preëminently meant the material part, the flesh, not of course to the exclusion of the immaterial soul, the existence of which in Christ is implied by some of the expressions of these fathers, but without particular reference to it. And when the point was first raised, it was not entirely clear to all whether Christ had a human soul (*ψυχή*) or not. But Origen affirmed that he had. "The Son of God, then, desiring for the salvation of the human race to appear unto men and to sojourn among them, assumed not only a human body, as some suppose, but also a soul resembling our souls indeed in nature, but in will and power resembling himself." This idea, once fully received, was never relinquished by the church.

The movement which derives its name from Arius was

both a theological and a christological movement. Arius agreed entirely with the church that there was divinity in Christ, but, in order to make this divinity consistent with the unity of God, he explained it as constituted by the Logos, who was a creature, the first of all created things and the medium of all other creation, who was "advanced" to divinity as a reward for his perfect holiness. Thus the unity of God was preserved, as he thought. It remained still to protect the unity of Christ. Divinity was in him and humanity, and he was one. How could this be? Arius' answer was simple. • Let the Logos take the place in Christ of a human soul, and you have no divided personality, no double Christ, but a divine being capable through his human body of suffering as men do. Eudoxius later expressed it, "We believe in one Lord, incarnated but not made man (*σαρκωθέντα οὐκ ἐνανθρωπήσαντα*), for he did not receive a human soul but was made 'flesh.'" He adds "Instead of a soul you have God in flesh."

Thus Arius' solution of the problem involved the abridgment of the humanity, and this was a denial, as the church viewed it, of the fundamental facts of the case. Accordingly Athanasius, who voiced the general churchly doctrine of his day, maintained the full humanity of Christ. Thus only was the deity to be protected from the charge of having suffered. The divine and human are perfectly united by the incarnation, so that we are to say that Christ is the Logos become man. Through this union the sufferings of the humanity become the proper sufferings of the Logos. Thus the church rejects the positions of Arius, but she does little herself to bring the matter into a clearer light.

Apollinaris (d. about 390) is the next theologian who attempts a solution of the problem. With Arius and associated thinkers, he rejected the idea of two perfect beings in Christ, God and man, since such a combination would never give unity of person, and upon this he laid the greatest stress.

There would then be two sons of God, one a son by nature, and the other by adoption. On the other hand, Christ is no merely inspired man "having God in him as one being may have another," but the Son of God dwelt in him in a more intimate manner than that. Hence we see that the two thoughts which seemed to Apollinaris essential and impossible to relinquish, were divinity and unity of person. Now, said he, if you have the *voûs* in the human part of Christ, you have personality, and hence these impossible two persons in Christ, since the *voûs*, as conceived by him, was the center of volition. And further, he said, this *voûs*, if found in Christ, must partake of our sinfulness, and this would make Christ a sinner, and would destroy the possibility of our salvation. Therefore, to solve the whole problem, you have only to suppose that the Logos took, in the human nature of Christ, the place of the *voûs*.

This attempted solution was also rejected by the church, for it was seen not to do justice either to the plain words or to the general impression of the Scriptures and to the necessity of a true humanity in a true Redeemer. By the years 374 and 376 two Roman synods had got far enough to affirm that the "Son of God took the human body, soul, and mind ('sensus' for the Greek *voûn*)," and in 381 at Constantinople it was declared with special reference to these efforts that Jesus Christ was both "incarnate" and "made man" (*σαρκωθέντα . . . καὶ ἐνανθρωπήσαντα*). But the church was not yet able herself to contribute anything of a positive nature to the solution of the great problem of two natures in one person.

One element in this solution had, however, received some attention from Athanasius and was to receive more from the two Gregories. This was the conception that the Logos was the personalizing principle in the God-man. We see it with Athanasius mainly in the emphasis which he laid upon the activity of the Logos in taking humanity upon

himself. He created the humanity, and he assumed it in creating it. The others brought the thought out more clearly, but it would be of little benefit to follow their forms of expression more closely. It is of greater importance that we attempt to understand the conception itself, and examine its promise for our own purposes.

If there were lying upon a table, scattered about in careless confusion, all the various elements of a watch, the wheels, screws, springs, hands, dial, case, etc., no one could rightly denominate this scattered and motionless accumulation of elements a watch. Let some skillful watchmaker now gather them together, and put part to part till they are all in their place, and the works are gathered into their case; while there is still no motion, there is yet no perfect and useful watch. There must be motion to be a watch. Not till the hands are moving and time is indicated does this collection of brass and steel and jewels deserve the name of watch. But, the instrument having been wound up, let the impact, that touch, be given it which causes it to spring into activity and to begin to move, and you have at last the watch.

In the light of this imperfect illustration we may, possibly, approach to a closer view of the incarnation. The elements of the humanity of Christ, if we may so speak, as they lay inchoate, in fact or in idea, ere the creating Logos assumed them as his own, were not a personality. If there were there body and soul, it was only a potential humanity till the Logos, in assuming it, gave it that touch which at the same time made it a humanity and made it his humanity. It came into being as a humanity in the moment of the incarnation, and when it gained the conception of its personality, that personality was the personality of him in whom centered all its experiences, its thoughts, feelings, purposes, and sensations, as his experiences. It had no personal experience apart from its union with that divine personality which was the personality of God in the Logos.

These fathers saw in this idea the meaning intended to be conveyed by the exact phrase which the apostle John employs, "The Word became flesh." That is, he so took flesh, or humanity, upon himself that all which it has and experiences is his possession and experience. Does it suffer? That suffering is not the suffering of a humanity, which leaves him impassive, but it is his suffering, for it only becomes the conscious suffering of the humanity in that it becomes his conscious suffering, for all the consciousness of the humanity is his consciousness. Thus it may be said of the man Jesus Christ, This man is God. There is no humanity there but such as is the humanity of the Logos, of God.

The Alexandrian school, under the lead of Cyril, developed this idea and carried it out to its consequences. The union of the two natures is an essential, but it must be admitted, a mysterious thing, beyond the conception or the utterance of man. That which is assumed becomes one with the Logos. Logically, there is still a distinction; God does not cease to be God, nor humanity to be humanity; but in reality, there are no longer two natures but one nature. One person, one being, one nature,—“one incarnated nature of the Logos.” The Logos is to be conceived of as assuming flesh, as being born a man, born flesh. Hence God was born of the Virgin, and Mary is rightly to be called the mother of God.

Now, here are extreme expressions which are likely to be misunderstood. It will serve to clarify our own thoughts as it did to clarify those of the church, if we follow the controversy between this school of thought and its rival, the school of Antioch.

The christology of the school of Antioch was determined by two fundamental ideas. The first was that the highest moral perfection is only to be gained by free personal development, and the second was its logical consequence, that the great work of the Redeemer was to present to man

in his own person an example to be imitated in attaining such perfection. The emphasis in Antiochian thought was therefore laid upon the life of Christ and upon his humanity, by which he is like us, and by which he affords us an example, and the relation between the divinity and humanity was conceived under the analogy of the indwelling of God in all holy persons. The incarnation is only a peculiar indwelling of God in humanity, so filling it that it partakes of the honor and perfection of deity.

Up to this point there is no necessary schism between Alexandria and Antioch. But the fully developed Antiochian thought begins to show an irreconcilable divergence. The incarnation, they taught, began in the womb of the Virgin. It is conditioned, on the one hand, by the Holy Spirit and on the other by the free will of the human nature. It grows more and more complete as time goes on, till at the resurrection all possibility of sin in the Redeemer is forever overcome, and the incarnation is perfect. Theodore of Mopsuestia refused to accept the Alexandrian phrase that the Logos became "flesh." This was to talk nonsense. The words of Scripture are to be taken in a loose sense. The incarnation is a "conjunction" of the two natures. The two natures are in all respects complete, and form two independent subjects. Consequently it was not the Son of God (the Logos) which was born of Mary, but only a man in whom God was; and hence she is not the "mother of God," but the mother of Christ. This term became the watchword of the school.

Into the wordy dispute between Nestorius and Cyril it is not necessary for us to enter. Nestorius was simply a faithful Antiochian, and Cyril was led by the natural tendency of controversy to emphasize excessively a tendency, already evident in the Gregories, to deify the human nature of Christ by teaching the mutual "communication of properties" between the two natures. But out of it all came

the clear and important result that unity of person in Christ is an indispensable element of the faith and that the personalizing element in Christ is the Logos,—a result which has entered into the substance of the Christian faith, and has been embodied, for example, in the Westminster Confession in the terms: "Christ, the Son of God, became man by taking to himself a true body and a reasonable soul [not a human personality], being conceived by the power of the Holy Ghost in the womb of the Virgin Mary and born of her, yet without sin."

But what in fact is the value of this idea? The problem of christology, as already stated, is to bring the three elements, perfect deity, perfect humanity, and unity of person into harmony. If there is to be unity of person, there can be but one center of consciousness, or in other words, one consciousness, for unity of person is unity of consciousness. But what consciousness shall that be? Evidently the consciousness of the being who speaks in the historical Christ in the first person, the Ego of the Christ, and that is he who was with the Father "before the world was," who "came down" from Heaven, who "humbled himself," who "became" flesh. It is the Ego of the active Logos. We affirm therefore, both as a result of the study of the Scriptures, and also as a necessity of thought, if the idea of a single personality in Christ is to be maintained, that to the Logos were referred, as the center of his consciousness, all the experiences of the God-man, that the Logos was thus the personalizing principle.

It may be said, by way of making the thought more intelligible, and at the same time of affording some additional proof of it from analogy, that our own dual nature gives us an example of personality resident strictly in one element of our being alone. Though the pain which I feel in my hand is the pain of my body, in the sense that it is a physical modification, yet it is my pain, the pain of my soul, because

it is known by that soul and first becomes mine by such knowledge. There is such a thing as feeling and reaction upon a pain-giving stimulus, without consciousness, as may be seen by the example of the sensitive plants. But an active spiritual personality is needed that there may be consciousness. Just so, if the human soul of Christ was so associated with the Logos that no feeling it might have, could exist without becoming immediately the feeling of the Logos from whom went forth the vitalizing principle of its existence, as our will goes forth from our souls and not our bodies, there would be no separate consciousness, and so no separate personality, in such a soul. The question whether there was a single or a divided consciousness in Christ, is the question whether the church rightly conceived its problem in the department of christology. This question we may be permitted to defer for the present, since it will be necessary to consider it fully when the more exclusively dogmatic part of the present discussion is reached.

VI.

THE RESULT OF THE COUNCIL OF CHALCEDON.

The remaining discussions prior to Chalcedon resulted merely in more exactly defining the elements of the christological problem. There was soon manifest a tendency to antithetic statement, whereby the humanity and divinity were set off over against each other and compared as to the things in which they agreed or differed. This tendency was very marked in Augustine's *Enchiridion*. His forms of statement modified those of Leo of Rome in his famous letter to Flavian, which in its turn became the great influential factor in the formation of the creed of Chalcedon.

Thus the council did little at bringing the problem to a solution. It affirms in strong and well balanced terms the unity of person, and the perfect humanity and perfect divinity.

ity of our Lord. The antithetic statements of Augustine and Leo are imitated in such phrases as "consubstantial with the Father according to the Godhead, and consubstantial with us according to the Manhood," "begotten before all ages of the Father according to the Godhead, and in these latter days, for us and for our salvation, born of the Virgin Mary, the Mother of God, according to the Manhood," etc. Both Leo and the council, by this antithetic balancing between the two natures, tend somewhat to hold the two apart, and lean, in spite of their statement that Christ "is not parted or divided into two persons," somewhat towards the Antiochian school of thought. We could not, of course, expect in a brief creed of this sort any reasoned and elaborate theory of the doctrine, and none is given. But not even the great facts which are to be maintained and which point towards a theory, are given. In a word, the creed is something to be believed, not something to assist belief or representing a stadium where the problems of the theme may be said to have been solved. It is a waymark of progress, not a goal.

VII.

LUTHER'S CHRISTOLOGY.

The christology of Luther is the next attempt to solve the problems of our theme which we need to consider. The Middle Ages devoted much attention to the theme, but they did not forward it; and they do not have that immediate connection with the thought of our day which would justify the study of their speculations as such in this place. We omit, therefore, all notice of John of Damascus, the great dogmatician of the Greek church, who did so much to give it a consistent and comprehensive system of thought, as well as the whole line of Roman theologians previous to Luther.

Luther's efforts for the advance of christology arose out

of his doctrine of the Lord's Supper. The important idea underlying the Roman system was that the means of grace and the distribution of grace to the individual soul were inseparably connected. Hence the mediation of the priest in the confessional and at the altar were essential to the forgiveness of sins and to the reception of the penitent to the favor of God. Luther retained this idea in its most important elements—"Deus interna non dat nisi per externa." Thus the forgiveness of sins is communicated through the sacrament, and whenever the sacrament is received, grace is received.

It is a remarkable fact, and one not altogether intelligible to the modern, American mind, that, though Luther got far enough along to reject the Roman doctrine of transubstantiation,—the doctrine that the substance of the bread and wine are transformed in the sacrament into the substance of the body and blood of the Lord,—he retained the idea that in some mysterious way the real body and blood of Christ were communicated by the elements which represented them. Why should he, who emphasized the necessity of faith, and faith as the organ of spiritual union with God, have insisted upon this point? It is not common to find any explanation of this point in Lutherans, and, indeed, they seem often as unable to understand what the difficulty of members of other communions in comprehending Luther's meaning is, as the latter are to understand Luther. One must, therefore, offer any explanation which he may have arrived at with diffidence, but upon the whole, a careful and extensive reading of Luther has led the present writer to the conviction that Luther's mind followed something like the following line of thought:—

Spiritual gifts are the operation of Christ upon the Christian's heart. Where Christ operates, there he is; and where he is, he is entire. Christ, then, the whole Christ, body as well as soul and divinity, is in the Christian's heart as he receives the gifts of grace. Particularly, then, when the sym-

bols of the body of Christ are received by the Christian, and when grace is conferred, the veritable body of Christ, though in an inexplicable manner, is present in the heart of the believer. It can be thus present here in Wittenberg, or yonder in Jerusalem, because it is everywhere, and it is omnipresent because, by virtue of the communication to it in the incarnation of divine properties, it possesses the divine omnipresence.

Thus the necessity of the omnipresence of the body of Christ that Luther's doctrine of the Lord's Supper might be possible, led him immediately into the consideration of christological problems.

Luther thus solved his problem in respect to the Lord's Supper by taking up an ancient idea which was current at an early time in the Greek church, and finally became fixed in its theology under the influence of John of Damascus. It was employed by him for quite a different purpose, for the Greeks had sought to explain thereby the unity of person in Christ. That unity was more easily conceivable, they thought, if the natures to be united themselves became the same. Cyril finally expressed this in the phrase quoted above,—“one incarnated nature of the Logos.” Thus Luther started at a different point from the Greeks, but the inevitable gravitation of thought brought him after a time to the same problem and the same solution as they. He might have never given the subject this further consideration, had it not been for the Colloquy at Marburg, for Luther was essentially a practical and not a speculative theologian. But certain turns of thought there brought him face to face with the larger problem. His solution of it is believed by the standard Lutheran theologians to have substantially furthered the topic.

We shall not understand Luther unless we bear in mind from the beginning his starting point. This was not the incarnation, or the historic Christ as he appeared upon earth.

The contest brought to a conclusion at Marburg began by discussing the Lord's Supper, that is, by considering what was true of the body of the exalted and glorified Christ. Hence the glorified Christ was the point from which the dogmatic development proceeded, and the omnipresence of Christ was the particular attribute which was ascribed to Christ, and which the theory was elaborated to provide for. Hence it could hardly be expected that in Luther's hands it would account for the concrete facts of the historic life of Christ.

The more definite christological problem was thus apprehended by Luther. If there be a single subject in Christ, then all the phenomena of consciousness, whether they come from the human or the divine side, will be felt as the affections of this one subject. The one person, the God-man, must say, when the humanity suffers, "This is my suffering"; when he exerts his power to still the waves, "This is my power"; when he prophesies the future, "This is my knowledge"; and when he is ignorant of the "day and hour," "This is my ignorance." This one center of consciousness is the Logos. How, now, can the sufferings of the human nature become the sufferings of the Logos, who is the unchangeable God? And how can the body of Christ be everywhere present while it is yet a true human body?

In beginning his answer to these difficult questions, Luther states, first, in the strongest manner, the reality of the union of the two natures. He says: "'The Word became flesh' is as much as to say: The Son of God has become a human son; the Father's eternal Son has become a temporal son; he who was without a beginning has begun to be." "The infinite God has become a finite and comprehensible man." Divinity and humanity are in Christ "one thing, one being, so that one can rightly say, 'This man is God, God is this man.'" "He who murders Christ has murdered the Son of God, God, the Lord of Glory himself." Extreme statements these are and not to be justified except

as they are the struggles of language to express in vivid manner a thought which Luther proceeds to make more clear elsewhere.

The solution he has to offer of the difficulties involved in these contradictions is the rehabilitation of the doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum*. This is defined by him in the following terms: "The divine nature communicates its property to the human, and in turn the human also its property to the divine." His meaning seems to be this. Here are two different things to be united in one consciousness, that they may be perfectly united in all their work. Their qualities are contradictory, omniscience and ignorance, omnipresence and local limitation, etc. If they retain their distinctive properties in all this irreconcilable antithesis, they cannot be united. But if each receives the qualities of the other, while it still retains its own, there will be a perfect similarity between them. Then they can be united without clash or difference. Then, whatever the one nature does in its own original property, the other does of its acquired property, and the two work together in perfect harmony, so that to the perception of consciousness it is only the one working of the one subject. Hence, whatever the God-man does, he does in the unity of a single consciousness, and hence he has a single Ego, and there is a perfect union of the two natures. The one person works all things through both natures.

If I may be permitted to seek to make this thought clearer by means of an illustration which I have often used with my classes in the history of doctrine, I will illustrate thus. Here are two drops which it is desired to unite in one. But they are possessed of irreconcilable qualities, for one is water and the other oil. They cannot be united. If, however, they could mutually impart their peculiar properties, so that the drop of water should take upon it the properties of oil, and thus become oil-water, and the oil take upon it the

properties of water and become water-oil, then the two, being perfectly similar in nature could unite without difficulty. Placed at any point in such a drop, a conscious soul would have the same sensations as at any other, and thus would not experience division of consciousness between the contradictory properties of the originally differing substances.

Vigorous as this effort at a solution of the difficulty is, we must, I think, vote it a failure, for the following reasons:—

1. It seems to be mere speculation without foundation in fact. The theory is developed to explain the possibility of the ubiquity of the body of Christ in the sacrament. If the ubiquity of the body of Christ is a fact, then it needs explanation, and so far as this theory is calculated to explain it, it is to be regarded with favor. But is it a fact? I think, as I shall attempt to show, that it is not.

2. At best the difficulty is transferred, not met. If it be impossible to unite two differing natures in one *person*, how is it possible to unite two contradictory properties in one *nature*? How can the human *nature* possess both ignorance and omniscience with any greater ease than the unity of *person* can possess them when lodged in different natures?

3. The ground upon which Luther supported the ubiquity of Christ was fallacious. If the presence of the body of Christ in the believer is necessary to his sanctification, confusion is introduced into the doctrine of the trinity. It is the office work of the Holy Spirit to sanctify. Inasmuch as each hypostasis takes part in the work of each of the others, Christ is in the heart of the believer in the work of sanctification, but he is this according to his hypostatic union with the divine spirit, that is, in his divine nature. Inasmuch as the humanity is united, not with the Holy Spirit, but with the Logos, there seems to be no necessity for the presence of the humanity in this work. Indeed, it seems to be excluded by it.

4. The theory when applied, as Luther applied it, to the

God-man from the very moment of the incarnation, destroys the true humanity of Christ. This was Zwingli's argument, and it seems to be philosophically sound. For instance, take temptation. If the human nature of Christ possesses omnipotence, how can it be tempted through human weakness, or defect, such as hunger, which as weakness or defect is excluded by its possession of omnipotence? If it possesses omnipotence only as an acquired property, how can it be tempted in its original property of limitation, while it yet really possesses omnipotence? So of the suffering. What, now, does the doctrine lead us to, except to an *apparent* temptation, without reality, or to what is substantially the ancient and exploded system of Docetism?

5. Philosophically, it is impossible that the limited human body should receive the property of omnipresence. Take whatever theory of space you may, making it objectively valid or invalid, refine the matter to its greatest subtlety, and yet the body of a man is the exercise of the forces of God in a certain way, and God, while exercising those forces in *that* particular way, cannot, at the same time, exercise them in a *contrary* way. That is, a thing cannot both be and not be, both be limited and not be limited. The answer which Luther makes, that this is a mystery, is not a valid answer. A flat contradiction is not a mystery, it is an impossibility.

These objections are, possibly, somewhat modern in their tone. But Luther himself had difficulties, though other ones, with his theory. Since he had made the *communicatio idiomatum* to take place immediately upon the incarnation instead of at the exaltation of Christ, he had to explain the limitations of space under which the historical Christ was placed when upon earth. He could not give up the *communicatio idiomatum* for this period, since that would overthrow his explanation of the unity of Christ's person. He therefore resorted to a twofold mode of existence which he as-

cribed to Christ. As partaking of the property of divinity, the humanity of Christ partook of omnipresence. But this omnipresence was not an omnipresence everywhere in space—it was an illocal mode of existence, that is a mode of existence having no relation to space. But, so far as the humanity was concerned in and for itself, it had a relation to space, and in this relation was circumscribed and limited, like all other bodies. The difficulty here Luther did not care to explain.

VIII.

CALVINISTIC CHRISTOLOGY.

On this topic there is little to say. Calvinists generally rejected Luther's speculations *in toto*, and fell back upon the results of the Council of Chalcedon as expressing their minds. There was always a tendency in Calvinistic theology of all the schools to a Nestorianizing form of statement, and the humanity and divinity were sometimes placed so far apart, in dividing up what Christ did between them, that all real unity of person was lost sight of. In general, it cannot be said that Calvinistic schools have done anything of note for this doctrine. It has been handed down with all its difficulties to the present day. We shall try to see, in our next article, whether anything can now be said to further its development.

ARTICLE VIII.
INJUNCTIONS AND STRIKES.

BY HON. WILLIAM H. UPSON.

WITHIN the past few years injunctions have been so often used to prevent the unlawful acts which frequently accompany strikes, that many persons suppose such means to be the result of new rules of law adopted by the courts, rather than the application of long-established principles; and that the judges have usurped the power of legislating, instead of only interpreting and enforcing laws already made. On this account there has been much clamor, and prejudice against the courts, for this resort to what has been called judge-made law in favor of corporations. Public attention has been especially directed to this subject by the great extent and importance of recent strikes. A brief statement will show that there is no ground for the charge referred to, and that the use of injunctions in such cases is not only not new, but is in accordance with the plainest principles of right and justice.

An injunction is a judicial process, or order, requiring the person to whom it is directed to do, or refrain from doing, some particular thing.

This general definition will answer the purposes of this article, without referring to the different kinds of injunctions. Under the name of interdicts injunctions were, more than thirteen hundred years ago, known to the Roman law, from which they were borrowed by the English law, and from that by our own; and they have been used in this country ever since our courts of justice have been established.

Persons are generally obliged to enforce their rights by

actions to recover damages, or by other legal remedies, but there are many cases in which those do not afford complete, or full, protection, and then the party is entitled to an injunction or other equitable remedy, and it certainly seems much better to prevent a wrong than to allow its commission, and then try to punish the wrongdoer, and compensate the injured person.

The general principle, as stated by the best authorities, is that wherever a right exists, or is created by contract, by the ownership of property or otherwise, cognizable by law, a violation of that right may be prohibited by injunction if the ordinary legal remedies are not complete and adequate.

Injunctions are used to prevent the sale of promissory notes obtained by fraud—to prevent the collection of illegal taxes—to restrain cities and villages from making contracts in violation of law—to prevent the unlawful use of streets, or of private property, by railroad companies—to prevent infringement of patents and the commission of frauds. Many other examples might be given, but these are enough to illustrate the general principle.

Injunctions may be granted either to prevent the gaining of a lawful object by unlawful means, or the gaining of an unlawful object by any means, whether lawful or unlawful, and it is for such purposes that they are properly granted in connection with strikes.

A strike is a general quitting of work as a coercive measure, as when higher wages, or shorter hours, are demanded, or a reduction of wages is resisted, and strikes have been resorted to for those, and other purposes, for more than two thousand years past. Livy describes one which took place at Rome three hundred and ten years before the birth of Christ, and about the end of the fifth century, in the reign of the emperor Zeno, a Roman ordinance provided that "No one shall hinder another from continuing a work that has been begun by another, as we are advised certain

artisans and contractors have dared to do, not being willing themselves to finish what they have commenced nor to let others finish it, and so have caused serious loss to those who had employed them."

Preventing others from working, either by actual violence, or by threats and intimidation, has so often occurred in connection with strikes, that many regard it as a necessary part of them, and in a recent case a judge of one of the Circuit Courts of the United States, in his decision said: "A strike is essentially a conspiracy to extort by violence; the means employed to effect the end being not only the cessation of labor by the conspirators, but by the necessary prevention of labor by those who are willing to assume their places."

This is not, however, a true statement, for in very many cases the object of a strike is good, and the means used to effect it are lawful and right. The question then arises, When may a court of equity properly interfere, by injunction, with the carrying on of a strike? and the answer is, Whenever the object of the strike is unlawful, or the means used to make it successful are unlawful, and the ordinary legal remedies do not furnish full, complete and adequate relief. In giving relief in such cases the courts are governed by the same principles which they apply to all similar violations of law, and by no others.

When a large number of men combine to carry out their plans by threats, force, and the destruction of property, it is evident that actions which are brought in ordinary cases to recover damages would be of no use whatever. If men have the right to labor for whom they please, and for such wages as they choose to accept, and if they have the right to manage their own business in their own way, so long as they do not interfere with the rights of others, those rights must be maintained by any government which professes to be a government by the people. A single case, that of *Arthur vs.*

Oakes, will illustrate the power of courts of equity in that respect, and the limits of that power. The Northern Pacific Railroad was in the possession of receivers appointed by the United States Circuit Court, and an injunction was granted, by that court, by which the employés of the receivers, and all persons, associations and combinations, were, among other things, enjoined "from disabling, or rendering in any wise unfit for convenient and immediate use, any engine, cars or other property of the receivers," "from interfering in any manner by force, threats or otherwise with men who desire to continue in the service of the receivers, or with men employed by them to take the place of those who quit," and "from interfering with or obstructing in any wise the operation of the railroad, or any portion thereof, or the running of engines or trains thereon as usual."

To this extent the injunction was sustained by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, in accordance with the principles before stated.

The Circuit Court had, however, also enjoined the employés "from so quitting the service of the said receivers, with or without notice, as to cripple the property, or prevent or hinder the operation of said railroad."

This part of the injunction the Circuit Court of Appeals refused to sustain, on the grounds that a court of equity will not, under any circumstances, compel one man to work for another—that to do so would be an invasion of one's natural liberty, and would place a man in a condition of involuntary servitude forbidden by the Constitution of the United States.

In some instances courts may have granted injunctions without due regard to the rights of individuals, or of labor organizations, but not in many; and so long as they administer justice impartially, without fear or favor, no one has reason to complain, least of all those who have neither wealth nor great influence, and most need the protection of the law.

ARTICLE IX.

MEMORIAL NOTES.

JOHN ALBERT BROADUS.

BORN in a region prolific of great men, and of a family noted for piety and talent, reared under the best conditions for healthy development, in a Christian home, in the country, where he was free alike from the dangers of wealth and of poverty, with the best opportunities for culture of mind and heart, and without the temptations too often called "advantages," John Albert Broadus grew to a noble and consecrated manhood. Within a small radius of the place in Culpepper county, Va., where he was born, Jan. 27, 1827, three Presidents of the United States first saw the light,—Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe,—besides many others famous in cabinet, in field, in literature, and in professional life. The father of Dr. Broadus was Major Edmund Broadus, a school teacher and a farmer at first, and afterward a politician. He acquired great influence over his community and they called him time and again to represent them in the legislature. His candidacy was always equivalent to an election, though he did not lack for able opponents. His speeches were calm, clear, and convincing. The people never failed to see what he meant. The young son accompanied his father in his canvassing tours, and thus learned his first lessons in public speaking.

Completing the courses of study in the schools of that region, the young man entered the University of Virginia, where in 1850 he graduated with distinction as Master of Arts. This degree he ever prized more highly than the honorary degrees that came to him afterward. He was at once appointed Assistant Professor of Latin and Greek, at the same time becoming pastor of the Charlottesville Baptist Church. This double work he continued for two years, when he gave up teaching and devoted himself wholly to the pastorate. In 1855 he became Chaplain of the University, and at the end of his two years' term, he served the church for two years more. The period of his pastorate was the golden age in the history of that church, recalled with vivid and unflagging interest by the survivors of that time.

It was in 1859 that he was called to join with J. P. Boyce, Basil Manly, Jr., and William Williams in establishing the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. It was a new departure in theological education that was proposed. The aim was to plant an institution suited to the varied

needs of the Baptist ministry in the South. Any preacher who would come must find what is suited to his wants—those of the meagerest attainments as well as the masters of arts. Those who could remain but a short time must also be enabled to use that time to the best advantage. The adaptation of the course to those of least preparation must not lower the standard or retard the progress of those well prepared. This difficult and delicate problem was most happily solved. More and more are the methods used in this institution being adopted by other seminaries, and some of us believe that ere many decades these methods will be universal.

The various departments of study were arranged into separate "schools," some requiring one year and some two years to complete the course. The student took such schools as his capacity and preparation warranted, and got full credit for all he accomplished. The completion of each school entitled the student to a diploma, and the completion of the nine schools was necessary to a diploma of full graduation. In some of the classes masters of art and men ignorant of the classics sat side by side and studied together with mutual profit. No lowering of the standard was required; and no seminary in the world has maintained a higher standard of scholarship.

Dr. Broadus was very reluctant to lay down the work of a pastor in order to take up that of a theological professor, and it was only when the call of duty became positive that he consented. Many have wondered how he could have succeeded so signally in a work he was so reluctant to undertake: but this very reluctance was one of his highest qualifications for this service. A great preacher who longs to preach, but is hindered, is ever the best man to train preachers. The very fact of his longing to engage in such service gives him a fine enthusiasm which else were impossible.

Yet he has done a great deal of the noblest preaching, which was a goodly part of the work of his life. During his summer vacations he would supply prominent pulpits. At conventions and other religious gatherings he was pressed into service, when Sunday came, and "Where will Dr. Broadus preach?" was the question on every lip. He was in great demand also to preach dedication sermons, and was often called forth when there was no special occasion. If he was visiting any of our cities and remained over Sunday he was sure to preach and the simple announcement would pack any audience room. Often he spoke to me of how he loved to preach and would say playfully, "I do not wish you any harm, but frequently when Sunday morning comes I have a sort of wish that something, some slight indisposition, would prevent your preaching, and you would send around a request for me to fill your pulpit." He was one of the few great preachers of the world. I remember soon after coming to Louisville I got him to preach one Sunday morning. Sitting in adjoining pews were the great man of science, Dr. J. Lawrence Smith,

and a ten-year-old boy; and they were observed to listen with equal interest to the clear and strong sermon of the great preacher. All classes heard him with equal delight if not with equal profit. There was no attempt at eloquence, no array of flowers of rhetoric, no exhibition of learning and no *sesquipedalia verba*. The great truths of religion were presented with crystal clearness and with deep impressiveness, in a manner perfectly natural. One cannot forget a sermon he heard from Dr. Broadus. I can never forget the first sermon I heard from him. It was in June, 1867, at the Commencement of the Washington and Lee University, Lexington, Va. It was a brilliant assembly gathered to hear from the great preacher one of his greatest sermons. With perfect simplicity and naturalness he talked on about "one Jesus, which was dead, whom Paul affirmed to be alive" (Acts xxv. 19), and soon we all forgot about the occasion and the preacher, and thought only of Jesus. It was a wonderful sermon. One of the professors, not a Christian, remarked that ten thousand pages of literature lay behind that sermon, but more and better than this, a deep and rich Christian experience lay behind it.

As a teacher Dr. Broadus was preëminent. He rose to his greatest height in the class room. It was worth a journey to see him teach. The skill with which he would get hold of the minds of the students, the deep and kindly sympathy he manifested for them, the great value he attached to the lessons, and the thorough mastery of the subject he unconsciously exhibited, made him one of the few really great teachers our country has produced. At times he would make appeals of surpassing tenderness and power to the students, so that to make notes was impossible, and yet the lessons were more deeply impressed upon their minds and hearts than could have been done by notes and subsequent study. Those who sat at his feet will remember through life many such incidents in the class room.

This wonderful teacher knew thoroughly the material on which he had to do his work. He measured every student with astonishing accuracy, and adapted his instruction to each case with consummate tact. Reverence for his character, respect for his abilities, regard for his attainments, and love for the man filled his students with an enthusiastic devotion as rare as it was beautiful. His aim was to make them real and faithful gospel preachers and manly men, by God's blessing. He sought not to tell them something they did not know before, and to fill their minds with information, however useful. He sought rather to make them something different from what they were before, and to fit them for the high service to which God had called them. His best work was done on the fifteen hundred students whom he trained for service in his class room, and whose work since has multiplied their teacher, and will multiply him to the end.

Without doubt, Dr. Broadus would have been famous had he done nothing else than produce the literature he has left us. Much of his

writing was in the form of newspaper articles, which ought to be gathered and put into permanent form. He wrote also a number of pamphlets on important subjects; such as, "Three Questions concerning the Bible;" "Ought Women to speak in Mixed Public Assemblies?" "Glad Giving," etc. "The Preparation and Delivery of Sermons" was his first book, issued in 1870. This at once commanded the attention of pastors and theological professors, and it was soon adopted as a text-book in various seminaries in this country and in England and Canada. It has held its place with increasing popularity for a quarter of a century, and it promises to do so for a good while to come. It is full of "saving common sense," and is studied by lawyers, legislators, and others interested in public discourse.

His next book was "The History of Preaching," which appeared in 1876, and was well received; but not till 1886 did his greatest work, and the chief monument to his scholarship, appear, his "Commentary on Matthew." Here we see the profound scholar and the loving disciple. This was his *chef d'oeuvre*, and many of us believe it is the best commentary on Matthew in existence. In the same year appeared his "Sermons and Addresses." Four years later (1890) came his "Jesus of Nazareth," a heart tribute from the disciple to his Lord. The chapters of this book were delivered as lectures at the Johns Hopkins University, just as his "History of Preaching" was delivered at Yale. Next to the Commentary on Matthew in permanent value stands his "Harmony of the Gospels," which appeared in 1893, and at once took rank as the best book of its kind. His last work was his "Memoir of Dr. J. P. Boyce," his life companion and friend, his fellow-worker and associate. This is a masterpiece of biography and deserves to rank with the great biographies of English literature.

Important work Dr. Broadus also did in the cause of higher education. His address on "A College Education for Men of Business," has stimulated many a young man to high endeavor in securing a training of mind and heart before entering on the work of life. He was trustee of the Slater Fund, for the education of the Negroes of the South, and no member of that board did more effective service. For years he was a close student of the Negroes, and it was he who first called attention to the fact that there are in the South three distinct races of Negroes, with widely different capacities. He was engaged to prepare the article on the Negroes for Johnson's Encyclopedia, and no more valuable contribution to the literature of the Negro problem has been made.

For years Dr. Broadus was a member of the International Sunday-School Committee, and of his work in that capacity Dr. Moses D. Hoge says: "When we were gathering at the place of rendezvous, as we were greeting each other, the first question would be, 'Has Dr. Broadus come yet?' And after it was known that he was present, there was a feeling of satisfaction that the work would be safely and well conducted." Often

the work of the Committee was simply to confirm and carry into effect what Dr. Broadus had wrought out.

Beside all this, Dr. Broadus did a great deal of quiet personal work in moulding and uplifting the characters of those with whom he came in contact. It was his delight to talk to children, and they were ever delighted to hear him. He would talk to a boy, and the boy would have a higher ideal and a nobler ambition. In his intercourse with men Dr. Broadus ever sought to make himself helpful, and many are the characters which have been blessed by his quiet personal ministry. On the Sunday after the funeral, the Rev. Dr. Adolph Moses, Rabbi of the Jewish Temple in Louisville, delivered a memorial discourse in honor of his friend, and among other things said: "Before I became familiar with Dr. Broadus, I knew Christianity only as a creed which seemed absolutely incomprehensible to me. I judged it mainly from the untold, unmerited misery, the agony of ages, which Christian rulers and nations had entailed on poor Israel under the impulse given by Christian priests and teachers. But when I learned to know and revere, in Dr. Broadus, a Christian who was truly a man of God, in whom there was the spirit of justice and mercy, the spirit of brotherly love toward all men, without distinction of nationality, race or creed, my conception of Christianity and my attitude toward it underwent a complete change. For the first time in my life, Christianity presented itself to me, not as a bundle of unfathomable dogmas, but as a living power for good, as actualized in an ideal man."

T. T. EATON.

LOUISVILLE, KY.

JAMES DWIGHT DANA.

THE death of Professor Dana, on the fourteenth of April, 1895, removes from the world at once one of its most prominent men of science and one of its most devoted Christian believers interested in the work of harmonizing the diverging tendencies between science and faith.

James Dwight Dana was born February 12, 1813, in Utica, N. Y., not far from the native place of Professor Asa Gray, with whom he was so long associated in editing the *American Journal of Science*. He graduated from Yale College in 1833, and in 1838 joined the Wilkes Expedition, and was absent till 1842, circumnavigating the globe. In 1850 he was appointed Professor of Natural History in Yale College, but did not begin his work until he had completed his report on the Wilkes Expedition, in 1855.

His publications have been too numerous for us to mention here. His "System of Mineralogy" was first issued in 1836, and in successive editions has continued to be the standard authority on that subject. The fourth edition of his "Manual of Geology," entirely rewritten and enlarged to twelve hundred pages, was issued a few weeks before the au-

thor's death, and makes a fitting monument to his life's work. Professor Dana had been honored by degrees from the Universities of Munich, Edinburgh, and Harvard, in addition to membership in nearly all the scientific societies of the world.

Turning to the topics more directly related to the aims of this Review, we note that in 1856 and 1857, Professor Dana published in the *BIBLIOTHECA SACRA* five articles upon "Science and the Bible," and "On Species," which have been quarries to which subsequent writers have constantly resorted for material. These developed and defended the views of Arnold Guyot, who had just come to this country, and found in Professor Dana an appreciative and life-long friend. In the *New Englander* he published articles of a similar character in 1859 on "Anticipation of Man in Nature," and in 1863 on "Man's Zoölogical Position" and on "Cephalization." In 1885 he furnished the *BIBLIOTHECA SACRA* with his last formal contribution to the Harmony of Science and Revelation in an article entitled "Creation; or the Biblical Cosmogony in the Light of Modern Science." This has been translated into Japanese, and also republished in a convenient form for circulation.

Professor Dana never fully accepted the Darwinian theory of development, though his views were so much modified that he is to be classed among the evolutionists who minimize the influence of natural selection, and give prominence to the theistic element. He recently wrote, "While admitting the derivation of man from an inferior species, I believe that there was a divine creative act at the origin of man; that the event was as truly a creation as if it had been from earth or inorganic matter to man. I find nothing in the belief to impair or disturb my religious faith—that is, my faith in Christ as the source of all hope for time and for eternity. The new doctrines of science have a tendency to spread infidelity; but it is because the ideas are new and their true bearing is not understood. The wave is already on the decline, and it is beginning to be seen more clearly than ever that science can have nothing to say on moral or spiritual questions; that it fulfills its highest purpose in manifesting more and more the glory of God."¹

¹ Letter to Rev. John G. Hall, March 7, 1889, printed in the *Christian Advocate*, N. Y., May 16, 1895.

ARTICLE X.

CRITICAL NOTES.

BAD PHILOSOPHY GOING TO SEED.

OF late, there has been a marked tendency among Christian apologists to defend miracles, and supernatural intervention generally, by abolishing the doctrine of second causes and resolving everything into the direct acts of God. Calling this the theory of divine immanence does not, however, save it from the ultimate fruitage of pantheism, which, by doing away with the realistic view of nature, does away at the same time with the idea of the supernatural, and with the freedom of the human will, upon which are based the doctrines of sin and redemption through the truth. It is not difficult to see, that, in thus breaking down the barriers between the natural and the supernatural and destroying our belief in the bestowment by the Creator of a limited amount of independence upon the forces of nature, we are cutting from under us the ability to cherish with confidence any reasonable beliefs about anything.

In his anxiety to discredit the doctrine of the derivative origin of species, advocated by Darwin and his followers, a prominent philosophical writer maintained, not long ago, that, of course, each *species* was a separate creation, because each *individual* is such, being, with everything else, a direct product of the ever-present activity of the Creator. This denial of the reality of secondary causes is probably, in the minds of the writers referred to, largely a matter of confusion of words rather than of clear thought; but, for all that, it may be equally deleterious when the symbols are carried out in the substitutions of a long line of reasoning.

We do not suppose that the advocates of the doctrine of divine immanence mean to deny to man that amount of independence which makes him responsible for his character, or that they disbelieve in the persistence of force as the idea is involved in the ordinary reasoning of daily life; but they seem to deceive themselves in the use of inconvenient and misleading symbols of thought. In ordinary reasoning, when we refer to a chemical combination we mean that a certain quality and degree of force has been set up by the Creator in a position of limited independence, in a field from which the Creator has withdrawn counter-acting agencies or acts of his will, and so, is left as a thing which can be

treated by itself. As it came into existence by fiat of the divine will, it can be destroyed in the same manner.

The extreme advocates of divine immanence attempt to express the same thought by resolving all the persistent phenomena of nature into the direct repetition of divine acts of a similar sort; thus securing a uniformity through the settled purpose of the Creator to act for a limited time in a definite manner. The uniformity in this case is like that of a business man who for a series of weeks and months and perhaps years never fails to meet his appointments at a particular hour. Limited observers might possibly confound such regularity of movement with that of the planets and their satellites! It is even possible that a child might grow up to regard the regularity of the passage of a railroad train as similar in its cause to that of the rising and setting of the sun! But to confound these classes of uniformity with each other must create great confusion of thought in the broader generalizations of life. The uniformities of nature are something more than the mere "habits of the universe."

We are led to make these observations by many things which have recently appeared touching the credibility of New Testament teaching and history. For example, the editor of a prominent religious newspaper (*The Outlook*), who is an advocate of the most thoroughgoing evolution, and saves his theism only by maintaining an extreme form of the doctrine of the divine immanence, favored the world not long ago with a partial list of what he considers useless theological controversies. Beginning with the Andover contention over the question of the continuance of probation in another world, he couples with it the controversy in the Presbyterian Church over the final authority of the Bible in religious matters; and the discussions, in which Professor Harnack is now prominently engaged, concerning the miraculous conception of Christ. More recently he added to this list the question concerning the reality of the resurrection of Christ's body upon the third day after his crucifixion. The editor believes the ordinary doctrine, it is true, but, nevertheless, is ready to consign it to the rubbish heap without any apparent regret.

With all such articles eliminated from the creeds of the Christian church, it is difficult to see what is going to be left worth contending for. If such obvious facts concerning the bodily resurrection of Christ as those witnessed to by the Evangelists do not establish the ordinary creed upon the subject, it would seem that little confidence can be placed in their testimony concerning anything. If by metaphysical subtleties the reality of the body of Jesus is explained away; and if the voice which was recognized by Mary Magdalene, the feet which were embraced by the women in the early morning, the wound prints which were offered to the doubting Thomas to experiment with, and the hands which presented the disciples with food to eat when he appeared to them upon Lake Galilee, are not satisfactory witnesses to the re-animation of his body during the period intervening between the resurrection morn and

the day of ascension, there would seem to be little encouragement to attempt to convey thought by the use of language.

To one who is caught in the toils of such metaphysical speculations about the reality of the life of Jesus we recommend a perusal of Balfour's "Foundations of Belief," where he will find drawn out the entirely similar lines of speculation which can be pursued concerning every department of knowledge, even the plainest cases of inference from direct perception. A sound philosophy lies at the basis of a correct interpretation; while an unsound system is sure to vitiate everything and pervert the plainest truths and the simplest statements of fact and history.

G. F. W.

PROFESSOR HERRON'S IMPRESSIONISM.

The nineteenth century bids fair to go out witnessing the fields of literature and art dominated by impressionism. Socialistic thought in its very nature loves glittering generalizations, and abhors details as nature does a vacuum. That socialism as a theory, and socialistic thought, has had its influence in literature, no one can deny who reflects upon the enormous sale of such a book as Bellamy's "Looking Backward." There is a growing tendency to impatience of details, to paint truths of impression rather than truths of fact, to aim at tone and effect without proper regard to exactness and truth. The motive is the desire to make a striking picture.

In art, this desire for effect ignores and even despises photographic accuracy, and rebounds "into the extreme of fleeting and shadowy *impressionism*." (See Century Dictionary, "Impressionism.") "It is the doctrine that natural objects should be painted or described as they first strike the eye in their immediate and momentary effects—that is, without selection, or artificial combination or elaboration."

Professor George D. Herron has painted another impression piece,—for he can paint none other,—and the result is before us in the form of a tasty and modest appearing book entitled "The Christian State."¹ He is frank to admit that his book may have no more than an inspirational value, and this confession reveals the fact that he is aware of the limits of the practical utility of impressionism. There have been many and conflicting opinions of the real need and influence of such writings as Professor Herron's. By many he has been hailed as a new apostle full of divine truth and inspiration and an impetus for the rapid development of Christ's kingdom; while others have deemed him a destructionist,—

¹ The Christian State. A Political Vision of Christ. A Course of Six Lectures delivered in Churches in Various American Cities. By George D. Herron. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell & Co. 1895. (Pp. 216. 5x3.) 75 cents.

tearing down, with no effort to rebuild, and going through the Lord's vineyard plucking its half-ripe fruit, and pounding it to make it ripe, while all it needed was but time and sunshine to develop and mature it. Of course it rots.

There need be no such conflicting opinions, however, of Professor Herron's work. He is simply an artistic impressionist, an impatient idealist, and, as such, has an abundance of merit. He is poetical, striking, and oftentimes, even inspiring. He is emotional but never judicial; full of fancy but not of fact; theoretical but not practical. His sayings run easily and sometimes naturally into the hysterical, the fanatical, and even the crazy. They have the merit of possessing passion and fire, but are rhetorical and sensational.

Professor Herron writes for effect and not for truth. In this particular he is a quasi-Jesuit, justifying the means by the ends; for so long as his theme is Jesus, or the principle of sacrifice, or the "kingdom," he deems exaggeration justifiable, and fancy an honorable substitute for fact.

We account for the large number of able minds that have been captivated by Professor Herron's style, precisely as we account for the admiration for Turner's *Slave Ship* which Ruskin expressed when he said it was the greatest work of the greatest living master. Ruskin simply read into that canvas what was in his own mind, and the very haze and mist of such an impression piece enabled him easily to do so. Many minds that have been captivated by Professor Herron's writings are able to read into them their own knowledge of detail, and hence they find in him an abundance of merit, an inspiration which is stimulating and often exhilarating. So Goethe saw his ideal in Marguerite, and Keats saw in Fanny Brawne what the practical and everyday mind could never discover. It is a truth of everyday life. And here Professor Herron has genuine merit, for he does stimulate thought, and awaken an earnest desire to know the truth and to follow it.

But to the trained mind, suspicious, accurate, careful, patient, in love with the truth only as the truth is painted in colors of fact, much that Professor Herron writes seems but a series of shrieks or mental spasms, the fruit of a nervous temperament, even of a disordered brain, oftentimes fanatical in spirit, purpose, and tendency. Such a mind evades a critical analysis as successfully as the screams of a spoiled child, no less than its questions, outwit the reflections of a philosopher, or the whims of fashion evade the sanctions of the reason. The petulancy of a Xantippe may even defeat the quiet contemplative reflections of a Socrates, and leave unproved the doctrine of immortality.

Professor Foster has so ably analyzed Professor Herron from the standpoint of the class room, that we have no desire to do it again. The arguments against the union of church and state have been so unanswerable, even before Macaulay wrote in 1839 his remarkable essay on Glad-

stone's "The State in its Relations with the Church," that we find no time or disposition to go into the subject in reviewing this book.

We take it that it is conceded by all earnest and careful thinkers that as anything but an impressionist Professor Herron has been weighed in the balances and found wanting. How such a mind found its way into the class room must remain a mystery, for the emotions, spasms, and shrieks have no more merit because they play on the word "Jesus" than if they shouted "Great is Diana of the Ephesians," or "Hosanna to the Son of David," or "Crucify him."

But as an impressionist, Professor Herron is delightful reading, warm in his sympathies, earnest in purpose, original in his way of putting things, but so erratic and unreliable as to lose the confidence of accurate thinkers. He reveals a loving and forgiving nature that charms and captivates even the most critical. No one can call these qualities in question, and we would not underestimate his great power for good when his sphere and mission are rightly understood. He has genuine merit, and with all his faults we respect him and admire him. And we wish it understood that this is an impression review of one of the leading impressionists of to-day.

Z. S. H.

ARTICLE XI.

SOCIOLOGICAL NOTES.

CHARITY.

THE first duty of every human being born into this world is to toil. To be a toiler in some part of this vineyard called earth is the highest prerogative and privilege of each person. Work is a blessing and not a curse. This relation of existence and labor has been imposed upon man as a law by a wise and benevolent Creator. Man comes to his best, physically, mentally, morally, and religiously, by a life of industry and usefulness. This truth is taught deductively by ethics no less than by religion, and is enforced inductively by the widest observation and experience. Toil transforms the wilderness into a garden,—it makes the barren desert to blossom with flowers. Our World's Fair was a tribute to industry where all men paid homage to its utility and beauty. It became a place where the unseen forces and laws of the world divine and beautiful were revealed through man's love of toil.

Industry begets value. This is a fundamental truth of political economy. Not all value; for capital, mind, and land share with it the honors of production. But capital may be said to be only the accrued results of the toil of yesterday, or in other words, coagulated labor. We must be careful not to confine the meaning of the word "toil" to the manual laborer or the worker in the mechanic arts, but it must include all the toilers in all the useful arts and sciences and in every sphere of human industry. Æsthetic and intellectual culture, moral and religious training, executive ability, by which we achieve business supremacy,—these, all, are necessary forms of activity in the great vineyard which man is commanded to cultivate and improve. Shall the man who makes the piano usurp the honor and title of laborer, or must he share it with the man who brings forth music out of the instrument after it is made? It must be admitted that the poet, the scholar, and the artist, no less than the artisan, are among the noble toilers of earth.

Not only objectively, but subjectively, is industry seen to be beautiful. It is twice blessed. It blesseth him that gives and him that takes. Industry not only begets value, but it begets virtue. Nothing of human origin can so purify the soul from evil and kindle in it new light, life, and energy; new hopes, aspirations, and desires; new ambitions, new sense of duty, new love, like the daily and faithful pursuit of toil. Industry brings

out the dormant and latent forces in man's nature, and it alone can reveal to man the object for which he was created. It brings life, health, sunshine, growth, development, fruitage. For the body physical strength, for the mind intellectual vigor, for the soul spiritual life and light. It brings peace and contentment, the consciousness of progress, the conviction of fulfilling wisely the end for which we are created. The duties of life become light by bearing them, the law of toil becomes beautiful by fulfilling it. The Venus of Milo, Gray's "Elegy," no less than mechanical inventions like the telephone, are perfect so far as they are simple, for simplicity is ever the soul of culture. But this is the result of training or toil. When the work of genius stands before our eyes, we marvel at its naturalness, whether in sculpture, painting, literature, or invention, and we wonder that we never saw the truth before in its simplicity. But this is the genius that is born of hard work. It is the simple child of toil.

Any religion adapted to this world must count among its earlier precepts the truth that no man is saved until he loves work. The world cannot be saved in the truest sense until it has come most deeply in touch with labor and the toilers are recognized as the uncrowned kings and the true sons of God. Had Milton lived in this day we should never have had a celestial city as he has portrayed it. The Apocalypse has not yet been written which we can understand.

If it be true then that industry is a blessing to earth, it becomes a corollary that furnishing employment to those unable to obtain work is a high form of philanthropy. The employer who takes upon himself the duties and responsibilities of furnishing useful and profitable work for his fellow-men is practically a philanthropist. He is the best friend of the laboring classes and more deserving of their confidence and friendship than their parasite, the walking delegate; than the political demagogue who incites them to hatred and violence by reciting their real and imaginary grievances; than the political economist who assures them that all wealth is created only by labor, and that they only are producers, while all others are robbers, sharing unjustly the results of their labor. It matters little that the motive of the employer be a desire to acquire, the result to society and to the laborer is the same; and it is results that we are considering.

Over against industry stand sloth and idleness. These are not negative virtues, they are positive vices. Man is not made to remain stationary,—he grows better or worse. Hence idleness is not only destructive of self-respect and happiness, causing a diminution of the forces of body, mind, and soul, but it breeds crime and vice. Idleness is, therefore, demoralizing, debasing, degrading. The greatest loss to any man is the loss of his self-respect. To be self-respecting he must be useful, to be useful he must toil. The slothful servant who hides his talent in the earth and lets it rust, is bound with many chains and cast into outer dark-

ness. The mildew gathers fast upon his faculties, the memory unless exercised loses its recollecting power, the will becomes inert, the intellect becomes clouded, the imagination gives way to every evil fancy and becomes poisoned; as Tennyson says, in his "Enoch Arden," of the lazy gossips of the port, "And one in whom all evil fancies clung hinted at worse in either." Like the old Colosseum at Rome, mildew, decay, and death linger with the dust of ages on the walls that once listened to the plaudits of the noble Roman. When a man goes to pieces, the grandeur and magnificence of the ruins testify to what he might have been.

But the evil results of sloth and indolence, begotten by idleness, are not simply subjective, they are objective. The sluggard bequeaths to his children his characteristics, and in less than three generations a race of paupers has started on its accursed career. The physiological and mental aspect of the family line changes. To lead man away from sloth, great and noble passions have been implanted in him; such as, the love of progress, the love of home, of offspring, the love of a good name, the desire to acquire, to own and bequeath. Every human being should be moved onward and upward by these great trade winds of the soul. The reason why the sons of rich men are so frequently colossal failures, is that they do not enjoy the advantages which their fathers possessed, of self-denial, industry, and economy. Some who inherit large fortunes are saved by the toil required to preserve their property, which is sometimes found to be greater than that required to acquire it. Much of the protest against the hardship of daily toil comes from the foreigners who partake of the bounty of American hospitality and in return bequeath to us their continental ideas of aristocracy. Every great man in America is an answer to their fallacies.

But while we observe the blessings of industry and the curse of idleness, and note the great general law of work for each and all, we must note the exceptions to the rule that if a man will not work neither shall he eat. A large number of human beings are unable to do physical or mental labor, for reasons quite beyond their control. Such persons must be supported by private or public charity. The mentally and physically imperfect or unsound, the maimed, the halt, and the blind; the defectives, delinquents, and dependents, are a part of the human race, and are as much entitled as the more favored, to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The laws of humanity, voiced rightly through the laws of society, demand the support of such persons by private or public charity. Such a service should be generously and cheerfully rendered by the industrious. The reward for so doing is not the applause of men, though every respectable and self-respecting citizen desires the respect and good will of his fellow-men. Nor is the hope of heaven, much less the fear of hell, a proper incentive to deeds of charity. Simple obedience to the great spiritual law of gravitation—good will or love, the *conscia recti*, is

sufficient reward. The man who through life strews his pathway with deeds of mercy and kindness, who from the natural promptings of a kind and loving heart wisely bestows charity, is the true American gentleman, the genuine aristocrat, the future nobleman. It is unwise as well as wicked to await the sound of the pistol shot in the Board of Trade or in the home of an official before we awaken to a sense of our duty to the mentally unsound.

A large class of people are able and willing to work, but cannot find employment. To beg they are ashamed. It would seem to be a self-evident proposition, that since men must live by work, cannot live without it, must be supported by the State rather than be permitted to starve, that employment should be furnished by the State to prevent them from becoming paupers or permanent dependents. This, to be sure, may combat our preconceived theories of the proper functions of government, which heretofore have been perhaps too largely shaped by the *laissez faire* doctrine, or the "let alone" policy. It is not, however, necessary that we should go to the extreme of favoring paternalism in government, nor adopting the tenets of socialism, because we broaden our horizon and enlarge our conceptions of the duty of the State to the unemployed. In fact we may thank socialism for emphasizing the duty of the general government to control non-competitive industries like the telegraph, the railroad, the street cars; the gas companies, the highways, the public works and waterways. Why should we be alarmed at the idea of centralization when the mails are so successfully and economically carried by the government? Thousands of unemployed men tramp the streets of our cities asking for work. The very streets over which they tramp need cleaning. Society has the money to pay them; they want to work; if they do not work they must beg; society must support them, working or idle; why not set them to work? Why degrade and humiliate a man by pauperizing him when he is able and willing to work? If the State shall have storehouses from which the unwilling poor must be fed, shall it not have upon its streets, roads, canals, and public works employment for its noble and worthy citizens who desire to preserve their self-respect and manhood by rendering value received for food? This does not mean that the State shall control the means of production. That is socialism. No greater economy and wisdom can be found than to have the roads of the States put in order by the unemployed. If this be true, the way to do it must be discovered by the men who are anxious to serve the people.

We now come to that class of people who are physically and mentally able to work, but are unwilling to exert themselves in any useful direction. Instead of being self-supporting and self-respecting, they are willing dependents, or in other words, paupers. They are as distinctively a class as are criminals or drunkards. The dread of work takes on many

forms, some of which are vicious, and many would be humorous if they were not so dangerous. Pauperism is twin-sister to vice and crime. Just here is where charity demands the highest wisdom. The wisest way to dispense charity to such is to dispense *with* charity. A maudlin sentimentalism that permits such a class to live without labor is partner with pauperism in its demoralizing and vicious results. Indiscriminate charity perpetuates the evils it seeks to remedy. "Emotional almsgiving is more cruel than a pestilence," says Dr. Strong. Our large cities are full of beggars who prefer begging to work. It pays better. They will even mutilate and deform their children to excite the sympathy of the sentimental. We may empty the banks of our cities upon paupers, and not lessen the evil. Charity to such puts a premium on filth, disease, pestilence, and deformity. The Charity Society in New York found that in thousands of cases only one in sixteen required continuous aid, and only one in four needed any aid at all. Of course the managers are cursed and abused, as Dr. Truesdell and Dr. Wines know, but the facts remain unchanged. It is dangerous to give money to strangers, and it is usually done as a lazy and selfish way to satisfy the conscience, as Dr. Strong says.

The cure for pauperism has been tried and is successful. Indiscriminate charity will do more harm than good. The socialists' dream is simply Utopianism; the Henry George theory of land tenure is to cure misfortune by injustice; nor can the anarchist's theory of revolution by force answer the question. Strikes, boycotts, and labor unions are all equally helpless in the presence of this practical evil. In Missouri they have a law by which the pauper's time may be legally sold at auction to the highest bidder and he is thus compelled to work. But this lacks the personal educating influence of private methods, and hence does not strike deep enough. Dr. Graham Taylor's cure is to have the better classes live with the lower, but it seems impracticable. "Not alms, but a friend; not silver or gold, but moral healing." Professor R. T. Ely says, that wherever there has been any earnest and intelligent attempt to remedy the evil, the success has been equal to all the most sanguine could anticipate. The experiments at Elberfeld in Germany and in New York proved that by wise personal effort pauperism could be cured by raising the pauper to a sense of his degradation. The English workshops are partly an antidote for the evil. At Bradfield in Berkshire the workshop reduced the percentage of paupers from 1 in 13 to 1 in 132. This was done by personal work. Industry and education are the wisest and best cures. But the poorhouse and the charitable institutions must part company with politics, and join hands with true philanthropy.

[*To be Concluded in the October Number.*]

ARTICLE XIII.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF BELIEF: Being Notes introductory to the Study of Theology. By the Right Hon. Arthur James Balfour, author of "A Defence of Philosophic Doubt," etc. New York and London: Longmans, Green, & Co. 1895. (Pp. viii, 366. $5\frac{1}{4} \times 3\frac{1}{2}$). \$2.00.

The publication of Mr. Balfour's notes on "The Foundations of Belief" marks an important stage in the development of contemporary thought, and no one can afford to pass them by without reading. Aside from the fact that they are the production of an eminent English statesman, and of an author who, in his "Defence of Philosophic Doubt," has long had a high standing among the philosophical critics of this generation, the volume is in itself a phenomenal production, exhibiting wide and profound acquaintance with the philosophy, the science, and the religious movements of the age. The style in which it is written is inimitable, making it worthy of being read from a purely literary point of view. The reader is conducted over a broad territory by processes so natural, and through fields and meadows so inviting that he is unaware of the rapidity of the progress made until he is landed safely at the door of the church, prepared to believe everything which it proclaims and for which it stands.

The work does not profess to be a positive defense of religious dogmas, but, like Butler's "Analogy," is designed merely to clear the field of objections, so that the mind may be free to consider the evidences of Christianity without prejudicial bias. This volume and Romanes' "Notes on Religion" are well calculated to serve for this generation somewhat the same purpose as that accomplished by Mansel's "Limits of Religious Thought" and Sir William Hamilton's "Philosophy of the Unconditioned" for a preceding generation, and are open to somewhat the same criticisms. All these works in the line of Pascal's "Thoughts" and Butler's "Analogy" aim to prepare the way for faith by emphasizing the extent and depth of our ignorance.

Butler proved to the men of his generation that every kind of objection which they could bring against the Bible could be brought against the course of nature; so that they had no more reason, on *a priori* grounds, for rejecting the Bible as a revelation of God than they had for rejecting nature as a product of divine wisdom and goodness. So Balfour shows that over the foundations of our belief in science hang precisely the same kind of doubts which becloud the foundations of our

belief in the doctrines of religion. No better statement of this truth has been made than that by Hamilton, forty years ago, in his "Philosophy of the Conditioned":—

"The highest reach of human science is the scientific recognition of human ignorance; 'Qui nescit ignorare, ignorat scire.' This 'learned ignorance' is the rational conviction by the human mind of its inability to transcend certain limits; it is the knowledge of ourselves,—the science of man. This is accomplished by a demonstration of the disproportion between what is to be known, and our faculties of knowing,—the disproportion, to-wit, between the infinite and the finite. In fact, the recognition of human ignorance, is not only the one highest, but the one true, knowledge; and its first fruit, as has been said, is humility. Simple nescience is not proud; consummated science is positively humble" (p. 517).

"The grand result of human wisdom, is thus only a consciousness that what we know is as nothing to what we know not ('Quantum est quod nescimus!')—an articulate confession, in fact, by our natural reason of the truth declared in revelation,—that 'Now we see through a glass darkly'" (p. 518).

In like strain we read in Balfour:—

"The least modest of men would admit without difficulty that there are a great many things which he does not understand; but the most modest may perhaps be willing to suppose that there are some things which he does. Yet outside the relations of abstract propositions (about which I say nothing) this cannot be admitted. Nowhere else—neither in our knowledge of ourselves, nor in our knowledge of each other, nor in our knowledge of the material world, nor in our knowledge of God, is there any belief which is more than an approximation, any method which is free from flaw, any result not tainted with error. The simplest intuitions and the remotest speculations fall under the same condemnation. And though the fact is apt to be hidden from us by the unshrinking definitions with which alike in science and theology it is our practice to register attained results, it would, as we have seen, be a serious mistake to suppose that any complete correspondence between Belief and Reality was secured by the linguistic precision and the logical impeccability of the propositions by which beliefs themselves are communicated and recorded" (pp. 278, 279).

"If both in the natural world and in the spiritual the advancement we have made on our forefathers be so great that our interpretation seems indefinitely removed from that which primitive man could alone comprehend, and wherewith he had to be content, it may be, indeed I think it is, the case that our approximate guesses are still closer to his than they are to their common Object, and that far as we seem to have travelled, yet measured, on the celestial scale, our intellectual progress is scarcely to be discerned, so minute is the parallax of Infinite Truth" (p. 285).

The danger of pursuing this style of reasoning too far is, that one will work himself into a state of pure skepticism, and be paralyzed by doubts concerning everything. It was the study of Butler's "Analogy" to which John Mill attributed his atheism. Butler had made so strong a case against the wisdom and benevolence of nature, that Mill rejected the God of nature as well as the God of the Bible. But this effect is not likely to be produced except in highly speculative minds. Our belief in the realities of the material world rests upon so secure a basis that there is not much practical danger of its being disturbed. Our author may show that so simple a sentence as the following: "We are, each of us, situated at any given moment in some particular portion of space, surrounded by a multitude of material things, which are constantly acting upon us and upon each other" is "clear only until it is examined, is certain only until it is questioned; while almost every word in it suggests, and has long suggested, perplexing problems to all who are prepared to consider them" (p. 289); but there will be little danger that people in general will have their faith in the order of nature seriously disturbed by the subtleties of metaphysical reasoning which can be thrown around such a proposition.

Few, however, are aware of the number of steps intervening between their perceiving minds and the objects of perception about which they are most sure.

"Take, for example, an ordinary case of vision. What are the causes that ultimately produce the apparently immediate experience of (for example) a green tree standing in the next field? There are, first, (to go no further back), the vibrations among the particles of the source of light, say the sun. Consequent on them are the ethereal undulations between the sun and the objects seen, namely, the green tree. Then follows the absorption of most of these undulations by the object; the reflection of the 'green' residue; the incidence of a small fraction of these on the lens of the eye; their arrangement on the retina of the eye; the stimulation of the optic nerve; and, finally, the molecular change in a certain tract of the cerebral hemispheres by which, in some way or other wholly unknown, through predispositions in part acquired by the individual, but chiefly inherited through countless generations of ancestors, is produced the complex mental fact which we describe by saying that 'we have an immediate experience of a tree about fifty yards off.'

"Now the experience, the causes and conditions of which I have thus rudely outlined, is typical of all the experiences, without exception, on which is based our knowledge of the material universe. Some of these experiences, no doubt, are incorrect. The 'evidence of the senses,' as the phrase goes, proves now and then to be fallacious. But it is proved to be fallacious by other evidence of precisely the same kind; and if we take the trouble to trace back far enough our reasons for believing any

scientific truth whatever, they always end in some 'immediate experience' or experiences of the type described above" (pp. 108, 109).

The object of thus dwelling upon the uncertainties of commonly received truths is not to foster universal skepticism, but to put the mind at rest in religious matters, where the evidence is reasonably sufficient, yet open to many puzzling doubts. If we are called upon to prove anything beyond possibility of criticism, the task will be so great as to paralyze all effort. In any sphere of life there is practical necessity that we act on evidence which is far short of demonstrative. Mr. Balfour brings his readers around to this important conclusion by a road which is without a break and that leads through green pastures from beginning to end. The book is Butler's "Analogy" clothed in nineteenth-century language and made to scintillate on every page with bright turns of thought and unexpected humor.

THOUGHTS ON RELIGION. By the late George John Romanes, M. A., LL. D., F. R. S. Edited by Charles Gore, M. A., Canon of Westminster. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company. 1895. (Pp. 184. $5\frac{3}{4} \times 3\frac{1}{4}$.) \$1.25.

A touching interest, and at the same time very great significance, attaches to this little volume. Since Darwin's death, Mr. Romanes has been the best-recognized exponent and defender of the Darwinian theory, and a volume written by the author in 1878, entitled "A Candid Examination of Theism" by *Physicus*, has been generally recognized as one of the most subtle critiques of the theistic hypothesis which has ever appeared.

Mr. Romanes was a graduate of Cambridge University, England, where in 1873 he gained the Burney Prize for an essay on "Christian Prayer considered in relation to the belief that the Almighty governs the world by general laws." The volume published five years later, signed *Physicus*, combats the position of this earlier essay, and maintains that there is no sufficient evidence, for either the existence of a personal God in the universe or of an immortal soul in man. His numerous subsequent publications endeavoring to extend the theory of development so as to cover that of human intelligence from animal life have attracted wide attention and had great influence.

Personally Mr. Romanes was a most courteous, cultivated, and candid gentleman, intimate with all the leading thinkers of England, the most of whom, he had to confess, maintained their Christian faith unshaken by their scientific investigations. Among such associated with him in Cambridge were Sir William Thomson, Sir George Stokes, Professors Tait, Adams, Clerk Maxwell, and Cayley,—a galaxy of genius, especially in mathematical studies, such as had never before emanated from that ancient seat of learning.

After twenty-five years of unrest in his life of unbelief, Mr. Romanes

came back again to the light, and clearly discerned that in the eagerness of his scientific investigations he had been led to overlook the most important premises from which correct conclusions can be drawn concerning the unseen world. His testimony concerning the emptiness of life without religion is most touching and important. Agreeing with Pascal, that the nature of man without God is thoroughly miserable, he remarks as follows:—

“Some men are not conscious of the cause of this misery: this, however, does not prevent the fact of their being miserable. For the most part they conceal the fact as well as possible from themselves, by occupying their minds with society, sport, frivolity of all kinds, or, if intellectually disposed, with science, art, literature, business, etc. This however is but to fill the starving belly with husks. I know from experience the intellectual distractions of scientific research, philosophical speculation, and artistic pleasures; but am also well aware that even when all are taken together and well sweetened to taste, in respect of consequent reputation, means, social position, etc., the whole concoction is but as high confectionary to a starving man. He may cheat himself for a time—especially if he be a strong man—into the belief that he is nourishing himself by denying his natural appetite; but soon finds that he was made for some altogether different kind of food, even though of much less tastefulness as far as the palate is concerned.

“Some men indeed never acknowledge this articulately or distinctly, even to themselves, yet always show it plainly enough to others. Take, for example, ‘that last infirmity of noble minds.’ I suppose the most exalted and least ‘carnal’ of worldly joys consists in the adequate recognition by the world of high achievement by ourselves. Yet it is notorious that—

“ ‘It is by God decreed
Fame shall not satisfy the highest need.’

“It has been my lot to know not a few of the famous men of our generation, and I have always observed that this is profoundly true. Like all other ‘moral’ satisfactions, this soon palls by custom, and as soon as one end of distinction is reached another is pined for. There is no finality to rest in, while disease and death are always standing in the background. Custom may even blind men to their own misery, so far as not to make them realize what is wanting; yet the want is there” (pp. 150, 151).

The position to which Mr. Romanes had come at the time of writing these notes is the true one to which the majority of students are led by the study of Butler’s “Analogy.” From being an agnostic who does not believe the Bible true because he does not know it to be true, he came to be what he calls a *pure* agnostic, who can believe the biblical doctrines on a reasonable amount of evidence because he does not know *but* they are true. Though the volume consists merely of notes, which it was the design of the author to expand into a book, this will be an advantage to

many busy readers, enabling them to get the ideas by less expenditure of time than if compelled to follow the argument into all the details of discussion.

THE HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE HOLY LAND, especially in Relation to the History of Israel in the Early Church. By George Adam Smith, D. D., Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament Exegesis, Free Church College, Glasgow. With six maps. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1895. (Pp. xxiv, 692. 6x3½.) \$4.50.

This elegantly printed volume supplies a want that has long been felt, and the work is executed in a manner which is above criticism. It is divided into three books. The first contains a general description of the whole land and of its historical relations. In this part are discussed, "The Place of Syria in the World's History," "The Form of the Land and its Historical Consequences," "The Climate and Fertility of the Land, with their Effects on its Religion," "The Scenery of the Land, with its Reflections in the Poetry of the Old Testament," and "The Land and Questions of Faith." In the second book, Western Palestine is described in detail, including the Lake of Galilee, the Jordan Valley, and the Dead Sea. The third part is devoted to Eastern Palestine, including the Hauran and Damascus. To this are added five appendices, and six carefully prepared maps, showing the contours of the land with a clearness that has never before been presented. Both the maps and the texts incorporate the latest information, making the volume in all respects the most valuable summary upon the subject yet published.

Space will not permit us to enter into details of so vast a subject. Suffice it to say, that the reader can have no better commentary on considerable portions of the Bible than such a geographical and historical handbook as this is; while the accuracy of the geographical references in the Bible as they are brought out in this careful discussion can but serve greatly to increase one's faith in the truthfulness of the record; for though, as the author remarks, geographical accuracy is not positive proof of historical accuracy, it does furnish an important line of confirmatory evidence. With reference to Deuteronomy and the prophets, for example, our author writes:—

"To whatever date we assign the Book of Deuteronomy, no one who knows the physical constitution of Palestine, and her relation to the great desert, can fail to feel the essential truthfulness of the conception, which rules in that book, of Israel's entrance into the land as at once a rise in civilisation from the nomadic to the agricultural stage of life, and a fall in religion from a faith which the desert kept simple to the rank and sensuous polytheism that was provoked by the natural variety of the Paradise west of Jordan" (p. 111).

The bearing of these discussions upon certain critical questions concerning the New Testament is thus stated by the author:—

"... Take the case of the Gospel of St. John. It has been held that

the writer could not have been a native of Palestine, because of certain errors that are alleged to occur in his description of places. I have shown in a chapter on the Question of Sychar, that this opinion finds no support in the passage most loudly quoted in its defence. And, again, the silence of the Synoptic Gospels concerning cities on the Lake of Galilee, like Tiberias and Taricheae, which became known all over the Roman world in the next generation, and their mention of places not so known, has a certain weight in the argument for the early date of the Gospels, and for the authorship of these by contemporaries of Christ's ministry" (p. 110).

A perusal of this volume can but deepen the impression that the "land" and the "book" are alike providential preparations and fitted to each other. There was a Providence no less in preparing the field for the display of the sacred history of the Jews than in directing the forces of actual history when the time for their display had arrived. In the words of Carl Ritter, "Nature and the course of history show that here from the beginning onwards there cannot be talk of any chance."

THE PROBLEM OF RELIGIOUS PROGRESS. By Daniel Dorchester, D.D. Revised edition, with new tables and colored diagrams. New York: Hunt & Eaton; Cincinnati: Cranston & Curtis. 1895. (Pp. 768. 5¼x3¼). \$2.75.

Dr. Dorchester's convenient and useful volume has been largely rewritten, and completely revised up to date. In its present form it furnishes the best handbook which has ever been published on the subject treated. The statistics are remarkably varied and full, are arranged in natural order, and discussed with rare wisdom. No better answer can be given to pessimistic views concerning the world's progress than is furnished by the facts themselves whose statement comprises the body of this volume. We have space to mention only a few of the most salient.

So far from there being any signs of decadence in the Christian forces of the nineteenth century, there are indubitable evidences of its remarkable rejuvenating power. This appears in a simple statement of the facts concerning the growth of the evangelical population in the United States, from which it appears that the increase of the enrolled communicants in these churches between 1800 and 1890 was more than 13,000,000, representing a population of nearly 50,000,000. But the total population usually classed as Christian at the end of the eighth century is only 30,000,000. The actual increase of enrolled church members in the United States during the first nine decades of this century is nearly equal to the total Christian population at the end of the fifth century. The figures are equally encouraging when the membership in the evangelical churches of the United States is compared both with that in the Roman Catholic Church and with the non-Christian population of the country. In 1870 the evangelical population was a little over sixty per cent of the whole, while the Catholic population was a little less

twelve per cent of the whole; in 1890, however, the evangelical population had increased to seventy-seven per cent, and the Catholic population to a little over thirteen per cent. The total numbers were, in 1870, 23,000,000 evangelical, 4,600,000 Roman Catholic population; and in 1890, 48,000,000 evangelical, and 8,500,000 Roman Catholic. The actual communicants in the evangelical churches have increased in the United States fourfold during the last forty years. These figures are a complete answer to the current statements implying that evangelical Protestantism has entered upon a period of decadence.

Nor is the evidence of spiritual vitality any less encouraging. The receipts of the Foreign Missionary Societies in the United States have increased from \$8,000,000 in the fifth decade to \$40,000,000 in the ninth decade, being nearly half the total receipts for the century. The rate of increase of expenditures for home missions is still larger. The progress of foreign missions is encouraging. In 1892 there were 52,000 native laborers in missionary churches, and 1,224,000 communicants, which is more than twice the total number of Christians at the end of the first century.

In minor matters it is cheering to learn that while the rate of wages is now twice what it was in 1840 the cost of articles of ordinary consumption is less than then, and that the consumption of distilled liquors is only about one-third as much per capita as it was in 1830, when the temperance reformation had just begun. But this is partly offset by the fact that the consumption of malt liquors per capita has increased fourfold since 1840. These, however, are only a few of the statistics relating to subjects which are discussed by the author in all their bearings, and with reference to the many perils and responsibilities of the hour. Everyone should read and study them.

THE BOOK OF DANIEL. By F. W. Farrar, D. D., F. R. S., late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge; Archdeacon of Westminster. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1895. (Pp. xii, 334. 5½x3¾.) \$1.50.

This volume upon Daniel is written with the author's accustomed brilliancy of style and confidence in his own opinions, and, we may add, notably displays his lack of judicial qualities in the treatment of conflicting evidence. In his general opinion of the character of the book he agrees, with the more advanced critics, that it was not written by Daniel, but by an unknown author about four hundred years later, or about 170 B. C. His arguments against the genuineness of the book are based upon alleged historical errors; the later character of the Hebrew style; the use of Greek words of late origin; the lack of references to the book before the second century B. C.; the position of the book in the Jewish canon, not with the Prophets, but with the "other writings"; the late character of the doctrines maintained, especially concerning angels and the resurrection; and the general consent of critics.

Among his alleged historical mistakes is the designation of Belshazzar as the son of Nebuchadrezzar. Dr. Farrar says that he was not the son of Nebuchadrezzar. Dr. Farrar falls into error here by failing to remember the extent to which the usage of the word "son" is modified by the social customs of the people. Belshazzar's mother may have been a daughter of Nebuchadrezzar. But even if this were not so, the term may have been applicable to him as belonging to the dynasty, just as the successors of Jeroboam I. are called his sons in 2 Chron. xi. 14. Dr. Farrar also affirms that there was no king Belshazzar, whereas the monuments show that Nabonidus did make Belshazzar co-regent with him; thus explaining in a remarkable manner the apparent discrepancies in the account. Again, Dr. Farrar declares without reservation, that "there was no deportation in the third reign of Jehoiachim" (p. 113). This is a statement without evidence, except of a negative sort. The passage of Berosus quoted by Josephus in confirmation is simply declared to be not trustworthy, and so on with statement after statement which can be met by counter-statements upon equally good authority.

The dogmatic character of his assertions is what misleads. Dr. Farrar thinks, or rather knows, that it would be an easy matter for a writer four hundred years after the time of Nebuchadrezzar to reproduce correctly the scenes of that earlier period, and to clothe it in true Babylonish costume. On the contrary, the Book of Tobit, written in the later times, and laying its scene in the same period of Nebuchadrezzar, falls into errors of almost every description, and illustrates the hazard of attempting to write about scenes with which one is not familiar.

Dr. Farrar *knows* that one at least of the Greek names of musical instruments is of late origin. We should like to know how he knows it, when there is such a large amount of ignorance concerning the intercourse between Greece and Babylonia, and, we may add, concerning the names of instruments current among the Greeks of that period. Recent discoveries have brought to light many relics of the Greek colonies which were encouraged by Pharaoh to settle at Tahpahanes, on the eastern border of Egypt, where they had constant communication with the Jews. The Greek word *symphonia* is etymologically descriptive of the double reed pipe in use from time immemorial among the boatmen of the Nile. The reference to these instruments with Greek names in Daniel occurs just after the return of Nebuchadrezzar from the conquest of this portion of Egypt. To assert that there was no such Greek word current among the people at that time, because it has not been discovered in print until a later period, is pure dogmatism, and betrays in the writer a logical defect that throws suspicion upon his good judgment throughout the whole discussion. Dr. Farrar must be omniscient to justify the confidence with which he makes this and many other assertions which he would have pass for conclusive arguments.

In this instance, and many others, we might properly apply to the

author one of the elegant phrases which he freely applies to others, and say of the book that it is "one of those slovenly treatises which only serve to throw dust in the eyes of the ignorant" (p. 89). Or we might call it, in the author's words again, "one of the tortuous subterfuges and wild assertions" characteristic of "the mere bluster of impotent *odium theologicum*," in this case *agnosticum*. Or, to use his own words again, we might call it "historical and literary assumption which can no longer be maintained except by preferring the flimsiest hypotheses to the most certain facts" (p. 42).

How free the author is himself from hypothesis is seen from the following passage, in which it appears that his opinion upon this subject was formed not from specific study of the facts in hand, but at an early period of his investigations. "My own conviction has long been that in these *Haggadoth*, in which Jewish literature delighted in the prae-Christian era, and which continued to be written even till the Middle Ages, there was not the least pretence or desire to deceive at all. I believe them to have been put forth as moral legends—as avowed fiction nobly used for the purposes of religious teaching and encouragement. In ages of ignorance, in which no such thing as literary criticism existed, a popular *Haggadoth* might soon come to be regarded as historical, just as the Homeric lays were among the Greeks, or just as Defoe's story of the Plague of London was taken for literal history by many readers even in the seventeenth century" (pp. 42, 43).

THE MESSIAH OF THE APOSTLES. By Charles Augustus Briggs, D.D., Edward Robinson Professor of Biblical Theology in the Union Theological Seminary, New York. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1895. (Pp. xv, 562. 6½x3¾.) \$3.00.

In this ample and learned volume, Professor Briggs fitly concludes for the present the series of investigations begun in his "Messianic Prophecy" and continued in the "Messiah of the Gospels." He purposes, however, in the future, if life and health are given him, to continue the series, with volumes on "The Messiah of the Church" and "The Messiah of the Theologians."

With the general conceptions of the Messiah presented both in this and the preceding volume we have little occasion to find fault. They are noble conceptions, and the author has in the main caught the true spirit of the sacred writers, and presented his theme in an inspiring manner. But with this, as with other of the Professor's publications, there is good reason to find fault with the frequent extrajudicial opinions to which he gives expression with a confidence not at all warranted by the facts.

Dr. Briggs finds it in his way to express incidentally his opinion upon a great number of questions respecting New Testament criticism, and it must be confessed the confidence with which he indorses some of the latest speculations of the latest New Testament critics somewhat lowers

one's estimate of the similarly confident pronunciamientos heretofore uttered respecting questions of Old Testament criticism. For example, Dr. Briggs thinks that the prologue to the fourth Gospel was prefixed to it as an afterthought by the author of the First Epistle of John (p. 497); and, while believing that the preponderance of evidence is in favor of John's being its author, confesses that to his mind "the difficulties in the way of the Johannean authorship have not been entirely removed" (p. 462). But of the Apocalypse he is more confident, maintaining, with Spitta and Völter, that it is a composite document, which was finally edited by the addition of the Epistles to the Seven Churches, perhaps as late as 130 A. D.

It is gratifying to find, however, that in respect to Second Peter the latest turn of the kaleidoscope is favorable to its apostolic origin. The same Spitta, who has so effectually remanded the Apocalypse to the list of composite works, "has recently, with great ability, defended its [Second Peter's] authenticity, and as it seems to me [Briggs] with considerable success" (p. 44).

Of Christ's descent to Hades, Dr. Briggs has a clearly defined opinion, remarking that it "evidently made a great change in the abode of the dead for men and angels. He redeemed some from Hades, and took them with him in his ascent to heaven. During his redemptive reign, for purposes of discipline and judgment, he summons evil spirits and devils from Hades, and imprisons them again at his pleasure" (p. 532). Again, commenting on 1 Peter iii. 19, Dr. Briggs not only knows that this preaching took place in Hades, but that it was successful in converting not only the antediluvians, to whom it was directly addressed, but others also. It was surely not in vain; "for the preaching of Jesus, more than any other preaching, is the power of God unto salvation even for the worst of men" (p. 56). Why, then, were not the scribes and Pharisees converted?

On the other hand, Dr. Briggs has no use for the doctrine of the miraculous conception. According to him, "It is quite evident that the doctrine of the incarnation in the theology of the apostles was constructed without any reference, direct or indirect, to the virgin-birth. The virgin-birth cannot therefore be essential to the doctrine of the incarnation. That cannot be an essential doctrine of the New Testament which seems to be unknown to the apostles and which finds no expression in the theology of Peter, James, Paul, and John" (p. 523). But in the Epistles there is silence respecting all the miracles except the resurrection. Does Dr. Briggs reject them?

It is by repeated unguarded statements and insinuations like these that Dr. Briggs is misrepresenting himself and strengthening prejudices that are already stronger than they ought to be. We think, for example, that Dr. Briggs believes in the genuineness of First and Second Timothy and of Titus, but, after what he has said of the doubtfulness of Paul's authorship of Ephesians and Colossians, it is difficult to tell just how much

he means by saying, "If these betray a later Paulinism, and are therefore disputed as to their genuineness, still more is this the case with the Pastoral Epistles" (p. 225); especially when we read later that, in the author's opinion, "The book [Apocalypse] is no more inspired or canonical if the apostle wrote it than if John Mark wrote it, or the so-called presbyter John, or any other John, or any other person. The prophets of the apostolic age were no less inspired and authoritative in their utterances than the apostles, and the most of these, like their brethren in the Old Testament, have not left their names to history. The Church has recognized the Apocalypse as a holy book of God because of its holy contents, and in her judgment of it the Church has made no error" (p. 303),—a position not far from that of the High Church party among the Episcopalians.

EXEGETISCH-HOMILETISCHES HANDBUCH ZUM EVANGELIUM DES MATTHAUS. Von D. Robert Kübel, ord. Professor der Theologie in Tübingen. Nördlingen: C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung. 1889. (Pp. xii, 544.) 8 M.

The aim of the author is to provide for the preacher a complete critical commentary upon the Greek text of Matthew which shall at the same time afford homiletical suggestions. It is his opinion that while critical exegesis should always be of such a character as to furnish practically useful homiletical material, the two methods of treatment should be kept distinct. He therefore follows the critical exegesis of each section with a separate homiletical treatment of the same.

The author's standpoint is that of one who seeks to combine an orthodox belief in the Bible with a full recognition of the laws of critical investigation (p. iv). He entirely discards the verbal-inspiration theory. He admits that in minor details of the Gospels the authors may have made mistakes. Even in their report of the teaching of Jesus there may be errors, in the sense that one author, by reason of his individual peculiarities, may have so overemphasized some feature actually contained in a discourse of Jesus as to cause a misunderstanding of Jesus' real meaning. But the erroneous impression thus occasioned will be corrected in other Gospels or in other parts of the same Gospel (p. 428); for Dr. Kübel constantly falls back upon the general assumption that the picture of the life of Jesus sketched in the Gospels *must*, in all essential features, be true. It is impossible that "God the Lord can have left to the world a false or utterly obscure, ambiguous picture of the life and teaching of his Son Jesus Christ" (p. vi). If any process of literary criticism reaches results inconsistent with this principle, the process is by that fact proved to be untrustworthy.

Evidently Dr. Kübel's position among critical schools depends largely upon his idea of what constitute *essential features* in the Gospel narrative. This is learned from the details of his exegesis which show that he has left the extreme right of German criticism, and is cautiously pro-

ceeding toward the center. He quite frequently contrasts his own views with the more radical views of Weiss.

Probably the best single part of the author's work is his discussion of the fundamental thought and purpose of the Gospel (pp. 3-15), in which he forcibly presents its unity and progress of thought. A translation of this section appeared in the *Biblical World* of March and April, 1893.

His argument from internal evidence for the apostolic authorship of the Gospel is an interesting one. It consists in the fact that the Gospel makes upon us the impression of such spiritual power as can be attributed only to an apostle (p. 27). Its author's independent treatment of the Old Testament is like that of Jesus himself, devout and yet independent, free from rabbinical allegorizing. He alters its words freely yet never alters its sense because "the Spirit of God who gave the Old Testament and the Spirit of him who fulfilled it, fully inspires and guides him" (p. 17). This same independent and original treatment is seen in his presentation of the discourses of Jesus. Luke is simply a reproducer of what he found in his sources, sometimes not daring to do more than compile disconnected statements of Jesus without trying to combine them into unity. Matthew, on the other hand, is "master of his material," working it over into a connected whole, and yet presenting a true picture of Jesus in word and deed. No one but an apostle in whom the promises of John xiv. 26 and xvi. 13 had been fulfilled, could use such freedom with such effect (pp. 20, 27). There is no reason to doubt the tradition that this apostolic author was Matthew.

Yet Matthew used sources. He had not only his own remembrance of events and common oral tradition but also written sources. Dr. Kübel accepts the two document hypothesis, one of the documents being an original-Mark (which our Mark most nearly reproduces), and the other a Logia document containing comparatively short, loosely connected pieces of teaching which Luke has least altered. Both of these were used by Matthew. Matthew was also probably helped by an amanuensis who took some liberties. The ideas of authorship prevalent then were different from ours and did not prevent friends from adding or changing where the interest of the matter described seemed to demand it. Yet we believe, as a matter of faith, that God, through these circumstances, has secured for us a true picture of the life of Jesus (p. 34).

The Hebrew Gospel attributed by Papias to Matthew, was a translation or free working over of our Greek Gospel, made possibly at the instigation of Matthew himself (p. 33).

Dr. Kübel's standpoint is well illustrated by his treatment of demoniacal possession and of the alleged disagreements between the Synoptists and John as to the day of the month on which the crucifixion occurred. He believes demoniacal possession to have been due to the actual presence of demons and to be possible to-day, though apparent to no such extent as at that "critical point in the development of the con-

flict between God and Belial." The supper which Jesus ate with his disciples the evening before his crucifixion, was, according to Dr. Kübel, an irregular passover meal, eaten one evening before the regular time. The synoptists do not mention this irregularity, but speak of it as the regular passover supper, because they had forgotten that it was not. John, however, in chapter xiii., remembering that it was not the regular paschal supper, makes no allusion to its paschal character, and rightly alludes to the regular passover as occurring after the crucifixion.

One feels inclined to protest against the use of any "homiletical commentary" on the ground that it greatly weakens the preacher, by tempting him to neglect close exegetical study, and by really furnishing him with sermon outlines which he ought to prepare for himself. The present volume is less objectionable than some of the sort because its homiletical comments are really the fruit of critical exegesis. The exegetical parts and the critical discussions are what give the volume its value. They are the product of a spirit both scholarly and devout, and represent an effort to adopt some of the newer critical views without at all abating the reverence of that traditional "Bibelglauben" to which the author so often alludes. It is certainly a useful protest against an extremely radical criticism which refuses to see unity in any of the synoptical Gospels and so shreds them as to leave no trustworthy account of the life and teachings of Jesus.

A criticism to which the book as a whole is liable, is that it too much neglects the contemporaneous thought and life of the first century, the "Jewish background" upon which Professor Schnedermann and others have for some years been placing so much emphasis.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES.
By J. M. Stifler, D. D., Professor of New Testament Exegesis in Crozer Theological Seminary, New York. Chicago and Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Co. 1892. (Pp. vi, 287. 5¼ x 3¾.) \$1.25.

As the author explains in the preface, this book is not an introduction in the ordinary sense of the word, inasmuch as it does not consider questions of authorship, time and place of writing, or integrity of the composition. It is an effort "to trace out the course of thought," showing why Luke made such selection of material as is here presented, and what he meant to teach by it. In accordance with this purpose the steps in the emancipation of Christianity from Judaism, as narrated by Luke, are clearly brought out. It is an outline of Acts considerably amplified, and with some application of its truths to present-day situations; as when, for instance, on page 47, those who try to gain reputation by preaching other men's sermons, are warned by the fate of Ananias and Sapphira.

The book evidently is not, and does not purport to be, the work of one who, by prolonged critical study, has brought himself into sympathy with the life and thought of the first century. It is written entirely from

a nineteenth century standpoint. Occasionally the outline will appear to some to rest upon a fanciful and artificial exegesis. On page 190, Paul's increased activity after the absorption of John's twelve disciples into the church at Ephesus (Acts xix.) is said to be a duplication of Jesus' increased activity after the imprisonment of John (Mark i. 14). Or again, on page 268, regarding the miracles performed by Paul on the island of Melita, it is said to be "a token of the fall of Israel that from the restoration of Eutychus to life (xx.) until this hour, or from the moment that Paul turned his face, more than two years before, toward Jerusalem, until now when he is at the gates of Rome, the divine energy could not show itself. It is given again on Roman soil."

The book will be of value, especially to those in training-classes and Sunday-schools who wish a bird's-eye view of Acts, before beginning to study it in detail.

LUTHER HALSEY GULICK: *Missionary in Hawaii, Micronesia, Japan, and China.* By Frances Gulick Jewett. Boston and Chicago: Congregational Sunday-School and Publishing Society. 1895. (Pp. 314. 5½x3¼.) \$1.25.

In this biography of her father, Mrs. Jewett has written one of the most interesting and instructive volumes that have appeared for a long while. Luther Halsey Gulick was born of missionary parents in the Sandwich Islands, came to America at the age of twelve, received his general, theological, and medical education under the loving care of friends and relatives, and returned with his cultivated wife in 1851, to lay the foundations of missionary work in the Micronesian Islands. Two years after his arrival an epidemic of small pox occurred upon the islands, which tested to the utmost both the wisdom and the courage of the medical missionary. In the absence of fresh vaccine material, Dr. Gulick first inoculated himself with small pox and suffered it to have its course, in the meantime isolating himself from his family, and then inoculated as many of the natives as were willing to trust themselves to his skill, and as he was able to provide for. The horrors of those months of isolation with this plague can scarcely be imagined, but they were safely passed, and the confidence of the people was so completely won that the message of the missionaries was thereafter heard with gladness, and a great moral change immediately followed. But five thousand of the ten thousand inhabitants had been carried away by the plague.

After ten years Dr. Gulick returned to the United States for a vacation, and for a year or more his story of missionary work thrilled the churches like a message from the other world. Owing to the health of his family it was not thought best for him to go back to Micronesia, and his general capacity for organization led to his appointment to have general charge of missionary affairs in the Hawaiian Islands, where he remained until 1870, when the change of policy there set him free for other

work. For two years he was sent to the papal lands in Europe to inaugurate the experiments of the American Board in Spain and Italy, and to make investigations into the conditions of the missions in Turkey. From 1876 to 1889 he had charge of the work of the American Bible Society in China, which was prosecuted with remarkable energy, 252,000 copies of the Bible having been distributed in the single year 1887.

If any one is inclined to fear that the primitive spirit of Christian heroism is dying out in these later centuries there is no better corrective than to read the simple but charmingly-told story of this book.

THE RELIGIONS OF JAPAN, from the Dawn of History to the Era of Méiji. By William Elliot Griffis, D. D., formerly of the Imperial University of Tokio; author of "The Mikado's Empire" and "Corea, the Hermit Nation"; late Lecturer on the Morse Foundation in Union Theological Seminary in New York. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1895. (Pp. xxi, 457. 5 $\frac{7}{8}$ x3 $\frac{3}{8}$.) \$2.00.

The rapidity of changes taking place in the Japanese Empire makes this volume of Dr. Griffis most important and timely. The author's residence in Japan and his general studies in Japanese history and social conditions enable him to write with an authority upon the subject which few possess. The author's sympathy with the Japanese is also above question. Still it would be difficult anywhere to find a more serious arraignment of heathen religions than this volume presents. Polytheism and its degrading accompaniments exhibit themselves on every page. Pantheism is seen to be everywhere the fruitful parent of animism or chamanism, fetichism and phallicism. Of the latter the author says that the efforts of the government in 1872 to abolish it have been so far successful in hiding its emblems from public view that recent scholars and investigators have scarcely suspected its universality. Previous to that time the degrading emblems were everywhere visible along the roads and in the religious procession. "To the enlightened Buddhist, Confucian, and even the modern Shintoist the phallus-worshipper is a 'heathen,' a 'pagan,' and yet he still practises his faith and rites; . . . the Eastern Asiatic mind runs to pantheism as surely as the body of flesh and blood seeks food" (pp. 29, 30).

After reading the really powerful arraignment of Japanese heathenism which appears in the body of this volume, one is the more surprised at a paragraph in the preface which, on the authority of Principal Fairbairn, affirms, that "what we call superstition in the savage is not superstition *in him*. . . . Between fetichism and Christian faith there is a great distance but a great affinity—the recognition of a supra-sensible life" (p. xiii). In illustration of this, Dr. Griffis remarks:—

"I write in sight of beautiful Lake Cayuga, on the fertile and sloping shores of which in old time the Iroquois Indian confessed the mysteries of life. Having planted his corn, he made his pregnant squaw walk round the seed bed in hope of receiving from the Source of life increased

blessing and sustenance for body and mind. Between such a truly religious act of the savage, and that of the Christian sage, Joseph Henry, who uncovered his head while investigating electro-magnetism to 'ask God a question,' or that of Samuel F. B. Morse, who sent as his first telegraphic message 'What hath God wrought,' I see no essential difference. All three were acts of faith and acknowledgment of a power greater than man. Religion is one, though religions are many" (p. xii).

It is but fair to say, however, that the essential errors of this remark are amply refuted in the pages of the book itself.

OUTLINES OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. By Rev. Cornelius Walker, D. D., Professor of Systematic Divinity in the Theological Seminary of Virginia. New York: Thomas Whittaker. 1894. (Pp. 256. 6¼x3¾.)

This modest volume contains the clear and concise statement of the Christian doctrines which are generally accepted as the basis of our religious life and the mainspring of our religious activities. Such a comprehensive statement is really the best defense of the doctrines themselves. There are twenty-two chapters, appended to each of which there is a list of six or eight of the most important and acceptable treatises to be consulted for fuller information. The judiciousness of the author's treatment appears in a single quotation. Speaking of the doctrine of original sin, which represents infants as criminal participants in the sin of Adam and under its divine sentence of doom, the author discusses the doctrine of baptismal regeneration in the following manner:—

"This, very naturally, led to the sacramental remedy. For dying infants there could be no other. The sin and its doom, criminally incurred, not by their own act, was, in the same manner, without their act or knowledge, removed. And, as one sacrament thus became debased from its original high moral and spiritual significance into a mere fetish, so in due time, the other came to be regarded and treated as of similar character. Where sin is looked upon as a physical thing, it will be treated, and its cure sought with physical remedies" (p. 156).

We trust the book will have a wide circulation.

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE GOSPEL OF ST. JOHN, together with an Interlinear Literal Translation of the Greek Text of Stephens, 1550, with the Authorized Version conveniently presented in the Margins for Ready Reference, and with the Various Readings of the editions of Elzevir, 1624, Griesbach, Lachmann, Tischendorf, Tregelles, Alford, and Wordsworth. By J. P. MacLean, Ph. D. Cincinnati: The Robert Clarke Co. 1895. (Pp. x, 240. 6½x4.) \$1.50.

Mr. MacLean has done a good service in presenting in so short compass and in so clear a manner the main considerations which prove the genuineness of the Fourth Gospel, and, at the same time, a full analysis of the contents of the book. The volume is a safe and very convenient guide to the study of the subject. Its merits are such that they should secure for it a large sale.

MONASTICISM: Its Ideals and its History. A lecture by Adolf Harnack, D. D., Professor of Church History in the University of Berlin. Translated by Rev. Charles R. Gillett, A. M., Librarian of Union Theological Seminary in New York. With a Preface by Rev. Arthur C. McGiffert, D. D., Professor of Church History in Union Theological Seminary. New York: Christian Literature Co. 1895. (Pp. iii, 87. 5½x2¾.) 50 cents.

In this translation of Mr. Gillett, the reader will find a very clear, concise, and comprehensive view of the various developments of the monastic orders in the Greek and Roman Catholic churches. It will be difficult anywhere else to find so much upon the subject so well said and in so little space.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

THE CAMBRIDGE BIBLE FOR SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES. General Editor for the Old Testament: A. F. Kirkpatrick, D. D. New York: Macmillan & Co. *The Book of Psalms.* With Introduction and Notes. By A. F. Kirkpatrick, D. D., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, Regius Professor of Hebrew. Books II. and III. Psalms xlii.-lxxxix. (Pp. lxxix, 333. 5¼x3¾.) \$1.00.

THE EXPOSITOR'S BIBLE. Edited by the Rev. W. Robertson Nicoll, M. A., LL.D., Editor of *The Expositor*. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1895. \$1.50 per volume. *The Book of Ezekiel.* By the Rev. John Skinner, M. A. (Pp. xi, 499. 6½x3½.)

THE ESSENTIAL MAN: A Monograph on Personal Immortality in the Light of Reason. By George Croswell Cressey, Ph. D., author of Essays on "The Philosophy of Religion," "Mental Evolution," etc. Boston: Geo. H. Ellis. 1895. (Pp. 84. 4¾x2½.) 75 cents.

QUALIFICATIONS FOR MINISTERIAL POWER. The Carew Lectures for 1895. By Charles Cuthbert Hall, D. D., author of "Into His Marvellous Light," "Does God send Trouble?" etc. Hartford: Hartford Seminary Press. 1895. (Pp. 241. 5½x3½.) \$1.50.

THE CHILDREN, THE CHURCH, AND THE COMMUNION. Two Simple Messages to Children from one who loves them and wants them to love the House of God and the Table of Christ. By Charles Cuthbert Hall, minister of the First Presbyterian Church, of Brooklyn, N. Y. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1895. (Pp. 55. 5x2¾.) 75 cents.

CHRIST AND THE CHURCH. Essays concerning the Church and the Unification of Christendom. With an Introduction by the Rev. Amory H. Bradford, D. D. New York and Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Co. 1895. (Pp. 321. 6x3¾.)

THIRTY YEARS' WORK IN THE HOLY LAND: A Record and a Summary. 1865-1895. New and revised edition. New York: Macmillan & Co. 1895. (Pp. 256. 5¾x3¾.) \$1.50.

THE UNITED CHURCH OF THE UNITED STATES. By Charles Woodruff Shields, Professor in Princeton Seminary. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1895. (Pp. xi, 285. 6½x3¾.) \$2.50.

THE BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL VALUE OF THE OLD TESTAMENT.

BY PROFESSOR OWEN H. GATES, PH. D.

A FEW introductory paragraphs may not be out of place. The writer is not anxious that the treatment of the subject should entitle it to constitute a chapter in a "Science" of Sociology. He will be content if he can suggest how men who are intent on the practical salvation of society can gain inspiration and information by the study of the Old Testament. It is not his fortune to have made a scientific study of the subject of Sociology, as will perhaps appear from what follows. He ventures nevertheless to use the word in the title, and a few times otherwise, in its natural, broad meaning.

In searching after that which will be of practical value, the claim is ventured that he approaches nearer the demand of the day than to aim at accurate scientific perspective without regard to the practical. What is it which has set the schools of the country on the *qui vive* to see which can organize the first or best department of Sociology? Is it the discovery of a new subject for scientific study, like a new element in the sun or a new bug? Not at all. It is the grow-

VOL. LII. NO. 208. 1

ing recognition that society needs improvement, the quickened conscience of men on the subject, and a strengthened purpose to aid in the work. This purpose is the wave on which Sociology has risen to its present importance, and it will not wait for the schools to search through the sub-sciences and elaborate the science of Sociology, or for philosophers to co-ordinate the various social sciences and enunciate a philosophy of Sociology. Vast improvements have been made in the centuries past in the condition of man, and that by men who would have been really nonplussed if they had been challenged to show the "scientific credentials" of their systems.

Moreover, the world need not wait for new discoveries. Society is not in its present state because men are ignorant how it can be improved and must wait until scientific workers have invented some new methods. The fact is, that the great fundamental truths in regard to society are as old as philosophy. That among the researches of Sociology which is novel, may be important scientifically, but that which is practically important to the understanding and control of society, has formed the basis of all missionary, benevolent, and educational institutions which the world has ever seen. It is now and then occurring that views are tentatively propounded as to the underlying defects of society, which have been the stock in trade of theologians since theology was possible. When the human race was young, so says one old and respected authority, there was a crime committed which involved a large per cent of the world's inhabitants. It was a murder. The murderer was at once subjected to an examination. One question only was asked and that sufficed, not indeed to make him confess his guilt, but to reveal that which rendered the crime possible. "Where is Abel thy brother?" The reply was equally short, "Am I my brother's keeper?" That was all, and enough. Responsibility for the well-being of our neighbor—there is no more fundamental truth than that. Re-

pudiation of that responsibility underlies the various crimes against society. This incident must possess tremendous force for those who believe that it happened, for it was none other than God himself who thus probed to the seat of the trouble. But there is a class of persons, not all irreverent and some of them good scholars, who do not believe that it all happened as is here stated. This fact may disturb the passage in some of its relations, but its sociological importance still remains; for if it is a legend, it only shows the more convincingly what was the thought of those among whom it arose and by whom it was transmitted as to the correct and incorrect relations between men. It then becomes a very old and important theory of society.

That which is still undiscovered, or even uncorrelated, the lack of which keeps Sociology the science from being perfected is not the vital essential part, but the trifles, the odds and ends. Reformers need not wait for these, and need not apologize to the schools for the unscientific character of their methods. This is not saying that the scientific researches of the schools are valueless or that their results may properly be ignored. On the contrary, the childlike spirit of receptivity of truth which is inseparable from Christian activity will insure a proper estimate of them by every worker in the field of the best social reform. But if the worker will do well to learn from the investigator all that he is ready to teach, on the other hand the latter cannot, if he would be scientific, ignore the work of the former. It is quite right that Chicago University, which is perhaps our most elaborately organized school for the scientific study of the subject, should lay great stress in its announcements upon the numerous charitable organizations of Chicago as affording valuable opportunity for observation and study. There is indeed everything to learn from the study of past and present efforts to reform and purify social institutions. To one such program this paper would draw attention.

The unit for consideration in the Old Testament is the people, and not an individual.

In this respect the Old Testament differs much from the New Testament. It will be seen later that the proper control of society involves a very definite consideration of the individual, but this does not cause the main issue to be obscured, and from the beginning onward the community is that which engages the attention of the Old Testament writers. In seeking illustrations of this fact we will confine ourselves to the Pentateuch, leaving the Prophetic writings to be considered later in another connection. In the quotations from the Pentateuch we will endeavor to observe, not simply the truth already stated, but also the adjustment of the legislation to it.

Long before the actual establishment of the nation whose fortunes are traced in the Old Testament Scriptures, God revealed to Abraham his purpose to make him a great nation. He had called him as an individual, but this call was for the purpose of establishing in the earth a people in which all the nations of the earth would bless themselves. The same promise was continued to Isaac and to Jacob. The nation was established by the Exodus of the Hebrews from Egypt. The difference between Israel after the Exodus and Israel before the Exodus was a difference not primarily in the relation of the individual to Jehovah, but in the community life which then began. The individuals composing the nation existed before, and the fundamental laws of human nature with which all proper legislation must correspond were their possession before as truly as after that time. It was an epoch for them because new relations were entered into, involving new duties, and new possibilities of blessing. The promises were theirs as a nation and they were to be realized, if at all, in the divinely directed development of their common life. The slaves of Egypt were set free in order that they and their successors as a nation might accomplish a work impossible except under these new conditions.

The new community entered at once into the very closest relations with Jehovah. In the oft-repeated sentiment "Israel is my son, my first-born," God throws his parental protection around the whole people. They receive his care as a unit and they owe obedience to Him, as a child to his father. In these days of pronounced individualism the doctrine here enunciated has largely been supplanted by the later doctrine of the Divine Fatherhood of individual believers, as if there were antagonism between the two. There is none; the older is not made obsolete by the rise of the later; the clearly defined truth that God is Father of a nation cannot be superseded or corrected, though it is very properly supplemented as God's revelation develops.

"I will take you to me for a people, and I will be to you a God." This relation, existing directly between the people and God, was the basis of the commands which he laid upon them. This is clear at every turn as we read the Pentateuchal legislation. The claim that the first-born and first-fruits are his, rests upon the acknowledged claim that the whole nation is his. The ten commandments are expressly justified by a reference to the divine act which brought the nation into existence. "I am Jehovah thy God which brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage." At the close of the Greater Book of the Covenant the blessings which are promised to the people if they are obedient, are such as will benefit them as a nation, and it is noticeable that many of the commands here and elsewhere in the legislation are of such a character that it must be the organized body which obeys or disobeys.

The sacrificial system furnishes an interesting illustration. Prominent among the provisions for sacrificial atonement for sin are the sacrifices which the nation as a whole must perform. All sins of individuals have their assigned methods of expiation, and in addition the sins of the public are to be acknowledged and atoned for. The motive of even

so individual a matter as purification for uncleanness is found in a reference to the God who brought them out of Egypt, and thereby gave them national existence. He is holy, they must be holy. One who sacrifices to another than Jehovah is to be cut off from his people; for the people have an obligation to holiness and obedience with the performance of which an individual is not to be permitted to interfere. In certain cases failure to inflict the penalty of excommunication will be followed by disaster to the nation. The land which was a continual evidence of divine favor, with which the promises of future prosperity were so inseparably connected that to this day possession of Palestine is looked forward to by many Jews, that same land was to vomit the nation out as it had done the nations before them.

The oft-repeated "I am Jehovah" had for the Jew a much greater significance than for others. Whatever the actual etymology of the name and whenever it was introduced into Israel, the explanation given in Exodus shows that they connected it fundamentally with the establishment of the nation. The idea of Israel as a nation must have risen in the mind as the phrase met the eye or ear. Observe what obligations a single chapter connects with it (Lev. xix.). They should leave gleaning ears in the field; should not steal, lie, nor deceive; should not keep back a workman's wages over night; should not be careless about the bodily infirmities of others; should not discriminate in the administration of justice; should not bear malice or hatred in the heart; should have just weights and measures; should treat strangers as native born. These are the duties that grow out of the thought of God as Jehovah. The laws concerning servants and their freedom at the year of Jubilee are based on the claim, reiterated by Jehovah and acknowledged by the people throughout their history, that they are all servants of God.

The examination might be carried on through the other portions of the Old Testament literature with equally clear

results. The community of Israel, called a nation from the political features of its organization, is the unit with which the Old Testament is chiefly concerned.

Let us note some features of the truth which are of importance. In the first place, this truth that Jehovah chose their nation to be his and especially directed its fortunes, is not a modern theory invented to explain the otherwise incomprehensible course of its history. It was a very practical matter for Israel. It was rehearsed in law and prophecy; it was acknowledged in song and prayer. The nation gloried in it, sometimes in a way they should not. It was their religious belief.

Secondly, this consciousness operated to bind the nation together very closely. Identity of religious views is always powerful as a social bond. But here there was more. This particular belief was especially significant. They believed that their God was theirs in a peculiar sense and degree. No other nation could speak of him in such terms as would describe his relation to Israel. The consciousness of superior privilege, the growing assurance of the power of their God, cultivated the spirit of exclusiveness to be sure, but at the same time bound them more firmly together in society. Theirs was a fraternity. They were alike in God's sight; he was no respecter of persons. Injury done to a fellow-citizen was done to God himself.

Thirdly, the truth intensified their patriotism. Their wars were all crusades, if right at all. Loyalty to their God was the test to be applied to their politics and to public opinion. On the other hand, irreligion, or polytheism, or impure worship of Jehovah, was rebuked by threat of national disaster. Religion and patriotism as we define them, strengthened each other in Israel.

Fourthly, this identity of the religious and secular was real. It was not a mere theory without foundation. The Old Testament doctrine of the divine right of kings was the divine right

to control kings, a doctrine which yields quite different results from that of which we are accustomed to hear. The doctrine was not the device of a king to secure allegiance otherwise refused or reluctantly given. It was not a made-to-order platform set up to work its natural result at some election, and to be forgotten afterward. God and religion were not national in the sense that they were controlled by the people and secular powers, but in the sense that these last were controlled by Jehovah. In our Bibles and perhaps in our thoughts the prophets and kings are widely separated; but not so in fact. The prophets were advisers in public matters. Those who wrote the books bearing their names are but a minority of the Old Testament prophets, and even in the case of this minority the writings were but an incident of their ministry, often an afterthought. Their chief activity was in other lines. Even in the writings themselves there is a very close connection with the kings. There are few kings in the northern or southern kingdom concerning whom there is not extant record that they were advised by some one or more prophets. But if this system was not a fraud perpetrated by the kings, neither was it a fraud perpetrated by the prophets. The uniform and consistent claim through the Old Testament must be regarded as true.

The belief corresponded to facts. God was indeed back of the theory. Jehovah is the same God who is creator and preserver of man and nature, the all-powerful, all-wise God, whom we acknowledge and serve.

We pass on now to consider that the development of the history of Israel according to this principle constituted a sociological experiment. The idea was worthy of a God both in its conception and in its elaboration. A people untouched by a culture which would conflict with their proposed future; marvellously led to a new country whose soil was fertile and climate unimpeachable; the former inhabitants so disposed of (at least so Israel believed), that on the one hand no shock

was given to agriculture, and on the other, no serious interference was offered by them to the continued possession of the country by the newcomers; the aspirants to world-power in the north and in the south so balanced that it was for the interest of both that the new state should be free and independent; wholesome laws given them, made in view of the ideal which was before them, recognized from the first; an unbroken succession of prophets chosen from among the people and so sympathizing with them, and yet speaking with divine tenderness or sternness as occasion required,—certainly here are all the essentials for a successful experiment; such a community should answer its own ideals; here there ought to be loyalty to the common interests and to the common God; each should cheerfully contribute his quota to the common good and might expect to receive divine blessing through the medium of the nation's life. Conceived by Jehovah, the idea was as wise as natural law, which he also formed—as good as was Creation itself.

It failed. The ideal was not realized. The goal was not reached. Or putting it in a way which avoids the anthropomorphism of saying that God failed in an attempt, the people did not stand the test. Surely it is worth while to seek the cause of this failure. The reason given clearly and forcibly by the Old Testament itself is *sin*. There is sin in man. It is in his heart and shows itself in his acts. The institutions which he founds are tainted with it. He surrounds himself with it. It enters into his private plans and public policy. It perverts and defiles every virtue. It warps and twists and rots and withers; no department of human activity is unaffected by it. Here is a factor which is constant in the great problems of society. Climate varies; the diagrams showing changes in density of population, production of gold and silver, in prevalence of crime and insanity, look like mountains and valleys, but no chart is needed to show sin in human nature. Varying conditions require modification of remedies,

but a constant condition has its one remedy; and once found it is always applicable. The one great remedy for sin is a Saviour. To him all Christendom looks back. To him all the Old Testament looked forward. But in the course of preparation for his coming various ideas are developed in the Old Testament which are of utmost importance to the world. A rapid glance at the steps by which the new principle was brought to bear on the community must suffice.

First, the growing recognition of the sociological importance of character.

The leaders of religious and ethical thought in Israel were the prophets. They were the men who were raised up to instruct the people in their duties manward and Godward; and noble preachers of righteousness they were. Preachers, but just as truly patriots; men with a full knowledge of public affairs and with an absorbing interest in them.

What does it signify that we can date a prophecy from internal evidence? It simply means that the prophecy contains such plain reference to the issues, political and social, of the day, that a picture can be drawn of them; and if the state of society be known from other sources, the date of the prophecy may be regarded as reasonably certain.

The prophets were greatly concerned with the welfare of the public; and being so much in earnest, God could and did use them as his spokesmen, commissioned by him to reveal to the people his own thoughts and purposes for them. They had clear vision; God clarified it still more. They were courageous; he augmented their courage, renewed their zeal. Straightforward, frank, bold, they never waver, never appear doubtful however complicated or critical the situation.

The ideal of these prophets was a glorious community, answering to all the promises of God made to the obedient and faithful nation. The people should have a divine king and just laws; happiness and blessedness should be the possession of all. This ideal, however, they saw clearly enough

was possible only after a judgment day, a terrible day of Jehovah which would come and destroy certain forces that were hostile to the ideal, and would prevent its realization. Those forces that would thus prevent the realization of the ideal were the very ones which were recognized as mischievous in the existing society. Well-nigh every sketch of the glorious future for Israel was accompanied by a stern prediction of an awful destiny in store for the wicked.

Now they might have done as some Christians of to-day; full of faith that Jehovah would ultimately purify society, they might have sat still to wait for that salvation. Or they might have done as some also do nowadays, not all of them Christians, take it upon themselves to execute God's judgment upon those who they think stand in the way of their rights. They did neither. On the one hand, they acted as if God had committed the reformation of the nation to them, as he had; the judgment which they foresaw never relieved them from the duty of working for the welfare of the nation. On the other hand, they were reformers, not revolutionists.

Indeed the judgment was predicted very largely as the natural result of the sins of Israel. True it is represented as being a sovereign act of God, but it was the habit of those unscientific times to ignore second causes and refer all to the one first cause. The prophets used the judgment as a warning against sin. It was one of their arguments to prove that a righteous God required a righteous people.

Let a quotation from Isaiah show how one prophet understands the condition of Israel, the ideal, and the elements which antagonize it and render it impossible of fulfillment.

"Let me sing for my wellbeloved a song of my beloved touching his vineyard. My wellbeloved had a vineyard in a very fruitful hill: and he made a trench about it, and gathered out the stones thereof, and planted it with the choicest vine, and built a tower in the midst of it, and also hewed out

a winepress therein: and he looked that it should bring forth grapes, and it brought forth wild grapes. And now, O inhabitants of Jerusalem and men of Judah, judge, I pray you, betwixt me and my vineyard. What could have been done more to my vineyard, that I have not done in it? wherefore, when I looked that it should bring forth grapes, brought it forth wild grapes? And now go to: I will tell you what I will do to my vineyard: I will take away the hedge thereof, and it shall be eaten up: I will break down the fence thereof and it shall be trodden down: and I will lay it waste; it shall not be pruned nor hoed; but there shall come up briars and thorns; I will also command the clouds that they rain no rain upon it. For the vineyard of the Lord of Hosts is the house of Israel, and the men of Judah his pleasant plant: and he looked for judgment, but behold oppression; for righteousness, but behold a cry."

The parable is a universal one. Not a feature of it but applies at one time and place as well as another. Man is a free moral agent, knowing no control. He acts out his own pleasure in spite of environment. Hedge him in as you will, you have not tamed him. The most favorable of surroundings will not insure his realizing the expectations of those who seek thus to direct him.

In thus tracing the evil of the community life back to its source in the human heart, Isaiah goes to the heart of the matter. For the rest he has but to describe the outworkings.

Examine the list of offenses with which Judah is charged by Isaiah alone in the course of a few chapters, and see how many are offenses committed directly against the welfare of society. Their religion is perfunctory; they come to offer sacrifices while their hands are stained with blood. The city is a lodging place for murderers. Their princes are companions of thieves. Their magistrates take bribes from those who are guilty, and those who cannot or will not offer bribes are unable to secure their rights. The land is full of silver

and gold, and military resources abound. The nation is puffed up with pride because of its wealth and strength. Idols and idol worship are present and are referred to in the closest connection with the great wealth in which they are confident, as if they thought that, rich as they were, they could have even gods of their own liking. They ape foreign customs which involve abandonment of their own, at once national and religious customs. After predicting the disappearance, in God's judgment of the nation, of the upper, controlling classes in the state, and the assumption of authority by incompetent rulers, Isaiah proclaims that this is the merited reward of their wickedness. Evidently the ill administration of public affairs, a condition constantly alluded to, was leading to the natural result, the elimination of those who were fit and willing to rule; for directly after, the prophet complains again that the rulers and princes were eating up the vineyards, crushing Jehovah's people, grinding the face of the poor and despoiling them.

Isaiah's picture of the women of his day is a classic. They were artificial in dress and manner, loaded with ornaments and trinkets. Was all this sinful? It was sin against God and a wrong against society, that those whose whole influence should have been exercised as guardians of public and private morals, were oblivious of any obligation resting upon them. Those endowed by the Creator with a nature sensitive to religious and moral distinctions were given up to shaking ankle-bells and flourishing mirrors and rings and nose jewels. In the Hebrew, the catalogue of ornaments has a curious rhythmical jingle, and it has been shrewdly suggested that very likely Isaiah incorporates into his own writing a song of ridicule for women, which was current among the wags on the street. Surely society is in a bad way when women have such a reputation.

Immediately after the song of the vineyard Isaiah enumerates several sins involving woe to those who commit them,

sins that may well have occasioned his complaint of the wild grapes which the vineyard yielded. First in order, if not in importance, comes the accumulation of vast landed estates, carried to such an extent that there is no room for others than the few owners, and the land is deprived of its "servants," as the Hebrew calls those who till the soil. What penalty was more inevitable and natural than that the soil should lose its fertility from sheer lack of cultivation, and the palaces become desolate from lack of occupants?

The prophet next rebukes the sin of spending long hours in drinking. "Woe unto them that rise up early in the morning that they may follow strong drink: that tarry late into the night, till wine inflame them." Thus occupied and thus stupefied, they do not possess the inclination or ability to grasp the significance of providential acts and facts. They "regard not the work of Jehovah, and do not consider the operation of his hands." There is an understanding of nature that is more profound and true than the mere comprehension of natural law. The result for Judah was that the people would go into captivity from lack of knowledge.

Woe to those, Isaiah continues, who are so secure in their sinful careers that they insolently challenge God to hasten his threatened destruction. Others deserve and receive the prophet's condemnation, whose conscience is so out of order that it registers good when it should register evil, so that men actually feel a moral obligation to do that which is really evil, and a conscientious repugnance to do what is in fact good. The prophet closes the series of woes with denunciation of the obstinate and conceited, and reiteration of his denunciations of the heroes of strong drink and the venality of judges. This list of sins perhaps does not read so racily as the recent developments in New York and Chicago, but there is, to say the least, a strong family resemblance between those times and the present.

Isaiah is not unique among his fellow-prophets in his

grasp of the social problems of Israel. A study of the range of prophetic literature convinces us that the prophets held in mind continually the ideal of a community answering to all that is best in humanity; that they analyzed society as it existed and found that it differed from its ideal just as an individual member of it differed from his best possible development, or in other words that social problems were really ethical problems; that it is impossible to force men to constitute an ideal community; and that the way to improve the whole was to reform the individual. Thus there is a growing recognition of the value of individual character as fitting a man to be a member of society. Professor Wilhelm Nowack of Strassburg, in his *Rectoratsrede*, 1892, writes:—“ . . . zu keiner Zeit der israelitischen Geschichte treten uns die sozialen Gegensätze in solche Schärfe und in diesen eigenthümlich ethischen Beleuchtung entgegen, wie in dieser nachexilischen. Freilich haben wir auch schon in der älteren vorexilischen Litteratur Ansätze zu der Umbiegung der sozialen Gegensätze zu ethischen.”

Secondly, the relation of the doctrine of the Messiah to this higher estimate of character. The Messianic blessing was to extend ultimately to the whole race. Even from the time of the call of Abraham, when he was singled out from among the nations to receive blessing for himself, the larger hope was expressed that all the nations of the earth would be the recipients, through him and his posterity, of his and their blessings. They were to be a kingdom of priests, and a priesthood exists for others. They should exercise for the nations priestly functions; should be the medium through which God was to bless the race. Isaiah and Micah quote a prediction of a time when all the nations shall stream to Jerusalem, there to learn Jéhovah's ways of peace. The nations shall seek unto the root of Jesse. In Egypt, which shall feel Jehovah's hand heavy in judgment, shall be an altar to Jehovah, and they too shall have a saviour. “And Jehovah shall

smite Egypt, smiting and healing." Assyria also shall worship, forming with Israel and Egypt a triple alliance that shall be a blessing to the whole earth. Zephaniah predicts a pure lip for all the nations, with which they shall call upon the name of Jehovah, making a proposition to serve him. For the exilic and post-exilic prophets this doctrine was a commonplace.

The persistence of this belief in the universality of the Messianic salvation is in contrast to the development in other features of the doctrine. We notice two points, viz., the narrowing of the agent and the heightening of the work. At first there is no Messiah distinguished from the nation. It was the whole people that was to be the channel of blessing to mankind. Then the promises were to the righteous in the nation, and as the doctrine grew the Messiah becomes a single well-marked individual. Coincident with this narrowing of the Messianic agent, was a gain in the content of the Messiah's work. Originally a work such as Israel could do for mankind, now it becomes a work which must be done for Israel as well as for the rest of the race. It still remains true, as before, that the blessing comes through Israel, but now Israel is able merely to transmit the salvation which it has itself received. Only as it is upheld by God and transformed by the work of the Messiah can it accomplish its benign mission for the race. The ideal was so far in advance that of himself man was unable to reach it even for himself. How then could Israel accomplish for other nations the work of securing for them the realization of the ideal of the race? The inability to attain the ideal became clearer and clearer as the centuries rolled on, and the appearance of the Messiah was timed by this growing consciousness. "When the fullness of the time came, God sent forth his Son."

The change in the Messianic work was chiefly a change in its character. It was constantly taking on more spiritual phases. Victory in battles was at first the height of the as-

piration. Then there was added to victory over foes a strong righteous reign of the Messiah which should bring abundant material blessings to his people. Then the peacefulness of the rule, and then the extension of that peaceful rule over other peoples was predicted. In a still further advance, the Messiah is endowed with spiritual qualifications, and this outpouring of the divine spirit testifies to a relation with his people more intimate than a sovereign's and an influence over them more thoroughgoing than would be exerted by a simple ruler, ideal though he might be. The Messiah was to receive, that he might impart, an insight into God's character and an appreciation of his designs. Corresponding with this change in the conception of the Messiah's work, we find the later representations emphasizing increasingly the character of the Messiah.

This development of thought about the Messiah is in entire agreement with the modification, already roughly sketched, in the valuation of the individual and his place and work in the community. There is in the case of the development of Israel, and of the Messianic ideal, the fundamental conception of a community. In both is a community within a larger one, whose function is to bless this larger body. Then the salvation and the blessing concerned assume such proportions and character that a work must be wrought for the community, in the one case by individuals within it and in the other case by a personal Messiah, also within it. The work is more and more a transformation of character, and in both cases this demands corresponding uprightness of character in the individual doing the work.

If the paralleling of these various features seems artificial, the artificiality arises from the attempt to keep separate as two sequences of thought that which is not two but one. The course of the history of Israel, thoroughly studied in the light of divine revelation increasingly bestowed through the centuries, produced in the minds of the best in Israel the profound

social philosophy of the prophets, and the same men, possessed of the same object lessons, made use of the same philosophy in their delineation of the Messianic community of the future. This community was an ideal one; ideal, not merely in the negative implication of the word as unreal; but ideal in that it gathers up the ideas of its portrayers with regard to a community. Messiah's kingdom was a picture of what, in the mind of the prophets, Israel ought to have become. From this fact arises the difficulty often encountered by students of Messianic prophecy, of distinguishing between prophecies truly Messianic and those which are merely optimistic hopes for Israel's immediate future.

The portrait of the Messiah contains all the features of the ideal citizen of a perfect community. Such as he was in character, every one should be who would be a perfect citizen of any community. The Messiah was unique but not in the type of character which he possessed; rather in the degree and perfection in which he exhibited that type. He was depicted as he was by the prophets, because to their inspired vision such was the ideal character, the one which ought to be copied.

Messiah's work likewise shows an identity with that to be wrought by an ideal citizen, although, as above, we must be understood as speaking of the kind, not the degree, of the work. The whole structure of Messianic thought and prophecy is based on the demand for a work on behalf of others. He exists not for himself alone, but for what he can accomplish for those about him. Very little is said in the Old Testament of the personal relations of the Messiah to God, except in this way, viz., that God sustains him in his work, and endows him richly with his spirit for the better accomplishment of his mission. He existed that he might save; he was what he was in character, because to the prophets that was the character which would save men.

We have described though not by name, the much ex-

toll'd law of service. The law, Christian though it is, does not take its rise in New Testament times, but rather under the old dispensation. Indeed it forms a convincing proof that the old and the new are essentially one. It appears not as the outgrowth of New Testament individualism, but of the Old Testament collectivism. It is proclaimed because the minds of the prophets dwelt upon the community and its common life and needs.

The Old Testament representations of the Messiah find their climax in the Servant passages of the second part of Isaiah. These passages rise above other Messianic predictions in their descriptions of the Servant, of the service rendered, of those who are benefited by the ministry. No other picture of the Messiah is so complete and satisfactory to us who can test the prediction by the Messiah of the Gospels, as is the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah. And yet the attention of the student of these passages is largely absorbed by the difficulty of identifying the Servant as variously presented. It is unfortunate and strange if we cannot determine the essential meaning of the writer. Of course we do not expect to escape doubt as to unimportant details of the prophets' teaching, but at so vital a point and in such essential conceptions ambiguity cannot be excused. If it is necessary to an understanding of these passages to determine absolutely in each several case whether Servant refers to all Israel, pious Israel or the Messiah, then the prophecies are sealed to us until the distinction can be made and accepted as free from doubt. But in fact there does not seem to be any antithesis involved in the predictions. What is in one place predicted of Israel, is elsewhere asserted concerning the Messiah. The sections do not lose in significance, on the other hand there is a great gain in unity of thought and simplicity of representation if we assume that there is really no change in the essential meaning of the word servant; that the prophet recognizes and delineates a certain character; that he regards this character as

Messianic, whether it is seen in one, in many, or in all of Israel, Messianic in that it is indispensable in the members of the ideal community.

The Messiah can be called a servant because to the prophets service was the law of the ideal society. This principle is an essential sociological truth, and it is in the Old Testament that it is found. But a right principle in a wrong place is a calamity, and in this respect also the teaching of the Old Testament is in accord with the profoundest social philosophy. The fifty-third chapter of Isaiah is in its proper place in the prophetic literature. In the Pentateuch it would be a failure. It is ethical not legal. As expressive of the principle the verb "serve" is not found in the imperative mood, and is oftenest used in the first person. It is God's own law for nature and for society, worthy the attention of the thorough student of social problems.

ARTICLE II.

THE RELATION OF CORPORATIONS TO PUBLIC MORALS.¹

BY THE REV. WASHINGTON GLADDEN, D. D., LL. D.

THE corporation is closely connected with the political, the industrial, the educational, and the religious interests of the people: its origin is political; it is a creature of legislation; and its work reaches out into the realms of production, of commerce and exchange, of learning, of philanthropy, of religion. Many of our great manufactories are conducted by corporations; all our railroad companies are corporations; so are our banks, our private charitable institutions, most of our colleges, and all of our churches. The question of the nature, the power, the limitations of corporations thus at once appears to be a question of the most vital and far-reaching importance. Our material prosperity may be said to be almost wholly in the keeping of these institutions; our intellectual development is largely dependent upon them, and it is easy to see that the standards of public morality must be powerfully affected, for good or ill, by their transactions.

What is a corporation? "A corporation," says Judge Cooley, "is a body consisting of one or more natural persons, *empowered by law to act as an individual*, and continued by a succession of members. If it consist of but one member at a time it is a corporation sole, if of two or more it is a corporation aggregate. Bishops, parsons, and vicars of the Church of England are corporations sole, but in the United States few if any exist."

The King of England is also a corporation sole; the

¹ Read at the Oberlin Summer School of Christian Sociology, June 26, 1895.

kingly powers and prerogatives which he assumes at his coronation are regarded as immortal; they do not die when the king dies; his successor is king as soon as the breath has left his body. "The king is dead! long live the king." The English parson, in possession of the living of a parish, is also a corporation sole. The tithes are due to the *office* of the parson,—to the impersonal entity which is still holding the place, after the parson dies, and before his successor is inducted. These legal fictions, as Judge Cooley says, are not familiar to Americans; we know nothing of the existence of such an artificial person as the corporation sole. The corporation aggregate is, however, an everyday acquaintance; we can scarcely take a step in life that we do not encounter him; he is the servant of our convenience, the minister to our wants, the purveyor of our pleasures; and if, sometimes, his hand is laid heavily upon us, the pressure is so slow and gradual that we are scarcely aware of the source from which it comes.

Corporations are public or private. The government of a village or a city is a public corporation. All citizens who are voters are members of these corporations; the officers chosen by them are officers of the corporation. A manufacturing company like the Singer Manufacturing Company, or the Pacific Mills at Lawrence, is a private corporation. The holders of the stock are members of the corporation. If you sell your share of stock to me, you cease to be a member, by that act, and I become a member. The voting in such corporations is by shares. The holder of a hundred shares has a hundred votes; the holder of ten shares ten votes.

There is also a class of *quasi* public corporations, among which are national banks and railway companies. The fact that national banks are subject to the constant inspection and surveillance of the government, and that all their operations are carefully regulated by law, clearly indicates their public character. Still more evident should it be that rail-

roads are not, though they often assume that they are, private corporations. They are public highways, as truly subject to the power of the state as are our public roads and our city streets.

These artificial persons, called corporations, created by the state for certain purposes, are very curious entities. There is nothing exactly like them in the heavens above nor on the earth beneath. It takes not a little subtlety to define their nature and comprehend their powers. "We are not likely," says Mr. Edward Isham, "to exaggerate in our conception of the distinctive personality of these mythical beings who are nevertheless actual members of the community. They may perform nearly all the acts that natural persons may, but these are in no sense the acts of their various members. They act by their respective names and corporate seals, not by the persons who compose them. In the language of Lord Coke, 'a corporation is invisible, immortal, has no soul, neither is it subject to the imbecilities or death of the natural body.' These words have attracted animadversion, but they are substantially accurate. If all the members are collected, one does not see the corporation. It may be sued, but if every member appear the corporation has not answered the writ. It may own property, real and personal; but the members will have no property nor any right in any part of it. It may owe debts of which the members owe nothing. . . . It is a citizen of the state by whose sovereignty it is created, and its action is determined by the mere majority of its members. All the members, however, may change, but it remains unchanged. They may succeed one another indefinitely; so that they may die, but the corporation remains immortal."

This impersonal person, this unmoral agent, this fictitious immortal is, you may safely conclude, a creature that will bear studying, and watching. When such a prodigy is let loose in society there will be consequences, depend upon it! Do you think that you could foretell exactly what it would do?

If you study its natural history inductively, by trying to observe and record its habitat and its habits, you will come upon some very curious and interesting facts. You will find, to begin with, as I have already suggested, that it has been a very useful creature. Under domestication and proper control it has been taught to bear many of the burdens of society, and to guard its highest interests. In the sphere of education, for example, what could we have done without this creature of law, the corporation? For the maintenance of great institutions of learning vast sums of money must be collected, land procured and held by firm title, buildings erected, funds endowed; and there are thus great accumulations of property to be held and administered from generation to generation. What other device for the custody and care of these great and permanent institutions could be so simple and effective as that of the corporation? The law establishing the corporation sometimes names the trustees who shall hold the property, always prescribes the general use to which it shall be put, and empowers the trustees to fill vacancies in their own number. This is an instance of what is called a close corporation; and under organizations of this kind the greater part of the educational and philanthropic work of this country has been done. The necessity of some such legal machinery as this for the administration of great schools and great charities, and the perpetuation of institutions of learning and benevolence, is sufficiently obvious.

The indebtedness of the church to this device is equally great. The church must have property; its property must be placed in some custody; provision must be made for transmitting it from one generation to another; and it would be difficult to hit upon any other way of securing it than that of incorporating the church (or the ecclesiastical society associated with it), and committing the property and the financial affairs of the church to the trustees of this corporation.

The industrial, the commercial, and the financial inter-

ests of our people are still more signally indebted to this contrivance. When the invention of machinery and the division of labor made great combinations necessary, and summoned into existence the large systems of industry, the corporation immediately appeared as the minister of these great functions. Few single men could be found whose accumulations of capital were vast enough to build and stock a great factory; still fewer to construct and equip a railroad; but the savings of many, combined, could be effectually used for such vast purposes. In the eloquent words of Mr. Isham:—

“The changed conditions of society found these mythical beings ready to spring into existence, with power and endurance equal to any requirement. They have enormously multiplied in the past few years. Unincumbered by the infirmities of natural persons, for them no aggregation of capital or of physical force is too great, nor any enterprise too vast or long enduring. Their administrative powers may expand from such as conduct the smallest enterprises to such as equal or surpass those of political governments; so that it has come about that the whole business of transportation has passed into the hands of corporations. The business of transportation includes all corporations engaged in the storage and transfer of freight, the carriage of persons, of parcels, of messages, and everything that relates to the intercommunication which is productive of commerce, and it is easy to see that their relations to society are of the most intimate and involved character, and that their stupendous powers are exercised directly upon the ratio of the resources to the subsistence, not of individuals here and there but of every person in every community. These are new conditions in human life. No such gigantic social power has ever existed in the world before. The conditions are not temporary. They are permanent and in process of development, and society must adjust itself to them.”¹

¹ Lalor's *Cyclopedia*, i., 671.

If these words of a sober and clear-headed lawyer are true words, then it behooves every man to give due heed to the tremendous problem thrust upon our nation by the existence of these mighty agencies. That these great combinations of capital and these vast organizations of power are necessary to the production of comfort and the ministry of convenience in these days is obvious enough; that they have resulted in increasing, almost miraculously, the material wealth of our people, and in greatly extending knowledge and the possibilities of welfare is not to be denied. We can never again dispense with them, until we agree to dispense with private capital altogether and adopt the socialistic programme, and that day, most of us are prone to think, is yet a long way off. And yet it is plain enough that with all these stupendous powers for good which they embody, there are also enormous capabilities of evil. When the purpose of a corporation is philanthropic or religious, its working is almost uniformly beneficent. But when the purpose is gain, the demon of avarice is let loose, and it must be owned that the safeguards of virtue and the restraints of lawlessness which act effectually as checks upon the conduct of individuals, are much less efficient in the case of corporations. It must be evident enough to any one that such a creature as a corporation has been described to be may do a great many lawless and mischievous things. The corporation has no soul. That is to say it has no conscience. If wrong is done in its name, the responsibility rests on no one in particular. At any rate it is perfectly easy for the individual members to hide themselves behind the corporation. "A body of men," says Herbert Spencer, "will commit as a joint act that which every individual of them would shrink from did he feel himself personally responsible." I am constrained to believe that the existence of industrial corporations has thus had a very deleterious influence upon public morals. Men are constantly performing acts, or consenting to acts, as members of cor-

porations, that they would not do or allow if they stood alone. Thus their moral perceptions are dulled, and their moral stamina weakened. This schooling in corporation morality prepares them for doubtful practices in individual transactions. Think of the rascally deeds with which most intelligent men are perfectly familiar, that have been done by corporations, under the cover of law! Think of the more startling fact that they have lost in this way but little social credit! These things become so common that the consciences not only of those who perform them but of those who witness them are somewhat blurred: the whole community suffers moral injury by familiarity with such dishonesties.

And there is still another way, as Mr. Spencer points out, in which corporations become the occasions, if not the authors of immorality. Individuals seem to have less conscience in dealing with corporations than with other individuals. A man will cheat a railroad company, if he can, when he would not cheat his neighbor. He can imagine the pain and indignation that his neighbor would feel on being cheated, and his realization of this restrains him; he cannot imagine anything of the kind in the case of a corporation, and therefore he cheats it with much less compunction. Of course this is not the fault of the corporation, it is the fault of the individual; but it is the natural consequence of introducing into society these unmoral entities with which moral beings are brought into moral relations. There can be no moral reciprocity between a man and a corporation,—between a being with a conscience and a being without a conscience. Yet transactions which involve moral principles are constantly taking place between men and corporations. Clearly the man is at a great disadvantage. He is not likely to get from the corporation what he is justly entitled to, and he is not inclined to render to the corporation all that it is justly entitled to. The whole relation is abnormal, and therefore morally

injurious. Men are morally damaged continually by their contact with corporations—those who are within the corporations by the weakening of responsibility; those who are without, by the lack of that reciprocal action of conscience upon conscience by which morality is vitalized.

Not only by the blur of conscience, but also by the impediment which they put in the way of equal freedom, the corporations are seriously affecting social morality. When it is said in the Declaration of Independence that all men are created equal, a very serious error is apt to be conveyed. It seems to signify an equality of natural powers; and that does not exist. Great inequalities of natural powers appear among men. From this natural inequality will inevitably result great inequalities of condition; and no law can prevent it. Some men are stronger than others and will get a larger portion of the good things of this world. So long as competition is the law of commerce this must be so. There is one and only one adequate remedy for this, and that is to fill the strong with the spirit of Christ, so that they shall use their strength not altogether in their own aggrandizement, but also in the service of the weak. So long, however, as self-love is the ruling motive in the conduct of men, so long there will be more or less of oppression of the weak by the strong; the natural law that "to him that hath shall be given" will operate to increase the accumulations of the rich and to deplete the small earnings of the poor. At best this is a grievous condition; it requires a constant exertion of the moral forces of the community to prevent it from operating with crushing weight. All this is true when individuals compete only with individuals; when the law of competition has its perfect work in existing society; when those natural inequalities which exist among natural persons furnish the field for competition. But the case is greatly aggravated when these tremendous artificial persons known as corporations are introduced into the field. The greatest inequality of power between one man

and another is as nothing compared with the inequality between this humblest man and the gigantic corporation. And this is an equality that is not natural; an inequality for which the Creator is not responsible; an inequality that we have created by law, for the promotion of the material welfare of the community. If the natural inequalities among men, when unchecked by conscience, often bear with crushing effect upon the weak, what must be the operation of these artificial inequalities which are so much greater?

The strong man has only a little while to live. In this respect there is perfect equality between the strong and the weak. He may have had tremendous power to grasp and to control the forces of production; he may have been able by skillful combinations to overbear his rivals; but they hold out against him because they know that this power of his must soon be relaxed. Death will come and unnerve his arm and paralyze his will: most likely his gains will be scattered; in the field that he has dominated there will be room for others. But the corporation is subject to no such vicissitudes, and the individual who is brought into competition with it has very little hope of the relaxation of its power. President Walker has stated this fact so strongly that I am constrained to quote his words:—

“It is because the hand into which these masses of capital are gathered is a dead hand, that the deepest injury is wrought to competition. The greatest fact in regard to human effort and enterprise is the constant imminence of disability and death. So great is the importance of the condition that it goes far to bring all men to a level in their actions as industrial agents. The man of immense wealth has no such superiority over the man of moderate fortune as would be indicated by the proportion of their respective possessions. To these unequals is to be added one vast common sum which mightily reduces the ratio of that inequality. The railroad magnate, master of a hundred millions, leaning forward in

his eagerness to complete some new combination, falls without a sign, without a groan; his work forever incomplete; his schemes rudely broken; and at once the fountain of his great fortune parts into many heads, and his gathered wealth flows away in numerous streams. No man can buy with money or obtain for love the assurance of one hour's persistence in his chosen work, in his dearest purpose. Here enters the State and creates an artificial person, whose powers do not decay with years; whose hand never shakes with palsy, never grows senseless and still in death; whose estate is never to be distributed; whose plans can be pursued through successive generations of mortal men."¹

As General Walker goes on to say, this is no conclusive reason why corporations should not exist: it may still be that their benefits are so great that we cannot dispense with them; but this is clearly one of their drawbacks. They do enter, as powerful disturbing influences, into the great realm of exchanges. They do enormously aggravate the natural inequalities among men. They do, therefore, impede the free action of many and shut the doors of enterprise in the faces of multitudes. This is part of the price that we are paying for the good that they do. It is an enormous price, and we must not forget it.

It is not, you will observe, the material progress of the multitudes that is necessarily impeded by the growth of corporations, but their moral progress. It can be shown, no doubt, that they have cheapened breadstuffs, and all the necessities of life. What they are killing out is individuality and enterprise. Here is a great corporation that combines the savings of a hundred men and the labor of a thousand men in the production of shoes. The work is all done by machinery, and each workman makes some small fraction of a shoe. The effect of this subdivision of labor in reducing the skill of the laborers, and in narrowing the discipline of

¹ Scribner's Monthly, i., 116.

their work is often referred to. There is room, perhaps, for difference of opinion about this. There are compensating advantages which must not be overlooked. But the effect upon the organizing power of the employing class is certainly depressing. If each of these hundred capitalists was compelled to employ his own capital in the manufacture of shoes we should have a hundred independent employers, studying methods, discovering processes, watching the currents of trade, disciplining his own faculties in the great enterprises of production. The great corporation can produce shoes more cheaply because it can have more and better machinery; but how much does it do in the way of producing men? The great corporation is and must be under the control of one man: he has subordinates, of course, to whom some responsibility is committed, but the organizing and directing power is concentrated in one man. One organizer and leader of business takes the place of a hundred. The effect of this concentration of directive energy upon the spirit of enterprise among the people at large cannot be easily estimated. It is evident that the system gives us cheaper shoes, and also cheaper men in the counting room if not in the shop.

Socialism proposes to suppress altogether individual enterprise, by putting all the capital into the control of the state, and giving the state the exclusive direction of all industrial organization. The corporate system of industry does not wholly suppress individual enterprise, but it is clear that it greatly restricts the area within which it may operate. It is a long step, therefore, in the direction of Socialism, and is hailed as such by all the socialistic philosophers. "Socialists," says Mr. Kirkup, "regard these colossal corporations and the wealthy bosses that direct them as the greatest pioneers of their cause. By concentrating the economic functions of the country into large masses, they are simply helping forward the socialistic movement. Their mission is to displace the smaller capitalists, but they will thereby eventually

undermine capitalism altogether. In proportion as the centralization of industry is pushed forward, the easier it will be for the democratic people to displace its capitalistic chiefs, and assume the control of it for the general good. They are only hastening the time when a vast educated and organized democracy, subsisting on precarious wage-labor, will find itself face to face with a limited number of mammoth capitalists. Such a crisis can have but one result. The swifter, the more complete the success of the most powerful bosses, the quicker will be their overthrow by a democratic society. Such is the belief of socialists."

This is the horoscope of the hour as it is read by one of the ablest and most moderate of the scientific socialists. His anticipations may not be realized; but it is significant that he sees in this development of the corporate system of industries a movement in the direction of socialism. My only point is that the depressing effect upon enterprise, and thus upon intellect, of the corporate system, is similar, though of course less powerful, than that which would be produced by Socialism; that something of the same kind of levelling and deadening effect which we might look for under a socialistic *régime* is already realized under the rule of the great industrial corporations.

There is another side to this picture to which our attention should be drawn. There are corporations whose action is uniformly more honest and more benevolent than the action of the average director of that corporation would be; because there is some one man—perhaps more than one—whose standards are high, and whose influence is so positive that the standards of the rest are elevated by his personal influence. I have known several such corporations, in which the integrity and magnanimity of a few leaders have lifted a whole business to an exceptionally honorable plan. Much may be hoped for in this direction, if the men of moral power who are officers of corporations will recognize their responsibility.

It is also true that multitudes of men are employed by these corporations in fiduciary positions; and the integrity of these men is developed by trusting them. Embezzlers and defaulters do appear; but the trustworthiness of the many is noteworthy.

Here are hopeful elements in this problem. These are the points to be strengthened. Yet, making due account of these, I believe that the influence of the corporation, *as it now exists*, upon public vigor and public morality is decidedly injurious. For the advantages that we secure by means of the system of corporate industry we are paying a large price. If the effect of the employment of this agency is to lower the standards of commercial morality, to increase social inequalities, and to repress the individuality, the self-reliance and the enterprise of the people, there is certainly a heavy deduction to be made from the gains they bring us. If we still insist that we must have corporations, let us face the fact that they "come high." We must be rich, indeed, in all the virtues, if we can well afford them. Such a deterioration in the morals of a whole people is a tremendous injury. And it is precisely these subtle but deep-working forces that the ordinary student of statistics and finance is pretty sure to miss. Triumphant Democracy, counting its millions of population and its billions of wealth, reciting the enormous gains of its manufactures, its mines, its farms, footing up its thousands of miles of railroads, and boasting of the swiftness of its trains and the cheapness of its transportation, takes very little note of these effects upon the intelligence, the morality, the self-respect of the masses of the people. The fact that a period may be reached "when wealth accumulates and men decay," is a fact that your enthusiastic statistician ignores.

One of the economists of the time, discussing these very questions, points out that a certain great monopoly has cheapened the price of a certain commodity; and alleges that it would be far better for the people to support as paupers the

unsuccessful competitors who have been crowded out of business by this monopoly, than to forego this great reduction in the price of one of the necessities of life. Would it? That is the question I am trying to raise. How many paupers could we afford to produce, for the sake of getting our oil a few cents cheaper? I trust that we are not forced to choose between cheap commodities on one hand and the mental and moral integrity of our people on the other; I hope that we may have both; but I, for one, should be loath to see our wealth increasing at the cost of the degradation of our population. And if the methods by which we are carrying on our great industries are such that they are silently sapping the foundations of our national vigor, it is well for us to be forewarned. Is it not possible for us to correct, in part, at least, some of these tendencies? Is there not some wise divine counter-working that we can discover and set on foot by which these demoralizing and destructive influences can be checked? It must be so. It cannot be that there is any such radical contrariety as now seems to be working out between the material and the moral well-being of the race. Corporations are an outgrowth of the social principle. It must be that they can be subdued to the service of the higher as well as of the lower nature of man.

Attempts have been made to regulate industrial corporations by law. In view of the inequalities that they introduce and the impediments that they put in the way of industrial freedom, some legislators have thought it expedient to put special burdens upon them. The State of Pennsylvania, if I mistake not, levies a special tax on all corporations. I am not at all sure about the wisdom of this; the corporation is not, like the saloon, an unmitigated evil, that ought to be discouraged by taxation; it is a great blind Samson that needs guidance. It has been grinding too much in the mills of the Philistines, no doubt; the problem is to turn its ener-

gies in other directions—not to cripple its energies by fines and disabilities.

Another proposition is the application to all corporations of that rule of publicity which is now applied to banks and insurance companies and railroads. The theory is that a creature like this, which owes its life to the state, should be kept under the constant surveillance of the state; that it should be compelled, periodically, to give account of its stewardship, and to publish full statements of its affairs. It is alleged that this enforced publicity has had a most salutary effect upon the management of banks and railroads; it is argued that it would remove many of the worst abuses connected with private corporations.

I am entirely clear that all corporations which are based on franchises granted by the state or the city,—or all corporations which use public property, like the streets of a city,—should be subject to the rule of publicity; they are quasi-public corporations, and they are bound to have no secrets from the public whose property they are using, and by whose authority they exist. Every gas company, electric light company, street railway company, should be subject to this rule; the most rigid and stringent regulations should be made respecting their book-keeping, and their annual reports; and any concealment or misstatement of the truth should work a forfeiture of their charters.

Whether the same rule should be applied to private corporations is not so clear; but I am inclined to think that this will yet be regarded as the only safe policy. Every corporation derives its power from the state; and the state has a right to know,—is bound to know, I think,—how this power is used. If any individual or partnership of individuals wishes to do business in the state, we may well hesitate about requiring them to publish their business secrets. Each of them is responsible for all the debts of the concern; and that responsibility is sufficient to hold them to a pretty conservative

business policy. But when a corporation is organized the case is greatly altered. The state has now stepped in and created a new kind of person, with enormous powers, and very limited responsibilities; I think that it is a kind of person whose works should never be done in secret. The people, through their representatives, have conferred these powers upon this organization; now the people have a right to say: "We are interested parties to this contract; the power here employed is ours; we, the people, have a right as real as the right of any stockholder, to know how these powers are used; it is our business to supervise, with the utmost care, all such artificial personalities created by our laws, to see that they do no public injury."

Professor Hadley of Yale University is a sufficiently conservative publicist; but I find in an essay of his, published eight years ago, the suggestion that perhaps all corporations would one day be treated as railway corporations are to-day. "There was a time," he says, "when railroads resented any attempt to secure publicity as much as manufacturing corporations would to-day. Yet when such publicity was enforced it was found to act as a protection instead of a harm to the legitimate interests of the property. The combination of secrecy and irresponsibility with limited liability opened the way for frauds upon the property-owners quite as much as upon the general public. It may be that the history of the railroad business will repeat itself in other industries. If regulation by public opinion and carefully enforced responsibility is resisted, there is danger of something far more stringent and sweeping."

That men have the right to form combinations,—to associate themselves for a common end will not be denied. This is true of both laborers and capitalists. But when such associations are formed they must govern themselves, in their corporate capacity, by the same standard of morality as that which governs individuals. Apply this, first, to combinations

of laborers. A trades-union must not divest itself of social and moral obligation. Every trades-union is bound to consider well in all its action not only what may be the effect upon the interests of the trade represented, but what will be the effect upon all other classes. If it is permitted to these men to associate themselves together as a class, it is not permitted to them to separate themselves as a class from other classes, and to attempt to aggrandize themselves at the expense of other classes. Such conduct is precisely as abnormal and abhorrent to true social ethics as would be the attempt of the arms in the human body to strengthen themselves by weakening the legs, or of the eyes to gain the mastery by stopping up the ears. "There is no schism in the body," Paul says; and there is no schism among economic classes, unless there is insanity in the body politic.

"The solidarity of labor" is the watchword of those laborers who sometimes undertake to push their own interests to the neglect, and even to the injury, of all other classes. This is an utterly unsocial principle: it repudiates the corner stone of republican democracy. Wage workers can never be permitted, in a republican government, to become a class by themselves, and to array themselves against all other classes.

The solidarity of labor is just as great a menace to the peace of the nation as would be the solidarity of capital. It is the solidarity of society which furnishes the true principle of all our conduct. We are all members one of another—laborers, employers, merchants, customers, professional people, artists, traders, all sorts and conditions of men; and this is the body to which we rightly apply the motto, "An injury to one is the concern of all." Not until our labor organizations comprehend and recognize these larger relations and obligations will they cease to be a source of peril to the state.

I have thus tried to show that the Christian law, which is really the fundamental principle of republican government,

applies to the conduct of trades-unions. I have no doubt that every capitalist who reads this heartily accepts all that I have said on that subject. Perhaps there are some capitalists, however, who would demur to the pleading that the same law governs corporations. But the pleading is true. I repeat, with emphasis, that every combination of capitalists is bound to use its accumulated power with a steady regard for the welfare of the whole community. The truth at which I am aiming is vigorously put by a brilliant young clergyman¹ whose voice we are never again to hear. These words were written last summer, soon after the great strike. If they repeat, in some measure, what has been said already, you will not, I think, be unwilling to hear them:—

“Two human creations which are essential to the existence and continuance and magnificence of our civilization, are the machine and the corporation. There is no question as to the soullessness of the machine. The machine, no matter how perfectly developed, belongs to the order of nature and is entirely without personal rights or responsibilities. The corporation, however, equally a creature of man, has been, partly by fiat and partly by evolution, endowed with many of the rights and privileges and responsibilities of personality, and yet it is soulless. Because of this its existence has become the nightmare of this age. It is a ‘Frankenstein.’ It is a monster; and, as we are now learning, is never more to be dreaded than when it undertakes to play the *rôle* of benefactor. Unlike a machine, a corporation may become more powerful than the men who think they manage it. The engineer controls the mighty locomotive of the New York Central Railroad, or if he loses control, it can at the worst crush the animal life out of him. The President of the New York Central Railroad Company is the servant and not the master of the corporation, and it saps his manhood. Moreover, as the corporation enters into competition with individuals it forces them down to a standard of soullessness in business matters. The most powerful and important personage in our modern life, the one which controls more votes, shapes more legislation, exerts more sway over the minds of courts than any other class of personage, is a personage without a soul.

“What is to be done about it? And are we able to do what should be done? Or is it too late? Have we created something which we ought not to have created but cannot now destroy? Was it a mistake to personify the corporation? If so can it now be depersonified? Can it and ought it to be taken out of the kingdom of man and degraded to the king-

¹ Rev. J. P. Coyle, in *The Kingdom*.

dom of nature along with the machine? Or is the more divine thing to go on and implant a soul in it? And are we, the men of to-day, divine enough, is there enough of God in us, to go through with what we have begun, and breathe the breath of life into these beings which we have created that they may become living souls? May God help us!"

What is the precise question now before us. Let us analyze the subject-matter:—

1. All power ought to be wielded by intelligence and conscience. To put vast power into the hands of a being that has neither intelligence nor conscience is a criminal procedure.

2. Property is power,—the most concentrated kind of power.

3. Property must, therefore, always be controlled by intelligence and conscience. If the state puts vast accumulations of property into the control of beings that are lacking either in intelligence or in conscience, the state is guilty of an enormous wrong.

4. It is a common saying that corporations have no souls. If so they must be lacking in conscience, if not in intelligence. I suppose that this is the real meaning of the saying—that a corporation has no moral sense, and must not be expected to govern itself by the ordinary principles of morality.

It is, however, by no means true that all corporations are administered without regard to moral principle. The men who constitute some corporations are just as scrupulously upright in administering their affairs as they would be in administering a private estate. It is quite possible to conduct the business of a corporation with a constant regard for the rights and interests of the whole community. When it is so administered it is a beneficent power. And the law of Christ requires every man who is a member of a corporation to see to it that it is administered in this way, and in no other.

But a great many corporations have accepted the theory of their own soullessness, and live up to it as well as they

can. Their power is used in a perfectly conscienceless manner for the spoliation of the community and for their own enrichment. They contrive to levy vast tribute upon the industry of the whole country: their burdens are borne by all classes. And this is done, in many cases, by a most flagrant violation of law.

Take two instances. The Atchison railway system, which is now in the hands of a receiver, was reported, by an expert accountant, as having been managed with an entire disregard of common honesty. Its resources were overstated to the extent of seven millions of dollars; and thus investors were deceived and swindled. I heard bitter words spoken about it in England last summer that made me blush for my country. It has practised a systematic evasion of the Interstate Commerce law by which unlawful rebates, to the extent of four millions of dollars, have been concealed. All this is criminal action. Here is a great corporation defying the law and defrauding the community. The extent of the wreckage caused by this failure will be five times greater than the destruction of property in the Chicago riots. Mr. Debs is in jail, I believe. How about the Atchison magnates? When combinations of laborers work mischief we all cry out that they must be punished. Are we quite as strenuous in our demands that when worse mischiefs are wrought, by methods no less nefarious, but a little more genteel, they also shall be punished? That is one instance. Here is another:

Senator Sherman stated, not long ago, in his place in the Senate, that the incorporators of the Sugar Trust, "upon a basis of \$9,000,000, issued \$75,000,000 of stock, and \$10,000,000 of bonds, and paid upon it, watered stock and all, from six to twelve per cent interest every year, *every dollar of which was at the cost of the people of the United States.*" We know, in part, how they have managed to do it: their contribution of campaign funds to both political parties has enabled them to manipulate the national legislature. But is

it not monstrous that such a tribute as this should be levied upon a whole nation for the enrichment of a few men? And is it not clear that property which is administered in this way becomes not only an awful engine of oppression, but a tremendous menace to our liberties?

Now I think that if we, the people of America, mean that this nation shall continue to stand for a genuine Christian democracy we must at once confront the fact that the day of judgment has fully come to all these great combinations of corporate wealth. Such vast accumulations of power cannot be left in the hands of soulless and conscienceless organizations. These corporations must find out whether they have souls or not. If they have and will demonstrate the fact by a conscientious administration of their trusts, there will be no disposition to interfere with them; they will be honored and praised and rejoiced in, as the ministers of God. Such they are now, in cases not a few. But if it becomes evident that they are, with few exceptions, gigantic egoisms, recognizing no relation to the community but that of a predaceous animal, then their power must be taken from them, at whatever cost. The nation is itself a moral organism, and it cannot entrust the greatest power under its control to immoral or unmoral agents. The nation must see that its enormous resources of material power are kept under the control of intelligence and conscience. A man has conscience and moral sensibility; and it is safe therefore to leave him free, under moral influences, to handle the resources of material wealth. But if a corporation has neither conscience nor moral sensibility,—if that is the nature of the creature—and, if there is no room in its constitution for the development of such faculties, then it cannot rightly administer wealth; and the nation must take it firmly in hand and establish a rigid supervision of all its affairs.

I think that in this rather cursory discussion I have uncovered certain "dangerous tendencies of current industrial

life." And I believe that the principles which I have just stated are perfectly clear and perfectly sound. You get down here to foundations which are as solid as Gibraltar. And it is high time that we had cleared the rubbish from these foundations, and had begun to build the fabric of our jurisprudence firmly upon them. When we are ready to do this, we shall find, I think, that outbreaks of violence from the working classes will be much less frequent. This nation cannot afford to give any room to the suspicion that combinations of laborers are judged by a more rigorous law than combinations of capitalists. Upon both these classes of combinations must be enforced the Christian law which binds us all to use all our powers with constant reference to the common good. This is the way of righteousness and it is the only way of peace.

ARTICLE III.

FORMULATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE
MASS AT THE COUNCIL OF TRENT.

BY THE REV. PROFESSOR C. WALKER, D. D.

1. *The History of the Council of Trent.* Written in Latin by Pietro Soave Polano, and faithfully translated into English by Nathaniel Brent, Knight, etc.

2. *Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent, with their History.* By Rev. J. Waterworth. Dedicated, by permission, to Right Rev. Nicholas Wiseman, Bishop of Melipotamus, etc.

3. *Memoirs of Council of Trent.* By Rev. J. Mendham.

4. *Catechism of the Council of Trent.* Translated into English by Theodore Aloise Buckley.

5. *Catholic Doctrine, as defined at the Council of Trent*, expounded in a series of Conferences, delivered in Geneva. By Rev. A. Nampon, S. J. Proposed as a means of reuniting all Christians, etc., etc. With the commendatory approval of Bishop Frederick and of Archbishops Hughes, Spalding and Purcell.

THE two main issues as to the Lord's Supper,—the first, that of the nature of the presence involved; and secondly, that of its sacrificial character,—while constantly running up into each other, and in popular apprehension inseparable, need to be carefully distinguished. Of the two, that of the presence is comparatively unimportant; in its ultimate element is more largely in the metaphysics of physics than one of a moral and spiritual character. The experience of a large ecclesiastical community, the Lutheran Church, shows that this doctrine of a bodily presence in the elements, objective to the recipient and ubiquitous in its nature, is comparatively innocuous, need not affect any of the great fundamental truths of Christianity. This, the fact, with consubstantiation, or impanation, might be also, with transubstantiation, sup-

posing it pure and simple, with none of the accompaniments involved in the doctrine of sacramental sacrifice. Had Lutheranism entangled itself with the idea of an Aaronic succession, and its kindred idea of the Aaronic priesthood, as has been the case with a section of Anglicanism, the effect of consubstantiation upon its theology and ritual would have been much more disastrous. This last touches the nervous center of the Christian system, affects in its influence the position of every truth of that system. While, in one direction, it evacuates the spiritual priesthood of the Christian believer, in another, it brings down the sole priesthood or prerogative of Christ to that of the Christian ministry, or, to put it in another form, exalts the Christian minister to the place and prerogative of Christ. As formulated in the Council of Trent, and reaffirmed in that of the Vatican, this doctrine of the Church of Rome presents itself for acceptance, and, pronouncing an anathema upon those rejecting, makes its demands upon our careful examination. Its affirmations, for three hundred years, have confronted the heart and intellect of Oriental and Protestant Christendom. Nothing, it would seem, ought to be easier than to say what is their meaning and substance. Why necessary, at this time, to subject them to investigation? It would appear, at the first glance, that nothing of this kind would be needed.

And yet we often, in regard to this subject, find conflicting statements. Indeed the popular view of Romish, as of Protestant communities, involves certain features that are by many Romish theologians repudiated. It does really seem as if there ought to be no doubt about it. The doctrine has been long before the world. The men who were burned for rejecting it, and the men who burned them, evidently thought that they understood each other. Was it all a logomachy, or upon points of minor importance? Questions of this kind naturally come up when it is asserted or implied that this doctrine is misrepresented or misunderstood, or that it is es-

entially that of others, say, of the English or the Lutheran churches; in other words, that of men who opposed it, drew up intended dogmatic affirmations of its unscriptural character, or who died at the stake for rejecting it. In the interests of love, as well as those of unity and truth, this question demands candid examination. If the discordant elements of Western Christianity be ever brought together, it must be by a frank and full admission of their really existing differences. Theological and ecclesiastical quarrels, like those of social or political life, may be temporarily patched up by other and shorter processes. But they will break out again, and rage more furiously than ever. "Nothing is to be extenuated" as to one's own position. "Nothing is to be set down in malice" as to that of others. "The truth thus makes free" on both sides. As there is this freedom of truth and of light, so will there be that of love and mutual forbearance.

At the same time, with every such desire and feeling, there may still be difficulties. There will be such difficulty in regard to this particular doctrine of the Roman mass. One of those difficulties, very soon manifesting itself, is that of its apparent inconsistency: the inconsistency, first, of its dogmatic statements, with popular belief and impression, both among Romanists and Protestants; secondly, the inconsistency of these statements in themselves, as with others, equally authoritative on the same subject, elsewhere. So again, the element of indefiniteness—intended indefiniteness—where, as we know from the record of the Council formulating this doctrine, it was the object and specific intent, not to decide certain points that among themselves were definitely and keenly contested. The fathers of Trent were not perfectly agreed among themselves; and intelligent minorities, although outvoted, always, in some form or other, exert their influence.

But there was also another disturbing force, in the shape of outside pressure. This pressure from without was from different and opposite directions. The members of the Coun-

cil had their own local constituency. They had to consider the effect of their decisions as related to the interests and wishes of the Pope. The "arrival of the Holy Ghost by the regular mail from Rome," to quote a profane joke perpetrated at the time, was apt to have its influence. So, too, there was to be taken into account the wishes and feelings of the Emperor, of the King of France, as of other temporal sovereignties; the feelings and expectations of the church at large; the positions and views and statements of Protestant opponents. Upon this particular point of the sacrificial character of the Mass and its form of declaration, there was eventually an attempted, if not an actual, compromise. This word "compromise," in its good sense, means the throwing out of all that is doubtful; agreeing, in this, to differ; harmoniously affirming what is undoubtedly true. In its bad sense, it means the sacrifice of truth in an ambiguous or imperfect conclusion. A says twice three is six. B says it is eight. A, with a rising inflection, repeats his first proposition. B, still more positively, reaffirms his. Whereupon they lock horns, and, each exhausting himself in the effort to put his antagonist over the precipice, they agree to call in arbitration, and compromise on seven. A congratulates himself that B has been compelled to come so much nearer his position. B congratulates himself for the same reason. The truth, in the meantime, falls between them. This is not the case, as we have seen, in all compromise; was not necessarily so in the case before us. But the actors were in a position which constituted a temptation to it. An extract will make manifest the character of that temptation, as also of the various influences operating to a decision.

"On the eleventh of August," says one of the historians of the Council, following Pallavicino, "came up the question which had already divided and agitated the theologians, to wit, Did Christ offer up himself as a sacrifice to the Father at the last supper, or solely on the cross?"

"Seripando, who had been the one principally employed in preparing the draft of the decrees, had designedly omitted all allusion to this question, as one which had hitherto been left undecided, and which in his judgment had better now be avoided.

"But no sooner had the decrees been laid before the congregation, than the question was mooted, that Christ could not be called a Priest of the order of Melchisedec unless it were also declared, on what occasion he fulfilled the type, by using and offering up the symbols of that Priesthood, bread and wine."

This argument, if it can be called one, based upon the assumption that the bread and wine provided as an ordinary refreshment, after a long march, for Abraham and his weary and hungry followers, was a sacramental and sacrificial offering—of which there is not a word or hint in the account in Genesis, or in any subsequent allusions to it, the real peculiarity of the priesthood of Melchisedec being clearly intimated in the Epistle to the Hebrews—was immediately urged, and insisted upon, by a portion of the Council, and was eventually incorporated in the decree, as adopted.

"Madrucci," says the historian, "supported by the bishops of Otranto, Castagno, and very many of the fathers, at once maintained the affirmative, supporting their opinion by obvious texts of Scripture and from numerous passages from writers of the Greek and Latin Church." But the chief defenders of the doctrine were Guasparre, Bishop of Leira, and Diego Lainez, the General of the Jesuits. Lainez viewed the question as a matter of fact, and, as such, to be decided by testimony. He adduced, accordingly, extracts from more than forty writers, ancient and modern, both Latin and Greek, who assert plainly the sacrificial act of Christ at the last supper. These testimonials he confirmed by a lucid exposition of the different passages of Scripture which bear upon the subject; and he replied, to the only objection urged against this opin-

ion, that it derogated from the sacrifice on the cross. He contended that our salvation is not to be ascribed solely to the death of Christ, though that was the final and crowning act, but to the life and death of Christ as a whole, and as embracing no one salutary and satisfactory act, but countless acts of obedience to the will of the Father, each of which was of infinite value, conducive to human salvation, and for which God, as St. Paul tells us, has exalted him.

In other words, as salvation depends not only upon Christ's expiatory sacrifice of himself upon the cross in a death of suffering, but also upon his incarnation, his teaching, his obedience, his example, so each one of these, and all, and each moment of his earthly life, might generally be called his sacrifice. Ergo, his institution of the supper may be specifically called his sacrifice of propitiative expiation. The dexterous transition, in this argument, from the general to the specific, in the meaning of the word sacrifice, is a piece of logic worthy of a general of the Jesuits. How often since then, and in how many different forms, repeated, not only by Romish but by Protestant theologians, the intelligent reader need not be reminded. If applicable to the supper to prove that a sacrifice expiative, why not, under the terms of the argument, to the teaching, or the obedience, or the example, elsewhere, and at other times, of the Institutor? Arguments sometimes prove so much that they prove nothing.

The contrary opinion, says the narrator, was supported by the Archbishop of Granada, Braga, and Lanciano, and by four other bishops; their chief ground being, as has been said, that the opinion which they impugned, derogated from the sacrifice upon the cross. They contended that Christ offered himself, indeed, at the last supper, but only a sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving, and not a sacrifice of satisfaction or propitiation; so that he did not, on that occasion, offer himself a sacrifice to the Father.

A third party among the fathers recommended that the

decree should, indeed, declare that Christ offered himself to the Father at that last supper, under the species of bread and wine; but that no mention be made of the nature of the offering, seeing that the opinion of the prelates did not agree concerning it.

"This suggestion," says the narrator, "as may be seen from the decree in question, in the first chapter on the doctrine, was finally adopted, and this with only two dissentients."

An examination, however, of the contents of the decree will show that the statement thus made needs modification. Putting this, for the present, aside, it is to be noted that four classes of opinion appear in this discussion. The first, represented by Seripando, were disposed to pass over the matter without any specific expression of opinion. The second, by Lainez, would have had a statement affirming a propitiatory sacrifice in the supper, without derogating from the sufficiency of that upon the cross. The third, represented by the Archbishop of Granada, that in the supper was a sacrifice, not of propitiation but of thanksgiving. And the fourth was that of those who would have affirmed that an offering or sacrifice of Christ was made, in the supper, under the species of the elements, without any specific decision as to the nature of such sacrifice.

What that decision really was, may be seen in the decree as finally adopted. Undertaking to be a compromise, it is substantially one of the extremes, that advocated by Lainez. Why, after the discussion, and when the final draft was made, there were only two dissentient votes, does not appear. We who have lived in the days of a general council, under the sectional control of an Italian majority, that of the Vatican, and know how many silent dissentients it contained, may hazard a conjecture as to the case before us. But we pass on to the decree as it was adopted.

Beginning, in the preamble, with the declaration that

VOL. LII. NO. 208. 4

the Eucharist is a true and singular sacrifice, it goes on to describe its time of institution, and its peculiar character.

“Forasmuch as, under the former Testament, according to the testimony of the Apostle Paul, there was no perfection of the Levitical priesthood, there was need, God the Father of mercies so ordaining, that another priesthood should arise, after the order of Melchisedec, our Lord Jesus Christ, who might consummate, and lead to perfection as many as were to be sanctified. He, therefore, our Lord and God, though he was to offer himself once on the altar of the cross, unto God the Father, by means of his death, there to operate an eternal redemption; nevertheless, because that his priesthood was not to be extinguished at his death, in the last supper, on the night in which he was betrayed, that he might leave to his Beloved Spouse, the Church, a visible sacrifice, such as the nature of man needed, whereby that bloody sacrifice once to be accomplished on the cross, might be represented, and the meaning thereof remain until the end of the world, and its salutary virtue be applied to the remission of sins, which we daily commit, declaring himself constituted a priest forever, according to the order of Melchisedec, he offered up to God the Father his own body and blood, under the species of bread and wine; and, under the symbols of those same things, he delivered his own body and blood, to be received by his Apostles, whom he then constituted Priests of the New Testament; and by these words, ‘do this in remembrance of me,’ he commanded them, and their successors in the priesthood, to offer them, even as the Catholic Church has held and taught. For, having celebrated the Passover, which the multitude of the children of Israel immolated in memory of their going out of Egypt, he instituted the new Passover, to wit himself, to be immolated, under visible signs, by the church, through the ministry of priests, in memory of his own passage from this world unto the Father, when, by the effusion of his own blood, he redeemed us, and delivered

us from the power of darkness, and translated us into his kingdom. And this is that clean oblation, which cannot be defiled by the unworthiness of them that offer it, which the Lord foretold by Malachias, was to be offered, in every place clean to his name, which was to be great among the Gentiles; and which the Apostle Paul, writing to the Corinthians, has not obscurely indicated, when he says, that they who are defiled by participation of the table of devils, cannot be partakers of the table of the Lord, by the table, in both places, meaning the altar. This, in fine, is that oblation which was prefigured by various types and sacrifices, during the period of nature and of the law; inasmuch as it comprises all the good things signified by those sacrifices, as being the consummation and perfection of them all."

Here then are two sacrifices of immolation. One of these is the offering or sacrifice, offered once upon the cross, by means of Christ's death to operate an eternal redemption, the effusion of his own blood, redeeming us, and delivering us from the power of Satan, translating us into his kingdom. The other, this, on the night before the crucifixion. As to the first of the sacrifices, thus described, it is to be said that the decree, so far, is thoroughly scriptural; and there is no conflict in it with any of the contending elements, either of Oriental or of Protestant Christianity, then in existence. Saving Socinianism, which at the date of the decree had scarcely become an appreciable force to be taken account of, the great Christian leaders of earlier times, as those contemporaneous, would have been in perfect accord with it. With Chrysostom, and Augustine, and John of Damascus, and Luther, and Calvin, Cranmer, and Zwingli, alike, there would have been full and hearty acceptance of this affirmation: Christ offered himself once on the cross, unto God the Father, there to operate an eternal redemption; that, then and there, by the effusion of his own blood, he redeemed us, and delivered us from the power of darkness and translated

us into his kingdom. So far there is no difficulty. All is scriptural, will be accepted alike by friends and enemies.

But this sacrifice, thus offered once, is not alone. There is another. And it is in reference to this other that all the difficulties of the case have existence. The last, indeed, constitutes the peculiar sacrifice of the Mass, as distinct from that on the cross. As described, it is different, and yet identical; the same in its efficacy, and yet additional; a repetition, not of that on the cross, but of that on the night before; having the same efficacy, and yet not adding to or derogating from it. The problem is to adjust the affirmations in regard to the one with those in regard to the other, so as to get out of them a consistent whole; or, to put the matter in the form in which it was put by the opposing Bishop of Granada, it is "to affirm the sacrifice of the mass, in its peculiar efficacy, without derogating from the all-sufficiency of that on the cross."

The nature of this problem will become manifest, in the light of certain particulars of affirmation, in the language above quoted. The sacrifice of the Mass, for instance, is differentiated, first of all, as to the time of its offering, secondly as to its character,—on the night before the crucifixion and not in the crucifixion itself; and it was unbloody. That on the cross, again, is offered once, is not to be repeated; this of the Mass is to be offered frequently, is to be constantly repeated, to the end of the world. That on the cross is all-sufficient, operates an eternal redemption; this of the Mass is truly propitiatory, one by means of which men obtain mercy, and find grace, in seasonable time of need; the Lord, by the oblation thereof, is appeased, granting the grace and gift of penitence, forgiving even heinous crimes and sins; it is the oblation prefigured in Old Testament types and symbols; in it Christ is contained and immolated; its salutary virtue may be applied to the remission of sins; such application extends not only to the persons actually receiv-

ing the element of this sacrifice in the Lord's Supper, but to others of the faithful living, present or absent; and also to the faithful of the dead, those not as yet fully purified.

Not less complicative are the affirmations of the grounds or reasons, first, of the institution of this sacrifice of the Mass, secondly, of its peculiar efficacy. One of these reasons is that of the imperfection of the Levitical priesthood and sacrifices. These are made perfect, not, as in the Epistle to the Hebrews, in the one great High Priest, making his one great sacrifice on the cross, and presenting it forever in heaven, but in the representative sacrifices of the Mass, repeated by human priests, standing in his place on earth. So again, all the types of the Old Testament as to pardon and purification from sin, find their antitype, not in the one pardon and purification, which come through the one sacrifice of the cross, but through these repeated sacrifices of the human priests, in the Mass. In this last, these typified results are consummated, and made perfect. Christ's eternal priesthood, thus, of the order of Melchisedec, is perpetuated, not in heaven forever, interceding there for his people, but in the successive intercessions of his representative priests on earth.

This word "represent," as used in this connection, is to be carefully noted. It is not in the sense of simply presenting over again to memory or cognition, something that had previously taken place, or had been known. It here means "to take the place of;" and its peculiarity, applied to the institution of the Mass, is that it describes an event, a sacrifice, the repetition of another that had not, as yet, except in divine intent, taken place. The unbloody sacrifice, offered up, in the institution of the supper, the immolation then and there made, represented, was in the place of the sacrifice on the cross, which was made the next day. So too, it represents it, not symbolically or eucharistically, that is as a sacrifice of thanksgiving, but as dispensing its saving power

then and in all its subsequent offerings and repetitions. Just as the officiating priest offers it, not *in propria persona*, but as Christ, in the place and exercising the prerogative of Christ, and by the act of sacrifice calls these efficacious agencies into exercise. This, moreover, being exercised, in the immolation, under the species and appearances of bread and wine, but, in reality, upon the soul, body, and divinity, the psychological, corporal, and divine Christ, is propitiative and sanctifying, exerts such influence alike for the living and for the dead.¹

So accordingly, in the Canons of the Council, we have the following declarations:—

“If any one saith that in the Mass, a true and proper sacrifice is not offered to God or that to be offered, is nothing else, but that Jesus Christ is given us to eat: let him be anathema.”

“If any one saith that by these words, ‘Do this in remembrance of me,’ Christ did not institute the Apostles

¹ An illustration of similar confusion presents itself in recent statements. “As to the sacrificial character of the Eucharist,” says Newman to Pusey, and this at an early stage of their movement, “I do not see that you can find fault with the formal wording of the Tridentine decrees.” “Pusey,” says his biographer, “acquiesced in the formal work of the Council of Trent, on the subject, except so far as its words were modified by the doctrines of Transubstantiation and Purgatory.” “Truly,” as “true,” not transub, nor consub, but subsub-stantiated bodily substantiated in some way or other. This is the asserted fact, which trans and consub-stantiated seeks to relieve. With all, it is ubiquitous body: body, a thing in its very definition outlined, without outline, in other words the old contradiction of long condemned Monophysitism.

“The thing,” says Dr. Dix, making a similar effort, “signified called Res, the body and blood of Christ, His glorified Humanity, which after a manner, inexplicable and without parallel in the range of our knowledge, becomes present, after consecration not locally or physically, according to the laws of material or carnal bodies but supralocally, hyperphysically, and spiritually, in some way believed by the Church but known only to God.”

And yet this same authority would speak of it as an extension of the Incarnation.

priests, or did not ordain that they, and other priests should offer his own body and blood: let him be anathema."

"If any man saith that the sacrifice of the Mass is only a sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving; or that it is a bare commemoration of the sacrifice consummated on the cross; or that it profits him only who receives it; or that it ought not to be offered for the living and the dead, for sins, satisfactions, and other necessities: let him be anathema."

Here the question, and the difficulty urged, in the council, during the discussion, immediately present themselves. If the sacrifice of the Mass be thus efficaciously propitiative and sanctifying, if it be the antitype of the Old Testament types, and the consummated perfection of Old Testament sacrifices, and extend in its influence, as it is offered to the living present and absent, as also to the dead; if it be all this, is any other, or more needed? If the priesthood of Melchisedec find its antitype, not in the great High Priest, offering up himself, but in the Apostles and their priestly successors offering him in the Mass, and this latter is necessary, how can it be affirmed that the former is either necessary, or perfect and all-sufficient? Is not the sacrifice on the cross, thus, made only supplemental, or introductory? So too as to the attainment through the Mass of grace and mercy, the forgiveness of heinous sins, the collation through it of the benefit of the sacrifice on the cross? Does not this imply that the latter needs to be helped out by the former, to the attainment of its divinely proposed results? So again, if the Old Testament types and symbols are so, not of the sacrifice on the cross, but of that in the Mass, in what peculiar position is the former placed to the latter? "He told them," says Father Paul, reporting the speech of the Bishop of Veglia, against such affirmation, "they should consider well of it; because one propitiatory sacrifice being offered, if this be sufficient to propitiate, no other can be offered, but only for thanksgiving. And he maintained that a propitia-

tory sacrifice in the supper must needs imply, that by that we are redeemed, and not by his death: which is contrary to Scripture and Scripture doctrine, which ascribe our redemption to that death." At an earlier period of the discussion, also, it had been urged by others, that if Christ offered himself, in the supper, that on the cross would have been superfluous; because mankind would have been redeemed by that which went before. Then, again, opposing the assertion that the sacrifice of the altar was instituted by Christ for a memorial sacrifice of that which he offered on the cross, it was argued that there cannot be any memorial, except of a thing past. Therefore the Eucharist, as first instituted, could not then be a memorial sacrifice of a fact which had not taken place, the oblation the next day of Christ on the cross. It will thus be seen, that Scripture and good sense had their representatives in this discussion; although, here, as in too many other cases, fearfully in the minority.

One mode of relief sought from these difficulties, in its inferences is no less opposed to Scripture: the affirmation of the essential identity of these sacrifices; that is, that while, in certain respects different, the sacrifice on the cross, and that in the Mass is the same. The language of the Catechism of Trent really comes to this position; while alluding to these distinctions, at the same time, affirms the identity of the things distinguished.

QUESTION LXXXIII.—"The sacrifice of the Mass, the same with that offered on the Cross."

"We, therefore, confess that the sacrifice of the Mass is and ought to be considered one and the same sacrifice, with that on the Cross; for the victim is one and the same, namely our Lord Christ, who offered himself, once, a bloody sacrifice on the altar of the cross. The bloody and unbloody victim are not two, but one victim only, whose sacrifice is daily renewed in the Eucharist."

QUESTION LXXIV.—"There is also One Priest of both."

"The Priest is also one and the same Christ the Lord; for the ministers who offer sacrifice, consecrate the holy Mysteries, not in their own person, but in that of Christ, as the words of consecration itself show; for the priest does not say this is the body of Christ, but this is my body; and thus acting in the person of Christ, the Lord, he exchanges the substance of the bread and wine into the substance of His body and blood."

This, in language immediately following, is truly a propitiatory sacrifice by which God is appeased and rendered propitious to us.

But if such be the case, is not this representative sacrifice in the Mass, really, that of the cross repeated? Although instituted in point of time before, and called by a different name, yet really that on the cross? What efficacy is there in the latter that is not affirmed of the former? Is it not, as now repeated, to all intents and purposes that of the cross over again? Distinction, as we have seen, is made between bloody and unbloody; so also between the atoning sacrifice on the cross and the representative one in the Mass. But if what is called unbloody is an immolation of the real and true substance of soul and body, of body and blood, and if everything that is efficacious belonging to the sacrifice of the cross, is affirmed of that in the Mass, it at once becomes manifest that their distinctive attributes, to all practical purposes, are annihilated. In the language of the Catechism, just quoted, they are one and the same.

Such then is the difficulty. Its explanation is not far to seek. There was a popular idea, then as now prevailing, that of the reënactment, in the Lord's Supper, of the one great sacrifice on the cross; and priestly application of it to the necessities of special cases. The problem was, how to save what was assumed to be true, in this popular conception, and at the same time avoid gross errors, manifestly in conflict with the clear statements of Scripture. They thus,

as we have seen, distinguished the sacrifices in words and in time; but identified them in efficacy and essence. The Mass is not the one great sacrifice, on the cross, never to be repeated. But it represents it. Representing it, that is, taking its place, containing all its efficacy, it dispenses, communicates it to the faithful.

Is it any wonder that opposing Protestants and unsophisticated Roman Catholics find it the great sacrifice on the cross repeated? Do not the distinctions, in any rational significance of them, annihilate the difference?

However that may be, and upon either supposition, the original charge against the doctrine of the Mass, that of derogating from that of the cross, is easily sustained. If, for instance, they are distinct and different, the affirmation of the necessity and peculiar efficacy of the repeated sacrifices of the Mass, or of any one of them, derogates from the perfection and all-sufficiency of that on the cross. If that was "once for all," and "all-sufficient" how is, or can be, any other needed? If, on the other supposition, they are identical no less is its assertion derogatory, to the one and, the all-sufficient oneness of that on the cross; for in that case it needs to be constantly repeated. In other words, its perfection is made perfect, and filled out in these repetitions. Take either horn of the dilemma, and we come to the same antisciptural conclusion.

That conclusion, it is sometimes asserted or insinuated, is substantially that of the English communion service. The language of a writer of that church may well be quoted in reply to such assertion. "I think," says Bishop Thirlwall, "it can hardly be denied that there is a very wide and important difference between the general view which our Church takes in her Liturgy, and the Roman view of the Mass. The difference is marked by their several names and distinctions. The one is an office for the administration of the Lord's Supper or Holy Communion; the other, for the

celebration of a sacrifice. These differences, indicated by the titles, are equally conspicuous in the contents of the Liturgies. In the Anglican, the idea which is almost exclusively predominant is that of Communion. There is, indeed, an offertory, and an oblation of common things, for sacred and charitable purposes. There is mention of a sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving, which appears to include the whole rite; and the communicants offer themselves, their souls, and bodies, as living sacrifices. But of any other kind of sacrifice, and particularly of any sacrificial oblation, of the consecrated elements, there is not a word. The consecration is immediately followed by the communion, which is the great business, the whole. On the other hand, the Council of Trent pronounces an anathema on those who say that there is not offered to God, in the Mass, a true and proper sacrifice; or that the offering consists only in Christ being given for manducation; or that the sacrifice of the Mass is of thanksgiving; or a bare commemoration of the sacrifice is only one performed on the cross, and not propitiatory. A more direct conflict of views, if they are supposed to relate to the same subject, not essentially different from each other, it would be difficult to conceive; for that which the council so emphatically denies to be the sacrifice, is the only thing which our church gives the name of sacrifice. That which the council declares to be the true and proper sacrifice of the Mass, is an offering as to which our church is absolutely silent." She is thus silent, we may say, in her communion office. But in her thirty-first Article she is very free and outspoken; and in terms which can scarcely be misunderstood.

ARTICLE IV.

CALVINISM: THE ORIGIN AND SAFEGUARD OF
OUR CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTIES.¹

BY THE REV. ABRAHAM KUYPER, D. D.

IV.

WE go back another century, from 1650 to 1550, from the Calvinistic troubles in England to the struggle of the Huguenots in France. It must be shown that the Independents and the Huguenots were congenial to each other, as well as that they differed; only when the affiliation of the two is established, does the line of Calvinistic development appear unbroken.

Their spiritual affiliation is shown, first of all, by de Coligni's plan of colonization, which, though but little known, is exceedingly noteworthy. It is well known that de Coligni, however different in character, was the Cromwell of the Huguenots; and, without his faults, was, no less than the Protector, the soul and sword of Calvinism. As much as four years before the Huguenots took up arms against the court in 1559, and the martyrs' woes had been endured in silence for nearly forty years, the natural leaders of the Calvinists began to see that it would not do, in the long run, to submit to slaughter without defence. From a writing to Cardinal Boromeus it appears that the Huguenots numbered nearly half of the population of France, and this fact stimulated both their desire to offer armed resistance, and the purpose of the king to violently exterminate them. The very increase of their numbers rendered their position critical. This was suspected

¹ Translated from the Dutch by the Rev. J. Hendrik de Vries, M. A., Bronxville, N. Y.

in the cabinet of Catherine de' Medici, and led to the horrors of the Bartholomew massacre. Admiral de Coligni likewise saw through this, and it led him to devise a plan of colonization. "If then Calvinism is not to be tolerated in France, allow your Huguenots to emigrate to America. Let there be a Catholic France with Calvinistic colonies. Then will our persecutions be ended, and as a naval power also, France will be the successful competitor of Spain and Portugal." Henry II. deemed this project not altogether impracticable, and in August of 1555 Durand de Villegagnon, a Maltese Knight, and Vice-Admiral of Bretagne, set sail with two of the king's men-of-war, to found a colony in Brazil. He landed in the Bay of Janeiro, planted the flag of France, and named the fort which he built Coligni, after the hero whose project he was carrying out. In the following year three ships of the royal navy were employed in the transportation of emigrants. But, alas! even then a less noble intention was entertained at court. Orders were sent to Fort Coligni to introduce Romish worship. This put a stop to further Huguenot emigration, and those who were already in Brazil were overtaken by the Portuguese and most pitilessly massacred.

But de Coligni went on, and in 1562 induced King Charles IX. to send out three men-of-war with Huguenot colonists to North America. The fort they built was named, after the king, Carolina, to which in their turn the states of North and South Carolina owe their name. By bad management, however, this fort also fell into the enemy's hands. The Spanish marines took it, and the Huguenots they strung on trees, with the base superscription over their heads: "Killed as heretics, not as Frenchmen." This cruelty became the more notorious in history because it incited that Gascony nobleman, Dominique de Gourgues, to take revenge by going to America, and obtaining a hearing with the Indians; with their help to recapture this fort, and then, with equal cruelty,

to string up the Spaniards to the same trees on which he found the bodies of the Huguenots, with this writing above their heads: "Killed as murderers, not as Spaniards." But aside from this historic incident, who does not see the striking similarity between this colonization plan of de Coligni which ended in failure, and that of the Puritans which met with success? The eyes of both looked for a new world, the glance of both was turned toward America, and in Coligni's idea, as well as in Robinson's, the consciousness found expression that Calvinistic faith could not flourish in a commonwealth constituted after Romish state-law, but rather carried within itself a creative principle which contained a state-law of its own, and a new political life.

On the question of toleration, Independents and Huguenots, though less closely, were also allied. It cannot be denied that, impelled by passions so violently aroused by warfare without quarter, cruelties were also practised by them. Facts are facts, and to falsify history is no temptation to us, for the reason that Calvinism does not seek its strength in persons, but in principles. The question is: What was the desire and the design of those Calvinistic leaders in France? And the answer is found in that important document of state which was issued by the Huguenot leaders, on the sixteenth day of December, 1573. Hence after the massacre of St. Bartholomew and conceived in the midst of its horrors. It bore the title "*Reglement de Politie et de Guerre*," and contained the carefully-outlined fundamental law which was to be the constitution of the Huguenot state in France. In this constitution, Article XXXIII. treats of the attitude toward Romanists, who were by far the minority in Reformed neighborhoods, and reads: "Unarmed Catholics are to be treated in the gentlest possible manner. No outrage shall be committed upon them, nor shall violence be done against their conscience, honor, or property. They shall be allowed to dwell in the bonds of friendship and peace, as good citizens and beloved

brethren." And this was written on the day after Jonneau, the invincible commander of Sancerre, together with that powerful preacher de la Bourgade, had been most cruelly murdered, in spite of the most sacred pledge of safety, by the troops of the king.

The moral character of their movement points with equal definiteness to the austerity of the Puritans. The soldiers of Cromwell, as referred to above, committed no outrage, but respected honor; they were not profane, but devout. This was foreshadowed by the army of the Huguenots, of which Varillas, their bitterest enemy, narrates in his "*Histoire de Charles IX.*," that, among them prayers were made with utmost regularity, every offence visited by immediate penalty. Idleness was not countenanced, and if Marshal Brissac prided himself on his cleverness to settle every dispute among his soldiers, the Calvinists did better still: their troops quarrelled none. Daily they sang psalms. They never gambled. Their food was simple, and venders were forbidden to offer other diet. Immorality was not practised, and the farmers were paid for their produce with market regularity in times of peace. The opponent, of course, considered all this ascetic follies, but whoever is acquainted with the morals of the French army, in its earliest and latest campaigns, cannot but wonder, with Varillas, at the strength of a principle which wrought from the French infantry an army such as this. No one will deny that this family resemblance to the Puritan army is striking. The affiliation of Independents and Huguenots is clearly seen in their sternly moral tone.

The same is true, finally, of their fundamental concept of politics; even to such a degree that in broad outline the American Constitution is almost a literal fac-simile of the Huguenot Constitution of 1573. The principles of the "*Règlement de Police et de Guerre*," referred to above, are these: From their homes the Huguenots come to the market place, and swear for themselves and their descendants that the fol-

lowing statutes shall be kept. Then, after taking an oath, they elect from their own number, by a popular vote, a mayor and a council of one hundred members. The choice is made from the people and the nobility, without preference of either class. The one hundred councillors divide themselves into two chambers, one of which consists of the mayor and twenty-five councillors and the other of the remaining seventy-five. No decree of the mayor is valid without the approval of the first. The approval of the seventy-five is needed for every matter of importance, such as the introduction of new laws, raising taxes, military operations, coinage, etc. The mayor abdicates each year, and is not eligible for re-election. Likewise the two councils resign from office each year on January one, but may be elected again. The right of election of the first chamber is vested in the second, and that of the second in the first. A jury is added to the tribunal. From these mayors and first councils, a state governor and a captain-general are appointed. These appointments also are to be made by the people; but, on account of the embarrassments of the time, it rested temporarily with the councils. Their power is by no means unlimited, and, mark you, at the close of the war, they lose their rank, and return to private life. This is exactly what was witnessed in England after Cromwell's death, and in America after the late civil war. Indeed, there may be noted but one point of difference between the basal thought of this Reglement and that of the American Constitution. In the Reglement the appointing power is exercised for the people by their appointees; in America even minor elections are decided by the popular vote. It must be granted that the Calvinists in France were ready to return to the government of the king. Article IV. of their constitution states this in so many words: "in waiting till it please God to soften the king's heart, and to re-establish the ancient liberties of France." But so much is certain: the fundamental outlines of the liberties realized in America by the Puritans

were formulated, one hundred years before, by the Calvinists in France.

In spite, however, of these clearly-outlined traits of resemblance, in their plan of colonization, in the homage they paid to the liberty of conscience, in their morals and in their fundamentals in politics, the Independents and the Huguenots do not occupy the same standpoint. Both are representatives of Calvinism, but each in a different phase of its development. With Robinson, Calvinism is more broadly developed than with de Coligni or La Noue. This has already been shown by the violence and bitterness of the troubles between the Independents and the Presbyterians. For the Presbyterians in England demanded the very thing which the Huguenots proposed in France, both for church and state.

In the church they did not want, what the Independents asked for: a circle of free, autonomic congregations. They demanded a thoroughly-organized ecclesiasticism, in which authority was vested with the synod, and from which the influence and voice of the laity were carefully excluded. In 1559 this fusion of the free congregations into one church union was effected, and only in our century has the appointing power of the boards been abolished. Was this a necessary consequence of the Calvinistic principle? By no means. In Switzerland there was no mention at this time of a synodic bond. During Calvin's lifetime there never was anything more than a consistory in Geneva. Calvin's church was absolutely autonomic. No: the motive for this close organization had another origin; its cause was not ecclesiastical, but political, and was not born of spiritual, but military interests. Consider the times. In 1559, shortly before the conspiracy of Amboise, it was felt that passive endurance had reached its limit, and that the issue was not to be decided but by the sword. The prelude of civil war had begun, and it was well known, that for such a war organization, unity of action and leadership were indispensable, but the idea was not yet born

of building "a state within the state." The *Reglement de Politie et de Guerre* is of 1793. This induced them to seek a substitute for the body politic, till then wanting, by strengthening the ties of the church. No war can be waged without money. To raise it, consistories assessed their congregations. Troops had to be levied, cannons and ammunition to be bought, cavalry to be hired, and for this the network of consistories spread over France was made to do service; and, to strengthen the common purpose, its cords were made to run through only a very few hands. Thus things were done in Holland, and thus they were done in France, and in both countries it was a secondary design of political and military interests, and not the claim of the principle of faith, by which the Reformed church was put, as it were, in a strait-jacket within which its life has languished for more than two hundred years.

Nor was this all. The Calvinistic principle, when logically applied, leads to separation of church and state, as soon as the state is not wholly Calvinistic. This principle could not prevail in Geneva. The dissension among the citizens of Geneva, which Calvin quieted, arose not from a difference of confession, but from shameful libertinism. There were no Romanists there. But there were Romanists in France. To assume the consequences of separation, and as a free church pay homage to the independence of civil government: this stage of development in Calvinism had not been reached. Hopes were too sanguine that the other half of the French nation also would honor the Reformation. The question in hand would then drop of itself, and the whole of France be Reformed. When this hope proved vain, and two forms of faith maintained themselves in the state, even then the proper course of action was not discovered. A way of escape was tried in the colonization plan. France would then be Catholic, and its colony Reformed. And when this failed, the other extreme became the watchword. Two states for two

faiths. A Huguenot government side by side with a Romish government in the bosom of the same nation. This was equally futile, for this insured the maintenance of the union of church and state. The Huguenots wanted to be the state church, or a church with politics of its own within the state. But, that emancipation of the church is the condition for the permanent development of its life, was not recognized in France.

The last point of difference is the aristocratic character of the French, and the democratic character of the English movement. This is explained by the fact that French nobility favored the Huguenots, and English nobility opposed the Dissenters. At least as late as the St. Bartholomew massacre, this influence continued its ascendancy, and in the Synod of Orleans in 1652 was rigorously maintained against the demagogic tendency of Morel and his following. When, however, on the night of August 24, and in the succeeding days, the Protestant nobility of France were literally slaughtered, the democratic influence of necessity gained the day, and the gateway opened wide for that demagogic fanaticism which so disgraced the closing period of the War of the Huguenots. This found its cause in the very character of French conditions. Citizens in Holland and England might safely be placed at the helm of state, but not in France. Perrens' master-work "*La démocratie en France au Moyenage*" has but too graphically pictured to us the *Jacquerie*, and the mutinies of Etienne Marcel and Robert le Coq, than that we can fail to see how greatly, in general development, the citizens of Holland and England were in advance of the citizens of France. From the interesting dialogue "*Le réveille matin des Français*," which was published as an expression of these demagogic ideas, it was readily prophesied that the apostolate of popular sovereignty would have its rise with the people of France. For therein it was stated: "A people can exist without public authority, but no public authority can exist without the people. The people create the government, by

way of a social contract, and for the sake of the advantages which accrue from an established order of things." These are the very ideas of Rousseau! And we read further: "The people that have lent authority to the king have reserved highest authority for themselves, even over the king"; and when the king becomes tyrant, "The assassination of such a despot, after the examples set by classic Greece and Rome, is to be lauded as the most praiseworthy of deeds." This Jacobin passion becomes so heated in this pamphlet, that a man from the people is finally introduced to exclaim: "A patricide used to be drowned, sewn up in a bag together with a rooster, a serpent, and an ape. What an excellent thing it would be, if this old form of punishment could be repeated in the case of King Charles, the slayer of his country. Catherine de' Medici might go with him as the serpent, Anjou as the rooster, the Duke of Retz could play the ape, and, freed from these four villainous good-for-nothings, France could once more be powerful as of yore."

These bloodthirsty notions were not engendered by Calvinism, but mingled with it. They were rife in France before Calvinism was known there at all. As early as 1408 the Romish priest John Parvus, in his "*Justificatio Ducis Burgundiae coram rege recitata*," defended and lauded the assassination of tyrants, saying that, on the strength of natural, moral, and divine laws, every citizen has the right to slay a tyrant, without official authority; this was the more meritorious, according as the tyrant's chances of escape from the gallows were favorable. The Sorbonne condemned this book in 1416, and with equal solemnity recalled this sentence in 1418. Moreover, John Parvus stood not alone in this matter. Even van Salisbury and Gerson, the Doctor christianissimus, "proclaimed doctrines about authority which were equally questionable," and the Spanish Jesuit John Mariana, in his "*De Rege et Regis Institutione*," said that he wrote for King Philip III., the Infanta, in like spirit. Equally positive and

revolutionary ideas on the sovereignty of the people are found in the writings of Boëthius, Commynes, Montaigne, and Thuanus, and there was so little respect for the authority of the king, that, in 1478, one, Oliver Maillart, dared answer Louis XI., who threatened him with death by drowning: "Sir King, it will be less difficult for me to creep on my knees to the Seine, than for you, with your best coach and four, to reach any other place than hell." Let us have historic fairness. It is true that even Melanchthon and Beza approved of killing a tyrant, but when it is found that, before the Reformation broke out, and before the Father of Calvinism had yet been born, these ideas were rife, then they should not be laid to the charge of Calvinism or Romanism, but the cause of these immoral ideas should be discovered in a sinful trait of the Renaissance. For it is in this school that the false heroism of the ancient Romans and Greeks has engendered such bitter fruit.

As purer sources from which to draw knowledge of Reformed state-law, the standard works of Hottoman and Languet should be consulted. Even though this self-same false vein of the Renaissance courses through Hottoman's *Franco Gallia*, and through Languet and the Pseudonym, "*Vindiciæ contra tyrannos*," by Junius Brutus, yet, with the last-named author especially, are marked out the fundamental lines of the Calvinistic system in which roots the true, constitutional state-law. For with this learned statesman and sagacious diplomat, whose works have lately again been translated by Richard Treitzschke, is found indeed a system. He esteems all authority as descended from God. He is an advocate of the "*Droit divin*." In this wise, however, he looks for the sovereignty of the crown; not in the person of the king, nor yet in the isolated office of royalty, but in the organic union of this office with the "*magistratus inferiores*." And with these he does not mean the officers appointed by the king,

but the dispensers of power, who, independent of the will of the king, hold seats in political bodies and parliaments. These are "*regni officarii, non regis*," officials of the realm, not of the king. Officials of the king are dependent on the king, but not they. Hence of the former the function is to protect the person of the king; of the latter, to prevent harm to come upon the republic. These *magistratus inferiores* have received a part of the state sovereignty of God, as well as the king. They and he together are responsible to the King of kings that authority be for the good of the people. The king's shortcomings in the discharge of duty do not release them from their oaths. If the king watch not, they must watch, though the king himself be the oppressor. This is the first germ of constitutional state-law, having its deepest root, not in the people, but in God. This doctrine of the *magistratus inferiores*, preached by Calvin, and recommended in the "*Liber Magdeburgensis*," was first elevated by Languet, though not without some error, into a scientific, state; judiciary system of highest rank, based upon the Word of God, and enriched with the principles of Germanic and of natural law. To this system the English revolution owes its fundamental thought, and on this was based the right of the Dutch in their brave resistance to Spanish tyranny. This very idea of sovereignty in our own circle still draws the boundary line between the people's sovereignty and our constitutional state-laws; and, as de Tocqueville has shrewdly observed, it is the decline of these *magistratus inferiores* by which our political liberty is again most seriously threatened.

V.

And herewith the uncertainty is lifted, which obscured the origin of our constitutional liberties. Since everybody knows that the Calvinistic nations in Europe, as well as in America, were the first to obtain their liberty by conquest, and have enjoyed liberty longest, and have developed the best

traits for the preservation of civil liberty; since from history it appears that America's United States, where to this day the liberty-plant thrives most luxuriantly, owes its glory not to the French Revolution but to Puritanic heroism; since, according to the unanimous testimony of all modern historians, the banner of England's greatness was first lifted by William of Orange, and the glorious revolution which brought him to the throne, appears a spiritual outcome of the War of the Independents; yea, since the archives show that the pearl of great worth, which our constitutional state-law offers for the liberty of the people, was not taken from the bed of the unholy stream of the French Revolution, but was plucked by the Rousseaus and the Montesquieus from the martyr crown of the Huguenots, and from the blood-drenched diadem of our Nassaus and Oranges;—before such testimony of facts, let the doctrinaire's prejudice yield, and let the claim which Calvinism makes of being the source and origin of our civil liberty, no longer be disputed.

This must be insisted upon, provided our last point can also be demonstrated, viz., that the process of development here traced, finds its starting-point in Calvin, and its explanation in the characteristics of the Calvinistic Confession.

Beza van Vezelay, Calvin's *fidus Achates*, marks the transition between Calvinism at Geneva and Calvinism of the Huguenots. He does not claim liberty of worship. "That every man should worship God," said he, "in any form he will, is a merely diabolical dogma." On the other hand, he has already come to despise judicial murders. To the Hungarian Baron Thelegd he writes: "Forsooth in the matter of religion no one should be persecuted by fire and the sword, this I hold as a primary principle, only let it be a care lest immorality hide behind the conscience-mask." He also defends subjection to the powers that be. He disapproves of Cæsar's murder by Brutus. But he is in favor of a Constitution. "Finally, the power of the lawful magistrate is not

illimitable." He therefore is in favor of parliaments, deputies, superiors of the people, *magistratus inferiores*, with sovereignty each in their circle. These, and not private citizens, are to resist tyrannic authority. He hailed with gladness the Dutch insurrection against Spain. For Condé he recruited cavalry regiments, and presided over the diplomatic bureau in Geneva which maintained the French Huguenots in friendly relation with Germany's Reformed princes.

If then in Beza no single character-trait is wanting, the development of which we saw in the course of Calvinism, we find them still more sharply outlined in Calvin, even if somewhat intricate because of the trappings of the times.

With him, also, we consider first the liberty of conscience. The trial of Servetus needs no recital here. Whoever chides the reformer of Geneva for this procedure makes simple exhibition thereby of lack of historic knowledge. The spirit of the times was the executioner at the stake of Servetus, and not Calvin. For this assertion we have no proof more conclusive and final than the testimony of Servetus himself, when, concerning the "incorrigible and obstinate wickedness of heresy," he writes with his own hand, that "this is a crime plainly worthy of death with God and men." What Calvin spake and did after the manner of his times does not concern us, but only that which, in distinction from the spirit of the times, he introduces as new principle. And this was his position, that, although in the essentials of our Christian confession no heresy was to be tolerated, yet toward those who diverged in minor points toleration should be shown, "since there is no one whose mind is not darkened by some little cloud of ignorance." This is a principle. The Huguenots extended this toleration to unarmed Romanists. The Holland republic went farther, and tolerated different forms of worship, at least within closed doors. Still further developed, it led in England to the "Toleration Act," until finally in America the last consequence is deduced in the emancipa-

tion of every form of worship and of everybody's conscience.

Secondly, we consider sovereignty. Calvin also honors the *droit divin*. Highest authority in monarchy or democracy reigns *Dei gratia*. But that divine right attaches to the crown, not to the person. Princes are common creatures and, as a rule, of lower morals than average men. In his "Commentary on Daniel" he writes: Monarchs, in their titles, always put forward themselves as kings, generals, and counts, by the grace of God; but how many falsely pretend to apply God's name to themselves, for the purpose of securing the supreme power. For what is the meaning of that title of kings and princes—"by the grace of God," except to avoid the acknowledgment of a superior. Meanwhile, they willingly trample upon that God, with whose shield they protect themselves,—so far are they from seriously thinking themselves to reign by his permission. It is mere pretence, therefore, to boast that they reign through God's favor. "They hear it said," he continues, "that sovereignty is inviolable, and what now do they do? They make of it a shield for themselves, as though this inviolability was predicated of their own person." At court we often see highest positions held by ignorant and unprincipled men, and the kings themselves, in these days, are often as inane as the ass among dumb brutes. Moreover, earthly princes lay aside all their power when they rise up against God, and are unworthy of being reckoned in the number of mankind. We ought rather utterly to defy them than to obey them, whenever they are so restive and wish to spoil God of his rights, and, as it were, to seize upon his throne and draw him down from heaven. This differs not a little from the *droit divin* as claimed by Louis XIV., but shows that it made Calvin no cringing slave of kings, even though we do not approve his passion.

The form of government Calvin looked upon as an outcome of history, and which, as such, commands our respect. Is it a monarchy, then honor the king. Is it democracy, then

honor the leaders. Sovereignty can be imposed by God upon a few, upon many, and upon all. This does not touch the principle itself. If, however, Calvin is free to choose, he prefers a republic. He read too closely the annals of the sins of royal autocrats, not to dislike despotism. In an authority entrusted to many there is less temptation to tyranny.

And what must be done when the authorities oppress the land? May a private person take up arms? Never, says Calvin. And when the authorities issue orders that are contrary to the honor of God, not even then. Refuse obedience, and suffer the penalty. But when Calvin is asked, whether then there is no way of resistance, he quickly adds: "This observation I always apply to private persons. For if there be any magistrates appointed for the protection of the people, as the Ephori at Sparta, or the popular tribunes at Rome, or the three estates of Parliament, then, I am so far from prohibiting them, in the discharge of their duty, to oppose the violence or cruelty of kings, that I affirm, that if they connive at kings in their oppression of their people, such forbearance involves the most nefarious perfidy, because they fraudulently betray the liberty of the people, of which they know that they have been appointed protectors by the ordination of God." With Calvin is found the origin of the system of secondary authorities, of the motto under which de Condé rose against Charles, the Netherlands against Philip, England's Parliament against the Stuarts, and the American colonies against the mother country. With Calvin is found the glorious principle from which has germinated constitutional public law.

Finally, a point which is no less worthy of emphasis is this: Calvin opposed non-intervention. According to his international law, Europe was not an aggregate of independent states, but formed one family of nations. Hence it was the duty of the prince of a neighboring realm to interfere, whenever a prince committed an offence against his people. Start-

ing from this principle, he himself, as appears from his correspondence, published by Bonnet, assisted in raising money for the German troops who went to France. In this sense also sang "the Silent," "As a Prince of Orange I am free," which meant, I am a sovereign prince in Europe's state confederation, and on this ground he entered the Dutch domains with his troops.

Of the church, let it be noted that Calvin considered the form a secondary importance. If needs be, he takes pleasure in an episcopate, as in England. But his ecclesiasticism was firmly rooted in the laity, ranging between aristocracy and democracy. His church at Geneva was autonomic. He never approved of a church organization of which the congregations were passive members. His synodical system was based upon confederation by voluntary subjection, and shunned every compulsion. And, finally, as to his views on separation of church and state, it is well known that in Geneva the two were closely united. On the other hand, it must not be overlooked that he founded free churches in Poland, in Hungary, and in France, which were in no way connected with the state, and thereby he planted the seed from which the idea of the free state also would of itself germinate, in the struggles of the Puritans.

If then the writings of Calvin contain the first creative utterances of that mighty spirit which started from Geneva, broke out in France, threw from Dutch shoulders the yoke of Spain, in England's troubles unfolded its virile strength, founded America's Union, and thus banished despotism, bridled ambition, limited arbitrariness, and gave us our civil liberties, can it likewise be shown which Calvinistic principle of faith supplies the root of these liberties? For Calvinism was, first of all, a reformation of the faith, and could not create a political liberty except as a sequel to its confession by the power of its faith.

There is no cause for surprise if, in answer to this question, even though apparently most contradictory, the fundamental doctrine of the Calvinists is cited: even the *absolute sovereignty of God*. For, from this confession, it follows that all authority and power in the earth is not inherent, but imposed; so that by nature there can no claim to authority be entered either by prince or people. God Almighty himself alone is sovereign. In comparison with himself, He esteems every creature as nothing, whether born in the royal palace or in the beggar's hut. Authority of one creature over another arises, first of all, from the fact that God confers it, not to abandon it himself, but to allow it to be used for his honor. He is sovereign, and he confers his authority upon whom he wills,—at one time to kings and princes, at another to nobles and patricians, and sometimes to the whole nation at once. American democracy is as useful an instrument for the manifestation of his sovereign glory as Russian despotism. The question is not whether the people rule, or a king, but whether both, when they rule, do it by virtue of Him.

This passes sentence upon a twofold wrong. First, upon the sovereignty of the people in the sense in which Hugo Grotius and Mirabeau proclaimed it. The idea that every man by being born of a woman has a claim to a part of the political authority, and that the state has its rise in the collection of these atomic parts, puts a limit to the sovereignty of God; it locates the source of sovereignty in man as such, and not in the mighty arm of God, and leads to the destruction of all moral authority. In like manner by this confession is condemned the *droit divin* in the sense in which it was pushed by the friends of the Stuarts, and the legitimists in France, and by the Prussian Junkerthum. The words of Charles I. on the gallows to his father confessor: "The people are not entitled to a part in the government; it belongs not to them; a king and his subjects are totally dif-

ferent persons," but echoes the evil doctrine of ancient date, which marks princes as a sort of higher beings, but which cannot accord with the confession of the free sovereignty of God. The fact that only lately the Duke of Chambord refused to accept the principles of 1789 as flatly as a treaty with the National Assembly, was the outcome of an equally false notion of the divine rights of kings. Even for a prince there cannot be, nor may be, any mention of a *regnum dei gratia*, or *droit divin* in another sense than that in which each of us exercises authority conferred on us, and on the grounds of which, after every recognition of the rights of others, we are still responsible to God.

This likewise shows that the confession of this divine right goes hand in hand with abhorrence of all worship of princes, and severely reproves all cringing before the king. If God alone is sovereign, then are we all, the king included, creatures dependent upon Him, and adoration of royalty and the esteem of princes as beings of a higher sort, are heinous offences committed against the glory of his name. Therefore the Calvinists have always demanded that the king as belonging to a church, should be dealt with as any lay member; and when one of the princes of Condé gave command to begin the battle of Drieux, the field preacher did not shrink from asking him, in the presence of his troops, how he dared to go to war without making confession of the outrage he had committed upon a daughter of one of his officers. And Condé, rather than striking him in the face with his whip, called the outraged father to him, dismounted, and did penance.

This principle of God's sovereignty turns with equal severity against the supremacy of the state. Whether that which belongs to God, is given to prince, parliament, or state makes no difference. The state, as well as the prince, is a creature that owes existence to Him, and therefore may not assume those prerogatives, of which he spake in majesty:

"I will give mine honor to none other." The Calvinists expressed this idea in their stern assertion, that unto an authority which commanded things contrary to God and his word, no one need yield, and much less obey. Hero-worship is looked upon by the Calvinist as a heinous sin; and whether the Persian despot called himself the sun-god, or Dives Augustus suffered sacrifices before his image, or whether the modern idea loses itself in apotheosis of the state, it is all the same. A true Calvinist will never be an accomplice in any such abhorrent wickedness as this.

And more remains to be said. If God's sovereignty rules the world, then he executes his plan in the exploits of heroes as well as by the sins of kings and peoples, and with disapproval of wrong, close reckonings must be made with the results of the latter. The Magna Charta was certainly extorted from John Zonderland by his barons in a way which renders them guilty; but that England's parliament should thereby obtain power, so that it is sneeringly said: "It may do everything except making a man a woman," is none the less an event which He decreed should come to pass; it created a right by Him sanctified. Nebuchadnezzar committed a sin in warring against Israel, but it was nevertheless the divine plan that Israel should go into Babylonian exile, and was productive of results for the good of Israel. So with the French Revolution. It was, as Burke expressed it none too strongly, "the most horrible of sins," but it was nevertheless a judgment of God upon kings that the ancient *régime* should terminate, and the results of the Revolution should be received with thanksgiving, not to France, but to the sovereign God, and as such accepted also by us, anti-revolutionists. For this distinguishes us from the contra-revolutionists; from the men who will not recognize the right created by history, and are bent upon the violent destruction of that which exists by virtue of history.

But this merely in passing. For a more important infer-

ence from the confession of God's sovereignty, consider for a moment the Calvinistic "*Cor ecclesiae*," the doctrine of election. At all times of public action, heroism, and national glory, the Calvinistic nations have confessed their faith in this doctrine, and only in days of spiritual decadence has this profoundest thought of moral life been forgotten or denied. Election is derived from the sovereignty of God. By election, the Calvinist has never meant an exaltation of self on the part of any one, but merely to emphasize that all honor belongs to God, even the honor of moral greatness and heroism of faith. It needs no repetition that from this, Calvin derived all his strength. Of our fathers and of the Huguenots this is known from their confession and petitions. Mrs. Hutchinson, whose memoirs were quoted above, wrote concerning the Puritan troubles: "At this period this important doctrine of election began to be abandoned by the Anglican prelates, but all persons more serious and saint-like, attached themselves to it with ardor." Of the founders of the American Union, Bancroft testifies, that the secret of their strength lay in their firm belief in the wonderful council of Almighty God who had elected them. Hence all fear was banished from their hearts, and they could as little become the slaves of a priestcraft as of a despot. And for more witnesses, take Professor Maurice, in his brilliant "*Lectures on Social Morality*." He writes: "The foundation on which we stand is immovable, for we stand upon the election, spake John Calvin, and all France, Holland, and Scotland attended to his word. That word furnished muscular vigor for the French religious wars. Holland's emancipation from Spain was the fruit of this confession. The moulding of Scotland's nationality was wrought by this spiritual principle. Yes: this incisive principle works still so mightily that social morality cannot interpret life unless it reckon with this doctrine." And no wonder. "A living God," he writes, "higher than all dogmas and systems, was heard not by the schoolman, but

by the hard-handed seller and ploughman, bidding him to rise and fight with himself, with monarchs, with devils. Let the soldiers of Alva and Philip yield to their threats. He, the Calvinist, dared not. He must defy them. For they were fighting against the Lord, who had called them out of death to life." In this lay the secret of that wonderful power called into life by this confession. He who believes in election knows himself chosen for some end, to attain which is his moral calling. A calling for the sake of which, since it is divine, life's most precious thing, if need be, must be sacrificed; but a calling also, in which success is certain, since God, who is sovereign, called him unto it. And therefore he argues not, nor does he hesitate, but puts the hand to the plough and labors on. And consider also this: A church which confesses election as its "*Cor ecclesiæ*" cannot be clerical, but must seek its strength in the lay members. Hence from this confession was deduced the democratic church-principle, which was soon transferred from the church to the political platform, and there called into life the liberties of Holland, the liberties of England's Whigs, and the liberties of America no less. Election creates a brave spirit in the people and undermines every principle of religious persecution. As Mrs. Hutchinson wrote, as early as 1660, "It demonstrates this grand truth that God does not approve of conversions violently forced by human laws. Our combats and our arms must therefore be spiritual."

Calvin's profound conception of sin is likewise the outcome of the recognition of the sovereignty of God. As mentioned above, he was republican because he knows that even kings are sinners, who yield to temptation perhaps more readily than their subjects, inasmuch as their temptations are greater. But he knows equally well that the self-same sin moves the masses, and that, hence, resistance, insurrection, and mutinies will not end, unless a righteous constitution bridles the abuse of authority, marks off its boundaries,

and offers the people a natural protection against despotism and ambitious schemes.

This is system. There is consequence in this. It is altogether different from the plan of the French theorists, who also clamor for liberties, but begin with a recital of the virtues of the citizen, in order presently, when herein disappointed, to reclaim this to them surprising abuse of these liberties by absolution and perjury, by the *coup d'état* and by ostracism.

Finally, from the sovereignty of God follows the sovereign authority of his word. And it is scarcely credible how greatly the study of the Old Testament especially, has ministered to the development of our constitutional liberties. All writers on Calvinistic public law, in Geneva and Scotland, in Holland and France, in England and America, from first to last, have defended the liberties of the people with appeals to the public law of Israel. Not for the sake of re-establishing Mosaic institutions in modern times. Of this Calvin says: "Others may show the danger and monstrosity of such a demand, to me its falseness and folly have been sufficiently demonstrated." But in that voluntary ministry of the prophets, in the prerogatives of the people's councils (the *Kahâl*), in the peculiar right of the tribes and heads of families, and especially in the manner of the election of their first king, there was manifest a principle of political liberty, which by the very force of its inspiration excluded every despotic authority. Of Saul it is written that he was made king both by anointing and by lot; and also, that after the liberation of Jabesh "all the people went to Gilgal and there they made Saul king." In like manner it is told of David, that he was consecrated by Samuel, but that nevertheless at Hebron he was anointed king by the elders of Judah. Nor did he obtain the crown of the apostate tribes until their elders crowned him in Hebron. Is it not self-evident, therefore, that the Calvinistic statesmen, who took no steps with-

out consulting the Scriptures, were led by the light of divine approbation to cherish the thought of a constitution of the people, which destroys not the hereditary rights of the throne, but limits the powers of the crown. The history of public opinion, as well as the writings on public law, show clearly that the fact of Saul's and David's coronation has hastened the progress of our constitutional ideas with Christian people far more than the most Utopian theories.

Thus has been shown that the plant of political liberty found its mother soil among the Calvinistic nations, Switzerland, Holland, England, and America; that America, where liberty is most profuse, is an institution of the Puritans; that the vigor of the Puritan spirit was the fruit of England's Calvinism, and that in turn the struggle of the Independents was the sequence of that vital thought, which had once animated the Huguenots in France. It has been shown that in these mighty commotions of spirit it was ever the one germ, developing itself, and that the seed from which this plant rose ever higher is to be sought in the giant mind of Calvin. The motto of his life, "God sovereign absolute," contained the magic power which is our surprise to this day, to give authority its firmest support while it allows the plant of liberty the utmost room for growth.

Does this imply the assertion that darkness reigned supreme until Calvin was born, and that only with him the first rays of light appeared? By no means. Boldest genius is, and must ever be, the child of its times, and even Calvin's majestic figure was born of the past. No: the reformer of Geneva was not the first to mingle a thirst for liberty and an aversion to tyranny with the blood of the Germanic race. Before him an Arminius in the Teutoburgen forest, and a Claudius Civiles in Holland domains, had known how to break in pieces the shackles of oppression. An enemy to tyranny has our race been through all ages, and Romish as

well as Reformed heroes have defended the people's rights and liberties against the Alvas and the Vargas. At Calvin's appearance the Christian church also was already fifteen hundred years old, and that through her spiritual offspring she took no part with tyrants, had been shown conclusively to the Corinthians by the hero of Tarsus, to the Emperor Theodosius by Ambrose in Milan, by Wycklif in chains, Huss at the stake, and Luther at the Diet of Worms. Add to this the influence of the Renaissance, whereby speech was restored to the heroes of Marathon, and the glory of Greece and ancient Rome was once more made apparent, and these three elements, the Germanic, the Christian, and the Renaissance, are the factors which foretold broader liberties for the people, before Geneva's name was yet heard. But these elements repelled each other, instead of lending mutual support. In the strife of the Guelphs and the Ghibellines, the church combatted with the German spirit, the ridicule of the Humanists fought Obscurantism, presently all Christendom was in arms against the Renaissance, and in these struggles it was both times the scene of Solomon's court repeated; both parties claimed to be mother of the child of liberty, and, less pitiful than before Solomon's tribunal, they cut the living child in two. Hence absolutism prevailed. And to overthrow it the spirited enthusiasm of the Germans must needs be curbed, the church purified, the Renaissance sanctified, and the three rubies strung into one chain. And this was done by Calvin. In the fires of his genius were forged the vigor of Germanism, the liberty of the Christian spirit, and the virtue of the classics into that precious metal, from which Holland also cast its goddess of liberty surmounting the Holy Scriptures, and the liberty cap with this inscription—"By this we strive, this we guard."

But alas, from his hands most of Europe's nations have not desired to accept the fresh waters of liberty. The Reformation was execrated, and Italy declined, and Spain fell

away: the Hapsburgers burrowed deep into the hearts of their people. France was hailed, and in its great king a true Eastern despot was tolerated. Hence the horrors of oppression, which, regardless of parliaments and courts, allowed the people to be trampled under foot by the nobility and courtiers, and extinguished in the hearts of the people every spark of liberty. This spirit was communicated to German courts where, for French money and French mistresses, German nobleness was offered for sale, and the youth of the land were sold like slaves to swell the numbers of a foreign army. Even the cantonal courts of Switzerland were contaminated in an evil hour, and under French influence, Holland's free states were infected with that self-same spirit of pride and of contempt for the people, in the form of patrician nepotism.

This could not last. Europe's fiery spirit is bound to rule Asia, but in free Europe there is no room for Asiatic despotism of Persian satraps. A break therefore was inevitable, and violent upheavals, and it was the judgment of God upon the despotism of the courts and the slavish subjection of the people that the means of salvation came in the horrors of the French Revolution.

The thing wanted was pure air; the cry arose for liberty, and behold, in Calvinistic countries there was a great store of both. These liberty-forms were imitable. But that which lay not in store, was the moral element, the heroism of the faith of our fathers, by which Calvinism had become great; that which was wanting, were the *magistratus inferiores* to forward the battle for liberty along the lines of law; that which was no more found, was international law, which promised outside help against the tyranny of nobility and monarch.

Then arose the Encyclopedists, the spiritual children of Hugo Grotius, that colossus of learning and irreconcilable enemy of the Calvinistic name. Though Grenovius refuted

his demonstration, borrowed from Holy Writ, it made no difference. It was Grotius' system not to locate the point of departure for his revolutionary idea in the faith, but in the social disposition of man. In this the Deists were his followers, and soon after, the school of the Encyclopedists in France. And thus was born the doctrine, the dogma of the rights of man which tried to graft the Calvinistic liberties, cut from their natural root, into the wild trunk of human self-sufficiency and caprice. Striking was the imitation of the structure above ground, but in the fundamentals was hidden the antithesis. In Calvinism is recognized the sovereignty of God, the sinfulness of man, and the claims of a stern morality; and in the clubs of the Parisian September heroes God's sovereignty was superseded by the doctrine of the sovereignty of self. Man was flattered in his self-esteem, and unchained his unholy passions.

This movement set France, and presently all Europe, on fire. Whatever stood, toppled over. Man and his home, society and state, were turned upside down. The rabble broke loose. And after the first wild song of unbounded revenge was over, Robespierre's terrorism and then Napoleon's grasp made the nations feel what becomes of the liberty of the people, which has been declared sovereign, when faith and *magistratus inferiores* are wanting. But under the animating leaderships of the Pitts and the Steins, Europe raised herself from so great humiliation. As said above, there is no room in Europe for Asiatic despotism, but there is less room yet for the African-Timbuctoo-blood thirst. The frenzy of the Septembrists was checked, and from the battle-field at Leipzig was raised the cry of salvation. A just judgment had come upon the kings and the great ones in the earth as well as upon our patricians and rulers; the blood and tears of downtrodden nations found their *sera vindicta* in the French Revolution; the honor of liberty was saved. With its perpetrators remains the guilt of the sinful principle of this rev-

olution and its crimes. God will judge them; but in the face of guilt and judgment, a blessing was conferred upon all Europe. What had been refused at the hand of Calvinism, was received with avidity at the hand of the French liberty heroes, and, however much Rome and the spirits of Restoration and of Romanticism sought re-establishment of the past, the nations of Europe would tolerate it no longer. Hence after the revolution of 1830, as well as after the revolution of 1848, the fruit of Calvinism was spared, at least in part.

Of Calvinism indeed. For what the French Revolution wrought in its own strength, ask it of poor France, which, after exhausting herself for the sake of a false idea, having battled through fourteen revolutions and worn out every form of state, still hurries on, with a *δός μοι πού στῶ* on her lips, in pursuit of liberty, which forever eludes her grasp. What revolution could accomplish, ask it of Spain, which has been scourged so pitilessly, which from the zenith of her glory has been falling ever lower, until now she can scarcely claim sympathy without rousing contempt also. And for further testimony, Mexico and Peru, Chile and Uruguay, all of which are model revolutionary republics,—one of which even boasts the Phrygian cap on a dagger as her coat of arms—would in comparison with the Union of the United States eloquently express this difference.

But danger threatens our western states also. As said before, we appreciate the fruit of the French Revolution. According to God's plan, even in its sinfulness, it served to advance the spread of Calvinistic liberties. This is no cause for complaint, but rather for rejoicing. Upon one condition, however, viz., that the poisonous element which it introduced into Europe's state organism be not overlooked. It did something more than copy Calvinistic liberties. It introduced a system likewise, a catechism and a doctrine, which, in opposition to God and his righteousness, loosened the

bonds of order and authority, undermined the securities of social life, offered free scope to the passions, and made room for the material and lower appetites to rule and enslave the spirit.

We, anti-revolutionists, have taken up arms against this system, not against those liberties. We know the *perspectives du paradis* cannot be realized on earth, but we are equally unwilling, without just cause, to retrace our steps to the *supplices de l'enfer*.

Thinking it an act of wisdom, the press has taken delight in calling us extreme revolutionists whenever our protests were entered against reaction and repristination. But this is a mistake. So little are we averse to revolutions, in the general sense, that the insurrection of Greece against Persia commands our admiration, and Switzerland's insurrection against the Hapsburgs awakens our sympathies, the resistance of Holland against Spain incites our love, England's glorious revolution receives our hearty approval, and America's liberation our warmest praise and applause.

But protest is entered against those who place these revolutionists side by side with the French Revolution.

Bluntschli's name excites no suspicion in the minds of liberals, and yet in his "Geschichte des allgemeinen Staatsrechts" he writes: "The English revolution did not intend, as the French Revolution did later on, to bring into the world a new state, and a new law; its only purpose was to defend the ancient rights of the people and with new guarantees to re-establish them."

And why not quote Burke, introduced among us by Professor Opzoomer in his rectoral oration in 1857 as a liberal statesman *par excellence* and a most trustworthy guide in all matters politic. Edmund Burke was an anti-revolutionist. He defended the American insurrection, because faith "always a principle of energy showed itself in this good people the main cause of a free spirit, the most adverse to all im-

pllicit submission of mind and opinion." To those who compare England's glorious revolution with the French Revolution, Burke answers: "Our revolution and that of France are just the reverse of each other in almost every particular and in the whole spirit of the transaction." And on being asked why *he* is an anti-revolutionist, and therefore bitterly opposed to the French Revolution, he answers: "Because the French Revolution is a turning-upside-down of society, and its system an antichristian doctrine." "We are at war not with a people, but with a system, and that system by its essence is subversive of every government." "The course hitherto of the revolution irresistibly suggests in its wild dismemberments of social forces the ancient myth of the deluded youths who tore asunder their venerable parent, and thrust into a boiling caldron the severed limbs, expecting thence to see him spring whole and rejuvenate." In fewer words still the antithesis is stated: "We are fighting for the rights of Englishmen, not of men."

Like Burke, we Calvinists in Holland favor liberty, and oppose all violence against orderly processes of nature. We favor liberty. We are not Calvinists in the sense that we suppose a return to conditions of old could do us any good. Our Calvinism is alive and contains the power of development: Why should we then desire a phase we have long since outgrown? We propose therefore no restoration of the state church; we rather despise it, knowing that it hurts the faith. We ask not the church to be school-mistress, knowing that it robs instruction of its vigor. We wish no restoration of former favoritisms, for it begets envy and bitterness. We seek no disruption of Union, for our hope for the future lies not in provincialism but in Nationality. Disregard of constitutional rights and privileges would meet its most violent opposition from our quarters; an attack against constitutional monarchy would find in us most implacable antagonism. But we ask equal rights for all, of whatever class or faith. Freedom of conscience, and of the press, of social

union and of thought, we will defend with all our might. We want the liberation of the church by an honest and absolute separation from the state, its finances included; liberation from the school, not to restore it to the care of the church, but under state regulation to restore it to the parents, because the impersonal state cannot be a teacher of our youth. We want to strengthen the cords that bind our people to the house of Orange, provided there be maintained that republican character trait of our people, of which Orange itself is both symbol and safeguard. We defend decentralization, organic representation of the people, and moral colonial politics. We demand more liberty for our seminaries, more independence in administration of justice, even by a jury, if needs be. And as for public defence, let it be said that Switzerland, England, and America, which are Calvinistic countries, spend least money on their armies, and their liberty, according to common opinion, is even now best assured.

And if, for the sake of this free programme and the banner of Christian liberalism which we raise on high, we are to be classed with the radicals of the Left, we dispute not that right, at least in part. There is some truth in the lately published Joshua Davids. In the formal programme of our social life, Fourier and St. Simon make near approaches to the prophet of Nazareth. Deramy understood it well: the holy Apostle Paul is also the apostle of democracy. But it should not be overlooked that no two things resemble each other so closely as the leaves on the true vine and the wild.

This is the case in hand. If our demands sound like those of the most active radicalism, they bloom on roots altogether different from theirs. *Duo cum faciunt idem, non est idem.* "We expect everything of the faith, they nothing."

Of the faith, and of this claim we can make no surrender. We love our liberties, and from the lessons of histories of nearly three centuries we have learned that the faith alone contains vital power to guard and keep these liberties for us and for our children unto latest generations.

ARTICLE V.

THE HYMNS OF MARTIN LUTHER: THEIR PREDECESSORS, AND THEIR PLACE IN HISTORY.¹

BY PROFESSOR EDWARD DICKINSON.

THE science of hymnology has never yet received the attention which it deserves at the hands of students of church history. It is a necessary branch of the subject of religious art, and yet while architecture, painting, and music have been examined with considerable thoroughness in respect to their ecclesiastical relations, the voice of the church in hymns and spiritual songs has been but slightly regarded. So far as hymns have been studied at all, it has been mainly upon the æsthetic side, and in individual instances; not by groups, or with reference to their expression of certain general types of piety. But it is in this latter particular that their historic value lies. The student of church history soon comes to realize that the ultimate object of his search is the enduring

¹ The following works are the most important sources of information upon the subject treated in this article: *Wackernagel*, Das deutsche Kirchenlied, von der ältesten Zeit bis zu Anfang des XVII. Jahrhunderts; *Koch*, Geschichte des Kirchenliedes und Kirchengesangs der christlichen, insbesondere der deutschen evangelischen Kirche; *Winterfeld*, Der evangelische Kirchengesang; *Hoffmann von Fallersleben*, Geschichte des deutschen Kirchenliedes bis auf Luther's Zeit; *Bäumker*, Katholische deutsche Kirchenlied in seinen Singweisen von der frühesten Zeit bis gegen Ende des XVII. Jahrhunderts; *Liliencron*, Deutsches Leben im Volkslied um 1530; *Koestlin*, Geschichte des christlichen Gottesdienstes. Translations: The Hymns of Martin Luther set to their original melodies, with an English version, edited by *L. W. Bacon* assisted by *N. H. Allen*; The Chorale Book for England, compiled and edited by *William Sterndale Bennett* and *Otto Goldschmidt*; *Lyra Germanica*, translated by *Catherine Winkworth*.

spiritual elements which underlie doctrinal systems and antagonistic policies. Clearing away the vast multitude of phenomena which tell only of political ambition, the lust of aggrandizement, and the delight in the exercise of mere intellectual subtlety—facts which make the annals of the church so bewildering and often so sad—we perceive that below all these there has been a persistent and constantly deepening current of conscientious spiritual endeavor. There is a history of piety, as well as a history of dogma and of conduct. This religious consciousness, this spirit of piety, has taken manifold forms, it has passed through many phases, often issuing in results of divine beauty and perfection, often led by erroneous conceptions into strange vagaries; yet the ultimate ground purpose has been a sincere longing to enter into right relations with God and to obtain his favor. This impulse has revealed itself in the mystical temper, the ascetic, the practical. In actual conduct it has at one time insisted upon obedience to authority, at another it has deferred to the spirit of individualism; it has absorbed the mind in contemplation, or it has neglected contemplation in favor of philanthropic activities; it has sometimes derived aid from the disciplined enjoyment of the good things of this world, again it has sought the annihilation of temporal satisfactions as hindrances to spiritual growth. All these aspects of the religious motive are the outcome of one common basic principle, acted upon by different conditions and diffracted through various types of mind.

These we study with an especially absorbing interest, for they lead us as far as we can go into the deepest and most sacred arcana of the human soul. We study them not simply as they have manifested themselves in conduct, but with a more penetrating insight and fuller comprehension as we scrutinize the forms of art expression which they have assumed. Religious conceptions, in their primary activity as emotion—love, reverence, aspiration—not deliberately formulated in dogma,

have never failed to embody themselves in some kind of artistic form. Art in its historic aspects is the utterance of typical minds when acted upon by ideas that are especially potent in certain epochs and localities. Religious art is at all times particularly truthful as a witness. For here the artist is most really himself, most free from the bias of fashion or the temptation of the market; he feels most urgently the demand that he be sincere, for his reference is not so much to the favor of men as to that of a divine Patron and Judge, who cannot be deceived by superficial charm, or gratified by anything but a desire for absolute truth. Religious art is not, however, entirely unconstrained, for while it may disclose the thought of men of genius who are sincere seekers after the heavenly vision, they are also, as a rule, adherents of some particular ecclesiastical institution, which they believe has in its keeping the essential body of truth. Their art is therefore not universally religious, it is definitely ecclesiastical. It is colored by the modes of thought and of devotional exercise which are especially nurtured by the confession to which they adhere. National traits also come into play, and these two elements, the doctrinal and the racial, give to religious art its various distinctive features, developing schools and styles which are the counterparts and reflections of historic creeds, politics, and disciplines.

Every form of religious art gives instruction in regard to the special type of piety that underlies it—but this is most universally the case with the arts of poetry, music, and ceremonial. Only in a few of the branches of the Christian church have painting and sculpture been systematically employed for religious uses. In many sects architecture has no other purpose than to furnish shelter and material convenience for the worshipping assembly. But poetry, music, and some form of symbolic ceremony, if it be no more than the bowing of the head in prayer, are, with but very few exceptions, essential accompaniments of religious service everywhere. In

the large sense they are not the creation of individuals, but of the church which they serve; and the church cherishes them, not only as a means of edification, but still more as her most appropriate form of speech in addressing the ear of her Lord and Master.

No phase of Christian art is more attractive from the standpoint which I have stated, than hymnology. Here we find every possible shade of devotional feeling. That hymns have not proved the highest form of poetry, judged by artistic standards, does not lessen but rather increases their significance. They have been written, not by the lofty poetic geniuses, but by men not ambitious of literary fame, willing to sink their own personality in the office of contributing that which would answer universal needs and be taken into the mouths of the people at large. As hymns have entered into the common everyday life, so are they most intimately the outflowing of the heart of the church. They are not the expression of exceptional experience, but of the common faith. Although not classed as folk song by technical definition, they are essentially such; they must be studied in the mass, be grouped in schools, with constant reference to large religious movements around which they gather and whose vital motives they always plainly reveal.

Among the great historic groups of hymns that have appeared since Clement of Alexandria and Ephraëm the Syrian set in motion the tide of Christian song, the Lutheran hymnody has for us the greatest interest. In sheer literary excellence it is undoubtedly surpassed by the Latin hymns of the mediæval church and the English-American group; in musical merit it no more than equals these; but in historic importance the Lutheran song takes the foremost place. The Latin and the English hymns belong only to the history of poetry and of inward spiritual experience; the Lutheran have a place in the annals of politics and doctrinal strifes as well. Protestant hymnody dates from Martin Luther; his

lyrics were the models of the hymns of the Reformed church in Germany for a century or more; the principle that lay at the basis of his movement gave them their characteristic tone; they were among the most efficient agencies in carrying this principle to the mind of the common people, and they also contributed powerfully to the enthusiasm which enabled the new faith to maintain itself in the conflicts by which it was tested. The melodies to which the hymns of Luther and his followers were set became the foundation of a musical style which is the one school worthy to be placed beside the Italian Catholic music of the sixteenth century. This hymnody and its music afforded the first adequate outlet for the poetic and musical genius of the German people, and established the pregnant democratic traditions of German art as against the aristocratic traditions of Italy and France. As we cannot overestimate the spiritual and intellectual force that entered the European arena with Luther and his disciples, so we must also recognize the analogous elements which asserted themselves at the same moment and under the same inspiration in the field of art expression, and gave to this movement a language which helps us in a peculiar way to understand its real import.

The ultimate consequences of this poetic and musical impulse do not come within the scope of this article. Our object will be simply to show in what the importance of the hymns of Luther himself consisted. The method must be that of comparison. The first questions are: What was the origin of the Lutheran hymnody? Had it models, and if so, what and where were they? In giving a store of congregational songs to the German people was Luther original or only an imitator? In this matter does he deserve the honor which Protestants have given him?

Protestant writers have, as a rule, bestowed unstinted praise upon Luther as the man who first gave the people a voice with which to utter their religious emotions in song.

Most of these writers are undoubtedly aware that a national poesy is never the creation of a single man, and that a brilliant epoch of national literature or art must always be preceded by a period of experiment and fermentation; yet they are disposed to make little account of the existence of a popular sacred song in Germany before the Reformation, and represent Luther almost as performing the miracle of making the dumb to speak. Even those that recognize the existence of a preëxisting school of hymnody usually seek to give the impression that pure evangelical religion was almost, if not quite, unknown in the popular religious poetry of the centuries before the Reformation, and that the Lutheran hymnody was composed of altogether new elements. They also ascribe to Luther creative work in music as well as in poetry. Catholic writers, on the other hand, will allow Luther no originality whatever; they find, or pretend to find, every essential feature of his work in the Catholic hymns and tunes of the previous centuries, or in those of the Bohemian sectaries. They admit the great influence of Luther's hymns in disseminating the new doctrines, but give him credit only for cleverness in dressing up his borrowed ideas and forms in a taking popular guise. As is usually the case, the truth lies between the two extremes. Luther's originality has been overrated by Protestants, and the true nature of the germinal force which he imparted to German congregational song has been misconceived by Catholics. It was not new forms, but a new spirit, which Luther gave to his church. He did not break with the past, but found in the past a new standing-ground. He sought in the Scriptures, in the writings of the fathers and the mediæval theologians, for ideas which satisfied his cravings; he rejected what he deemed false or barren in the mother church, adopted and developed what was true and fruitful, and molded it into forms which in style were already familiar to the people. In poetry, music, and the several details of church worship Luther recast the old models, and gave

them to his followers with contents purified and adapted to those needs which he himself had made them to realize. He understood the character of his people; he knew where to find the nourishment suited to their wants; he knew how to turn their enthusiasms into practical and progressive directions. This was Luther's achievement in the sphere of church art, and if, in recognizing the precise nature of his work, we seem to decry his reputation for creative genius, we do him better justice by honoring his practical wisdom.

The singing of religious songs by the common people in their own language in connection with church services did not begin in Germany with the Reformation. The German folk and popular song is of ancient date, and the religious lyric always had a prominent place in it. The Teutonic tribes before their conversion to Christianity had a large store of hymns to their deities, and afterward their musical fervor turned itself no less ardently to the service of their new allegiance. Wackernagel, in the second volume of his monumental collection of German hymns from the earliest time to the beginning of the seventeenth century, includes fourteen hundred and forty-eight religious lyrics in the German tongue composed between the years 868 and 1518. This collection, he says, is as complete as possible, but we must suppose that a very large number written before the invention of printing have been lost. About half the hymns in this volume are of unknown authorship. Among the writers whose names are given we find such notable poets as Walther von der Vogelweide, Gottfried von Strassburg, Hartmann von Aue, Frauenlob, Reinmar der Zweiter, Kunrad der Marnier, Heinrich von Loufenberg, Michel Behem, and Hans Sachs, beside famous churchmen like Eckart and Tauler, who are not otherwise known as poets. A great number of these poems are hymns only in a qualified sense, having been written not for public use, but for private satisfaction; but many others are true hymns, and have often

resounded from the mouths of the people in social religious functions.

Down to the tenth century the only practice among the Germans that could be called a popular church song was the ejaculation of the words *Kyrie eleison, Christe eleison*. These words, which are among the most ancient in the Mass and the litanies, and which came originally from the Eastern church, were sung or shouted by the German Christians on all possible occasions. In processions, on pilgrimages, at burials, greeting of distinguished visitors, consecration of a church or prelate, in many subordinate liturgical offices, invocations of supernatural aid in times of distress, on the march, going into battle,—in almost every social action in which religious sanctions were involved the people were in duty bound to utter this phrase, often several hundred times in succession. The words were often abbreviated into *Kyrieles, Kyrie eleis, Kyrielle, Kerleis*, and *Kles*, and sometimes became mere inarticulate cries.

When the phrase was formally sung, the Gregorian tones proper to it in the church service were employed. Some of these were florid successions of notes, many to a syllable, as in the "Alleluia" from which the Sequences sprung,—a free impassioned form of emotional utterance which had extensive use in the service of the earlier church, both East and West, and which is still employed, sometimes to extravagant lengths, in the Orient. The custom at last arose of setting words to these exuberant strains. This usage took two forms, giving rise in the ritual service to the "farced Kyries" or Tropes, and in the freer song of the people producing a more regular style of hymn, in which the *Kyrie eleison* became at last a mere refrain, at the end of each stanza. These songs came to be called *Kirleisen*, or *Leisen*, and sometimes *Leiche*, and are the origin of the German congregational hymn.

Sacred songs in the national dialects multiplied in the centuries following the tenth almost by geometrical progres-

sion. The tide reached a high mark in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries under that extraordinary intellectual awakening which distinguished the epoch of the Crusades, the Stauffen emperors, the Minnesingers, and the court epic poets. Under the stimulus of the ideals of chivalric honor and knightly devotion to woman, the adoration of the Virgin Mother, long cherished in the bosom of the church, burst forth in a multitude of ecstatic lyrics in her praise. Poetic and musical inspiration was communicated by the courtly poets to the clergy and common people, and the love of singing at religious observances grew apace. Certain heretics, who made much stir in this period, also wrote hymns and put them into the mouths of the populace, thus following the early example of the Arians and the disciples of Bardasanes. To resist this perversion of the divine art, orthodox songs were composed, and, as in the Reformation days, schismatics and Romanists vied with each other in wielding this powerful proselyting agent.

Mystics of the fourteenth century—Eckart, Tauler, and others—wrote hymns of a new tone, an inward spiritual quality, less objective, more individual, voicing a yearning for an immediate union of the soul with God, and the joy of personal love to the Redeemer. Poetry of this nature especially appealed to the religious sisters, and from many a convent came echoes of these chastened raptures, in which are heard accents of longing for the comforting presence of the Heavenly Bridegroom.

Those half-insane fanatics, the Flagellants, and other enthusiasts of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, also contributed somewhat to the store of pre-Reformation hymnody. Hoffmann von Fallersleben has given a vivid account of the barbaric doings of these bands of self-tormentors, and it is evident that their singing was not the least uncanny feature of their performances.

In the fourteenth century appeared the device which played so large a part in the production of the Reformation

hymns—that of adapting secular tunes to sacred poems, and also making religious paraphrases of secular ditties. Praises of love, of out-door sport, even of wine, by a few simple alterations were made to express devotional sentiments. A good illustration of this practice is the recasting of the favorite folk song, “Den liebsten Bulen den ich han,” into “Den liebsten Herren den ich han.” Much more common, however, was the transfer of melodies from profane poems to sacred, a method which afterward became an important reliance for supplying the Reformed congregations with hymn tunes.

Mixed songs, part Latin and part German, were at one time much in vogue. A celebrated example is the—

“In dulce júbilo
Nu singet und seyt fro,”

of the fourteenth century, which has often been heard in the Reformed churches down to a recent period.

In the fifteenth century the popular religious song flourished with an affluence hardly surpassed even in the first two centuries of Protestantism. Still under the control of the Catholic doctrine and discipline, it nevertheless betokens a certain restlessness of mind; the native individualism of the German spirit is preparing to assert itself. The fifteenth was a century of stir and inquiry, full of premonitions of the mighty upheaval soon to follow. The Revival of Learning began to shake Germany, as well as Southern and Western Europe, out of its superstition and intellectual subjection. The religious and political movements in Bohemia and Moravia, set in motion by the preaching and martyrdom of Hus, produced strong effect in Germany. Hus struck at some of the same abuses that aroused the wrath of Luther, notably the traffic in indulgences. The demand for the use of the vernacular in church worship was even more fundamental than the similar desire in Germany, and preceded rather than followed the movement toward reform. Hus was also a prototype of Luther in that he was virtually the founder of

the Bohemian hymnody. He wrote hymns both in Latin and in Czech, and earnestly encouraged the use of vernacular songs by the people. The Utraquists published a song-book in the Czech language in 1501 and the *Unitas Fratrum* one, containing four hundred hymns, in 1505. These two antedated the first Lutheran hymn-book by about twenty years. The Bohemian reformers, like Luther after them, based their poetry upon the Psalms, the ancient Latin hymns, and the old vernacular religious songs; they improved existing texts, and set new hymns in place of those that contained objectionable doctrinal features. Their tunes also were derived, like those of the German reformers, from older religious and secular melodies.

These achievements of the Bohemians, answering popular needs that exist at all times, could not remain without influence upon the Germans. Encouragement to religious expression in the vernacular was also exerted by certain religious communities known as Brethren of the Common Life, which originated in Holland in the latter part of the fourteenth century, and extended into north and middle Germany in the fifteenth. Thomas à Kempis was a member of this order. The purpose of these Brethren was to inculcate a purer religious life among the people, especially the young, and they made it a ground principle that the national language should be used so far as possible in prayer and song. Particularly effective in the culture of sacred poetry and music among the artisan class were the schools of the Mastersingers, which flourished all over Germany in the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries.

Standing upon the threshold of the Reformation, and looking back over the period that elapsed since the pagan myths and heroic lays of the North began to yield to the metrical gospel narrative of the Heliand and the poems of Otfried, we can trace the same union of pious desire and poetic instinct which, in a more enlightened age, produced the four hundred

thousand evangelical hymns of Germany. The pre-Reformation hymns are of the highest importance as casting light upon the condition of religious belief among the German laity. We find in them a great variety of elements,—much that is pure, noble, and strictly evangelical, mixed with crudity, superstition, and crass realism. In the nature of the case they do not, on the whole, rise to the poetic and spiritual level of the contemporary Latin hymns of the church. There is nothing in them comparable with the “*Dies Irae*,” the “*Stabat Mater*,” the “*Hova Novissima*,” the “*Veni Sancte Spiritus*,” the “*Ad Perennis Vitae Fontem*,” the Passion Hymns of St. Bernard, or scores that might be named which make up the golden chaplet of sacred Latin verse from Hilary to Xavier. The latter is the poetry of the cloister, the work of men separated from the world, upon whom asceticism and scholastic philosophizing had worked to refine and subtilize their conceptions. It is the poetry, not of laymen, but of priests and monks, the special and peculiar utterance of a sacerdotal class, wrapt in intercessory functions, straining ever for glimpses of the Beatific Vision, whose one absorbing effort was to emancipate the soul from time, and discipline it for eternity. It is poetry of and for the temple, the sacramental mysteries, the hours of prayer, for seasons of solitary meditation; it blends with the dim light sifted through stained cathedral windows, with incense, with majestic music. The simple layman was not at home in such an atmosphere as this, and the Latin hymn was not a familiar expression of his thought. His mental training was of a simpler, more commonplace order. He must particularize, his religious feeling must lay hold of something more tangible, something that could serve his childish views of things, and enter into some practical relation with the needs of his ordinary mechanical existence. The religious folk song, therefore, shows many traits similar to those found in the secular folk song, and we can easily perceive the influence of one upon the

other. In both we can see how receptive the common people were to anything that savored of the marvelous, and how their minds dwelt more upon the external wonder than upon the lesson that it brings. The connection of these poems with the ecclesiastical dramas, which form such a remarkable chapter in the history of religious instruction in the Middle Ages, is also apparent, and scores of them are simply narratives of the Nativity, the Crucifixion, the Resurrection, and the Ascension, told over and over in almost identical language. These German hymns show in what manner the dogmas and usages of the church took root in the popular heart, and affected the spirit of the time. In all other mediæval literature we have the testimony of the higher class of minds, the men of education, who were saved by their reflective intelligence from falling into the grosser superstitions, or at least from dwelling in them. But in the folk poetry the great middle class throws back the ideas imposed by its religious teachers, tinged by its own crude mental operations. The result is that we have in these poems the doctrinal perversions and the mythology of the Middle Ages set forth in their baldest form. Beliefs that are the farthest removed from the teaching of the Scriptures, are carried to lengths which the Catholic Church has never authoritatively sanctioned, but which are natural consequences of the action of her dogmas upon untrained superstitious minds. There are hymns which teach the preëxistence of Mary with God before the creation; that in and through her all things were created. Others, not content with the church doctrine of her intercessory office in Heaven, represent her as commanding and controlling her Son, and even as forgiving sins in her own right. Hagiolatry, too, is carried to its most dubious extremity. Power is ascribed to the saints to save from the pains of hell. In one hymn they are implored to intercede with God for the sinner, because, the writer says, God will not deny their prayer. It is curious to see in some of these poems that the attributes

of love and compassion, which have been removed from the Father to the Son, and from the Son to the Virgin Mother, are again transferred to St. Ann, who is implored to intercede with her daughter in behalf of the suppliant.

All this, and much more of a similar sort, the product of vulgar error and distorted thinking, cannot be gainsaid. But let us, with equal candor, acknowledge that there is a bright side to this subject. Corruption and falsehood are not typical of the German religious poetry of the Middle Ages. Many Protestant writers represent the mediæval German hymns as chiefly given over to Mariolatry and much debasing superstition, and as therefore indicative of the religious state of the nation. This, however, is very far from being the case, as a candid examination of such a collection as Wackernagel's will show. Take out everything which a severe Protestant would reject, and there remains a large body of poetry which flows from the pure undefiled springs of Christian faith, which from the evangelical standpoint is true and edifying, gems of expression not to be matched by the poetry of Luther and his friends in simplicity and refinement of language. Ideas common to the hymnody of all ages are to be found there. One comes to mind in which there is carried out in the most touching way the thought of John Newton in his most famous hymn, where in vision the look of the crucified Christ seems to charge the arrested sinner with his death. Another lovely poem expresses the shrinking of the disciple in consciousness of mortal frailty when summoned by Christ to take up the cross, and is comforted by the Saviour's assurance of his own sufficient grace. A celebrated hymn by Tauler describes a ship sent from Heaven by the Father, containing Jesus, who comes as our Redeemer, and who asks personal devotion to himself and a willingness to live and die with and for him. Others set forth the atoning work of Christ's death, without mention of any other condition of salvation. Others implore the direct guidance and protection of Christ, as in

the exquisite cradle hymn of Heinrich von Loufenberg, which is not surpassed in tenderness and beauty by anything in Keble's "*Lyra Innocentium*," or the child verses of Blake. This mass of hymns covers a wide range of topics: God in his various attributes, including mercy and a desire to pardon,—a conception which many suppose to have been absent from the thought of the Middle Ages; the Trinity; Christ in the various scenes of his life, and as Head of the church; admonitions, confessions, translations of Psalms, poems to be sung on pilgrimages, funeral songs, political songs, and many more which touch upon true relations between man and the Divine. There is a wonderful pathos in this great body of national poetry, for it makes us see the dim but honest striving of the heart of the noble German people after that which is sure and eternal, and which can offer assurance of compensation amid the doubt and turmoil of that epoch of strife and tyranny. The true and the false in this poetry were alike the outcome of the conditions of the time and the authoritative religious teaching. The fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, in spite of the abuses which made the Reformation necessary, contained many saintly lives, beneficent institutions, much philanthropy, and inspired love of God. All these have their witness in many products of that era, and we need look no farther than the mediæval religious poetry to find elements that show that on the spiritual side the Reformation was not strictly a moral revolution, restoring a lost religious feeling, but rather an intellectual process, establishing an hereditary piety, upon reasonable and scriptural foundations.

We see, therefore, how far Luther was from being the founder of German hymnody. In trying to discover what his great service to religious song really was, we must go on to the next question that is involved, and ask, What was the status and employment of the folk hymn before the Reformation? Was it in a true sense a *church* song? Had it a recognized place in the public service? Was it at all liturgical,

as the Lutheran hymn certainly was? This brings us to a definitive distinction between the two schools of hymnody.

The attitude of the Catholic Church to congregational singing has been frequently discussed, and is at present the object of a great deal of misconception. The fact of the matter is, that she ostensibly encourages the people to share in the Latin offices of the service, but the very spirit of the liturgy and the development of musical practice have in course of time, with now and then an exception, reduced the congregation to silence. Before the invention of harmony all church music had more of the quality of popular music, and the priesthood encouraged the worshipers to join their voices in those parts of the service which were not confined by the rubrics to the ministers. But the Gregorian chant was never really adopted by the people,—its practical difficulties, and especially the inflexible insistence upon the use of Latin in all the offices of worship, virtually confined it to the priests and a small body of trained singers. The very conception and spirit of the liturgy, also, has by a law of historic development gradually excluded the people from active participation. Whatever may have been the thought of the fathers of the liturgy, the eucharistic service has come to be simply the vehicle of a sacrifice offered by and through the priesthood for the people, not a tribute of praise and supplication emanating from the congregation itself. The attitude of the worshiper is one of obedient faith, both in the supernatural efficacy of the sacrifice and the mediating authority of the celebrant. The liturgy is inseparably bound up with the central act of consecration and oblation, and is conceived as itself possessing a divine sanction and an objective sanctity. The liturgy is not in any sense the creation of the people, but comes down to them from a higher source, the gradual creation of men believed to have been inspired by the Holy Spirit, and is accepted by the laity as a divinely authorized means in the accomplishment of the supreme sacerdotal func-

tion. The sacrifice of the Mass is performed for the people, but not through the people, nor even necessarily in their presence. And so it has come to pass, that, although the Catholic Church has never officially recognized the existence of the modern mixed choir, and does not in its rubrics authorize any manner of singing except the unison Gregorian chant, nevertheless, by reason of the expansion and specialization of musical art, and the increasing veneration of the liturgy as the very channel of descending sacramental grace, the people are reduced to a position of passive receptivity.

As regards the singing of hymns in the national languages, the conditions are somewhat different. The laws of the Catholic Church forbid the vernacular in any part of the eucharistic services, but permit vernacular hymns in certain subordinate offices; as, for instance, vespers. But even in these services the restrictions are more emphasized than the permissions. Here also the tacit recognition of a separation of function between the clergy and the laity still persists; there can never be a really sympathetic coöperation between the church language and the vernacular; there is a constant attitude of suspicion on the part of the authorities, lest the people's hymn should afford a rift for the subtle intrusion of heretical or unchurchly ideas.

The whole spirit and implied theory of the Catholic Church is therefore unfavorable to popular hymnody. This was especially the case in the later Middle Ages. The people could put no heart into the singing of Latin. The priests and monks, especially in such convent schools as St. Gall, Fulda, Metz, and Reichenau, made heroic efforts to drill their rough disciples in the Gregorian chant, but their attempts were ludicrously futile. Vernacular hymns were simply tolerated on certain prescribed occasions. In the century or more following the Reformation, the Catholic musicians and clergy, taught by the astonishing popular success of the Lutheran songs, tried to inaugurate a similar movement in their

own ranks, and the publication and use of Catholic German hymn-books attained large dimensions, but this enthusiasm finally died out. Both in mediæval and in modern times there has virtually remained a chasm between the musical practice of the common people and that of the church, and in spite of isolated attempts to encourage popular psalmody, the restrictions have always had a depressing effect, and the free hearty union of clergy and congregation in choral praise and prayer is essentially unknown.

The new conceptions of the relationship of man to God which so altered the fundamental principle and the external forms of worship under the Lutheran movement, manifested themselves most strikingly in the mighty impulse given to congregational song. The explanation of the musical outburst is here. The love of song and the practice of song in the church had existed for centuries, but hampered by lack of clerical sympathy and by constant suspicion. Luther set the national impulse free, and taught the people that in singing praise they were performing a service that was well pleasing to God and a necessary part of public communion with him. It was not simply that Luther charged the popular hymnody with the energy of his world-transforming doctrine,—he also gave it a dignity which it had never possessed before, certainly not since the apostolic age, as a part of the official liturgical song of the church. Both these facts gave the folk hymn its wonderful proselyting power in the sixteenth century,—the latter gives it its importance in the history of sacred music.

Luther's work for the people's song was in substance a detail of his liturgical reform. His knowledge of human nature taught him the value of set forms and ceremonies, and his appreciation of what was universally true and edifying in the liturgy of the mother church led him to retain many of her prayers, hymns, responses, etc., along with new provisions of his own. But in his view the service is constituted

through the activity of the believing subject; the forms and expressions of worship are not in themselves indispensable—the one thing necessary is faith, and the forms of worship have their value simply in defining, inculcating, stimulating, and directing this faith, and enforcing the proper attitude of the soul toward God in the public social act of devotion. The liturgy is not, as in the Catholic view, divinely inspired and regulated, itself of objective efficacy, the channel of descending grace by virtue of priestly mediation. The Lutheran conception recognized the entire body of believers as a universal priesthood, the offices of worship were restored to them, in theory and in fact, as their voluntary initiative act, certain functions, indeed, to be delegated to others, but these others their representatives, not their spiritual superiors. It will easily be seen what an unprecedented importance was given to congregational singing by this view, and how the whole theory of church music was altered by it. The congregational song both symbolized and realized the principle of direct access of the believer to the Father, and thus exemplified in itself alone the whole spirit of the worship of the new church. That this act of worship should be in the native language of the nation was a matter of course, and hence the popular hymn, set to familiar and appropriate melody, became at once the characteristic, official, and liturgical expression of the emotion of the people in direct communion with God.

The immense consequence of this principle was seen in the mighty outburst of sacred song that followed the founding of the new church by Luther at Wittenberg. It was not that the nation was electrified by a poetic genius, or by any new form of musical excitement; it was simply that the old restraints upon self-expression were removed, and that the people could celebrate their new-found freedom in Christ Jesus by means of the most intense agency known to man, which they had been prepared by inherited musical temperament and ancient habit to use to the full. No wonder that

they received this unhampered privilege with thanksgiving, and that the land resounded with the lyrics of faith and hope.

Luther himself led the way and furnished the model. In connection with his work of reconstructing the ancient liturgy for use in the Wittenberg churches, as set forth in the "Formula Missae" of 1523 and the "Deutsche Messe" of 1526, he turned his attention to the need of suitable hymns and tunes. He took up this work, not only out of his love of song, but also from necessity. He wrote to Nicholas Haussmann, pastor at Zwickau: "I would that we had many German songs which the people could sing during the Mass. But we lack German poets and musicians, or they are unknown to us, who are able to make Christian and spiritual songs, as Paul calls them, which are of such value that they can be used daily in the house of God. One can find but few which have the appropriate spirit." The reason for this complaint was short-lived; a crowd of hymnists sprang up as if by magic, and among them Luther was, as in all things, chief. His work as a hymn writer began soon after the completion of his translation of the New Testament, while he was engaged in translating the Psalms. Then, as Koch says, "the spirit of the psalmists and prophets came over him." Several allusions in his letters show that he took the Psalms as his model, that is to say, he did not think of a hymn as designed for the teaching of dogma, but as the sincere, spontaneous outburst of love and reverence to God for his goodness.

The first hymn-book of evangelical Germany was published in 1524 by Luther's friend and coadjutor, Johann Walther. It contained four hymns by Luther, three by Paul Sparatus, and one by an unknown author. Another book appeared in the same year containing fourteen more hymns by Luther in addition to the eight of the first book. Six more from Luther's pen appeared in a song-book edited by Walther in 1525. The remaining hymns of Luther (twelve

in number) were printed in five song-books of different dates, ending with Klug's in 1543. Four hymn-books contain pre-faces by Luther, the first written for Walther's book of 1525, and the last for one published by Papst in 1545. Luther's example was contagious. Other hymn writers at once sprang up, who were filled with Luther's spirit, and who took his songs as models. Printing-presses were kept busy, song-books were multiplied, until at the time of Luther's death no less than sixty collections, counting the various editions, had been issued. There was reason for the sneering remark of a Romanist that the people were singing themselves into the Lutheran doctrine. The principles of worship promulgated by Luther and implied in his liturgical arrangements were adopted by all the Protestant communities; whatever variations there might be in the external forms of worship (and Luther expressly declared that the "*Deutsche Messe*" was not intended as a law to the church), yet in all of them the congregational hymn held a prominent place, and it is to be noticed that almost without exception the chief hymn writers of the Lutheran time were theologians and preachers.

Luther certainly wrote thirty-six hymns. A few others have been ascribed to him without conclusive evidence. By far the greater part of these thirty-six are not entirely original. Many of them are translations or adaptations of Psalms, some of which are nearly literal transfers. Other selections from Scripture were used in a similar way, among which are the Ten Commandments, the *Ter Sanctus*, the song of Simeon, and the Lord's Prayer. Similar use, that is close translation or free paraphrase, was made of certain Latin hymns by Ambrose, Gregory, Hus, and others, and also of certain religious folk songs of the pre-Reformation period. Five hymns only are completely original, not drawn in any way from older compositions. Besides these five many of the transcriptions of Psalms and older hymns owe but little to their models. The chief of these, and the most celebrated of all Luther's

hymns, the "Ein' feste Burg," was suggested by the forty-sixth Psalm, but nothing could be more original in spirit and phraseology, more completely characteristic of the great reformer. The beautiful poems, "Aus tiefer Noth" (Ps. cxxx.), and "Ach Gott, vom Himmel sieh' darein" (Ps. xii.), are less bold paraphrases, but still Luther's own in the sense that their expression is a natural outgrowth of the more tender and humble side of his nature.

No other poems of their class by any single man have ever exerted so great an influence, or have received so great admiration, as these few short lyrics of Martin Luther. And yet at the first reading it is not easy to understand the reason for their celebrity. As poetry they disappoint us; there is no artfully modulated diction, no subtle and far-reaching imagination. Neither do they seem to chime with our devotional needs; there is a jarring note of fanaticism in them. We even find expressions that give positive offense, as when he speaks of the "Lamb roasted in hot love upon the cross." We say that they are not universal, that they seem the outcome of a temper that belongs to an exceptional condition. This is really the fact; here is the clue to their proper study. They do belong to a time, and not to all time. We must consider that they are the utterance of a mind engaged in conflict, and often tormented with doubt of the outcome. They reveal the motive of the great pivotal figure in modern religious history. More than that—they have behind them the great impelling force of the Reformation. Perhaps the world has shown a correct instinct in fixing upon "Ein' feste Burg" as the typical hymn of Luther and of the Reformation. Heine, who called it "the Marseillaise of the Reformation"; Frederick the Great, who called its melody (not without reverence) "God Almighty's grenadier march"; Mendelssohn and Meyerbeer, who chose the same tune to symbolize aggressive Protestantism, and Wagner, who wove its strains into the grand march which celebrates the military triumphs of

united Germany—all these men had an accurate feeling for the patriotic and moral fire which burns in this mighty hymn. The same spirit is found in other of Luther's songs, but often combined with a tenderer music, in which emphasis is laid more upon the inward peace that comes from trust in God, than upon the fact of outward conflict. A still more exalted mood is disclosed in such hymns as "Nun freut euch, lieben Christen g'mein," and "Vom Himmel hoch da komm ich her"—the latter a Christmas song said to have been written for his little son Hans. The first of these is notable for the directness with which it sets forth the Lutheran doctrine of justification by faith alone. It is in this same directness and homely vigor and adaptation to the pressing needs of the time that we must find the cause of the popular success of Luther's hymns. He knew what the dumb, blindly yearning German people had been groping for during so many years, and the power of his sermons and poems lay in the fact that they offered a welcome spiritual gift in phrases that went directly to the popular heart. His speech was that of the people—idiomatic, nervous, and penetrating. He had learned how to talk to them in his early peasant home, and in his study of the folk songs. Coarse, almost brutal at times, we may call him, as in his controversies with Henry VIII., Erasmus, and others; but it was the coarseness of a rugged nature, of a son of the soil, a man tremendously in earnest, blending religious zeal with patriotism, never doubting that the enemies of his faith were confederates of the devil, who was as real to him as Duke George or Dr. Eck. No English translation can quite do justice to the homely vigor of his verse. Carlyle has succeeded as well as possible in his translation of "Ein' feste Burg," but even this masterly achievement does not quite reproduce the jolting abruptness of the meter, the swing and fire of the movement. The greater number of Luther's hymns are set to a less strident pitch, but all alike speak a language fitted to become the appropriate speech of those who formed

the bone and sinew of the race. In philological history these hymns have a significance equal to that of Luther's translation of the Bible, in which scholars agree in finding the virtual creation of the modern German language. And the elements that should give new life to the national speech were to be found among the commonalty. "No one before Luther," says Bayard Taylor, "saw that the German tongue must be sought for in the mouths of the people—that the exhausted expression of the earlier ages could not be revived, but that the newer, fuller, and richer speech, then in its childhood, must at once be acknowledged and adopted. With all his scholarship Luther dropped the theological style, and sought among the people for phrases as artless and simple as those of the Hebrew writers." "The influence of Luther on German literature cannot be explained until we have seen how sound and vigorous and many-sided was the new spirit which he infused into the language." All this will apply to the hymns as well as to the Bible translation. In this was one great element in the popular effect which these hymns produced. Their simple, homebred, domestic form of expression caught the public ear in an instant. Those who have at all studied the history of popular eloquence in prose and verse are aware of the electrical effect that may be produced when ideas of pith and moment are sent home to the masses in forms of speech that are their own. Luther's hymns may not be poetry in the high sense; but they are certainly eloquence, they are popular oratory in verse, put into the mouths of the people themselves by one of their own number.

In spite of the fact that these songs were the natural outcome of a period of spiritual and political conflict, and give evidence of this fact in almost every instance, yet they are less dogmatic and controversial than might be expected, for Luther, bitter and intolerant as he often was, understood the requirements of church song well enough to know that theological and political polemic should be kept out of it. Never-

theless these hymns are a powerful witness to the great truths which were the corner-stone of the doctrines of the Reformed church. They constantly emphasize the principle that salvation comes not through works or sacraments or any human mediation, but only through the merits of Christ and faith in his atoning blood. The whole perverted machinery of Mariolatry, hagiolatry, priestly absolution, personal merit, and what not, which had so long stood between the individual soul and Christ, was broken down. Christ is no longer a stern, hardly appeasable Judge, but a loving Saviour, yearning over mankind, stretching out hands of invitation, asking not a slavish submission to formal observances, but a free, spontaneous offering of the heart. This was the message that thrilled Germany. And it was through the hymns of Luther and those modeled upon them that the new evangel was most widely and quickly disseminated. The friends as well as the enemies of the Reformation asserted that the spread of the new doctrines was due more to Luther's hymns than to his sermons. The editor of a German hymn-book published in 1565 says: "I do not doubt that through that one song of Luther, 'Nun freut euch, lieben Christen g'mein,' many hundred Christians have been brought to the faith who otherwise would not have heard of Luther." An indignant Jesuit declared that "Luther's songs have damned more souls than all his books and speeches." We read marvelous stories of the effect of these hymns; of Lutheran missionaries entering Catholic churches during service and drawing away the whole congregation by their singing; of wandering evangelists standing at street corners and in the market places, singing to excited crowds, then distributing the hymns upon leaflets so that the populace might join in the pæan, and so winning entire cities to the new faith almost in a day. This is easily to be believed when we consider that the progress of events and the drift of ideas for a century and more had been preparing the German mind for Luther's message, that as a peo-

ple the Germans are extremely susceptible to the enthusiasms that utter themselves in song, and that these hymns carried the truths for which their souls had been thirsting in language of extraordinary force, clothed in melodies which they had long known and loved. Take such a stanza as this:—

“Dear Christians, one and all rejoice,
With exultation springing;
And with united heart and voice
And holy rapture singing,
Proclaim the wonders God hath done,
How His right arm the victory won;
Right dearly it has cost Him.”

Or this:—

“But love and grace with Thee prevail,
O God, our sins forgiving;
The holiest deeds can naught avail
Of all before Thee living.
Before Thee none can boast him clear:
Therefore must each Thy judgment fear,
And live on Thy compassion.”

Still another:—

“Into hell's fierce agony
Sin doth headlong drive us;
Where shall we for succor flee.
Who, oh, who will hide us?
Thou only, blessed Saviour.
Thy precious blood was shed to win
Peace and pardon for our sin.
Holy and gracious God!
Holy and mighty God!
Holy and all-merciful Saviour!
Let us not, we pray,
From the true faith's comfort
Fall in our need away.”

Imagine the effect of such words as these upon a deeply religious and dissatisfied people! Let us not be surprised at the seeming magical effect of these hymns. It is not that the Germans are a volatile people, easily carried off their feet by a wave of excitement, for exactly the opposite is the

case. Schuré has hit the fact of the matter when he says: "Since the fifteenth century the church had its religion and the people theirs, the former to rule, the latter to satisfy the needs of their hearts, and in this consisted the strength of this nation. Remarkable enough, a church jealous for its own unlimited dominion has always more power over a frivolous, superficial, and skeptical nation than over one that is uncorrupted, credulous, but inwardly serious. The first mocks, but obeys, the other considers and revolts; the first is restive, but yields, the second at first follows, then mutinies, and no power on earth can bring it again under the old yoke, since it is free in its conscience."

We must now briefly consider the tunes to which the hymns of Luther and his imitators were sung. What was the nature and origin of these melodies? Were they original, or borrowed? Were they a new or old style? We find that throughout the Middle Ages the method of musical composition was in one respect radically different from that prevailing to-day. A composer now invents his themes and melodies, as well as the harmonies. But down to about the year 1600 the scientific musician always borrowed his themes from older sources—the Gregorian chant, or popular songs—and worked them up into choral movements according to the laws of counterpoint. He was, therefore, a tune *setter*, not a tune *maker*. The same custom prevailed among the German musicians of Luther's day. In this way were produced the early German Chorales, or congregational hymn tunes. The task of Luther and his musical associates was to take melodies from music of all sorts with which they were familiar, alter them to fit the meter of the new hymns, and add the necessary harmonies. In course of time the enormous multiplication of hymns, each demanding a musical setting, and the requirements of simplicity in popular song, brought about a union of the functions of the tune maker and the tune setter, but this was not until after Luther's day.

Down to a very recent period it has been universally believed that Luther was a musician of the first sort, i. e., a tune maker, and that the melodies of many of his hymns were of his own production. Among writers on this period no statement is more frequently made than that Luther wrote tunes as well as hymns. This belief is as tenacious as the myth of the rescue of church music by Palestrina. Dr. L. W. Bacon, in the preface to his edition of the hymns of Luther with their original melodies, assumes, as an undisputed fact, that many of these tunes are Luther's own invention. Even Julian's "Dictionary of Hymnology," which is supposed to be the embodiment of the most advanced and exhaustive scholarship in this department of learning, makes similar statements. But this is altogether an error. Luther composed no tunes. Under the patient investigation of a half-century, the melodies originally associated with Luther's hymns have all been traced to their sources. The tune of "Ein feste Burg" was the last to yield; Bäumker finds the germ of it in a Gregorian melody. Such proof as this is, of course, decisive and final. The hymn tunes called Chorales, which Luther, Walther, and others provided for the Reformed churches, were drawn from three sources, viz., the Latin song of the Catholic Church, the tunes of German hymns before the Reformation, and the secular folk song.

1. If Luther was willing to take many of the prayers of the Catholic liturgy for use in his German Mass, still more ready was he to adopt the melodies of the ancient church. In his preface to the Funeral Hymns (1542), after speaking of the forms of the Catholic Church, which in themselves he did not disapprove, he says: "In the same way have they much noble music, especially in the abbeys and parish churches, used to adorn most vile, idolatrous words. Therefore have we undressed these lifeless, idolatrous, crazy words, stripping off the noble music, and putting it upon the living and holy word of God, wherewith to sing, praise, and honor the same,

that so the beautiful ornament of music, brought back to its right use, may serve its blessed Maker, and his Christian people." A few of Luther's hymns were translations of old Latin hymns and sequences, and these were set to the original melodies. Luther's labor in this field was not confined to the Chorale, but, like the founders of the musical service of the Anglican church, he established a system of chanting, taking the Roman use as a model, and transferring many of the Gregorian tones. Johann Walther, Luther's co-laborer, relates the extreme pains which Luther took in setting notes to the Epistle, Gospel, and other offices of the service. He intended to institute a threefold division of church song—the choir anthem, the unison chant, and the congregational hymn. Only the first and third forms have been retained. The use of chants derived from the Catholic service was continued in some churches as late as the end of the seventeenth century. But, as Helmore says, "the rage for turning creeds, commandments, psalms, and everything to be sung, into meter, gradually banished the chant from Protestant communities on the Continent."

2. In cases in which pre-Reformation vernacular hymns were adopted into the song-books of the new church the original melodies were often retained, and thus some very ancient German tunes, although in modern guise, are still preserved in the hymn-books of modern Germany.

3. The secular folk song of the sixteenth century and earlier was a very prolific source of the German Chorale. After Luther's day, however, for it does not appear that any of his tunes were of this class. Centuries before the great age of artistic German music began, the common people possessed a large store of simple songs which they delighted to use on festal occasions, at the fireside, at their labor, in love-making, at weddings, christenings, and in every circumstance of social and domestic life. Here was a rich mine of simple and expressive melodies from which Chorale tunes might be

fashioned. In some cases this transfer involved considerable modification, in others but little, for at that time there was far less difference between the sacred and the secular musical styles than there is now. The associations of these tunes were not always of the most edifying kind, and some of them were so identified with unsanctified ideas that the strictest theologians protested against them, and some were weeded out. In course of time the old secular associations were forgotten, and few devout Germans are now reminded that some of the grand melodies in which faith and hope find such appropriate utterance are variations of old love songs and drinking songs. There is nothing exceptional in this borrowing of the world's tunes for ecclesiastical uses. We find the same practice among the French, Dutch, English, and Scotch Calvinists, the English Wesleyans, and the hymn-book makers of America. The same has been true of the modern Jews. This method is often necessary when a young and vigorously expanding church must be quickly provided with a store of songs, but in its nature it is only a temporary recourse.

One who studies the German Chorales in the German hymn-books of the present day must not imagine that he knows the sacred songs of the Reformation. They have been greatly modified in rhythm, harmony, and in many cases even in melody. The mediæval Gregorian scale and harmonic system was the only one then in existence. The present Chorale, moreover, is usually written in notes of equal length. The meter is in most cases double, rarely triple. This manner of writing gives the Chorale a singularly grave, solid, and stately character, often amounting to monotony and dullness. There was far more variety and life in the primitive Chorale, more vigor of accent as compared with the steady, even flow of the modern. The transformation of the Chorale into its present shape was completed in the latter part of the eighteenth century, a result, some say, of the relaxation of spiritual energy in the church of Germany in the period of Rational-

ism. A party has been formed among German churchmen for the restoration of the primitive rhythmic Chorale. Some congregations have adopted the reform, but there is as yet no sign that it will ultimately prevail.

Thus the German hymn, revitalized by Luther, clothed in fitting music, assumed its active rôle in the momentous spiritual, intellectual, and political awakening of the sixteenth century. No other example is to be found in history of a popular poesy so efficient in promoting the movement that produced it, or so instructive a reflex of the temper of a people in the moment of revolutionary activity. It is not that they were a new phenomenon. Luther simply availed himself of a principle which had existed among the Germans almost from the hour of their conversion, a principle which had always been recognized by the mediæval church, but held in abeyance, and virtually repressed by the very conditions of her rule. Luther gave it free play, a more practical and pregnant form, and adapted it to the conditions of the new age. With but little that was original in externals, there was at the heart of the Lutheran hymnody that which made an epoch. Like all great artificers in the world of thought, Luther builded better than he knew. Upon the course he laid was reared the work of Paul Gerhardt and the thousand evangelical hymnists of Germany, of Johannes Eccard, Sebastian Bach, Felix Mendelssohn, and the scores of composers who stored the treasure-house of Protestant religious song. We study the hymns of Luther, therefore, to find the germ from which sprang such magnificent results. We shall not find it if we merely apply æsthetic canons of style and form. The abrupt, rough-hewn lines of Luther must not be compared with the balanced rhythms, the ingenious rhymes, the melting cadences, the glowing fancies, the subtle turns of thought that appear in the hymns of Bernard of Cluny and Adam of St. Victor, or those of Newman, and Faber, and Heber, and Palmer, and

many Christian bards in whose ardent lyrics devotion finds divine nourishment. Luther's songs were not the product of conscious art: they were sparks struck from a steadfast mind by the shock of strenuous circumstance. We cannot make these songs our own, in the sense that we appropriate the hymns of those later poets whose vision takes a more comprehensive sweep, and whose consolations touch upon every need of the heart. They are not for our age, they are monuments to conditions and modes of feeling which can never return. But they are stern and imposing monuments, more durable than brass, and upon them, if we have eyes to see, are carved memorials of a great soul and a great age.

ARTICLE VI.

THE NATURE OF THE RESURRECTION BODY
OF CHRIST.

BY THE REV. SAMUEL HUTCHINGS, D. D.

THE nature of the resurrection body of Christ has been much discussed by learned men at different times in the church. Three opinions have prevailed. One, that his body was changed as to its *substance* at his resurrection, and so became a spiritual and wholly different body in its very *essence*. Another opinion held is, that Christ had after his resurrection the same body as before, but glorified, or, as the earlier writers termed it, changed as to its *qualities* and *attributes*. The third view, and the one generally held, is, that the body with which Christ rose, was the same material body of flesh and blood which was crucified and laid in the tomb.

The first opinion is akin to the ancient error of the Doctetæ, or Phantasiasts, who held that Christ was a man in appearance only; that all the actions of his life, before and after his resurrection, were a mere phantasm, without any reality whatever.

As this first opinion is mere fanciful speculation, unsupported by any evidence, and is directly opposed to the declaration of our Lord to the disciples, "A spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye see me have," no attempt at refutation is necessary.

The second view, that Christ had the same body in *substance* after the resurrection as before, but possessing new qualities and attributes, and not subject to the laws of flesh and blood, was held by some of the early Fathers. They de-

scribed the body of the risen Lord as ἀθάνατον, ἀφθαρτον, ἀδιάφθορον, αἰώνιον, *immortala, impassibile, incorruptibile*. Irenæus, of the third century, speaks of Christ "as made incorruptible after the resurrection." The earlier Lutheran divines who believed in the ubiquity of Christ's body, described his risen body as glorious, the same in substance, but endued with new qualities, viz., *impalpability, invisibility, and illocality*. Among the moderns who have held this second view are Hahn, Olshausen, and Hengstenberg.

"This second view," says Dr. Edward Robinson, "seems not to differ essentially from the preceding one, except in the single point of identity. In both, our Lord's resurrection body is regarded as possessing like qualities and attributes; but in the former, these are connected with a different substance; while in this they are superinduced upon the same substance. That is to say, in the second view our Lord's resurrection body has a relation to his former human body; while according to the first view it has no such relation."

That the body of Christ was changed at the resurrection to the spiritual, glorified body, has been the opinion of eminent men. This was the view of Bishop Horsley, who says: "His body was indeed risen, but it was become that body which Paul describes in the fifteenth chapter of First Corinthians, which, having no sympathy with the gross bodies of this earthly sphere, nor any place among them, must be undiscernible to the human organs." Dr. Dods of Scotland says: "By the resurrection of Christ, Paul meant his rising from the grave with a body glorified, or made fit for the new and heavenly life he had entered."

The arguments adduced for this view are the following:—

1. Jesus was not recognized by those who met him. When he appeared to Mary Magdalene, "she beheld him, and knew not that it was Jesus," supposing that it was the gardener. So the two disciples going to Emmaus, though they held long conversations with him, and sat at table, and

partook of food with him, did not know him, and were surprised to find him apparently ignorant of what had occurred in Jerusalem concerning the crucifixion of Jesus of Nazareth.

That he was not recognized by Mary is not strange, for, in the first place, she had no idea that he would rise, and therefore was not expecting to see him. Again, her mind was so much agitated and distressed, by the removal of the body, as to lose its quick and accurate perception which she might otherwise have exercised. Further, in the twilight she could not distinctly discern his features. Then again, his dress, being probably that of a gardener, concealed his identity. All these circumstances account for Mary's failure to recognize the Lord. But no sooner does she hear the familiar voice calling her name than she recognizes him. And so far as we know, his appearance was the same as before, for it is not to be supposed that his body was again changed from the spiritual to the natural.

As for the failure of the two disciples on their way to Emmaus to recognize him, the reason is distinctly given by the historian: "Their eyes were holden so that they should not know him." That is, their vision was so supernaturally obstructed as to prevent their recognizing him. And from the fact that *as soon as* "their eyes were opened" they knew him, it is evident their failure to recognize him before was not owing to any essential change in his body. "The whole passage," says Dr. John Owen, "shows that no essential change took place in Jesus, but that the failure of the disciples to recognize him, resulted from a hindrance of some sort supernaturally produced in their vision. If it was the pleasure of Jesus to remain awhile in the company of these disciples without being recognized, he who formed the eye could easily have wrought some change in the organ of vision necessary to such a result."

Whatever the reason for not recognizing him, it is certain they understood that the person with whom they held those

conversations was a real man in a body of flesh and blood.

2. It is argued that the manner of his appearance to the women, and afterwards to the apostles—unforeseen and sudden, and also his disappearance no less sudden—would seem to show that his body had undergone a change from the natural to the spiritual. Thus, having finished his conversation with the two travelers, and blessed and broken the bread, it is said he vanished out of their sight. This language certainly implies a sudden and abrupt departure, but not necessarily a vanishing from sight as a spirit or specter might be supposed to do. When they recognized him, they were doubtless utterly astonished, and before they could collect their thoughts to do him homage, he had withdrawn himself. From the form of expression here used, which is literally, "*He was no longer seen by them,*" nothing can be determined as to the manner of his departure.

Other instances of a like kind with this before his crucifixion are recorded. Thus, when the enemies of Jesus at Nazareth were about to throw him down the precipice to which they had led him, he passed through the midst of them, and went his way (Luke iv. 30). Whether by a miracle he made himself invisible, or assumed some other form, as he had power to do, or whether he so affected their minds or eyes that they could not perceive him, we do not know. We know that he "vanished out of their sight" as he did from the sight of the two disciples. A similar occurrence is recorded in John viii. 59 in his escape from the Jews when they attempted to stone him.

Again, it is said that in the evening of his disappearance from Cleopas and his companion he appeared suddenly to the apostles assembled in a room with the doors closed (and doubtless locked or bolted) for fear of the Jews. This appearance through locked doors is said to be proof that he had a body superior to the laws of matter. Certainly it is if he entered without the doors being opened. The form of expression implies abruptness and suddenness of entrance, but

nothing miraculous. The two disciples from Emmaus had entered a short time before, when the doors were closed, but doubtless opened for their entrance, and Christ may have entered the same way. From its being said that the doors were closed for fear of the Jews, it is inferred that they were fastened. But this does not follow. They may have been closed that the disciples might not be interrupted by spies or informers, rather than from fear of violence. For surely had the Jews been evil-disposed, no bars or bolts would have prevented their entrance, breaking up the assembly, and arresting the leaders. But even if the doors were fastened, there is nothing in the narrative against the idea that Christ directed the door to be opened for him. The statement that he *stood* (in John, *came* and *stood*) in the *midst of them*, denotes only that he came suddenly and unexpectedly among them, but does not tell the *mode* of his entrance.

But suppose the doors were fastened, and we admit that his entrance was effected by a miracle, could not he, who, by his divine power, performed so many miracles, by the same power, have silently opened the doors, then, closing them, veiled their eyes so that they did not recognize him until he actually stood before them? This is the view of Dr. George Campbell, who says: "The words do not necessarily imply that, while the doors continued shut, he had entered miraculously. The participle for closed is more literally *having been closed*, that is before, than being closed. They may, therefore, for aught related by the evangelist, have been made by miracle to fly open, and give him access." This is the view of Calvin, Grotius, Whitby, Dick, Doddridge, and Bloomfield.

In confirmation of this view we may refer to the deliverance of the apostles from prison, when the angel opened the doors, and brought them out, the officers sent to take them reporting that they found the prison-doors securely closed, and the keepers standing without, but no man within (Acts

v. 19-23). These keepers were as ignorant of the departure of the apostles as the disciples were of the entrance of Jesus. In like manner an angel opened the prison-doors, and released Peter, the iron gate leading into the city "opening of its own accord."

Those who hold that Christ entered through closed doors the room where the disciples were assembled, and that therefore his body must have been a glorified one, hold also that he passed through the closed stone doors of the tomb with such a body. If so, we ask, Why the wonderful display of the earthquake, and the descent of the angel from heaven *to roll away the stone*? Why roll away the stone if the body of Christ glorified had already left the tomb through the closed stone door? The stone was no greater obstacle than the closed door of the upper room, and there is no more reason why the one should be supernaturally removed than the other.

3. As proof that Christ's body was changed from the natural to the spiritual at his resurrection, it is said that he left the tomb before it was opened.

This strange statement is made by Bishop Horsley. He says: "It is evident that he had left the sepulcher before it was opened. An angel indeed was sent to roll away the stone, but this was not to let the Lord out, but to let the women in." Again: "St. Matthew's women saw the whole process of the opening of the sepulcher, for they were there before it was opened. They felt the earthquake; they saw the angel descend from heaven; they saw him roll away the vast stone which stopped the mouth of the sepulcher."

But what says the narrative? Matthew, according to the correct rendering, says that when the two Marys arrived at the sepulcher, "there had been a great earthquake, and the angel of the Lord had descended from heaven, and rolled away the stone." According to Mark, when they arrived they said, "Who will roll away the stone from the door of the sepulcher?" "And when they looked, they saw that the stone

was rolled away"! Luke says: "They found the stone rolled away from the sepulcher." John says: "Mary Magdalene cometh to the sepulcher, and seeth the stone rolled away from the sepulcher."

That Jesus therefore left the tomb before the stone was rolled away, as Bishop Horsley affirms, cannot be proved. That the women found the stone removed, and the tomb open when they arrived, is manifest from the fourfold narrative.

4. It is argued that, as Christ certainly ascended in a glorified body, he must have risen from the tomb in such a body. But that does not follow. We have conclusive evidence that he was in a human body as long as he was on the earth, and we have conclusive evidence that he is now in heaven in a glorified body. When the change took place we are not told. But the Scriptures furnish some analogies which enable us to answer the inquiry. Elijah when on earth was in a human body. At the moment of his translation to heaven, his natural body, we believe, was changed to the spiritual, glorified body. Christians who are alive at the coming of Christ will not die, but their bodies will be changed, and fashioned like to Christ's glorious body. When this change takes place, Paul tells us, "We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump, for the trumpet will sound, and the dead will be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed."

Now as this change takes place in the bodies of those Christians at the moment of their ascension, and as the change in the body of Elijah took place at the moment of his translation, we may with reason conclude that the body of Jesus assumed the glorified form in the very act of his ascension.

5. It is argued that, as Christ is declared in Scripture to be the earnest, pledge, and pattern of the future resurrection of his people, that could not be the case if he arose in his natural body, and they with spiritual bodies. But it is not necessary that they should rise with bodies of the same nature,

in order for Christ's resurrection to be a pledge and assurance of theirs. The great fact revealed is, that as he rose, the first-fruits of them that sleep, and entered into his glory, so they, united to him as his members, will also rise, and enter into the same glory. Christ had a mission to fulfill on earth, and, in his human body in which he rose, he fulfilled it during his forty days' sojourn with the disciples, and then ascended to heaven in a glorified body. The risen saints have no such mission, and their resurrection and ascension are simultaneous. Moreover, it was necessary that their bodies, which had decayed, should be changed at the moment of resurrection, but as Christ's body saw no corruption, it might, if there were good reason, remain for a while unchanged, until his ascension.

Having examined the arguments adduced to prove that Christ rose in a spiritual body, let us consider those advanced in support of the third view, that he rose in the same body that was laid in the tomb.

This theory is the one generally held. It was the view of Ephraëm Syrus of the fourth century, Gregory of Nyssa, Epiphanius in the fifth, Cyril, Jerome, and others. Among the moderns, Calvin and his followers have strenuously maintained this view, and it has been recently adopted among the Lutherans by Herder, Neander, Lücke, and Tholuck.

The arguments in support of this are:—

1. The language which Christ uses of himself. When he appeared to the eleven disciples and those gathered with them at Jerusalem, they were greatly terrified, and thought it was a spirit. Once before, when Christ appeared to them walking on the sea, they cried out in terror, supposing it to be a spirit or some phantom. But it was the same Jesus in the same natural body, whom they had often seen before. So now, when in their fright they thought the person so unexpectedly standing before them to be a spirit or phantom

sent to delude them, he said, "Why are ye troubled, and wherefore do reasonings arise in your hearts?"

What course now does Jesus take to reassure his agitated disciples? "Behold my hands and my feet, that it is I myself; handle me and see: for a spirit hath not flesh and bones as ye see me have." And when he had thus spoken, he showed them his hands and his feet. Christ certainly meant by this language to convince his disciples, first, that what they saw was not a spirit or phantom; and, second, that it was the very same body of flesh and bones which they had often seen. For the truth of this he appealed to their physical senses. Handle me, not merely touch me, but *feel with the hand*, and *see*, that is, satisfy yourselves by freely placing your hands on my person, that I am a living, bodily reality, and not a spirit or specter as you imagine. But this is not all. "The pronoun *I myself*," says Dr. Owen, "is in emphatic opposition to their notions of his being a spectral appearance. It is the very form of expression employed the world over to denote the personal identity of the one making use of it. It denotes here that our Lord was the very person whom they had formerly known him to be. It denies that he had undergone any change whatever. He stood before them with the same body in all its physical properties and parts, hands, feet, eyes, mouth, which he had when he was among them as their friend and teacher."

What can be more convincing than the test which Christ presented? It was an appeal to the senses, and the argument was irresistible. The disciples were convinced of the reality of his resurrection in the same body that was crucified.

Dr. Heber Newton admits that the disciples did really believe that Christ arose, and was actually before them in his physical body, but he thinks they were prejudiced in favor of a bodily resurrection, and therefore their testimony is unreliable. But, in fact, their prejudices were against this idea. True, they had seen Lazarus come forth from the grave, the

widow's son and the ruler's daughter restored to life, and thus had proof that the dead could be made to live again in their natural bodies. Yet when Christ declared to them that he would rise again on the third day, they did not understand what the rising of the dead meant; and when Jesus appeared to them, they thought it was a spirit, instead of a material body. Though they were afterwards convinced as to the true nature of Christ's body, yet Dr. Newton thinks they were deceived. This is incredible. How could they be deceived? Could they not trust their own senses of sight and touch? Our senses may sometimes deceive, but only when they are diseased, or their functions carelessly performed, or when the object is so situated as not to be fully subjected to their test. But otherwise their testimony is infallible, and they are safe guides.

In the case of the disciples there was no possibility of deception. The result of their seeing and handling the body of Jesus, was to them a demonstration that the body before them was his veritable body of flesh and bones. Apparent difficulties must give way to proved facts.

But Thomas was not present at the first interview, and when they told him that they had seen the Lord, he refused to believe their testimony, and demanded, what to him would be the only satisfactory test, a personal examination of the body. "Except I shall see in his hands the print of the nails, and put my finger into the print of the nails, and thrust my hand into his side, I will not believe." This test Jesus graciously granted him. The result was his firm conviction that Christ had actually risen from the dead, and with joyful faith and adoring love, he exclaimed, "My Lord and my God."

In this connection let the following circumstance be noted: When Jesus met the women who had left the sepulcher to tell the disciples the wonderful news, *they held him by the feet* (ἐκπάρτησαν αὐτοῦ τοὺς πόδας) Matt. xxviii. 9. "They

could," says Dr. Robinson, "have no doubt, that the limbs, the body which they then touched and embraced, were the very same in which three days before they had seen and known the Lord."

It is easier to believe that Christ in his natural body miraculously opened the doors even if locked or bolted, than to believe that, being, as is claimed, in a spiritual body, he practiced a deception on his disciples, when he told them to assure themselves by handling his body and his wounds, that it was the very same body that had been crucified.

2. That Christ's body was unchanged in its nature when he rose from the tomb, is evinced by his acts.

At the interview with the disciples, after he had shown them his hands and his feet, to his inquiry if they had any food, they gave him a piece of broiled fish, and some honey, which he took and ate before them.

The act of eating belongs to the nature of the human body, but not to a spirit, or a glorified body. It was the common and popular belief of that day that spirits do not eat. Hence the evidence which our Lord, by eating in the presence of the disciples, gave, was not only fitted to remove all doubts from their minds of his personal identity, but also furnished proof against the Docetæ or Gnostics, who held that it was only an appearance that lived and died in Judæa. This proof is so employed by John in his first epistle (i. 1): "That which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled of the word of life." As Christ ate before the disciples in order to remove any remaining doubt as to his identity, they were now convinced that it was his true body of flesh and blood which they saw.

Other instances are given of his eating. On the shores of the Lake of Tiberias, where he met the disciples, he took bread and gave to them, he himself doubtless partaking with them. And Peter in his discourse with Cornelius and his

friends, said, "God raised him up, and showed him openly unto witnesses chosen before of God, even to us who did eat and drink with him, after he rose from the dead," implying certainly that he ate and drank with them. The eating and drinking are presented as proof of the reality of Christ's human body.

To break the force of this argument, it is objected that the angels who came to Abraham ate and drank, and yet they appeared to the eye without corporeal substance. To this it is replied that they are expressly called men (Gen. xviii. 2). And the narrative certainly conveys the idea that they were in human bodies. They came to Abraham as travelers. He ran to meet them, brought water to wash their soiled feet, prepared a meal and set it before them, and we are told (ver. 8) they did eat. Two of the men went on their way towards Sodom, and Abraham accompanied them. They ate and drank and lodged with Lot, and when he was pressed by the crowd, they with their hands pulled him in, and shut the door. All these circumstances show plainly that the angels appeared in human bodies, and therefore eating and drinking were natural to them, as it was with Christ, and in both cases the act proves the nature of the body.

3. It was essential that Christ should appear to the disciples in the body which they had known, as they were to be witnesses of his resurrection, which would have been impossible had the body been different from the one placed in the tomb. Had the risen body been a spiritual, impalpable, glorified body, it would not have been the resurrection of the Christ who had been crucified, and who foretold that he, the very one whom the disciples saw, would rise again on the third day. They were appointed to be witnesses of his resurrection, and, it was necessary, in order that they might be able to testify the truth of his having risen, that they should have such evidence as could not be gainsaid. Such evidence

they had, and not a doubt remained in their minds as to his personal identity.

On this point Dr. Owen has the following remarks: "It was necessary to the fulfillment of his own repeated prediction, that his body would rise from the dead on the third day. Of this fact the disciples were to be witnesses. They were to have therefore the most indubitable evidence, that of the senses, of the truth of this great fact, which was to be at the very basis of the Christian religion as a cardinal point of faith (1 Cor. xvii. 1). Now what cognizance by their physical senses, such as sight and touch, could they have of a glorified body? Had any revelation been made to them as to the nature and properties of heavenly bodies? There is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body. Of the former the disciples had some knowledge; of the latter, none whatever, except the revealed fact that such glorified bodies exist, or were to exist in heaven. Who could believe their testimony to the resurrection of Christ, if, when they stretched their hands to touch the sacred person of their divine Lord in confirmation of their faith that he had actually risen, they had perceived only an intangible, spiritual body?" Again, "The actual, tangible, bodily appearance of our Lord, is the great and fundamental fact of the gospel, and any interpretation which regards the appearance of Jesus during his forty days on earth after his resurrection as one in a spiritual rather than in a natural body, should be regarded as leading to an error which would undermine the very foundation on which Christianity reposes. If we give up this great truth which he himself took such pains to establish by eating and drinking in the presence of his disciples, bidding them touch him, and showing them his hands and his feet, we vitiate and destroy the main proof of his resurrection."

This argument seems impregnable. If the apostles when pressed by their adversaries, instead of being able to declare with certainty, and without any qualification, that Jesus Christ

rose from the dead in that same body which was taken down from the cross, had been obliged to say that Christ's resurrection body had no blood, as Alford teaches, and could pass, an impalpable, shadowy substance, through closed doors and barred gates, their message would have been received with scorn and ridicule.

4. Another consideration in favor of the view that Jesus rose in his natural body is, that after his resurrection he remained on earth forty days, having interviews with the apostles, and instructing them in the things pertaining to the kingdom of God. He appeared to them eleven different times, and once to five hundred brethren together. We do not know where he was most of that time, nor the manner of his life. But it is reasonable to suppose that in his intercourse with the apostles for so long a time he would appear in the same body which they had seen in the three years of intimacy with him, rather than in one totally different. Among the interviews with the disciples was that tender one with Peter concerning his love for the Saviour. Is it not unreasonable to suppose that Jesus had that long, familiar conversation with the apostle in a spiritual, intangible, glorified body? Moreover, if it were necessary, in order for Christ to hold intercourse with men during his three years of ministry on earth, it was equally necessary for him to retain that nature in his intercourse with the apostles during his sojourn of forty days. But this is not all. The work for which the apostles were to be qualified, was to go forth and testify that Christ, the very one they had known in a human body, had risen in the same body. They had been "slow to believe." The report of the women that they had seen him, seemed as "idle tales," and they disbelieved the testimony of those returning from Emmaus. But when Christ showed them his hands and feet, and told them to handle him, and see that it was not a bodiless specter before them, they believed that he had actually risen. But these interviews before going into

Galilee were few and brief, and the impressions they had received of his personal identity, might have been effaced, had they seen him no more, or had he appeared to them in an ethereal, impalpable form, rather than in his natural body. To prevent this, and fully prepare them to be witnesses of his resurrection, it was necessary that they should have frequent interviews with him. And this was their privilege during those forty days. As they listened to the familiar voice, beheld the same lovely features, and heard his gracious words, not the shadow of a doubt did they have that he was the very same Saviour whom they had seen, loved, and followed.

In closing this part of the subject, it is proper to notice a peculiar view held by some concerning the change in the body of Christ. While admitting that he rose in his human body, they think that his body was gradually changed. This is the view of the German scholars Hahn, Olshausen, and Hengstenberg. They regard the process of transformation of the Lord's body from human flesh and blood into the glorified state as commencing with the resurrection, and going on gradually through the forty days, until completed at his ascension.

On this, Dr. Robinson remarks: "In respect to the idea of a gradual process of glorification going on in our Lord's risen body, for forty days, it is enough perhaps to say that there exists not the slightest warrant for it in any part of the Scriptures,—not the slightest hint, which logically or philosophically can be wrested to sustain such a position. It is an airy hypothesis, without foundations, without necessity, without utility; and as unsound in its philosophy as it is without analogy in the providence and Word of God. It asserts of the body of our Lord just what he himself took pains to contradict; and what assuredly it never afterwards entered into the hearts of his disciples and apostles to conceive."

The evidence presented from Scripture in this discussion

concerning the nature of Christ's risen body clearly establishes two conclusions: one, that Christ endeavored in various ways to convince the disciples that the body which they saw was the same body of flesh and blood they had seen crucified and laid in the tomb; the other, that the disciples were convinced from the *acts* and *words* of Christ that his body was, after he rose, that very identical body, and not a shadowy, spectral, impalpable form, as they had supposed.

While fully believing that the body which rose was the same material, fleshly body that was crucified and buried, it is not questioned that there may have been some peculiar manifestations at times in his external appearance. The two views are consistent. Such was sometimes the case before his death, and it may have been so after his resurrection. Thus, for instance, at his transfiguration on the Mount his appearance was wonderfully changed. The fashion of his countenance was altered, and his face did shine as the sun. From this it appears that his body was capable of passing from one state to another without losing its identity. There was here no change in the bodily substance of the Lord, no destruction of the proper attributes of a body. He came down from the Mount in the same body in which he ascended, and in it mingled freely with the people as before. In the same body he afterward toiled and suffered. So, while affirming that his body had not been changed to the glorified condition, there may have been at times a marked change in his visage and general appearance from what it was before his passion. But no change in his visage or manner of life can invalidate the arguments presented from Scripture that the body which rose from the dead, and was seen and handled by the disciples, was the very same that had moved about in Judæa, was taken down from the cross, and was laid in Joseph's tomb.

ARTICLE VII.

PROFESSOR PRESTWICH¹ ON SOME SUPPOSED
NEW EVIDENCE OF THE DELUGE.

BY PROFESSOR G. FREDERICK WRIGHT.

IN scientific circles the name of no geologist carries more weight than that of Joseph Prestwich, late professor of geology in the University of Oxford, and author of one of the most elaborate and comprehensive treatises on geology which have ever been published. In England Professor Prestwich's position is very much such as that of the late Professor Dana was in America. His descriptions of the geological facts which have come under his own observation are generally set down to be as nearly perfect as it is possible for a human observer to make them. It is worthy also of note, in connection with the present subject, that Professor Prestwich was the first English geologist fully to recognize the evidence of glacial man in the gravel deposits of Northern France and Southern England. For nearly forty years he has been foremost in the investigations establishing the great antiquity of paleolithic man in Western Europe.

¹ "The Raised Beaches, and 'Head' or Rubble-drift, of the South of England: their relation to the Valley Drifts and to the Glacial Period; and on a late Post-glacial Submergence." From the *Quarterly Journal of the Geological Society*, Vol. xlviii. pp. 263-343. London, 1892.

"The Evidences of a Submergence of Western Europe, and of the Mediterranean Coasts, at the Close of the Glacial or So-called Post-glacial Period, and immediately preceding the Neolithic or Recent Period." [From the] *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London*. Vol. 184 (1893) A, pp. 903-984. [Plate 33.] London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, and Co., 1893.

"A Possible Cause for the Origin of the Tradition of the Flood." Author's copy. Pp. 38.

The scientific papers from which the present summary is made, are the result of observations extending over a lifetime ; but the facts were of such a nature as long to resist all ordinary attempts at explanation. It was only as a last resort that the distinguished author applied to them the theory, that since the advent of man there has been in Western Europe a subsidence of the land to the extent of between one thousand and two thousand feet, from which it subsequently rose in a succession of earthquake shocks. In the opinion of Professor Prestwich this theory, and this only, adequately accounts for all the phenomena, which he details, and thus brings into the view of science an event closely corresponding to that described in Genesis, which is recorded to have been so destructive to the life both of men and animals. We will endeavor to compress into a few pages the more salient points in the evidence ; but to receive an adequate impression of the arguments one must consult the original papers with their abundant illustrations. It should be noted, also, that the facts dwelt upon all relate to regions outside of the glaciated area, and have been carefully distinguished from the many anomalous gravel deposits which have been so diligently studied in connection with the direct evidences of glacial action.

The evidence is classed under three heads, namely, The Rubble-drift of Southern England and Northern France ; The High-level Loess of France and Central Europe ; and The Ossiferous Breccias of the Continent.

1. *The Rubble-drift.*—At numerous places over the southern counties of England and on the south side of Dover Strait, in France, there are deposits of angular gravel, bearing no relation to the present drainage systems of the country, and containing paleolithic implements and the bones of extinct animals associated with prehistoric man. This drift is found as far inland as the vicinity of Oxford, and at an elevation on the Cotteswold Hills of about nine hundred feet. It differs in important respects from all ordinary gravel, such as

is found along river courses or on the beach of oceans and lakes, in—

(1) The angularity and sharpness of the harder constituent *débris*. Evidently the material has been moved but a short distance; since both the fragments of stone and the fractured bones retain their sharp angles.

(2) A second peculiar characteristic is that the material is all of local origin, and is derived from the higher grounds of the immediate vicinity. A significant fact, also, in connection with this, is that the drift is arranged around the base of the higher land, as if it had been swept in all directions from it, yet so far from the base that the agency of distribution could not have been running water. In some cases, as on the South Downs, at Portslade, west of Brighton, this drift extends from two to five miles over a comparatively level surface, but the material is not collected 'in deltas, as would be the case if it were transported by small streams, but is pretty equally distributed around the base, nor does it have any regular stratification, as would be the case if it had been transported by ordinary water action.

(3) There is a total absence in these deposits of marine and fluviatile shells. This has ordinarily been taken as conclusive evidence against the origin of these deposits during a period of submergence. In the opinion of Professor Prestwich, however, it is simply evidence of the brevity of the submergence: the time of its continuance was too short to permit the establishment of colonies of shell-fish of any description.

The only way in which Professor Prestwich finds it possible to explain this distribution of Rubble-drift is on the theory of a submergence followed by a series of paroxysmal periods of elevation. We will permit him to explain the process in his own words:—

"It is evident that the force—whatever it was—which determined the formation of the Rubble-drift acted from above downwards. This, under certain circumstances, might have been the result of the descent

from the hilltops of ice and snow, or of water. Ice might have acted in some respects in accordance with the observed phenomena, but in other respects there are the objections I have already named; and with regard to rain and surface-waters, the results are, as I have shown, irreconcilable with their agency. But there is another form under which we may consider the action of water, and this, although not free from objections, answers to all the physical conditions of the case.

"It is that of water in a body, not moving rapidly over the surface as in a wave of translation, but displaced from a state of rest, while the land is in process of elevation from beneath it. There is the objection, amongst others, to a wave of translation that it would carry the *débris* in one prevailing direction, and in each locality we should have foreign elements more or less largely introduced, and the drift assuming a 'crag-and-tail' arrangement behind the hills; whereas no such distribution prevails, but on the contrary we have in the area we have described a number of local centres from which the drift diverges in different or in quaquaversal directions and combines in the intervening valleys. This is a result which would necessarily follow on the emergence of land from beneath a body of water, and such seems to me the most probable solution of the problem we have before us.

"I am therefore led to suppose that a submergence of the land which, judging from the heights at which the Rubble-drift is found, could not have been less than one thousand feet, followed immediately upon the epoch of the low-level valley drifts and the Caves. There is little or nothing to show as a direct consequence of the submergence. The land over which the waters spread seems to have undergone but trifling alteration or denudation. The Raised Beaches exhibit in consequence thereof no apparent erosion, and the Blown Sands only slight denudation; and this may be due to the impact of the Head. It is even difficult to say whether their irregular thickness and eroded surface resulted during the submergence or emergence of the land. I can only conclude that the submergence was slow and gradual, yet sufficiently rapid to prevent wave-action from removing the whole of the Blown Sands, or from forming terraces, which it would have done had the fall been prolonged or subject to long interruptions. For the same reason no portion of the strand was washed on to the land.

"The absence of marine shells in the submerged land may seem a difficulty. Had the submergence been of long duration, a marine fauna would necessarily have established itself; and I can only account for its absence by supposing that re-elevation followed, after but a short interval, on the previous subsidence. The physical results of that elevation are sufficiently definite to justify our assumption, and are explanatory of the conditions under which it was in all probability effected.

"Mr. Hopkins has shown that if a considerable area at the bottom of the sea were *suddenly* elevated, a *wave of translation* accompanied by a

current, the velocity of which would depend principally upon the depth of the sea, would diverge in all directions from the central disturbance. Calculations, he says, 'prove beyond all doubt that paroxysmal elevations, beneath the sea, varying from 50 to 100 feet in height, may produce currents of which the velocities shall vary from at least 5 or 6 to 15 or 20 miles an hour, provided the depth of the sea do not exceed 800 or 1,000 feet.' In considering the magnitude of the blocks which might be moved, he found that the force exerted on the surface of given magnitude *increases as the square of the velocity*, and that it '*varies as the sixth power of the velocity of the current.*' But the movements must be repeated for large blocks to travel beyond short distances.

"It is evident that we have in this form of disturbance an engine of enormous power; and though our hypothesis does not deal with the great changes and powerful currents contemplated by Mr. Hopkins, we may infer what the results might be with even a fractional proportion of such changes. Movements of this character would, like Nasmyth's hammer, be capable at times when the uplift was rapid of exerting enormous force; while at other times, when the uplift was slow, the action might be of the most gentle character. Hopkins's calculations were made for one central area of elevation, and dealt with surrounding level surfaces. In the case before us the area of elevation consisted of a variable and uneven land-surface, so that each hill or group of hills formed a centre for the divergent currents, the velocity of which would further vary according to the varying gradients and lengths of the slopes.

"It follows from these premises that the character of the deposits formed under such circumstances will afford a relative measure of the velocity and duration of the currents under which they were accumulated. Where, for example, the sediment is fine, we may conclude that the velocity was slow, and the rise which gave origin to it small. When, on the contrary, the materials are coarse, we may suppose the rise to have been more rapid and the velocity of the current greater. Where, again, large blocks have been transported, a more energetic movement is made manifest. Some indication also of the duration of the uplift is afforded by the mass of the material moved and distance traversed.¹

As direct evidence of the rapidity of the subsidence, Professor Prestwich points to numerous raised beaches and dunes of blown sand, which underlie the Rubble-drift throughout a considerable portion of its extent near the English Channel. These buried dunes show that, after the beach was formed, the land was somewhat elevated so as to expose it to the wind and so permit the accumulation of the dunes. This

¹ Raised Beaches, etc., pp. 331-333.

elevation was, however, slight. The submergence which followed, was so rapid that there was not time for the waves to obliterate the sand dunes, as they would surely have done had the exposure lasted for more than a very brief period. Upon the re-emergence of the land, the Rubble-drift was swept down over the beach, and thereby everything was preserved from further disturbance till the present time.

2. *Ossiferous Fissures*.—The same theory is demanded to explain the “ossiferous fissures” abundant in Southern England and in France, and long ago described by Buckland in his “*Reliquiae Diluvianae*,” but not fully understood by him. These fissures abound in the limestone regions of Southern England. They are not caverns in the ordinary sense of the word, but simply fissures, open at the top and extending down perpendicularly, or at a slight inclination, sometimes a hundred and forty feet. They are filled with angular rock fragments, broken and splintered bones whose fractured edges are unworn and sharp, all cemented together in a matrix of sand, earth, and clay through which lime has filtered, making what is called a breccia. The bones represent the horse, ox, deer, wolf, hyena, tiger, hare, water rat, weasel, boar, and some other animals.

It is acknowledged by all that these fissures have been filled in from above, and it was the opinion of Dr. Buckland, that the process had been very gradual, and that the animals had accidentally fallen in from time to time. An unanswerable objection to this theory is, that, though the opportunities for observation have been very extensive, in no case has a complete skeleton of any animal been found, or even scattered bones that would make a skeleton. If animals had fallen in, as Buckland supposed, it is inconceivable that this result should have followed. In the fissure at Oreston, Mr. Cottle collected, 1,587 teeth of the animals above mentioned, 147 jaws, 250 vertebræ, and 26 skulls; but there was not a single whole skeleton, nor did any of the bones show marks

of wear, such as would appear if they had been rolled along by a running stream of water, nor did any show the marks of hyenas' teeth, which are common upon the fragments of the ordinary caves.

After considering exhaustively all possible modes of accounting for these facts, Professor Prestwich finds himself limited, as before, to the hypothesis of a brief submergence of the land, such as would drive the animals in a heterogeneous mass to the higher lands, where they would be drowned, and their remains scattered over the surface. After time enough had elapsed for their carcasses thoroughly to decay, the re-emergence of the land distributed the bones by the same process that determined the distribution of the Rubble-drift. As the material was swept along by the successive impulses of uplift beneath the water, the fissures along the slopes became filled in the heterogeneous manner described.

Among the most interesting and instructive fissures supposed to have been filled in this way is that at Santenay, a few miles south of Chalons, in Central France. This is situated upon an isolated hill connected with the range of Côte-d'Or, 1,030 feet above the valley of the Saône, which is here 600 feet above the sea. Two ordinary bone-caves occur upon the opposite sides of the hill, containing remains of the horse, wolf, fox, bear, lion, deer, ox, elephant, and rhinoceros.

The fissure under consideration is near the summit of the hill, and is filled with a breccia—

“composed of the fragments of the adjacent rocks, embedded in a yellow or brownish earth, with bones which were determined by Professor A. Gaudry to be of the cave lion, lynx, horse, wolf (very abundant), fox, badger, bear, hare, rhinoceros, hog, ox, and deer. These were all ‘in a very broken state. M. Gaudry observes that their accumulation could neither be attributed *to man nor to animals*, for the fractures in no way resemble those made by man for the purpose of extracting the marrow, and, notwithstanding the abundance of wolves, *none of the bones show traces of having been gnawed by Carnivora*. How then could this collection have been brought together? As M. Gaudry justly remarks, ‘why should so many *Wolves, Bears, Horses, and Oxen* have ascended a

hill isolated on all sides?' M. Gaudry further remarks that the deposit seems to have been formed by water precipitating the breccia and the bones into a fissure. 'But whence,' he says, 'have come the waters sufficiently abundant to bring together the bones?' The fissure is so near the top of the hill that there is little gathering ground above it, and had the bones and fragments of rock been carried in by a stream or torrential rains, they must have shown more or less wear, and have lost their sharp angles."¹

After duly considering all other suggested hypotheses, Professor Prestwich applies his theory for the solution of the problem in the following forcible paragraph:—

"The condition and position of the bones are, on the other hand, at Santenay and Pédémars, as they are at Oreston and Catsdown, such as might result from the effects of a gradual submergence of the land. For a submergence of the character I have described would naturally drive the animals in the plains to seek refuge on the higher hills. Flying in terror and cowed by the common danger, The Carnivora and Herbivora alike sought refuge on the same spot, and alike suffered the same fate wherever the hill was isolated and not of a height sufficient for them to escape the advancing flood. We may suppose the subsidence to have been so slow that there was no sudden rush of water to carry the bodies far away, so that as they decayed, the limbs fell and were scattered and dispersed irregularly on the submarine surface. When that surface was again upheaved, the bones and detached limbs, together with the detritus on that surface, were, as I have before explained, carried down by divergent currents to lower levels, or they fell into fissures of the rock over which the detrital matter passed, or else, when facing the coast, over the ledges of the old cliffs rising above the Raised Beaches. Swept down by the intermittent currents produced by the more or less rapid uplifts, and falling with the mass of detritus in a body over the old cliffs or into the open fissures, the bones, in the one case as in the other, were broken and smashed in the extraordinary manner we now find them. Added to this was the fall, caused by the earth tremors inevitable with such movements, of fragments of rock, some of large size, from the sides of the fissures, so that very few of the bones escaped whole. At the same time the action was of too short duration, and the transport was too short a distance to wear down the sharp angles either of the rock or the bone fragments. Raised again to the surface, the rain waters, percolating through the calcareous rocks traversed by the fissures, and carrying down carbonate of lime, have generally cemented the débris of the fissures, and occasionally of portions of the 'head' (Brighton), into a hard brecciated mass from which it is now difficult to extract the bones. Where, on the

¹ The Evidences of a Submergence of Western Europe, etc., pp. 936-937.

contrary, the débris remained loose on the surface and formed permeable superficial drift, the effect of water percolation has been to remove the calcareous matter together with the bones, so that where thus exposed, the rubble is more unfossiliferous than when it lies in fissures or hollows where the surface waters could not freely percolate."¹

An equally striking application of the theory is found on the rock of Gibraltar, where fissures nearly three hundred feet deep occur, filled with breccia similar to that already described. In the case of Gibraltar, strong additional support to Professor Prestwich's opinion is given by consideration of the smallness of the area at the top of Gibraltar. The animals found in the fissures on Gibraltar are nearly the same as those enumerated at Santenay. It is in the highest degree improbable that all these various wild animals could have at any time or habitually lived together on the rock.

"The crags and caves may have been the resort of Hyænas and other predaceous animals, but the Deer, and other ruminants, the remains of which were numerous, could never have lived in the neighborhood of these Carnivora. They would naturally have frequented the surrounding plains and forests, where they could have found food, shelter, and water, rather than scrags—dry and in great part barren. It is true that the predaceous animals might have carried there some portions of their prey, but had they done so, either the bones would have been devoured, or such as remained must inevitably have shown marks of the animals' teeth.

"In the second place, no animal remains left on the surface could possibly have escaped destruction in the proximity of ground frequented by Hyænas and other Carnivora; or, supposing any bones had escaped, they would have decayed under ordinary atmospheric agencies, and exhibited more or less weathering; had they also been washed down by streams and amongst rocks, they would have been rolled and worn. But there is no evidence of weathering or wear, nor is it shown that the fissures are connected with old watercourses. The bones have clear and sharp fractured edges. Only in two instances it is mentioned that the bones present the appearance of being weathered and sun-cracked, and this seems to refer to those found with human remains and works of art, and not to the older breccia.

"For these reasons I think this explanation cannot be accepted, and would again revert to the hypothesis of a submergence of the land. This affords a *vera causa* for the association of animals otherwise so little likely

¹ Evidences of a Submergence of Western Europe, etc., pp. 938-939.

to be found together. It could only have been, as in the cases I have before named, a great and common danger, such as that of the gradual encroachment of the sea on the land, that could have so paralyzed their natural instincts as to have driven those various animals to flock together in search of a common place of refuge from a catastrophe which threatened all alike. Under such circumstances the Ruminants would naturally flee from the plain to the higher hills, and when these were isolated, as in this and the other cases I have named, whenever the waters rose above those hills, they were drowned and their limbs dispersed in the manner I have before described."¹

We have room for but one more illustration upon this point. Near Palermo, upon the island of Sicily, there is an ossiferous breccia of a very remarkable and unique character, containing an enormous number of hippopotamus bones, which are so fresh that they are cut into ornaments and polished, and when burnt give out ammoniacal vapor. More than twenty tons of bones were shipped from this one place for commercial purposes in the first six months after their discovery. The bones were mostly those of hippopotami, with a few only of deer, ox, and elephant. They belong to animals of all ages down to the foetus. The bones of the various animals were mixed together without order, and were broken, scattered, and dispersed in fragments, and none of them bore marks of gnawing. The collection is at San Ciro, about two miles from Palermo, and is at the base of the remarkable amphitheater of hills surrounding the plain on all sides, except towards the sea. The hills are from two thousand to four thousand feet in height. The amphitheater is from two to four miles in diameter, and the elevation of the rock shelter is about two hundred feet above the sea.

"The circumstances, therefore, which led to these remarkable accumulations of the remains of the Hippopotami must have been *extraordinary*, and I see no hypothesis which meets the case, so well as the one that I have suggested to account for the bones of Mammalia in the Rubble-drift and in the ossiferous fissures, though the local conditions in this case are peculiar.

"On the submergence of the Sicilian area, the wild animals of the

¹ The Evidences of a Submergence of Western Europe, etc., pp. 944-945.

plains would, as in the case of Santenay, Cette, and Gibraltar, be driven to seek refuge on the nearest adjacent high ground and hills. In the instance before us, the animals must have fled to the amphitheatre of hills which encircle the plain of Palermo on all sides except the sea, and on the slopes of which the Cave of San Ciro and the others are located. As the waters rose, the area of this plain became more and more circumscribed, and retreat more and more impossible, except through a few rare passes in the range of hills, until, at last, the animals were driven together at the base of the hills, where they were stopped by mural precipices impassable to the larger and heavier animals, though some of the more active and agile Ruminants and Carnivores may have, and, judging by the rarity of their remains, probably did escape to the mountains behind. Retreat entirely cut off by projecting promontories on either side, the only paths yet open to the imprisoned herds were those that led to the caves, which were a little above the general level of the plain. Hither the animals must have thronged in vast multitudes, crushing into the caves and swarming over the ground at their entrance, where they were eventually overtaken by the waters and destroyed, and, as their bodies decayed, a confused mass of their remains were left and scattered on or near the spot where they had finally congregated.

"For reasons before given, the land could not have remained long submerged. As it rose intermittently from beneath the waters, our supposition is that the rocky débris on the sides of the hills was hurled down by the effluent waters on to the piles of bones below, breaking them into fragments, and forming, together with them, the heterogeneous mass of bones and rubble constituting the breccia. The last more rapid uplift, the effects of which are so frequently seen in many sections of the *head*, brought down the larger blocks of rock that now lie on the top of the whole. Scinà, an independent witness, inferred from the character of the rock fragments, and from the red clay in which they are imbedded—and which comes from decomposed rock surfaces on the hills above—that, in the case of the Belliemi breccia, both the detritus and the bones had been washed down from Monte Belliemi. All this must have been effected in a space of time comparatively so short, that, though the bodies of the animals decayed, the bones underwent but little change, nor, encased as they became in an almost impermeable breccia, has the change they have since undergone been great.

"Thus there is, in all the essential conditions, a close agreement between this Sicilian breccia and the Rubble-drift of the south of England, as likewise with the rubble on the slopes of Mount Genay, of the Rock of Gibraltar, and of other places mentioned in the preceding pages. In all, the débris consists strictly of local materials; the fragments are angular and sharp; the bones are mostly in fragments, and are neither gnawed nor worn; and the faunal remains are those alone of a land surface, and of species such as then were to be found in the district. This rubble, also,

forms in all these cases the last of the drift beds. The only apparent difference arises from the circumstance that, in the Sicilian area, the geographical configuration was that of a land-locked bay with many minor bays or embrasures in the front of the hill-range, so that, as the waters rose, the animals of the plain were driven together, as in a seine, into those bays, where, as a last resource, they sought shelter under the mural precipices and in the more accessible caves. As these precipices were nearly vertical, they formed, as the land rose again, a partial protection from the effluent currents, which otherwise might have carried the débris to a greater distance outwards. Under no other circumstance that I can conceive could the animal remains have been massed as they are at the foot of the escarpments encircling the plain of Palermo.

"It may be asked how could large herds of Hippopotami have existed in so limited a plain as that of Palermo. It needed then to have had much greater extent and larger rivers. I have shown that the present height of the Raised Beaches on the English Coast does not give the initial upheaval, but is the sum of the differences of several earth-movements—that the primary upheaval of the beaches was not less than 100 to 150 feet greater than the altitude at which they now stand, and that this led to the conversion of a considerable extent of the area of the Bristol and English Channels into dry land. What little evidence we have on the coast of Malta, and of Greece, points to similar elevations of the coasts of the Mediterranean, so that large tracts of dry land may then have existed between the Sicilian and Italian shores, and formed suitable pasture grounds for the Hippopotami. With increase of the land area, so would the rivers also have had increased size, and though they may not have been very large, yet as Sir S. Baker has shown, perennial waters are not indispensable to the Hippopotamus, for in the Settite and other rivers of the Soudan, these huge animals tide over the dry season, by resorting to the few pools left in the dried-up channels of the rivers."¹

Not to pause longer upon the numerous other facts collected by Professor Prestwich bearing upon this point, we turn finally to select one from his many illustrations drawn from the "loess deposits of Europe." It is well, however, to call the attention of the reader to the fact that the origin of the loess is one of the most difficult problems which geologists have to consider, and that here, as in the other evidence, it is the wide experience and great skill of Professor Prestwich which have enabled him clearly to see the bearing of the facts presented. For clearly the loess has been distrib-

¹ *Evidences of a Submergence of Western Europe, etc.*, pp. 959-962.

uted by a variety of agencies. It is only in special conditions that its occurrence can have the significance which Professor Prestwich assigns to it in the instances adduced by him.

Loess is a very fine loam without any intermixture of sand or gravel, or indeed of any grit, and without any remains of marine or fluviatile shells, which in various regions occur upon the surface of the soil. Along the Missouri River from Kansas City far up into Dakota, loess forms the lining bluffs of the valley, having a depth of more than a hundred feet. Large areas in China are covered with it to even greater depths, while its occurrence along the valley of the Rhine accounts for the German name by which it is ordinarily designated.

The anomalous facts connected with its distribution have greatly puzzled geologists. The material is so fine that it is readily blown about hither and thither by the wind, so that Baron Richthofen and others maintain that the loess of China is but the accumulated dust which the westerly winds have brought over from the parched and elevated plains of Mongolia and Thibet. The definite relation, however, of the deposits to water levels in the valleys of the Mississippi and the Rhine make it certain that in many areas these are water deposits. Still, the facts are so complicated that Geikie and others think it necessary in Central Europe to bring in both wind and water to account for its distribution. In the glaciated regions both of Europe and America many anomalous local deposits of loess can be readily accounted for by the action of water held in place by ice during the retreat of the continental glacier. No doubt the greater part of the arguments for the flood drawn from the loess by Mr. Howorth and others are explained by fuller knowledge of the irregularities produced by the slowly melting ice-sheet which covered the northern parts of the continents of Europe and America. But the facts adduced by Professor Prestwich have been carefully selected with reference to this danger of error, and

strongly confirm the other evidence pointing so strongly to the occurrence of a recent catastrophe in Western Europe closely analogous to that described in the biblical account of Noah's Flood. A single one of the facts under this head must suffice.

The Channel Islands of Guernsey and Jersey are surrounded by a raised beach which is overlaid by Rubble-drift such as was described under that head. The greater part of the island, however, consists of a plateau of granitic rocks from 300 to 350 feet above sea-level, but without any commanding heights. This plateau is covered very generally by a deposit of loess or brick earth from five to ten feet thick, extending over the highest points of the surface. In character this is identical with that on the mainland.

It is not possible to account for this deposit of loess on any of the theories which are limited to river floods, glacial inundations, or rain wash as the distributing agencies; for—

“there are no rivers in either island, and the water courses are mere small brooks that could scarcely flood the lowest ground, and certainly could never, in present nor past times, have reached the plateau on which the loess occurs. Nor are there any hills, rising above the general level of the plateaux, the wash from which could have been spread over those plateaux. Nor can it be admitted that it was formed when the island was connected with the mainland, and that the loess is due to the extension of the land flood-waters, over what was then part of the continental area; for, unless the loess were older than the raised beaches, it is obvious, as those beaches extended all round the islands, that at the time of the deposition of the loess, the islands were then, as now, detached from the mainland.”¹

After giving further evidence that this loess must “have an origin independent of those to which it is ordinarily assigned,” and presenting similar evidence in a large number of other cases both among the Channel Islands and over widely spread portions of the Continent, Professor Prestwich states the probable method of accumulation as follows:—

¹ *Evidences of a Submergence of Western Europe, etc.*, pp. 913-914.

"I am well aware that several objections, more or less formidable, may be raised to the hypothesis which I have suggested to account for the origin of this drift. A few of these I may allude to here, though it would not be possible to discuss in these pages the wide and important general questions involved. Those who hold uniformitarian views will object to the want of known precedents and to the exceptional character of the agency proposed. In this difficulty I cannot share. I must repeat what I have long contended for, that it is impossible to suppose that our very limited experience—say of 2,000 years—could furnish us with standards applicable to the comparatively illimitable past. In fact, those that are relied on depend upon unstable conditions and are liable to vary with every passing century. While admitting the *permanence of the laws of Nature*, it is impossible, under the conditions through which this globe has passed, to suppose that at all former periods the effects, which have resulted from the operation of those laws, though *equal in kind*, were *equal in degree*. As in other similar questions, we must judge of the hypothesis not by an *à priori* assumption, but by the agreement of the consequences which it involves with the facts, and by the extent to which it satisfies the various conditions of the problem."

"Whatever phase of the Rubble-drift we may examine, we recognize in all of them physical and faunal conditions referable to the agency of one and the same cause. Whether we look at (1) the *débris* in one section of the Loess, (2) the Breccia on slopes, (3) the '*Head*' over the Raised Beaches, (4) the Basement gravels of many valleys, or (5) the Ossiferous fissures, we discern a complete absence of that wear which results from maintained river, sea, or ice action. Nor is there any indication of that transport of *débris* from a distance which attends river or tidal action. On the contrary, all the component materials are of *local origin*, derived from the adjacent slopes or hills, and they are *all unworn*. The evidence of the organic remains is to the same effect, in that they are those of a *land fauna alone*, with an entire absence of marine and fluvial remains. The bones found in the Rubble-drift are not only in the same unworn condition as the rock fragments, but they are *free from all marks of gnawing*. This is a proof that the animals had not, as in the caves, fallen a prey to Carnivora, but must have met their death in a way which was unusual—such as from drowning—for had their bodies remained on a land surface after death, they would have been subject to being devoured by predaceous animals, or else the bones would have shown traces of weathering and wear. At the same time the *sharply* fractured state and dispersion of the bones show that they must have been subjected to considerable violence and displacement. These conditions, as well as the mode of distribution of the rubble from many independent centres, accord in all points with the results that would ensue from the submergence and re-elevation of a land surface from beneath deep waters after a temporary submergence.

"These conclusions, startling though they may appear, have been forced upon me, not only by my own observations in the South of England, and parts of the Continent, but also by the independent evidence of other geologists, though their interpretation of the facts may be different. Looked at in all its aspects, I see no alternative that equally well answers to all the conditions of the problem. Other explanations may satisfy some of the conditions in particular cases, but none of them satisfy all, whereas I think it will be found that the submergence hypothesis not only meets the requirements of each particular case, but that it also shows them all to be concordant, and such as would pertain to one common and general cause.

"Another important conclusion hinges upon this question. I have before pointed out the bearing that the position of the Rubble-drift should have in limiting our estimate of the time elapsed since the close of the Glacial period. In a paper already referred to I had shown cause why that time was not to be measured by Dr. Croll's reckoning of eighty thousand years, as not being supported by the facts of geology. The position and character of the Rubble-drift show that the transition from the so-called Post-glacial beds to the recent Alluvial deposits is very abrupt, and that there is an absence of sedimentation or of anything indicative of lapse of time between these two series. This conclusion is confirmed by the sections of the Belgian caves. There, as we have seen, the Quaternary cave deposits are separated by only a few feet of Rubble-drift from deposits of the stone or Neolithic age. Nowhere are there any intervening sedimentary beds, or any deposits requiring length of time for their accumulation—the only subsequent work requiring time being comprised in the alluvial accumulation of our great rivers.

"Besides, on Croll's hypothesis, Man must have remained comparatively stationary during a vastly long period. But how does this accord with the facts? Take the earliest works of Man with which we are acquainted—the rude implements of the Chalk plateau—and note the difference between them and the implements of the later Valley gravels. The former consist of rude flints picked up on the surface, and given only such an amount of trimming as to bring an angle to a point, or to form a cutting edge out of a blunt natural fracture, or else the stones, just as they were found, were used as hammers and trimmers. The valley implements, on the other hand, comprise flint tools and implements carefully worked all over and trimmed to certain definite patterns, the workmanship, apart from the want of grinding, being in some cases so fine as almost to equal that of the implements of the Stone age.

"The caves of Central France and of Belgium afford still clearer evidence of the progress made by early Man in the interval between these two stages. His work in the last Quaternary stage exhibits an intelligence higher than that of many modern savages. His harpoons and bone implements were skilfully made, and that he possessed some artistic taste

is shown by the sculptured bones and horns, and by the rude, but sufficiently accurate representations, of the contemporary fauna. How can we, then, believe that Man, who had shown himself thus progressive early in the Quaternary period, could towards its close have remained for, say, seventy thousand years without further progress than that shown by Man of the early Stone period. There is certainly nothing to represent geologically that long period of time, nor have biologists been able to detect any essential structural differences between Paleolithic Man and Neolithic Man in support of such a conclusion. All the evidence tends, on the contrary, to prove that late glacial (or post-glacial) Man, together with the great extinct Mammalia, came down approximately to within some ten thousand to twelve thousand years of our own times, and that the Rubble-drift marks the stroke of the pendulum when the Glacial period came to a close, and the Neolithic age commenced."¹

¹ *Evidences of a Submergence of Western Europe, etc.*, pp. 982-984.

ARTICLE VIII.

CRITICAL NOTES.

TRUTH OR PIOUS FRAUD.

IN the preface of "The International Critical Commentary" the editors say: "There are now before the public many commentaries written by British and American divines, of a popular or homiletical character . . . but they do not enter into the field of critical biblical scholarship occupied by such series of commentaries as" certain German works. "The time has come, in the judgment of the projectors of this enterprise, when it is practicable to combine British and American scholars in the production of a critical, comprehensive commentary that will be abreast of modern Biblical scholarship, and in a measure lead its van." The commentaries "will be based upon a thorough critical study of the original texts of the Bible, and upon critical methods of interpretation. They are designed chiefly for students and clergymen, and will be written in a compact style." Dr. Driver tells us in the preface of his "Deuteronomy"¹: "The aim of the present volume is to supply the English reader with a commentary which, so far as the writer's powers permit it, may be abreast of the best scholarship and knowledge of the day." Dr. Driver's name is the synonym of Hebrew scholarship of the first rank, and the names published of the other scholars who will comment on the remaining books of the Bible assure us that nothing will be wanting in scholarship. Whether this scholastic commentary will furnish the best knowledge of the Bible is altogether another question. In this volume there is a crush of painstaking erudition, of minute detail, endless citations of contradictions, a method of comment that covers every verse with the dust that has never known rain and will make "the student and clergyman" pine for a cup of cold water only in the name of a disciple. Whatever criticisms might justly be offered on subordinate points are in this note passed over in order to set before the reader the main points on which this whole criticism rests, and of which any man of sound moral perception is quite as good a critic as the most learned Hebraist.

¹ A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Deuteronomy. By the Rev. S. R. Driver, D. D. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1895. Pp. xcv, 434. \$3.00. The International Critical Commentary on the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, under the editorship of the Rev. Charles Augustus Briggs, D. D., New York, the Rev. S. R. Driver, D. D., Oxford, the Rev. Alfred Plummer, D. D., Durham.

It may seem strange to one not intimately acquainted with the shifting scenes of German criticism that Dt.¹ is issued as the first volume of this critical commentary. But it is in accordance with the present dicta of that criticism that Dt. is now made by it "the firm basis and turning point,"² of all its decisions. "Here we have the *δὸς μοι τοῦ στῶ* for the criticism of the whole Old Testament literature."³ "The study of Dt. carries the reader into the very heart of the critical problems which arise in connexion with the Old Testament" (Driver, p. xii). It is well that this basis is taken, for the fundamental critical problems of Dt. are perfectly plain. A reading of Dt. in any fair translation will enable an intelligent reader to decide very quickly whether Dt. is what it claims to be, or what this criticism says it is.

The theory concerning Dt. by this criticism is that until 900-800 B. C. the Israelites had no written records, only oral traditions, sagas, legends of their history; their first writings, J and E, were collections of these popular traditions, legends; there were two political parties with antagonistic interests, the prophetic and the priestly; both suffered greatly under Manasseh (685-639 B. C.); for a compromise and union of the interests of both parties, Dt. was written by one of the prophetic party, as the basis of a reform, to establish the sole worship of Jehovah (prophetic), and this worship only at Jerusalem (priestly). Written with this intent, Dt. was "found" just at the right time and the intended plan carried out. The author, to give greater force to his history and laws, puts them in the mouth of God and of Moses; but in reality the history and laws were not so delivered, they were only tradition and legend.

The points fundamental to all this criticism are: The proof of the date of Dt.; The character of the history taught by Dt.; The character of the author.

THE DATE BY THIS CRITICISM.

Dr. Driver (p. xlv), in common with all critics of this school, makes Dt. the book found by Hilkiah in the temple B. C. 621. He leaves it an open question whether Dt. was written under Manasseh or Josiah (p. xlix), but the "verdict of criticism" is that it was written between 685 and 621 B. C., and consequently the Mosaic authorship cannot be maintained (p. xii). Dt., therefore, was the first written book of laws acknowledged as authoritative by the Israelites (p. lxiv), or as Smend⁴ puts it, "Dt. became the earliest law book of Old Testament religion and the beginning of all the canonical Scripture of the Jews." For the proof of these positive dogmatic assertions we are referred to 2 Kings xxii. and xxiii. This is the passage that serves as the foundation socket on which all this criticism turns.

¹ Dt. in this note is put only for what Dr. Driver says was the original Deuteronomy, and D for the author of that original. According to Dr. Driver, there were four authors of the book as we now have it.

² Reuss, *Gte d. H. S.*, § 286. ³ Wildeboer, *Litt.*, § 11.

⁴ A. T. Rgte, p. 284.

It therefore must be one of the absolutely sure points in the Bible which this criticism has discovered. But when we ask as to the credibility of the books of Kings, we are told that they are full of sagas and fictions, which have been worked over three times in the interest of the Dt. party,¹ and when we ask about this small portion (2 Kings xxii. 8 ff.) where all this criticism begins, we are again assured that it is not of contemporary authorship, it is "saga," "fiction," "tradition," written in the late exile or post-exile period, and worked over and over by partisan editors; that the prophecy of Huldah,² the mainstay of the passage, and many other points, are fictitious.³ Therefore we are cautioned by the leaders of this criticism: "As to the particulars in 2 Kings xxii. the greatest precaution is needful. . . . The dressing up of the narrative, which must be granted, did not extend to the entire expulsion of the original tradition."⁴ "The account of Josiah's reformation in 2 Kings xxii. 8ff. has come to us only in a reworked form and therefore is to be used with precaution."⁵ "The narrative in Kings on the reformation by Josiah is not in its present form really historical."⁶

This date of Dt., this turning-point of "this criticism," the bottom fact for all its positiveness, by its own confession, is to be picked out with "the greatest precaution" from an original tradition worked over by partisan editors, and now overlaid and surrounded by sagas, fictions, honey-combed with errors, in which the only thing credible is just what this criticism wishes to believe. "It is to be used with precaution, but in the chief matter it is credible and by it we are directed to Dt."⁷ That is the character of the foundation of this criticism. It never fails to pour its contempt on believers in the truth of the history in the Bible as traditional believers. But here we see it by its own testimony founded on what it says is nothing but tradition extracted from an unhistorical account. Somewhat more of modesty might well be sought by these positive dogmatists.

THE CHARACTER OF THE HISTORY IN DT.

Since the author of Dt. places the facts he relates as occurring nine hundred years before his time, according to this criticism, it is needful to

¹ Wellhausen, *Gte Isr.*, pp. 293-309; Kuenen, *Ond.*, Vol. i. p. 421; Driver, *Introd.*, p. 189 ff.

² Dr. Driver knows that this criticism unanimously decides that Huldah's prophecy is fictitious, yet quotes that prophecy as proof of the honesty of Dt. (p. lx). Similar instances of the proffer of known forbidden fruit compel again the question asked by one of Dr. Driver's own school, "Is Dr. Driver laughing in his sleeve?" Such things ought not to be done "in the van of criticism."

³ Kuenen, *Ond.*, Vol. i. p. 420; Reuss, *Gte d. A. T.*, § 287; Stade, *Gte Isr.*, Vol. i. pp. 649, 651, 664; Kautzsch, *A. T.*, 2 Kings xxii. 15-20; Smend, *A. T. Rgte.*, p. 279; Holzinger, *Einl.*, p. 255 ff.; Horst, *Hist. d. Rel.*, 1887-91.

⁴ Holzinger, *Einl.*, p. 257.

⁵ Wildeboer, *Lept. d. A. T.*, p. 175.

⁶ Smend, *A. T. Rgte.*, p. 279.

⁷ Wildeboer, *Litt.*, p. 175.

ask, whence he obtained the history and laws he prescribes? Does he furnish true or false history? Dr. Driver tells us that all his history and his laws, with few exceptions, are taken only from JE (pp. xiv-xix, xlii).¹ J and E are assumed by this criticism as the two authors of the greater part of the history and many of the laws contained in the first four books of the Pentateuch. What then is the value of these documents for history and law? Dr. Driver does not characterize them. He assumes and acts upon but does not say plainly what is the unanimous verdict of this criticism on these documents. All European critics of this school without exception decide that J and E were nothing more than collections of "sagas," "myths," "legends." They deny them any historical value whatsoever; i. e., that all the history and laws contained in the Pentateuch are fictitious, destitute of the slightest claim to be regarded as history. "Its patriarchal history is saga, not history;" "only sagas."² "In Genesis there is no history."³ "For the beginnings of Israelite religion and history the Israelite saga offers nothing."⁴ "The narrative concerning the time of Moses is saga."⁵ "The exodus, the wandering, the passage of the Jordan and the settlement in Canaan, as they are described in the Hexateuch, are simply impossible." "The representation of all this given in the Hexateuch is absurd."⁶ Dr. Driver treats these histories and laws as fictitious in his comments, but refrains from saying so.

The history and laws, then, in Dt. are fictitious, traditional, legendary, according to this criticism.

THE CHARACTER OF THE AUTHOR.

Dr. Driver tells us (p. lii) that, under Josiah, 639-621 B. C., "the prophets, encouraged by the brighter prospect, resolved upon putting forward the spiritual requirements of the age in a shape [i. e. book] which, if circumstances favored, might serve more immediately as a basis of reform. Such at any rate . . . was the aim which the prophetic author of Dt. set himself." The author is unknown and for lack of knowledge is marked simply D. This book, written by a certain school for a certain end by which that school is to gain, and "found" by that school

¹ Dr. Driver says (pp. xiv-xix, xlii), that Dt. was later than JE. For this he offers no proof. He certainly knows that all the leaders of this criticism say that J and E were not united into JE until after the date of Dt.; and that Dt. took its statements from J and E while separate documents. This puts a different phase on the matter. Why does Dr. Driver here differ from all his school?

² Holzinger, Einl., pp. 172 ff., 226.

³ Kayser, Theol. d. A. T., ed. Marti, p. 20.

⁴ Meinholt, Kleinglauben, pp. 25, 30.

⁵ Smend, A. T. Rgte, p. 13.

⁶ Kuenen, Hex., pp. 43, 46, 226 ff., 240 ff.; Wellhausen. Prol., pp. 300, 358, 371, etc.; Reuss, Gte d. H. S., §§ 213, etc.; Dillmann, Gen., pp. xi, xiii, 217, etc.; Riehm, Einl., Vol. i. p. 343 ff.; Cornill, Einl., p. 46, etc.; Holzinger, Einl., pp. 364, 371, etc., and many others.

in the temple just in the nick of time for carrying out its purposes, is severely characterized by all the European and a few English critics, except Dr. Driver. We pass over this manipulation for the more important point. D was no blind ignoramus, merely following the copy set him without inquiry. According to Dr. Driver, he possessed great "rhetorical power," his style is "singularly pure and beautiful." "The strong individuality of the author colors everything that he writes." "In his command of a chaste yet warm and persuasive eloquence, the author of Dt. stands unique among the writers of the Old Testament." No argument, therefore, can be founded upon his want of intellect or knowledge of his subject. D, to impress his contemporaries with the legal aspect of his work (p. lx), throws all his history and laws back in the past, eight hundred to nine hundred years previous to his time, and makes the traditional hero of Israel, Moses, who left neither history nor laws, the spokesman of both the history and laws; D makes Moses assert in a hundred ways that he had lived through and knew by personal experience this history and gave under the most solemn admonition these laws. D knew that Moses knew nothing of the history and laws which were put in his mouth. D makes Moses with the most sacred adjuration on his lips (Dt. vi. 1-5) a monotheist, what, according to Dr. Driver, Moses was not (p. 90). But D goes still further: he makes Moses assert, what D knew to be false, that he (Moses) received these laws from God directly (Dt. iv. 1, 2, 40; v. 28-31; vi. 2; viii. 11; x. 13; xi. 27, 28; xiii. 18 (19); xv. 5; xxvi. 16; xxviii. 10; xxviii. 1, 13, 15; xxx. 16).

And there is a deeper depth. D makes Moses asseverate and plead (iii. 23-29; ix. 18-29) the fictitious history in fictitious prayers to a fictitious God, and makes Moses teach each Israelite to plead these fictitious laws in prayer to God (xxvi. 13-15). "If the critical view of Dt. be correct," D's course respecting Moses is the least of his frauds. He may have been in some measure blinded by the legends, traditions, sagas concerning Moses. But there is no possibility of a plea justifying a man ascribing to God what he knew God had never said. But, if the critical view be correct, this is just what D did in the instances quoted and in i. 42; ii. 1, 2, 9, 17, 31; iii. 26; iv. 10; ix. 12, 13, 15, etc., etc. The commands given by D are, though given through Moses, said to be God's voice speaking to the people (v. 22 (19); ix. 23; xiii. 4 (5), 18 (19); xv. 5; xxvi. 14, 17; xxvii. 10; xxviii. 1, 2, 15, 45). Still this does not satisfy D. He goes beyond Moses, across a thousand years of pure legend, and makes God solemnly covenant¹ with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, to give them

¹ "That the idea of a covenant of Jehovah with Israel is everywhere in the Old Testament the center of gravity and of support in Old Testament religion needs no proof" (Reuss, *Gte d. H. S.* § 261); "Fiction . . . sagas about the mythical persons of the patriarchs," "myths" (§§ 130, 132).

"The idea of a covenant between Jehovah and his people was foreign to ancient Israel." (Smend, *A. T. Rgte*, pp. 116, 300; and so the others.)

and their seed the land of Canaan (i. 8; vi. 10; ix. 5, 27; xxx. 20); to redeem their seed from Egypt (vii. 8); to love, bless and multiply their seed (vii. 12); and this covenant Jehovah guaranteed by his oath and this oath is twenty-two times solemnly insisted upon in Dt. as the warrant of their faith (i. 8, 35; vi. 10, 18, 23; vii. 8, 12, 13; viii. 1, 18; ix. 5; x. 11; xi. 9, 21; xiii. 17 (18); xix. 8; xxvi. 3, 15; xxviii. 9, 11; xxx. 20; xxxi. 7). D teaches the Israelite who turns in prayer of gratitude to God (xxvi. 13-15), to use this fictitious oath of Jehovah as an argument with him. "If the critical view is correct," the covenant of God with Abraham is pure fiction, the oath of God is an equal fiction, and yet D represents Jehovah as faithful to all his promises and keeping covenant (vii. 9); and by means of this mass of fiction and oaths encourages the people to put their trust in Jehovah. Jehovah also made a covenant with Israel at Horeb (iv. 13, 23; v. 23; ix. 9, 11, 15; xvii. 2; xxix. 1; xxviii. 69) and in Moab (xxix. 1), as solemn and sacred as he made with Abraham. But these are fictions also if this criticism is correct.

There is still a deeper abyss of infamy and fraud "if the critical view be correct." D has the unparalleled hypocrisy to brand as a sin to be punished with death his own deed, ascribing to Jehovah what Jehovah had never said (xiii. 1-5; xviii. 20). D makes Jehovah forbid the changing of any word of his (iv. 2; v. 32; xii. 32; xvii. 11, 20). He makes Jehovah promise all blessings to obedience to D's words (v. 32 f; vi. 1-9, 12-19; xi. 13-25; xiii. 17 ff. etc); and threaten all dire curses upon disobedience (viii. 19, 20; xi. 28; xxviii. 15 ff.). There is no space to follow D, on this critical theory, through all his frauds; the above may suffice.

No European critic of this school justifies this; they condemn it as "a lie told for the glory of God," "not a moral proceeding," "an intentional forgery," "a literary fraud," "a pious fiction," "an error."¹ Dr. Driver alone justifies D in his proceeding. "The means which he [D] adopted for giving it practical effect were well chosen" (p. lii). His purpose was good. "Ancient writers permitted themselves much freedom in ascribing to historical [Moses historical according to this criticism?] characters speeches which they could not have actually delivered;" "the dialogues of Plato, the epic of Dante, the tragedies of Shakespeare, the Paradise Lost, and even the poem of Job" do the same; D "makes no unfair use of Moses' name . . . he merely develops with great moral energy and rhetorical power, and in a form adapted to the age in which he [D] lived, *principles which Moses had beyond all question advocated, and arguments which he would have cordially accepted as his own*" (p. lviii ff.).

Since, according to this criticism, Moses was behind a Sahara of saga

¹ Kuenen, Hex., p. 219 ff.; Bible for Learners, Vol. ii. p. 330 ff.; Wellhausen, Comp., p. 294; Dillmann, Numeri, etc., p. 595; Reuss, Gte d. H. S., §§ 287-289; Stade, Gte., Vol. i. pp. 16, 656; Cornill, Einl., p. 36 ff.; Holzinger, Einl., p. 328 ff.; Kayser, Theol. d. A. T., pp. 49, 192; Wildeboer, Litt., p. 186 ff.; Westphal, Sources, Vol. ii. pp. 115, 264, 280.

tradition five hundred years wide, without a scrap of history concerning him, Dr. Driver's assertion in the words italicized by us, is a piece of pure dogma destitute of the palest moonbeam of proof. It is a case of attempted mind reading across an abyss of five hundred years; an appropriate plea in defense of D against all his fellow-critics. "If the critical view of Dt. be correct," the book is not a forgery or a fiction or an invention (p. lxi); "he cannot be held guilty of dishonesty or literary fraud;" "its moral and spiritual greatness remains unimpaired; its inspired authority is in no respect less than that of any other part of the Old Testament which happens to be anonymous" (p. lxii). "The adoption of this verdict of criticism implies no detraction either from the inspired authority of Dt., or from its ethical and religious value. . . . Dt. gathers up the spiritual lessons and experiences not of a single lifetime, but of many generations of God-inspired men. It is a nobly conceived endeavor to stir the conscience of the individual Israelite, and to infuse Israel's whole national life with new spiritual and moral energy" (p. xii ff.).

Under this criticism it has become common to use terms with positive historic signification in a sense that none but the initiated understand. Moral, spiritual, ethical, inspired, God-inspired (only once used in the Bible), conscience, certainly mean something very different from the definitions of the lexicons and common use when applied to justify what every other critic of this school says is a pious fraud. We are glad that only one critic justifies their figment D in the work they have given him to do. This commentary is designed chiefly "for students and clergymen." If they accept the fundamental theory of this criticism, that its fulcrum is mere tradition in pious fraud, we hope they will have, like the European critics, the courage of their convictions and say so plainly, and save morality by denying that God ever inspired fraud and hypocrisy.

If Dt. is what this criticism and commentary make it to be, a fiction from the mouth of God, all labor spent on it is lost. If Dt. is God's truth from God's mouth, good were it for this commentary had it never been born.

THE USE OF KINGDOM AND CHURCH IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.

IN our hymnology, "kingdom" and "church" are synonyms. So are they in the New Testament, but with a wider range of variation. In their simpler meanings we may accept Fairbairn's remark, that "the kingdom is the immanent church, the church is the explicated kingdom." When Christ in the Sermon on the Mount, or in parables, or in passing

allusion, spoke of the kingdom of heaven, or the kingdom of God, or simply of the kingdom, it was usually to set forth the ideal which he came into the world to make actual, but which was not yet realized.

This ideal began to be realized in the local Christian assemblies, and the apostles, both in the Acts and the Epistles, spoke much oftener of the actual, concrete church or churches, than of the ideal kingdom.

Of the twenty-one times the word "church" occurs in the book of Acts, all except ix. 31 can be understood of the local congregation, and only three or four others can possibly be taken in any wider sense. In Acts xx. 28, "the church of God which he purchased with his own blood," the word is more naturally taken of the church universal; and so perhaps viii. 3, "made havoc of the church." In ix. 31 the best MSS. leave no doubt of this use, for they read, "then had the church rest throughout all Judæa and Galilee and Samaria."

The word occurs five times in the Epistle to the Romans, all in the sixteenth chapter, and always with the local meaning.

Of twenty-two occurrences in First Corinthians, only two have the distinctively larger sense: x. 32, "Give no occasion of stumbling, either to Jews, or to Greeks, or to the church of God;" xii. 28, "And God hath set some in the church, first apostles," etc. Two others may be taken in the more extended meaning: xi. 22, "or despise ye the church of God," and xv. 9, "I persecuted the church of God." In Second Corinthians, "church" occurs nine times, always of the local body. The three uses in Galatians are the same except that i. 13, "I persecuted the church of God," cannot be so readily taken of the church in Jerusalem as of the church universal. Two references in each Epistle to the Thessalonians are simply to the local church or churches.

On the other hand, the Epistle to the Philippians has one reference to the local and one to the universal church; while two of the four passages in the Epistle to the Colossians are of the church universal and glorified, calling the church the body of Christ. In the Epistle to the Ephesians this last use occurs nine times, and the local use not at all.

Thus there appears in the Epistles of Paul, and especially the later ones, a use of "church" in a meaning hardly distinguishable from that of "kingdom" in several of the parables and in such phrases as "enter into the kingdom," "fit for the kingdom." Compare especially the phrase "For his body's sake, which is the church" (Col. i. 24) with "For the kingdom of heaven's sake" (Matt. xix. 12), and "the kingdom of heaven, for which ye also suffered" (2 Thess. i. 5).

In the Gospels the word "kingdom" occurs more than a hundred times. The word "church" is found in none of them, except Matthew, and there in but two passages. In Matt. xviii. 7, Christ makes the local church or congregation the final court of appeal in the case of an offending brother. In Matt. xvi. 18, Christ tells Peter, "On this rock I will build my church." Here the word "kingdom" would fit so well that Thayer does

not hesitate in his lexicon to suggest that the evangelist misreported this saying!

On the other hand, in the Acts and Pauline Epistles, exclusive of the Pastoral Epistles, "kingdom" occurs but nineteen times, while "church" is found seventy-nine times. The drift of usage was very rapid in preference of the shorter word. We know how emphasis was increasingly put on the word "church" in the post-apostolic time until the accepted saying was, "There is no salvation outside the church."

Two important inferences may be drawn from these facts.

The first is, that a time much later than the apostolic is very improbable for the production of four books like the Gospels that eschew the use of the word "church" which already in the days of the apostles had become so popular. Some evidence, also, in regard to the date of Revelation may be found in the fact that it never uses "church" in the larger sense.

The second inference is as to the accuracy with which the evangelists reported the words of our Lord. Some, if not all, of the Gospels are later than a part, if not all, of the Pauline Epistles. What but the accuracy of their memory and the carefulness of their record can explain their persistent use of "kingdom" when in so many places "church," in the meantime already becoming current, would have fitted equally well?

W. E. C. WRIGHT.

CLEVELAND, O.

ARTICLE IX.
SOCIOLOGICAL NOTES.

CHARITY.

IN the July number, charity was considered in its relations to the general law of toil. It was seen that toil is the natural lot of man; that it begets value when wisely directed, and that it begets virtue; that sloth and idleness are not negative virtues, but positive vices. Their results, like those of toil, are subjective and objective. The exceptions to the general law of toil for each and all were then noted. There were found to be the physically and mentally unsound, which brings to consideration the subject of dependents, defectives, and delinquents. A large class was found of those who are able and willing to work but cannot find employment. The suggestion of a remedy for such conditions was employment furnished by the State.

A large class who are able to work, but are unwilling and prefer to become dependents, presented a problem not so easily solved. It is simply the problem of pauperism. A false remedy was found to be indiscriminate charity. The true remedies were suggested to be in enforced industry and in education which must be largely a personal work.

But the broad question of pauperism demands a wider inquiry than is revealed through some self-evident economic axioms. While we may differ from many of our labor-union friends who find in our social conditions the entire causes of intemperance, poverty, and crime, we shall do well to heed their indictment of society as they see it to-day, and enter upon a general inquiry as to how far such a civilization as ours is responsible for the existence of a criminal and pauper class. This simply raises the question, Is the solidarity of the human race such that a contagious disease in the upper classes has become epidemic among the lower?

If pauperism is caused by social conditions, then the whole of society needs purifying, from the head to the feet. Charity, legal procedure, workshops, or even education would be like a poultice on a boil,—it would draw the bad blood out, but would not necessarily purify the system. Such would not be permanent cures. They might cure paupers, but not pauperism.

Society, being simply an aggregation of individuals, seems to resemble the individual in his periods of health and sickness, of hope and de-

pression. If, then, the permanent causes of pauperism are not in the individuals that make up the class, but in the social conditions or in environment, then the environment must be changed before pauperism can be permanently eliminated. Is our social condition responsible for that disease,—pauperism? It is charged by socialists and by many enthusiastic reformers that such is the case. Some find it in the overdevelopment of individualism as the economic *reductio ad absurdum* of the *laissez faire* doctrine; some in the evils of the competitive system, and others in the exploitation of the lower classes by organized capital controlling the means of production.

The causes of pauperism must not be sought in conditions peculiar to our own age or civilization, for poverty and pauperism have always existed, so far as we know, in a greater or less degree. The early church sought too largely to remedy pauperism by charity, and it soon developed into giving for subjective reasons, which is but another form of selfishness. No theory of pauperism will stand the test that ignores the freedom of the individual will and the superiority of man to his environment. This fact is as well attested as any truth or fact of human nature, and to deny it is to usher in a hopeless pessimism that is the fruit of such a fatalism.

The desire to get something for nothing is not confined to the pauper class. It is a passion as old as human nature, asserting itself alike in the millionaire no less than in the beggar and pauper. To buy a birthright for some bread and pottage of lentils has ever been the aim of the commercial instinct in human nature. Few, indeed, seem to be entirely free from it. It is a passion that has come along down through the centuries from palace and hovel, from throne and hamlet, from pulpit and pew. Its pathway, like that of so many mixed evils, has not been strewn entirely with flowers of fragrance, but with poisonous weeds, with briars and thorns.

Man is naturally a lazy and selfish animal, more ambitious that his neighbor should be altruistic than to be so himself; having fine theories and noble ideals—usually for some man, race, age, or condition other than himself or his own. Like the student who advertised for a comfortable home, with a corner suite of rooms and bath attached, where his Christian influence could pay for his board.

The idea of getting something for nothing took on shape in the doctrine of the divine right of kings. It is perpetuated in the laws of primogeniture, entailment, and royal descent. The golden rule has been true in theory, but too often false in fact. The English mode of procedure is in point. Our critical and genial friend, Mr. Stead, has written "If Christ Came to Chicago"; but the book is not yet written, "If Christ Were in England." England subjugates not to serve, but to be served. Opium is not a bad thing for China so long as it is such a good thing for England;

silver will do for India so long as the value of the rupee is fixed by the English market, and the wheat of India can be bought at the price of silver so fixed in the market, and paid for at that price; Ireland's potatoes are agreeable to English stomachs provided sixty per cent of them can be secured for nothing. Her treatment of Egypt, of the Zulus, is a fair sample of the supremacy of the commercial spirit in England, and it is anything but Christian. Gladstone boils with indignation at the atrocities of the Turk, but the habit of national introspection flavored with a little of the same righteous sense might make England a little more worthy of the name of Christian.

We use England for an illustration, because it is far more pleasant to speak first of the faults of our neighbor than of our own, and because pauperism has for so long a time been such a tax not only upon her resources, but upon the best thinking of her statesmen and philanthropists. If it be true that English civilization is permeated with such principles, why should not the poor practice the general precept and make the desperate attempt, in their way, to get something for nothing. The cynicisms of Carlyle, the lamentations of Ruskin, or the sweetness and light of Matthew Arnold are a comment upon that Christian civilization. Ruskin says: "The man who is not day by day doing work which will earn his dinner must be stealing his dinner; and the actual fact is, that the great mass of men calling themselves Christians do actually live by robbing the poor of their bread; and the simple examination of the mode of produce and consumption of European food—who digs for it, and who eats it—will prove that to any honest human soul."

The Englishman is no different from the American. The colored race know that. The Indian has learned it to his sorrow. The doctrine that might makes right has had ample illustrations of its popularity and of its cruelty. Even woman, whenever she has left to her liege-lord and master, man, the matter of making laws for her protection and benefit, has found to her sorrow that the noble and divine animal called man has enacted one set of laws for himself and quite another set for her. The difficulty which has attended raising the "age of consent" by law is in evidence, that too often the sense of justice and even of decency is quite foreign to the masses of men, when acting in large bodies. Woman is sent into the fields to work with the beasts of the field, and man has been the overseer. It has been said that the only difference between the New England farmer and the Mormon in the matter of marriage was this: the farmer drove his wives tandem, and the Mormon drove his wives abreast.

The doctrine of man's nobility, of the divine right of the king, of the divinity of slavery, of woman's inferiority, of the right to subjugate in the name of Christ,—none of these have ever lacked proof by colossal, masculine intellects.

It is quite natural to want something for nothing. The capitalist likes, for a few dollars, to incorporate a company of a million, sell ten per cent of the stock at one-fourth its nominal value, which will warm up his nine hundred thousand to par, when he will proceed to unload it on the innocent market. A city like Chicago constantly furnishes testimony to the truth that the men of this age are actuated too largely by the desire to acquire. It has never been the lower classes that have bribed councils, corrupted legislatures, and purchased public franchises by fraud. It is the eminently respectable, and, in Chicago, even the very devout, that have been the chief sinners.

Why, then, shall we blame the poor pauper alone who attempts to operate upon the same plan but adopts the most vulgar and lowest form of doing so? So long as the royalty and titled aristocracy eat Irish potatoes that are not purchased, so long will England be cursed with a pauper class. We can never civilize a nation so long as a large part are brutalized, and its lower classes will be brutalized so long as its upper classes live by their wits, and not by toil. If capital combines in the form of trusts and monopolies, and lays its hand on the throat of consumers, labor will organize, taking the law into its own hands, as it did at Homestead, at Buffalo, Toledo, New Orleans, and Chicago. The cure for pauperism must begin with the upper classes. If not, the accursed assumptions of royalty and aristocracy will ever keep time with the howling mobs of anarchy. Reform must begin above. The gods must be just if they expect us to be. Reform must come from those who know better. It must purify pulpits no less than politics; prince no less than pauper; the avenues no less than the slums; Dives no less than Lazarus. The New Era, like the Master, with a scourge of small cords will drive the traders out of the temples of trade, of politics, of law, of medicine, of learning, no less than of religion. To be consecrated to God will be found to be consecrated to humanity, for that is most divinely perfect which is most perfectly human. "The best way to realize the ideal is to idealize the real."

ARTICLE X.

SEMITIC AND ORIENTAL NOTES.

THE TRIUMPH OF ASSYRIOLOGY.

WHEN the first results of the marvelous discoveries which the study of the cuneiform inscriptions brought to light were offered to the critical world, they were received not only with skepticism as to their practical use, but not infrequently with positive derision as to their permanent value in the science of Old Testament criticism. Indeed, it may fairly be said that the non-critical public received these results and incorporated them into their fund of general biblical information with much greater readiness and hospitality than those from whom such a reception might legitimately have been expected. The reason for this is not entirely clear, unless it be that the results were so novel, and the inferences therefrom so startling and revolutionary, that the critics themselves, accustomed to bold generalizations, were nevertheless appalled at the radical nature of the conclusions which these discoveries suggested. So until even within thirty years there existed grave doubts in the minds of the most competent of the literary critics of the Old Testament as to the value of the cuneiform results. Since that time the systematic study of the inscriptions, the increasing information, and the constant advance in Assyriological science have all tended to allay these fears, so that there remain but few critics of first rank who are not willing at least to reckon with these results as a part of the Old Testament literary and critical problem.

By no means the least of the results which have been wrought by the cuneiform study has been the demonstration of the value, and indeed absolute necessity, of a thorough knowledge of Semitic archæology as well as philology as a part of the necessary equipment for a sound Old Testament criticism. Received at first with coldness or attacked with vehemence, these results are now recognized as among the indispensable requirements of the higher critical investigations. In fact, the triumph of Assyriology has been even greater than this. The long-standing dicta of the purely literary critics have not only been shown frequently to be based upon literary and philological generalizations which had their basis only in the fancy of the literary critic, but to be in direct antagonism to the plainest historical facts as these have been revealed by the inscriptions and the monuments.

In the July number of the *Contemporary Review*, Canon Cheyne has a suggestive article, which reveals even more clearly than the increasing interest and attention to Assyriological study could demonstrate, how Assyrian history and archæology have put to flight the literary critics with their often, flimsy guesses and insecure inferences. Professor Cheyne finds himself moved to set up an outpost of defense against the final rout of the purely literary critics. He admits, what is refreshing to students of Assyriology, that both Wellhausen and Robertson Smith never fairly considered or gave adequate weight to Assyriological material in making up their estimate of the Semitic history and development. He seems to recognize, indeed to admit frankly, that archæological investigation has already made, and must make still further, modifications in the long-accepted results of literary criticism. He objects to the term "literary critic," and states that they are not "hopelessly drifting," but are well aware of the end which they desire to secure. He makes a just plea for a more critical archæology, but desires it understood that the advanced positions of literary criticism are not to be yielded to the Semitic archæology which is largely founded upon Assyrian and Babylonian investigation. This is a significant symptom. It is well known that the whole tendency of the Assyrian archæological investigation is towards a more conservative view of the origin and history of the oldest of the Old Testament books. It is beyond question that many of the extreme positions which the most advanced critics had taken, and held with a defiant arrogance which seemed to indicate the possession of absolute truth, have certainly been made untenable when they have not been shown to be ridiculous; and that in the brief space of thirty years the literary critics have been forced from a position of arrogance and ridicule with respect to the message of the ruins of the Tigris-Euphrates Valley into a position, first of tolerance, then of recognition, and now of defense, against that message as one of the most characteristic evidences both of the temporary character of critical results founded upon purely literary analysis as well as the fact that arrogance is not scholarship, and that history will have its revenges. But on the question itself, it is true that there is no necessary antagonism between a genuine literary criticism and a genuine archæology. Both must be critical, but both must be tolerant; and both must recognize that new discoveries may in an instant render nugatory many of the maxims and methods upon which we have long based our most positive conclusions.

Professor Cheyne's plea for the expansion of criticism and exegesis in the direction of archæology is to be commended from every point of view, and cannot but be attended, if heeded by the critics, with thoroughly desirable results; so, also, the desire for a closer and saner estimate of the results of Semitic archæology is also thoroughly praiseworthy and to be encouraged. The difficulty on both sides hitherto has been, on the one hand, the desire to show that traditional views could be held in spite

of critical results, and on the other an apparently insane desire to annihilate tradition, even though it be with fanciful and ridiculous inventions. Obviously, what we most need above all things, is the truth, and it is of first importance to the Christian public everywhere that the expositors of the critical elements of the Book of its religion should be animated less by a desire to maintain a particular position than to learn the truth, and that the truth should make them free. It is in the nature of human investigation to be fallible. No more conspicuous contrast between the Divine permanence and human transitoriness can be imagined than that which is exhibited in the comparison of the critical estimates of the books of the Old Testament as made by the critics for one hundred years past and the books themselves in the solid, permanent uplifting and intellectually spiritual stimulus which they have afforded to the reverent students of the Bible in the same period. As we have often said before, so we repeat again, that no criticism, no investigation, can be absolutely divorced from the practical life and the logical effect of living religion upon the purely intellectual outlook, and if the entrance of Semitic archæology into the field of biblical criticism shall force this practical element into the consciousness and thought of the literary critics, it certainly will be not the least of the victories which the Assyriologists have gained, not only for their own science, but for permanent knowledge as well.

THE PERSISTENCE OF ANTI-SEMITISM.

THE progress of civilization and the amalgamation of races, under the tremendous pressure brought about by increased commercial intercourse and the annihilation of separative influences, has not been equal to the question of securing a proper classification for the Jew in the social character of our modern life.

In spite of the fact that racial differences are constantly growing less marked, and the nations are becoming one in their common human interest far more rapidly than in the presence of the vast European armaments and the diplomatic imbricæ which are ever recurring one would imagine, no nation has as yet shown itself sufficiently cosmopolitan to successfully incorporate the Jew into its social human life without friction and without prejudice.

It has been a common supposition that the antagonism to the Jew was created chiefly by the events connected with the martyrdom of our Lord, as recorded in the New Testament; but this is not the case. Long before the New Testament was in existence, and longer even than before the expectation of a Messianic Redeemer became a part of the Jewish national life and hope, the anti-Semitic feeling was not only in existence but vigorously dominant among the nations of antiquity with whom the Jews had any considerable intercourse.

The increased attention which the Semitic peoples have been receiving, under the stimulus of recent Oriental study, indicates that they will still more receive, as they will properly merit, the interest and careful thought of the scholarly world, with reference to their permanent place in the final ethnological development of our race. Conspicuous among them will always be the Jews—not merely by reason of the fact that we have adopted their Scriptures as our rule of faith and practice; but because they will, apparently, remain forever socially exclusive and singular among the races whose origin and whose destiny will be one of the constant subjects of human speculation and thought.

Anti-Semitism, therefore, is not merely post-Christian, but pre-Christian, and classic also, if indeed it does not date from a period still farther back. Both the Romans and the Greeks despised and avoided them, except when political necessity, or some other sufficient cause, compelled respect or dictated interested intercourse. This history is of singular interest, because it illustrates how interest and prejudice have been battling with each other for centuries in the question of what to do with the Jews. No nation is free from the stain of having dealt with them brutally and unjustly—often without reason, or certainly without sufficient cause. The reasons for this prejudice are not always clear.

The distinctive Semitic trait, which has appeared in the Jew more than in the other Semitic peoples—at least in his contact with the Western world—has been his instinct for commercial supremacy in almost every field in which he ventures to try his hand. His success has been more or less marked also in political and artistic endeavors, and we shall never successfully forget how much we owe to him when we remember the scores of artists, who, for centuries, have furnished us our most delightful recreations in those distinctive occupations, where the genius of the religious sentiment could combine with the high æsthetic feeling in producing permanent monuments of art in melody and in song.

On the other hand, as M. Théodore Reinach has shown in the first volume of the "*Fontes Rerum Judaicarum*," the religious and social exclusiveness of the Jew impressed itself most distinctly upon the classic nations, and was probably the main cause of their anti-Semitic feeling. The inclusive character of the Greek religion contrasted so strikingly with the exclusive habit of that affected by the Jew, and these religious traits affected the daily and practical ideals of both peoples so sensitively, that something other than antagonism was hardly to be looked for if each adhered to its own ideal.

There are other elements, doubtless, which have caused the persistence of this peculiar race prejudice, but it is interesting to note that those which M. Reinach points out as animating the classical anti Semites, are essentially those which move the nations in their prejudice against the Jew to day. Wherever the Jew has gone, although from time to time he has been tolerated, he has never been incorporated into any national life

as a permanent element, except with fear and trembling, and then only because the motives of self-interest dictated his acceptance.

Professor Lombroso may well educe the persistence of this prejudice as a significant symptom of atavism. While barriers have been breaking down on every side, and under the motives toward universal peace and brotherhood, in the substantial acceptance of practical Christian ethics, we are proving that the fiercest antagonisms and the most persistent prejudices can be successfully overcome, this alone persists, and not only persists, but after slumbering through a score of years, breaks out with increased violence, and makes itself felt with redoubled barbarity and outrage.

The literatures of the civilized nations bear a striking testimony as to how constantly the stream of virulent attack against the Jew has been kept full and overflowing. And while there may have been, from time to time, reason for such hatred, it is undoubtedly true that, for the most part, it has been irrational and undeserved.

What significance for the further understanding of the relation of the Semitic peoples to the non-Semitic nations of the globe this fact may have, cannot now be determined, but it seems to be one of the survivals of barbarism, against which Christian thinkers and scholars should put forth their strongest efforts in the interest not only of a simple human civilization, but also for the credit of a cosmopolitan Christianity.

A. A. BERLE.

BOSTON, MASS.

ARTICLE XI.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

OUTLINES OF SOCIAL THEOLOGY. By the Rev. William DeWitt Hyde, D.D., President of Bowdoin College. New York: Macmillan & Co. 1895. (Pp. x, 260. 5½x3¼.) \$1.50.

The epoch of reconstruction in Systematic Theology is fairly upon us. After a long period in which the main processes of thought have been critical and more or less destructive, scholars are seeking to rearrange their theological thinking and to incorporate in their views of the truth what they deem the assured results of the critical work which has been already completed. Thus we have recently had Fairbairn's "Christ in Modern Theology," Stearns' "Present-Day Theology," Denney's "Studies," and now have Hyde's "Social Theology,"—all works which cover the whole ground of Systematic Theology, but all small in compass, and engaged rather in the work of showing what general lines the system as conceived by their authors is to follow than in developing that system in detail or establishing it by elaborate proof.

The title of this work deserves a moment's attention. "I have called it Social Theology," says the President, "because the Christianity of Christ and his disciples was pre-eminently a social movement, and because we are looking at everything to-day from the social rather than the individualistic point of view. In ethics, in economics, in sociology, in politics, we no longer treat man as capable of isolation. *Unus homo, nullus homo*. Man is what he is by virtue of his relations to that which he is not. . . . At this period of transition the adjective 'social' serves to call attention to the shifting of emphasis from the abstract and formal relation of the isolated individual to an external Ruler, over to man's concrete and essential relations to the Divine Life manifested in nature, history, and human society."

There are three main divisions of the book, the "theological," treating of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; the "anthropological," treating of sin and law, repentance and faith, regeneration and growth; and the "sociological," treating of the church, the redemption of the world, and the organization of the kingdom. Under these successive heads almost all the great doctrines of religion are touched upon, or discussed more at length. The general impression left upon the mind by the book is excellent. It is pervaded throughout by the genuine evangelical spirit, and it presents the doctrines often with a clearness and with a power of con-

viction which carries them home to the reader as eminently reasonable, and sometimes as axiomatic. For men standing outside the Christian church, particularly for those who are much exercised over the problems of society at the present time, and to whom the title of the book will be a recommendation, it will be very useful indeed.

We might well dismiss the book with these words of praise. It is not a work for the theological scholar, for the constructive, critical thinker. It is a product of theological thought, not a tool for theological thinking. That work is done with other tools; and it may seem unfair to criticise this book from the standpoint of the constructive theologian. Still it is at the same time an indication of present thought, a way-mark upon the road of progress, and as such raises for the thinker the question, What does it suggest as to the modes of arriving at theological conceptions in vogue now, and what are the points at which the writer thinks himself to have made an advance upon previous thinking?

The sources from which the writer has drawn his materials seem to be all three of the main sources, the Bible, the world interpreted by the illuminated natural reason, and Christian experience. To all these sources, he is loyal in heart. He has no contempt for historical theology, though he seeks to improve it. His mind is permeated with biblical truth, and he is nowhere intentionally disloyal to the Bible. The book is the general result at which he has arrived in all his studies, the general impression made upon his mind by all he has received from every quarter, including the Bible. No doubt the biblical element has been uppermost in his reading and thinking. Still, we fail to find that the Bible is the determinative element in his thinking. It is not the standard to which the results of religious thinking are brought to test them and determine their value. The Scriptures are not "authority" in the sense of Protestant theology. For example, in treating the question, Will the righteous survive death? President Hyde says: "Strict proof is impossible." It is not impossible if the Bible has "authority." To be sure, Dr. Hyde comes to a satisfactory conclusion in his own mind. "Out of this deep experience of the present love of Christ; out of the strong courage with which the Spirit helps us to give our lives unsparingly in social service, there is born the lively hope and the serene confidence that can come to us in no easier way and on no cheaper terms;--the practical certainty that 'he that doeth the will of God abideth forever'" (p. 259). This is no doubt true, but the conviction of most Christians is largely dependent upon the direct testimony of the Bible, which Dr. Hyde seldom, if ever, employs as proof. The Bible is to him "the church's most precious heritage . . . the history and literary expression of the life of God in humanity. As such it is the product of the Holy Spirit. It is inspired. . . . The inspiration of the Bible is deeper and clearer than this inspiration which is common to all honest literary men. It is the added inspiration of love and worship and service, which in very different degrees gives to the Sacred Scriptures

the peculiar charm and authority they have" (p. 188). It is preëminently literature, and hence the careful exegetical methods, which Christian scholarship has perfected to determine the precise sense of various individual passages that they may be employed in settling religious truth, are of much less value than the general impression which the book makes. "It is idle to presume to determine the issues of eternity by our interpretation of this or that figurative passage even of Sacred Scripture" (p. 255). Indeed, Dr. Hyde's general mode of treating the doctrines leaves the impression upon his reader that he regards the general result of the present consciousness of the church quite as determinative as that even of the biblical period.

It needs no further words to show to the theologian that this method, with all its affection for and loyalty to the Scriptures, is mere rationalism. The writer is not a rationalist, except in spots, but the method is utterly so. Hence we are prepared to find his treatment of the miraculous element in the Bible defective. It is, in fact, the most unsatisfactory thing in the whole work. We read: "Any attempt to base the belief in the divinity of Christ on the miraculous is sure to alienate multitudes of honest minds who will thus be led to regard it as simply one among the many deifications of saints and heroes with which the legends of antiquity abound" (p. 67). But belief in the divinity of Christ, is belief in the incarnation, and the incarnation is a miracle. How, by any process, can a man who will not believe in miracles be brought to the belief in the incarnation, when the end of the process is to be belief in this crowning miracle? President Hyde seems, for a moment, to remove the miraculous even from his conception of the incarnation, for he says: "The divinity of Christ is merely a question of the agreement of two conceptions: the conception of the spiritual character and will of God; and the historic narrative of the life and work of Jesus Christ. That the Father is greater than the Son is evident. But that in the moral and spiritual points in which the two can coincide they agree; *this is all that the believers in Christ's divinity affirm*" (p. 69). Nothing could be farther from a correct statement of what "believers in Christ's divinity affirm" than that! When Dr. Hyde says that "miracles are at best merely the scaffolding or decoration, not the foundation and substance of Christian faith" (p. 68), the latter half of the sentence is true, but the first half altogether inadequate. But when he says that "ten times the miracles ascribed to Jesus, supported by ten times the evidence, would not be sufficient to convince us that Nero was the Son of God," he has left the basis of facts and gone into the region of the mere imagination. The Christian thinker may well decline to discuss what would be true in such case till miracles accompanying such a character as Nero are actually produced!

The actual departure from the purpose to conform theology to the definite mind of the Scriptures is manifest in many minor points. We cite as examples, the identification of the punishment of sin with its con-

sequences, and the theory of the atonement favored. Dr. Hyde denies positive penalty for sin. "To condemn a sinner, because of his sin, to more misery than the direct consequences of his sin involve . . . would be the act not of a Father, but of a brute; not of a God but of a devil" (p. 134). That does not seem to the present writer either axiomatic or reasonable; but what is of more importance, it is certainly quite contrary to the teachings of the New Testament. The doctrine of the atonement, after the governmental theory has been expressly rejected, is thus stated: "All this he endured simply because it is in the nature of love to identify itself with its object. To love a good man is to rejoice in and share all the glory and gladness that his goodness sheds about him. To love a bad man is to suffer with and share all the shame and pain his badness brings upon him. God loves bad men. Christ came to bring God's love to a wicked world. And that is why he was compelled to live a life of suffering and die an ignominious death" (p. 138, compare p. 227). We shall not now argue for what we deem the correct theory of the atonement, but we shall venture to say that this theory has no Scripture foundation, except such as may be derived from the general impression which the Scripture makes upon a certain class of minds. There is no attempt made here to exhibit its conformity with the Scriptures, and such an attempt has rarely been made by any one. It would certainly be foredoomed to failure.

To turn to another point, we notice with regret that President Hyde rejects the distinguishing feature of the Congregational polity in giving up its doctrine of the regenerate church. We have supposed that the great merit of the Congregational system in contradistinction from the Episcopalian, was just its demand of an "individual profession of faith and conscious experience of grace as a condition of admission" to the church (p. 186). But President Hyde calls it "the great weakness." Of course, it depends upon what you want to accomplish with a church, whether a certain feature makes it weak or strong. A scalpel is very weak for plowing, but not for the surgeon's purposes. If one believes that the world is ruined by sin, and that the only way of salvation is by individual conversion to Christ, then a church composed of the regenerate is the best of all agencies for saving men. The marvelous efficiency of Congregational churches in the past in this direction is the result of their conformity to their principle of admission to fellowship, which Congregationalists should remember was the chief achievement of original Congregationalism, and the greatest result of the revival of religion under Edwards and his followers. But if this object is not a desirable one, doubtless the Episcopalian system is the better.

We have marked the pages of our copy repeatedly with commendatory exclamations, such as "good," "excellent," etc. Upon the less favorable side of the work our duty as reviewer has compelled us to dwell longer. If the book is a sign of the drift of thought in certain quarters,

as we have deemed it, it suggests to Congregationalists many weighty questions for deep consideration. Is it true that the younger generation growing up among us have abandoned our most fundamental ideas as to the constitution of the church? Have they given up the idea that the Bible is an authority in theology? Do they reject the idea of "revelation" technically so called, whereby Jesus Christ, in particular, is believed to be the perfect representation of normal truth, valid for all time, and whereby the New Testament preëminently, but all the Bible after its own nature in each part, is the expression of absolute truth, good for all time and eternity, and designed to guide and control the thinking of the Christian church? And are they on the verge of rejecting the supernatural in religion, as a mythical addition, and an impossibility under the reign of law, and are they beginning the process of readjusting the doctrines of the incarnation and the atonement to an anti-supernatural interpretation of the facts and ideas of Christianity? If so, the times call for no more dilettanteism, but for a sober and thorough discussion of great themes upon the merits of the case and the actual truth.

OAKLAND, CAL.

FRANK HUGH FOSTER.

SCHÖPFUNG UND CHAOS IN URZEIT UND ENDZEIT. Eine religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung über Gen. 1 und Ap. Joh. 12, von Hermann Gunkel, ao. Professor der Theologie in Berlin. Mit Beiträgen von Heinrich Zimmern, ao. Professor der Assyriologie in Leipzig. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. 1895. (Pp. xiv, 431. 6¼ x 4.) 10 M.

The purpose of the book is to show that the Babylonian myth of the creation has been employed in the Bible, appearing in the creation narrative of Gen. i., in numerous minor passages scattered through the Old Testament, and finally in Rev. xii. The author has given a very interesting treatment of his theme, and the theme is important from a literary point of view; indeed it may be called essential to an understanding of the development of religious doctrine. The book is agreeable to read. The thesis is placed clearly before the reader, the argument advances obviously, conclusions are stated with admirable distinctness.

The quotations are the author's own translations, and seemingly he is best satisfied with them when they reflect clearest his evident learning. He often diverts the attention to issues not at all connected with his argument. Of course he cannot be too careful to justify a correction of reading or rendering when anything depends upon it, but it would be better not to provoke criticism at points where it can be spared.

Professor Zimmern contributes translations of the Babylonian literature discussed, and an occasional comment in the body of the book, from the point of view of a trained Assyriologist.

The author first subjects Gen. i. to a minute examination, as a result of which he discovers that the writer did not compose freely. He ignores entirely the theory which we must insist is still possible, that he was led

to the form of narrative which he employs by the facts which he narrates. He argues that if he had not been influenced by some earlier tradition he would have written more in accord with the thought of his own time as shown in other literature; and he would not have introduced features that are at variance with his own thought. Analogy of other cosmogonies which belong to the earliest ages of the literature of their respective languages, lack of connection and sequence in the chapter are other arguments requiring the assignment of a tradition back of the written narrative. The following are some of the particulars which are wholly or partially inexplicable within the horizon of the narrator: Matter existent before the ordering of it into a kosmos; the Spirit brooding the world-egg—for so he understands the passage; darkness not created; plants growing and not created; the heavenly bodies not consistently conceived of as rulers; the taking of counsel, a quite unexpected feature; the verdict of excellence involving a possibility of the opposite issue; the assignment of vegetable food, further removed from the original than Isa. xi.; the seven-day scheme evidently not the original subdivision of the account. We enumerate these points without comment.

There follows an examination of the cosmogony of the Babylonians, as described in Damascius of the sixth century of our era, in Berossus of ca. B. C. 300, and in the cuneiform tablets that have come to light. He finds that the myth was well formed as early as the fourth millennium before Christ, and argues from the various and variant versions of it that it was very commonly known. One generalization which he makes is of great importance, viz., that it describes the process of creation essentially as one would describe the phenomena of springtime in Babylonia, especially the omnipresence of water and water vapor and its gradual yielding until in summer the earth displays its familiar features. This is decisive to him that the Babylonian myth is indigenous in that country, and further, it goes to prove that Gen. i. had its origin there.

Having placed before his readers by an admirable summary the features of the Babylonian cosmogony, and more especially the conflict between Marduk and Tiamat (cf. תְּהוֹמִים), Gunkel returns to the Old Testament for a canvass of the references to it or reminiscences of it. One of the chief contributions which the author makes to Old Testament study is that he draws attention to the significance of the figurative use of proper names in the Old Testament. If the writer is conscious of alluding to a myth as he uses the figure, it is of course evident that he knows the myth. If he uses "Rahab," for example, merely as "another name" (as one commentator puts it) for Egypt, it is clear that the myth was once current, and has died, giving up of its phraseology to the terminology of later years. The use of figures in the Old Testament would be a theme affording rich results of study.

The allusions are grouped in two classes. The first are those which refer to the traditions of the dragon, under the names Rahab, Leviathan,

Behemoth, the dragon in the sea (Job vii. 12; Ps. xlv. 20, etc.), and the serpent of Am. ix. 3. We note a few points at which caution seems to be necessary in accepting the author's explanations. There are some instances like his treatment of Ps. lxxxix. From the appearance of verse 10 [Eng.] before 11 it is inferred that in the legend Rahab was killed before the creation. The passage is too truly poetic for one to assume the order to be chronologically given. It is not perfectly clear that verse 10 belongs at all to the reminiscence; much less can one argue from the milder punishment of the waves to their subordination to Rahab among the forces at war. Why may not all allusions to the myth begin and end with the word Rahab? Gunkel fails to prove that such cannot be the case.

With reference to Job xl., xli., it is a narrow path which he has to walk to make the writer describe actual sea animals and use in doing it so numerous expressions out of the myth. He answers the questions in xli. 5 [Eng.], "No, you cannot, but God has done so." It is this sport which makes the ebb and flow of the tide.

The second class of passages describes the victory over the primeval waters.

Now among the allusions thus discovered, not a few are in Apocalyptic passages, and the author concludes that the form which Apocalyptic takes is thus determined by current traditions as to the great conflicts that preceded creation.

Having thus gained much material in addition to that which the incomplete cuneiform texts reveal, Gunkel comes again to Gen. i., and after a painstaking comparison feels justified in concluding without reservation that Gen. i. is based on the Babylonian myth. It is still true that we are to treat the chapter quite otherwise than we treat the Marduk myth. This is but an interesting antiquity; in that we are able to discover the God in whom we believe.

He believes the tradition to have found its way into Israel soon after the conquest of Canaan, and appeals to the Amarna tablets with their Adapa myth as evidence that Babylonian mythology had even before the Exodus penetrated to Canaan.

Brief space is left to indicate his treatment of Rev. xii. He argues that it is not of Christian origin because it introduces features which do not correspond with the course of the life of Christ, and omits features of the life of Christ which would not have been omitted if the reference had been to him. The introduction of historical facts into an Apocalypse would be without parallel.

The evidence is strong in support of the position that the chapter owes its introduction into its place in the book to a Jewish hand. The Talmud shows that the Jews possessed entirely similar conceptions. The hebraizing character of the language makes in the same direction. As in the case of the Old Testament apocalypses, he regards the form of the chapter as dictated by the then condition of a codified tradition. This

tradition he traces to Babylonian sources, rejecting Dietrich's comparison with the Apollo myth, and arguing from its similarity with other parts of the Apocalypse, with Enoch, Daniel, and Zechariah.

It will be seen from this imperfect outline that the book is a meaty one. It cannot fail to awaken thought to important questions.

OWEN H. GATES.

STUDIES IN THEOLOGY. Lectures delivered in Chicago Theological Seminary. By the Rev. James Denney, D. D. Third edition. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1895. (Pp. viii, 272. 5x3.) \$1.50.

This volume most happily introduces its author to the American public. The brief reports given of the lectures in the papers created a wide desire to see an authoritative edition of it in print. In the present volume that desire is satisfied and the reputation of the author is fully sustained and even enhanced. The chapters, though professing not to amount to a system of theology, do, however (with the learned notes appended), not fall far short of that. The lectures treat of "The Idea of Theology"; "The Witness of Jesus to Himself"; "The Apostolic Doctrine of Christ"; "Man and Sin"; "The New Testament Doctrine of Atonement"; "Inadequate Doctrines of Atonement"; "Christ in His Exaltation"; "The Church and the Kingdom of God"; "Holy Scripture"; and "Eschatology."

The standpoint of the lecturer is that of evangelical Calvinism of the moderate type, which would well have fitted in with the activities of the American churches. In the lecture upon "Eschatology" he takes decided ground against all theories of future probation. The destiny of all Gentiles, he says, "is determined, not by their conscious acceptance or rejection of the historical Saviour, but by their unconscious acceptance or rejection of Him in the persons of those who needed services of love. Those who acknowledge the claim of a brother's need prove themselves the kindred of Christ and are admitted to the Kingdom; those who refuse to acknowledge it prove themselves children of another family and are shut out. This is unquestionably Christ's account of the judgment of the heathen, and it does not square with the idea of a future probation. It rather tells us plainly that men may do things of final and decisive import in this life, even though Christ is unknown to them. I frankly confess that this is the only view of the matter which seems to me to keep the ethical value of our present life at its true height" (p. 243).

The author's views of inspiration were most seriously questioned at the time the lectures were delivered. In publishing the volume this lecture has been rewritten, "in order, as far as possible, to obviate misconceptions." In its present form it will prove in the main acceptable to most evangelical scholars. While holding that the use which Christ made of the Old Testament secures for it as a whole a position "from which it cannot be dislodged, and in which no other book can compete with it," yet he says that "the witness of the Spirit, by and with the word in the soul, does not guarantee the historicity of miraculous details, but it does

guarantee the presence of a supernatural element in the history recorded. It bars out a criticism which denies the supernatural on principle, and refuses to recognize a unique work of God as in process along this line" (p. 212).

Two or three pages later, however, we meet this rather vague statement: "We do not need to believe that the prophets could write history beforehand. The revelation they have to make to us is not the revelation of this or that incident in the fortunes of men or nations; it is the revelation of God" (p. 215). Again, on page 217, we read that the writers of the Bible may have been mistaken about the details of its history, and may have had poor facilities for obtaining information, so that "the story of the first man cannot be history." In describing what this is, the author finds no better word than myth. "God has actually taken these weak things of the world [myths] and things that are despised, and has drawn near to us, and spoken to our hearts, through them."

There is a vagueness about all this which baffles criticism, and to some extent the understanding also, and so the author's emphasis upon the testimony of the Spirit is somewhat one-sided. For example, he says that the doctrine of the atonement for sin made in Christ's death is so witnessed to by the Holy Spirit that "it vindicates itself to faith as divinely and infallibly true; it asserts itself irresistibly, and beyond a doubt, as the supreme revelation of God's judgment and mercy to penitent souls" (p. 223). The question however arises, What is this doctrine of atonement but an interpretation of words found in the Bible, the words of the apostles and of the evangelists? If you are sure of your doctrine derived by interpretation, why are we not to be sure of the meaning of the literature in which those doctrines are objectively embodied? It is often correctly said, that the Bible is what the Bible means. We do not see, therefore, that Dr. Denney needs to differ from the strictest advocates of inerrancy, since they are at liberty to make allowance for the figures of speech and the rhetorical devices which have proper place in the enforcement of truths. If what is implicitly involved, both in the statements of Dr. Denney and of Dr. Warfield, is explicitly stated, they will be found to be not far apart.

THE TEACHING OF THE VEDAS: What Light Does it Throw on the Origin and Development of Religion? By Maurice Phillips, London Mission, Madras. London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co. 1895. \$1.75.

Touching the origin of this book, its author says: "When I began my missionary career among the Hindus thirty-three years ago, I felt keenly that in order to be an efficient worker, a knowledge of the religious and speculative thought of the people was absolutely necessary. But there was no book available that could furnish me with such knowledge. I had to gather it little by little: at first from the works of learned specialists and afterwards from the study of the Vedas by the aid of Pundits.

The results are embodied in this volume." At the present day, essays, treatises, volumes relating to India, its religions and philosophies, exoteric and esoteric, are almost constantly issuing from the press: but in most cases the authors, whatever their learning and intellectual gifts, lack one qualification that seems to me essential, namely, insight into the character and thought of the *living* people—the insight which comes, and comes alone, of long years of self-denying and sympathetic service as a missionary. If the basis of Christian Missions is sound, this must be acknowledged. For though Mr. Phillips says: "I must caution the general reader against concluding that the doctrines of the Vedas, as shown in this book, constitute what is known as Hinduism, or the religion of India to-day," yet if, "to understand its constituent elements, a knowledge of Vedic doctrine is indispensable," then to be livingly acquainted with the religion, will undoubtedly help the understanding of the significance of the writings, to which it owes many of its constituent elements. The lack of this acquaintance is largely to blame for the superficial sentimentalism which characterizes so much contemporary talk and writing about heathenism in general and Hinduism and Buddhism in particular. Mr. Phillips distributes his matter in five chapters, headed respectively, *The Literature, The Theology, The Cosmology, The Anthropology, and the Soteriology of the Vedas*. Whilst the first chapter, as he tells us, is "little more than a compilation, chiefly from the works of Professor Max Müller, whose opinions [on the literary history of the Vedas] I accept in preference to those of others," the remaining chapters are the fruit of independent investigation and thought; and certainly do the author all possible credit.

The third section of the chapter on "*The Theology of the Vedas*," headed "*The Origin of the Vedic Concept of God*," seems to me especially worthy of attention. "Only three answers," he says, "are conceivable" to the question, "viz., Intuition, Experience, Revelation"; and the only answer that covers all the facts is the "doctrine of a primitive revelation"—a revelation such as one person makes of himself to another, in the act of commanding or warning; expressing approval or disapproval, showing interest and love and so forth; not revelation in the form of specific, formal statement or doctrine, as a good many seem woodenly to conceive it in this connection. "The ancient Aryans (as well as other nations), neglecting to cultivate spiritual religion, lost the knowledge of God as a Supreme Personal Being separate from nature, which had been bestowed upon them and dissected the Infinite One into many finite ones, giving a characteristic to each. Or, in the words of Scripture, 'They changed the truth of God into a lie and worshipped and served the creature more than the Creator, who is blessed forever.'" "This being the case, we must believe that when applying the divine attributes to the personified elements and forces of nature, the Vedic Aryans were using language, the full meaning of which they did not understand. This is

self-evident: for had they understood its full meaning, they would have been conscious of the contradiction involved in ascribing infinite attributes to more than one being. The language is an echo of a purer worship in the primeval home. It is applicable to the true God alone. It has no meaning when applied to any one or anything else. It is the language of monotheism, and monotheism was the 'primitive religion.'

I trust Mr. Phillips' book will secure the thoughtful attention which it richly deserves:—in that case it will accomplish what unfortunately too many works on the ethnic religions fail entirely to do, namely, deepen by making more rational, the interest in missionary enterprise. D. W. S.

THIRTY YEARS' WORK IN THE HOLY LAND: (A Record and a Summary) 1865-1895. Published for the Committee of the Palestine Exploration Fund. New and revised edition. New York: Macmillan & Co. 1895. (Pp. 256. $5\frac{1}{2} \times 3\frac{3}{4}$.) \$1.50.

In this volume the reader will find, in condensed form, a vast amount of authoritative information concerning the latest discoveries in the Holy Land. Indeed, the book is almost indispensable to those who do not have access to the full reports of the Palestine Exploration Fund, or to the expensive volumes prepared by Major Conder; but to all, this will be most convenient, since it contains the cream of the whole. Seventy rare illustrations are also reproduced in this little volume. The chapter upon "The Work of the Future" will prepare the reader intelligently to follow the investigations which are now being so rapidly pushed forward.

MODERN MISSIONS IN THE EAST. Their Methods, Successes, and Limitations. By Edward A. Lawrence, D. D. With an Introduction by Edward T. Eaton, D. D., LL.D., President of Beloit College. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1895. (Pp. xvi, 329. $5\frac{1}{2} \times 3\frac{1}{4}$.) \$1.75.

Mr. Lawrence prepared himself for the task of writing this book by a two-years' trip around the world, during which he visited, at his own expense, as many missions of all denominations as the present rapid means of traveling would permit. The result is a volume of extraordinary value. The impressions received by the author are not limited to those from the missions of any one board or of any one country, nor is he embarrassed by the restraints of official responsibility. The missions of China, Corea, Japan, India, Egypt, and the Turkish Empire, all received his personal attention.

The book is carefully prepared, and written in a charming style. The author deals, at the outset, with general considerations relating to the providential preparation for missions, and of the principles upon which missions should be conducted. Then follows a detailed account of the missionary work as he saw it. The larger part of the book is occupied with chapters upon "Entrance into Work"; "The Departments of Missionary Work in Their Variety"; "The Home and Rest of the Missionary"; "The Problems of Missions"; "Sketches from the Mission Field";

"The Church and Missions"; and "The Spiritual Expansion of Christendom."

Special interest attaches to the author's treatment of the qualifications of the missionary, an idea of which can be formed from the following extract:—

"I will name one more indispensable qualification. It is that the one who goes out as missionary should be sound and strong in the faith. By soundness I mean something equally removed from doubt and dogmatism, something neither defective nor protuberant, the clear discernment and ready acceptance of the fundamental, living, working, practical doctrines and principles of Christianity as taught by Christ and the apostles. A shaky theology, one cut off from the main line of doctrinal development, out of tune with one's time, representing only individual, accidental, or provincial peculiarities, would be a poor tool for the founding of Christ's kingdom in Asia—a far greater hindrance to usefulness, I am convinced, there than in America. Were I in any way to have part in the examination of candidates for both missionary and pastoral service, acting with my present light, I should be far more critical and exacting, far less yielding to eccentricity and immaturity in the case of the missionary than of the pastor. It has been the study of the work on the ground which has brought me to this conviction. The pastor at home has but to continue a work already begun, administering the legacy of the past. He is surrounded, instructed, corrected by the pervading sentiments of Christian communities.

"Abroad it is different. The missionary is the founder and master-builder of the native church. It takes the tone of its Christian life, its interpretation of Scripture, the color of its theology from him, and much which might be a harmless deviation at home because counteracted on every side, and discerned in its true nature and results, may prove a germ of mischief and dissension abroad. It is the peculiar, original, and pivotal position of the missionary that brings his need of special soundness in the faith.

"There is yet another reason why I should be more exacting in the examination of the missionary than of the pastor. The latter is subject not only to the scrutiny and criticism and advice of his brethren, but to the withdrawal of their fellowship in his association, or at a council upon a change of location. But when the missionary is once on the field it is most important that he should be left to free, untrammelled development of his faith. If he have proved himself thoroughly rooted and grounded in the gospel, sound in faith and judgment, he can be trusted to encounter the subtle philosophies of the East, and to shape the theological thought of the new church" (pp. 51-53).

MISSIONS AT HOME AND ABROAD. Papers and Addresses presented at the World's Congress of Missions, October 2-4, 1893. Compiled by the Rev. E. M. Wherry, D. D., Corresponding Secretary World's Congress of Missions. New York: American Tract Society. 1895. (Pp. 486. 5¼x3¼.) \$2.00.

This handy volume is by no means the least valuable of the echoes that continue to come from the Columbian Exposition at Chicago, two years ago, and may serve as a partial antidote to some of the incidental evils connected with the grand Parliament of Religions. The papers collected in this volume cover the whole field of missions, and are prepared by those who have given special attention to each department treated. The work of Missionary Societies is presented by Rev. A. N. Hitchcock, District Secretary of the A. B. C. F. M., Chicago. City missions are discussed in their various phases by Rev. Dr. Burrell of New York City, Mackay-Smith of Washington, D. C., and Professor Graham Taylor of Chicago. Home Missions are discussed in three papers, by Rev. Drs. Roberts of New York City, Wishard of Ogden, Utah, and Hillis of Evanston, Ill., while to Foreign Missions seven papers are devoted by Drs. Smith of Edinburgh, Washburn of Constantinople, Scott of Chicago, Hayden of Cleveland, Wood of Callao, Peru, Dennis of Beirut, and Bishop Nicholson of Philadelphia.

Among the special topics treated are "Beacon Lights from the World's Mission Fields," to which four papers were devoted: "Auxiliary Agencies in Missions," to which six papers were devoted, one upon "Science and Missions" by Professor Wright of Oberlin, and one by Rev. Dr. Clark upon the "Responsibility of Young People and their Societies for Missions." There are two papers upon "Money and Missions," and four upon "Comity and Coöperation." The closing paper is by Joseph Cook upon "The Victories and the Hopes of Missions." Altogether the volume is one of great value. Nowhere else can one find, in the same compass, so much information concerning missions, and so much healthy discussion of the various topics directly and indirectly related to mission work.

EVOLUTION AND THE IMMANENT GOD. An Essay on the Natural Theology of Evolution. By William F. English, Ph. D., Pastor of the First Congregational Church, East Windsor, Conn. Boston: Arena Publishing Co. (Pp. 122. 5x3¼) \$1.00.

This is a concise and well-considered essay on Evolution as related to Theism. It accepts the general results of the theory of Evolution and maintains with candid and sound argument that between these conclusions and the truths of Scripture there is not only no conflict, but a mutual gain, when to each we add the truth of the other. The arguments for the belief in the existence and benevolence of God are considered in order, with the result that while evolution is not able to remove every difficulty, "it does not complicate the problem, and, on the whole, may be said to powerfully aid and reinforce our conception of an Immanent

God, whose beneficence is illustrated in the progress of development, and will, we believe, become ever increasingly manifest as we come more fully to understand that process, and as its ideals and aims are more fully realized" (p. 82). The relation of evolution to revelation, providence and prayer, is considered, with the result that, while the form in which belief in these doctrines is often stated must be given up, the essence of the doctrines remains. As to immortality, the author is ready to affirm that the doctrine of evolution demands "some belief in immortality to afford a satisfactory and worthy end for its processes."

The book is temperate, reasonable, and good. One need not agree with the author's reasoning at every point to commend it heartily. In the main it is in entire accord with what an increasing number of thoughtful Christians regard as true.

THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE. Collected and Edited by Moncure Daniel Conway, author of "Life of Thomas Paine." Vols. II., III. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1894. (Pp. 523, 436. 7x4.) \$2.50 per volume.

The second volume of Paine's collected works includes his writings from 1779 to 1792. The most important of these is his treatise on "The Rights of Man," and the principal new document is the Preamble to the Act of Emancipation, passed by the Philadelphia Assembly in 1780, which was introduced on the day that Paine became clerk of that body, and is believed by the editor, on comparative and other evidence, to have been the work of Paine. It resembles his plea for emancipation published in the first volume, and is said to be the earliest Act of Emancipation passed in America. The religion of this volume is the single sentence in "The Rights of Man" that "every religion is good that teaches man to be good."

The third volume covers the period 1791-1803, and contains, among the rest, the letters from Paine to Monroe, written from the Luxembourg prison, where, as Conway again affirms, he was placed through the hostility of Gouverneur Morris. There, too, is the letter to Washington, which has taxed Paine's reputation as severely as anything he ever wrote.

OLD SOUTH LEAFLETS. Edited by Mr. Edwin Mead. Nos. 48-57. Boston: Directors of the Old South Work, Old South Meeting-House, Boston. (6¼x3¾.) 5 cents each; \$4.00 per hundred.

No. 48.—Bradford's Memoir of Elder Brewster (8 pp.); No. 49.—Governor Bradford's First Dialogue (24 pp.); No. 50.—Winthrop's "Conclusions for the Plantation in New England" (12 pp.); No. 51.—"New England's First Fruits," 1643 (16 pp.); No. 52.—John Eliot's "Indian Grammar Begun" (16 pp.); No. 53.—John Cotton's "God's Promise to his Plantation" (16 pp.); No. 54.—Letters of Roger Williams to Winthrop (20 pp.); No. 55.—Thomas Hooker's "Way of the Churches of New England" (16 pp.); No. 56.—The Monroe Doctrine (20 pp.); No. 57.—The English Bible, Extracts from the Important English Versions of the Bible from Wiclif's to the King James Version (20 pp.).

THE OBERLIN SUMMER SCHOOL OF CHRISTIAN SOCIOLOGY.

AT the call of the executive committee appointed by the convention held in Oberlin on the 14th of November, 1894,¹ the Oberlin Summer School of Sociology assembled upon the 20th of June, and remained in session ten days, having three addresses each day, followed by discussions. The suggestion of ex-President Harrison, that there be brought together on the occasion both the leaders of labor and employers, was followed, and the representation of all classes engaged in economic discussions was fuller than any other convention within our knowledge except the World's Fair Conference. To represent the interest of wage-earners, there were Hon. Clarence S. Darrow, attorney for the American Railway Union, who conducted the defense of Mr. Debs; Mr. Robert Bandlow, editor of the Cleveland *Citizen*; Mr. Thomas J. Morgan, leader of the socialists of Chicago; Mr. Samuel Gompers, ex-President of the American Federation of Labor; and Mr. James R. Sovereign, Grand Master Workman of the Order of the Knights of Labor. Representing various theoretical and practical interests there were Rev. Washington Gladden, D. D., LL.D., of Columbus; Mr. Z. Swift Holbrook, of Chicago; Mr. N. O. Nelson, of St. Louis; Professor John B. Clark, of Columbia College; Rev. Levi Gilbert, D. D., of Cleveland; Professor S. F. Weston, of Western Reserve University; Professor T. N. Carver, of Oberlin; Colonel Carroll D. Wright, United States Commissioner of Labor, Washington, D. C.; Miss Jane Addams of the Hull House, Chicago; Rev. James Brand, D. D., and Rev. Henry M. Tenney, D. D., of Oberlin. Each of these read a paper, and several of them two or three.

Mr. Darrow maintained that the use of the injunction by the courts, as in the case of Mr. Debs, was a dangerous infringement of the rights of the individual, and a violation of the Constitution, in that it permitted the punishment of a man before he had been tried by a jury of his peers to determine whether or not he was guilty; and that, even if he were guilty, it violates the Constitution in permitting him to be put in jeopardy of his liberty twice for the same offense. The trial of Mr. Debs before a jury is pending, yet he is punished by order of the court for inciting insurrection in contempt of its injunction. If the jury shall declare Debs innocent, then the court has punished a presumably innocent man. This is a dangerous power to lodge in the hands of judges, as has been proved by long experience in English history. It is better to suffer almost any amount of inconvenience than to undermine the foundations of liberty that have been laid at so great expense.

¹ See *Bibliotheca Sacra* for January, 1895, pp. 186-188.

To this, Mr. Holbrook, who had been one of the Grand Jury to indict Mr. Debs, replied, that Mr. Debs would not be punished twice for the same offense, since the act of inciting to insurrection is distinct from the act of contempt. In a republican form of government, where the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary can be so easily changed, it is especially important to bow to existing laws and decisions, and patiently await the dissolution of an injunction by an appeal to the courts and, failing in that, to remedy existing laws by an appeal to the general public for a change of the laws and the administration. With our form of government there is no excuse for open resistance to the order of court. The use of the injunction is ordinarily of greatest advantage to the wage-earner, since it allows him peremptorily to arrest an infringement upon his rights and secure an immediate decision of the case before an irreparable injury has been done. In resisting these forms of law provided for emergencies, wage-earners are in imminent danger of destroying the ship upon which their own safety, as well as that of everyone else, depends.

Dr. Gladden's first address was entitled "Is Society an Organism?" In this he exposed the fallacies of thoroughgoing individualism, showing that no unit in society stands alone, but each is dependent for his well-being upon union with the whole, to which he contributes his quota of good. But, on the other hand, society is not an organism in which the individual is completely absorbed. Each individual has freedom of will and is able partially to rise above and resist the conditions of life, and by virtue of his spiritual endowments to attain a noble ideal, even amidst the wreck of all earthly plans. Still, practically, the reflex influence of society upon the individual is of the highest importance, and every possible effort should be directed towards securing the conditions of life most favorable to the development of noble character. This principle is recognized by everyone in the efforts of each family to control the conditions under which the life of the children develop. The larger study of sociology legitimately aims to secure, in some degree for all, the advantages provided for a few in the most cultivated families. There is no nobler subject offered to the human mind for study and philanthropic effort, and none beset with more puzzling problems or with greater difficulties.

Professor Clark in his two addresses defended the proposition, that the law of competition, when limited by due regard to that justice which can be rightfully claimed for the individual, is our surest dependence for securing the highest attainable social prosperity; but it is necessary that the field be free, and that there should be legal protection against combinations and trusts whose object is to diminish rather than to increase and cheapen production. Here is the great field for legislation, and one which is beset with extremest difficulty. A single suggestion would indicate what might possibly be done to meet one class of evils,

though he would not have it taken for anything more than a suggestion. The evil contemplated is that where a great corporation, disposing of its products over a large territory, kills off the competition of local dealers, in the locality where competition is arising, by selling the product at less than cost, meanwhile making its own profits in the other centers of trade. It was suggested that possibly the evil might be remedied by a law making the price uniform throughout the country, and making it illegal to collect a larger price for the product in any one place than the same firm asked for it in another, making due allowance for the differences in the cost of distribution. But all such laws must be thought out with great care and their enforcement will be beset with great difficulties.

Dr. Gilbert laid less stress upon drink as a cause of poverty than is usually done. From the facts collected in Cleveland by Mr. Mellen, it appears that, great as is the influence of drinking habits in producing poverty, it does not have that overshadowing position among the causes which many assign to it. Sexual immorality, shiftlessness, and downright laziness are among the causes which need to be emphasized more fully. Much as the pauper class which one encounters in the cities thirst for drink, they do not have any corresponding hunger for work, but will do almost anything to avoid it.

Professor S. F. Weston read a paper on "Ethics, Economics, and Business," which will be published in a future number of the BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

Mr. Bandlow confined himself to a presentation of some of the facts concerning the relief work of labor organizations. One of the most interesting methods of relief practiced by wage-earners, and a method less appreciated than any other by the general public, is that afforded by the wage-earners who have a job, surrendering it for a certain number of days in a month to those who are out of work, thus keeping them along during dull times until business revives. The extent to which wage-earners assist each other in such unobtrusive ways is one of the most encouraging facts, since it brings into play personal sympathy coupled with the best opportunities for knowledge of the facts upon which the sympathy is based. Indeed, the extent to which wage-earners afford each other assistance during periods of trouble goes far to relieve distress which would otherwise be unendurable.

Professor Carver presented with much fullness the evidence going to show that the law of competition is on the whole beneficent, maintaining that in a free and enlightened community the prevailing motives of self-interest coincided with the general good, since the main opportunities to barter one's services arose from the fact that they minister to the wants of others. The main hope of social progress, therefore, lies in the enlightenment of individuals concerning their highest wants, and the maintenance of the freest possible competition, which will permit others to minister to those wants in the most effective manner.

Mr. Morgan, representing the law-abiding socialists of Chicago, read the paper, "Why I am a Socialist," which follows these Proceedings, and which is valuable as giving a forcible statement of the views of an active company of citizens who advocate by lawful means a total change in the policy of the government relating to the management of private industries. We make no comment on this at present.

Mr. Carroll D. Wright in two papers, upon "Ethical and Economic Causes of the Social Unrest" and "Proposed Remedies for Social Unrest," presented an avalanche of statistics going to show that even in our present imperfect social condition the general standard of prosperity among wage-earners is constantly rising. He says, for instance, that there has scarcely ever been a more rapid rise in social conditions than is now taking place among the French Canadians who are swarming into the industrial centers of New England. In displacing the unskilled labor which had formerly occupied the field, they are themselves coming up to a higher level, and at the same time raising the social level of those whom they have displaced. These conclusions are drawn from long-continued observation and careful collection of statistics.

Among the most suggestive and far-reaching statements of Miss Adams was one in answer to the question, How were the people among whom you labor in the Hull House affected by the strikes? "Oh," she replied, "they are all below the strike level." And in many other ways it came out during the conference that the great strikes are limited mainly to an aristocracy of the better paid wage-earners, who in reality do not constitute more than ten per cent of the whole number, and who are constantly quarreling both among themselves and with non-union laborers. The practice of altruism seems to be as much of a stranger to the labor organizations as to the corporations.

Mr. Gompers emphasized the fact that the effect of strikes in raising wages is not to be judged wholly by the immediate result, claiming that the fear of a strike and the remembrance of past business disasters through disregarding the claims of the working people exercised a wholesome check upon the employers of labor. While Mr. Wright looked upon the recent general rise in wages as indicative of the general regard of capitalists for their employees, Mr. Gompers looked upon it as a result of the fear engendered by a former warfare.

Mr. Nelson gave a detailed account of the profit-sharing enterprise in which he is engaged. This has been in operation for about ten years. The business is that of preparing wood for certain processes of manufacture, in Indiana, and a factory at L. Claire, in Illinois, for making plumbers' supplies. His are among the very few successful efforts made in this country to secure better results from labor by giving the laborers, over and above their market wages, a share in the profits, but it is not a communistic arrangement. A fair per cent of the profits goes to pay interest upon capital, while the managers receive salaries on the ordinary

scale adopted throughout the country, and share with the laborers in receiving an additional per cent from the profits. So skillful has Mr. Nelson's management been, that a dividend of profits has been declared even during the depressing times of the past two years. He does not, however, recommend profit-sharing on the ground of its increasing the efficiency of the workman, but on purely philanthropic principles, and does not look upon it as a panacea for all the ills of society.

In another paper by Mr. Holbrook, he called attention to the limited extent to which profit-sharing and coöperative enterprises had been successful in comparison with the great mass of the world's business, and brought out in clear light the dependence of all business enterprises for their success upon wisdom of management. The most productive factor in a business enterprise is the skill of the directing mind, which makes ends meet, which properly adjusts the supply to the demand, and which sees to it that labor is not wasted in producing things which the people do not want. The whole labor of a factory making furniture may be wasted by the adoption of designs which are not popular. One of the great sources of loss in factories is the waste of material, which may be the result either of pure ignorance or of culpable carelessness. This creates a necessity for the maintenance of a large number of overseers, which he should presume it probable could be reduced in some measure in profit-sharing establishments, if that plan contributed to make the workmen more watchful over themselves and others. But Mr. Nelson could not see that there was any appreciable influence in this direction in the profit-sharing plan. Mr. Holbrook forcibly called attention to the responsibility which the captains of our industries have in the use of the capital which is intrusted to them. For the most part this capital belongs to widows, orphans, and to benevolent and educational institutions, or is the savings of the poor against a time of need. For anyone to handle these funds without supreme regard to their safety and to such investment as yields profit, is both criminal with respect to those who have provided the capital and destructive of the general well-being of society. Corporations rightfully exist for the purpose of reaping profit to the investor. This the highest ethics both sanctions and demands.

Mr. Sovereign was in general opposed to strikes, and defended the Knights of Labor on the ground that the organization had mainly in view the elevation of the character of their members, the promotion of temperance, and the relief of distress. In a country where everything is submitted to the ballot, he advocated relief through political measures, and the use of the ballot rather than the bullet.

Dr. Brand presented the beneficence of the work of the church in accomplishing for its members many of the highest aims of the labor organizations, especially in promoting temperance, morality, self-restraint, regard for law, and in enforcing upon both rich and poor obedience to the golden rule. Like the diffused light of the sunshine, that of the church

is so all-pervasive that it is too little appreciated, and even its own members do not realize either how great are their accomplishments or how vast their responsibilities.

Dr. Tenney presented in clear relief the importance of the family as a conservator of all the highest interests of society.

In a closing address Dr. Gladden spoke upon "Present Day Problems." He said that the present-day problems are not only capable of being solved, but are being worked out. The world is not going backward. These are the best days the world has ever seen. The estimate from the newspapers is erroneous. They give us the seamy side. The gentle, the pure, and the good is omitted, while evil deeds are given as news. The tendency has been to exaggerate the past as newspapers now exaggerate crime. The world is going forward, but its progress is irregular. If one could view the whole scene it would be grand and inspiring. Political problems are confronting us. Among these Dr. Gladden mentioned taxation, currency, representation, and civil service. He said that there is no place where the spoils system is more to be condemned than in our own state institutions. Educational and religious questions are also before us. He proceeded to a discussion of the question, "Is there anything which needs reform?" taking an affirmative view and arguing that so long as the law of self exists, competition will be conducted on the principle of each one getting what he can, and that the industrial world must be moralized and business be managed on a higher plane. He favored profit-sharing and shorter hours of labor. Any business supplying a general want and being a natural monopoly, such as railroads, telegraphs, and telephones, he would have owned by the general government, and water and lighting plants and street car lines by municipalities. He admitted that this was a step toward socialism, but here he would stop. His closing was an eloquent appeal in favor of higher living,

A resolution was passed favoring the holding of another Summer School of Sociology at Oberlin next year. The following gentlemen were recommended for executive committee, subject to the approval of the Faculty of Oberlin College:

Rev. Washington Gladden, D. D., of Columbus; President W. G. Balantine, D. D., of Oberlin; Mr. Z. Swift Holbrook, of Chicago; Professor S. F. Weston, of Western Reserve University, of Cleveland; Hon. James Monroe, of Oberlin; Rev. C. S. Mills, of Cleveland; Professor G. F. Wright, of Oberlin; Rev. D. M. Fisk, of Toledo; Professor T. N. Carver, of Oberlin; Hon. C. S. Darrow, of Chicago; Rev. James Brand, D. D., of Oberlin; Professor A. T. Swing, of Oberlin.

WHY I AM A SOCIALIST.

I DO not expect that the announcement that I am a socialist agitator, will call up any feelings of fellowship in your hearts, arouse your sympathy, or bring you closer to me. It will simply call up in your minds the socialist and agitator you have seen in *Puck*, *Judge*, or other illustrated papers, or as described in the public press, and the recollections thus revived, will not be friendly or sympathetic.

The individuality of the socialist, his ideas and doings, have been interesting public topics discussed by your favorite minister, author, statesman, teacher, and friends; all of these have been very close to you, and, living as you are in an atmosphere favorable to the absorption of opinions which circulate with every outward evidence of authority, and which harmonize with your daily life and future hopes, you would be more than ordinary men to escape its influence and retain an unbiased mind. Some men do. But the great majority follow their leaders along the well-beaten paths of thought, and arrive at the same terminus of general, orthodox public opinion.

I recently listened to one of these leaders directing the Ethical Culture Society of Chicago through the subject of socialism. I give you the substance of his closing remarks, which he characterized as his strongest strokes: "The central, vital, physical and intellectual force of socialism, is in its stomach. Being animal in its very nature, it would make all excellence, a' individuality of thought and action impossible, it would destroy the home, make the woman and child creatures of the state, would make the state like the Catholic Church, a despotism, and make the woman, as in that church, a spy, an informer, revealing to the state the secret thought and acts of those nearest and dearest to her. That is socialism, —a horrible thing to contemplate; and as you love your wife, child, home, and yourself, set your hearts and minds against it."

William Graham Sumner, Professor of Social and Political Economy of Yale College, speaks to a larger following and with greater authority. The following kindly references to us are taken from only one of his efforts. Referring to the socialists, he says: Their views are superficial; their historic knowledge defective; their statements dogmatic, unverified, and unverifiable; they fail to understand the industrial phenomena; theirs are but half ideas, a snarl of muddled facts, everything connected with their domain of thought is crusted over with false traditions, cheap philosophy, and undefined terms impossible to criticise.

The great daily journals portray us as men and women devoid of decency, honesty, or humanity, as blear-eyed beer guzzlers, the offscourings of Europe, loafers, revolutionists, anarchists, and dynamiters, and so on to the end of human denunciation.

Continued for years, this misdescription of Socialism and Socialists operates most powerfully upon the public mind. Its effects have filtered more or less deeply into your minds, have colored your views, barred us

from your sympathy, and clogged reason itself. Its effects on us have been to imbitter our lives; to label our homes as anarchists' nests; to fence our children off at the public school and in the neighborhood, from the pleasant associations of childhood; to isolate them as if they were lepers; to make the socialist a laughingstock, a byword, a thing to be contemptuously pointed out, to be sneered and scoffed at, in the workshop, on the street, in the labor union, in the convention, in the lodge, in the church, and at the grave.

In 1892 a graduate of Princeton College visited Chicago, and, prompted by a desire to know the truth, found his way into our meeting. After he had learned to know us as we are, he astonished a number of his friends gathered in the parlors of Mr. McCormick, the millionaire reaper machine man, with the story of his experience. The following is a brief synopsis of his statement as he related the incident to me afterwards:—

"I came to Chicago with the idea that the socialist and anarchist were one and the same; that a stranger inquiring for them or for their meeting place was liable to arrest; that to enter their meetings was a difficult and dangerous matter. I was surprised to find this was entirely erroneous. Their meetings were open to the public; the members were respectable and intelligent; their discussions of public affairs were entertaining and instructive. I participated in the debates; found the socialists present were Americans, English, Scotch, Irish, German, French, Jew, and Scandinavian; visited with the active agitators at their homes amid their families, some of them were old soldiers, whose parents were abolitionists, and, most strange of all, instead of the dangerous class of which I had read and heard, I found them vigorous defenders of law and order, a conservative force, opposed to all advocacy of violence and anarchy, desirous of remedying the evils of which they complained by legitimate, lawful American methods; that while their ideas were strangely in conflict with those commonly entertained, they were held and advocated by honest, intelligent, and courageous men and women, who had been most grossly misrepresented and slandered by those in position to affect the public mind."

His auditors listened politely, but with incredulous amusement, contrasted his statements with those acquired from regular sources, and refused to believe.

How did I become a socialist? It is a simple story, of value only as it serves to light up the subject-matter. I was born so low in the social scale that I could only look around and upward: there was no below for me. At nine years of age I was at the forge, hammering out nails from bars of iron, with mother and father at the same fire. We labored from early morn till late into the night for an existence. I struggled somehow to manhood, such as you see; recklessly married, as others did, and, at twenty-one years of age, joined my wife in a square look into our future, and saw a life of toil ending in pauperism or crime. We saw the sun-

shine, the pure air, the grass, trees, and flowers fenced off from our life, joined our old mother in thanking God that our first child was born dead. We read of a better land across the sea, where there was no king, no aristocrats, no privileged class. We saw the painted panorama of the great ship, the ocean, the valleys and mountains, the plains and rivers of America and listened to the emigration agent while he sang:—

“To the west, to the west,
To the land of the free,
Where the mighty Missouri
Rolls down to the sea;
Where a man is a man,
If he's willing to toil,
And the humblest may gather
The fruits of the soil.”

This invitation was resistless; the wife agreed that I should go, she to stay and work till I could send for her. We sold all we had, tore up all the roots which cling so strongly even to the poorest place called home, kissed the wife and old mother good-by, and became one of the mighty throng fleeing from a hopeless life of poverty, to the land of the free. But, oh, the surprise and disappointment of the reality, the struggle for life, the breaking down of all our castles in the air; homeless, friendless, in a strange land, the strange contest with many men of many lands begging in many tongues for leave to toil, for a chance to live.

Then the questioning, the search for the reason why this should be so; the grouping together of others like myself seeking information, sympathy, and encouragement; our organized protest against the injustice of our employer; our experience in the justice court, vainly seeking aid from the law to secure our unpaid wages; the organization of the men of our trade, the strike and defeat by those poorer than we, and ready to take the longer day's toil and the smaller pay; the arrival of the socialist agitator, and the organization of the first socialist section in Chicago.

At this time I had been here five years, had filed my citizen's papers three years, and in my efforts to find light on the cause of our industrial and social difficulties, I had, while out of work and hungry, read Adam Smith's "Wealth of Nations," Spencer's works, Hale's Social Science, Thornton and Wright on labor and many other works, the whole resulting in an increase of my confusion. The socialist agitator's simple speech made all plain and clear, and fixed my economic and political thought on the rock.

Twenty years ago I joined the first American section of socialists. We found a temporary meeting place in a basement saloon where the Masonic Temple now stands. We were fired out of there, because we did not drink enough beer to pay for the gas burned to light our conferences. We tried the churches and public schools, but all doors were shut against us but those of the saloon. In the rooms attached to these

places we made ourselves familiar with the common story of injustice, its fundamental cause, and the way which might lead to labor's emancipation.

While we were thus preparing ourselves for the work of agitation, like sections were forming in other industrial centers. These were rapidly linked together under the name of the Workingman's Party of the United States, and the propaganda of socialism began. Our forums were street corners, vacant lots, a room in or over a saloon, and in the labor unions; and our resources, the nickels and dimes from the workers' pay.

The industrial disturbances of 1877, the first great manifestation of industrial and social unrest in this country, gave us the sympathetic ear of the discontented toilers. We formed them into sections, each according to nationality.

At first the movement was confined to economic propaganda; but I, with other members of the national executive committee, strongly favored the request of sections to take political action wherever it would better aid the propaganda.

In 1878 a county ticket was nominated in Chicago, and 7,000 votes polled. Four Socialist candidates were elected to the State Legislature, the first in the United States. In 1879, 12,000 votes were cast for a Socialist city ticket, and four Aldermen were elected. At least 10,000 of these 12,000 votes came from the Republican party, defeating that ticket the first time since the war, and indirectly caused the election of the Democratic candidate, Carter H. Harrison, for Mayor, a position which he held for eight years, when the Socialists caused his defeat.

This rapid political growth was accompanied by great activity and success in the economic field, the Socialists completely controlling the public expression and work of the labor unions, leading them from their sole reliance in strikes and boycotts into the higher field of education and political action.

At this point the opponents to socialism seemed to take concerted action, the public press and the churches opened their batteries of misrepresentation and slander, and the corrupt elements in the trade union movement were united against us, and by treachery secured control of the central body, which we had formed from the various unions. With the aid of the public press, which supported them as the *bona fide* honest workingmen, this element, which is composed of men who seldom work at the trades they represent, but either live as salaried officers or are cared for by one or both of dominant political parties as their agents, were enabled to do our cause the greatest injury. Our active workers were attacked on all sides; some discharged by their employers; others terrified into silence by ruffians in the unions; others seduced into the ranks of the professional labor men by appointment to some small political position, which paid them about their daily wage, but gave them more leisure and ease; and finally, we were abused and beaten at the

polling places. Our ballots were refused, stolen, and the official returns falsified; the courts legalizing our disfranchisement, and the press, the church, and the professional labor leaders publicly rejoiced at our discomfiture.

Never since the respectable citizens of Boston mobbed Lloyd Garrison, and the equally good and law-loving citizens of Alton, Ill., murdered Owen Lovejoy, had the spirit of malicious intolerance manifested itself with greater vigor. The little band of Socialists, full of the enthusiasm and hope created and encouraged by the Declaration of Independence, were suddenly made to understand that equality, lawful rights, free speech, and a free ballot were for them but meaningless phrases, fit only to serve for decorative purposes in Fourth of July orations. The results of this discovery have made an interesting chapter in the history of this country, and, unless the people come to realize the true cause of the shame and disgrace it chronicles, worse chapters will be written by the future historian.

The immediate result of these tactics of the enemy was the division of the Socialists. The party as a whole determined to continue the political propaganda. A small part, with headquarters in Chicago, raging with indignation at the outrageous violation of their rights as American citizens, full of the bitterest feeling against the capitalistic class, whom they deemed responsible, and against the church, police, and professional labor leaders, whom they considered the agents of the capitalists, forthwith formed an organization which afterwards became known as the Anarchists. Their declaration called for the destruction of the present system of injustice by all and every means, illustrating their despair of peaceable reformation by appealing to the physical force of a Washington and a John Brown.

In two years they succeeded in forcing the Socialists out of the field of agitation in Chicago, and, under the skillful stimulus and direction of police agents and other creatures employed by leading citizens, the Anarchist movement was forced in 1886 to a head: the public press had carefully culled the speeches of its surface leaders of all the extravagant expressions and threats, published them in staring headlines, and all was ready for some act of violence. The second great labor disturbance in 1886, with its strikes, riots, police clubbing and militia shooting, furnished a fit time for the explosion, and when the police charged upon a peaceable meeting in a public street, after it had practically adjourned, the bomb was thrown.

Then all that was vile and wicked in those who had made such a movement and such violence possible was let loose. The public mind was maddened, the shout for blood was on every lip. Every Socialist was, in the public mind, an Anarchist; and every Anarchist a Socialist, and altogether they were a band of desperate murderers.

The Anarchists arrested were condemned before the jury was im-

panelled, and they were hanged by order of a group of millionaire members of a class which in the days fast coming will tear down your goddess of Liberty.

Yes; I know you will consider this last sentence but the ignorant vaporing of irresponsibility. To this I do not care to reply, but simply ask you to read Henry D. Lloyd's book, "*Wealth against Commonwealth*."

Immediately following the conviction of the Anarchists, there came a very remarkable local political movement, a reaction of feeling among the workingmen, caused by the very violence of the capitalistic press and its agents, a great labor protest against the police, the jury, and the judge. It was named the United Labor Party, and was composed of Socialists, Anarchists, Trade Unionists, Knights of Labor, and business men. Thirty-five thousand votes were cast for its ticket in the county, and eight members of the Legislature were elected. But most worthy of note was the election of the lawyer who, employed by the Socialists, had endeavored to secure the punishment of the ballot-box stuffers who had robbed us of our votes and aldermen five or six years previous; his election as county judge, by a majority of 10,000 over all other candidates for the bench, emphasizing the meaning of this political campaign. This was a stunning surprise to those in power, and everything known to the politician and trickster was tried to cause the destruction of this movement before the next spring election of 1887. But the whole power of the local capitalistic class, the press, the churches, the labor leaders, the whole force of the city government with its 15,000 employees, was unable to accomplish their purpose. Our convention was an overwhelming success. The party in power, with Carter H. Harrison the Mayor at its head, was paralyzed. It nominated a ticket, then forsook it, and joined the Republicans to save the city government from capture by "the Reds," as they called us. Never was there a greater scare among our masters. Preparations were made to place the police and fire departments under the control of the State, should the Reds elect their ticket; and, strange to relate, the Socialists were almost as much afraid of capturing the city government as were the capitalists. That was not our purpose. We desired to come as near to that accomplishment as possible, no more. We desired a great object-lesson for the public good, a great legitimate protest against a great wrong, a great indication pointing out to the workers of America the direction in which they could grasp the power to bend their masters within the limits of the laws of a free people. We knew that the rank and file of the workers did not understand their true situation, that theirs was the indignant emotion of the moment,—powerful, but transitory. The protest was made, and the party dissolved.

Since then, the socialists have kept up a less conspicuous but effective propaganda, the last political demonstration being made in Cook county under the name of the People's Party, which, last fall, polled

thirty-five thousand votes, and this spring cast some eighteen thousand votes in the city.

The economic agitation culminated at the convention of the American Federation of Labor, which was held December last, in Denver. The issue was on Plank 10 of the political programme, which I had submitted at the convention, December, 1893, and which was referred to all organizations represented in the American Federation of Labor to be voted upon during the year, and a tally of the vote to be taken at the convention in Denver by the delegates as they were instructed. Plank 10 declares for the collective ownership by the whole people of all means of production and distribution, and is practically the very essence of the whole socialist programme, and the shibboleth of the political movement of socialism throughout the world. This declaration had also been voted upon by the Great Trade Union Congress of Great Britain, in 1893 and 1894, when it was carried by almost unanimous vote.

A careful canvass of the voting strength of the delegates to the American Federation of Labor convention last December, showed a majority of two hundred votes for Plank 10, but the leaders would not permit such a result to be officially shown. A part of the delegates of the great unions, the miners, cigar makers, and carpenters, violated their instructions; and, as the vote of these three unions alone was almost one-half of the entire vote, this violation of duty saved the American Federation of Labor from being placed in harmony with the labor movement of the world which is distinctly and positively socialist.

The principle of political action and socialism, as represented in state regulation of the conditions and hours of labor, municipal control and ownership of light, heat, power, and transportation, and the national ownership and control of telegraphs and railroads, passed unanimously. But Plank 10 meant the condemnation of the wage system; it called for the scientific organization of labor and the distribution of its products by society itself. Further it meant that the political action of labor men should be in accord with this declaration, and that meant that labor leaders could no longer belong to trade unions and hold connection and office in the Republican and Democratic parties. It meant more work and less personal profit, more hard knocks and less glory. It meant more abuse and less praise, and, for some, a drop from the highest individual prominence to complete obscurity. To prevent this, the truth was stifled, and the American Federation of Labor stands before the world as last in the intellectual and moral elevation of the labor movement of the world.

Permit me now, as a Socialist, to address you personally, as representatives of capitalists, business men, clergymen, scholars, teachers, supporters, and actors in the economic and political world as it now exists. This personal relation will make it easier to understand our subject, and, if objectionable in any sense, other than as I have explained,

you can make your complaint as strong as you like when I am through.

We Socialists hold to the principle of human equality, whether man comes direct from the one father Adam, or from the slower process of evolution from the protoplasmic cell. As good Christians or Darwinians, we must not forget the common origin and brotherhood of man. But you do forget, and, as you do, the human race suffers thereby. *You* remember your *own* birth, the time, place, and circumstances of *your* early life, and according to your isolation or ignorance, the importance of these facts is exaggerated. A family name, the invisible county line the width of the road, the river, or mountain, the color of your skin is all sufficient to render the accident of birth an unending justification of your contempt and hate of your brother. I am an American! hear the eagle scream, aye hear the jackass bray. He's an Irishman, a Dutchman, a Dago, a nigger. The socialist looks with pity, with regret, upon the ignorance that will so magnify or belittle such an accident. I am a king, prince, a noble, a millionaire, a professor, a manager, foreman, a skilled mechanic, a laborer; each in turn looking up or down at each other. How stupidly ignorant, and wicked, this artificial scale, whose units turn from dust to dirt! What a denial of the brotherhood, of the oneness of humanity!

Horace Greeley said that we need the consciousness that individuals are but drops in the rivulets whose ocean is humanity; that the greatest that ever lived are but fragments and particles of manhood. Whether blackened by the fervid sun of tropical desert, or bleached by the fogs of a colder clime, a Christian or savage, a Washington or a thug, the same essential nature reveals itself through all. That the lot in which the life of each is cast, makes all the shades of difference between the red-handed savage and the gentle village pastor. Each might and could be the other in his place. This conception of man is fundamental in socialism.

We hear you talk of the brotherhood of man and the fatherhood of God, and then see you in your everyday practical way, outwit your brother, deceive him, let him deceive himself to your profit, buy and sell him in the marts of trade, harvest from his poverty and necessity, do him to death that you may profit thereby. This may sound harshly, but believe me it is tame, compared with the grim reality. You have taken the baby from the mother's breast, compelled the father and mother to carry it to the factory, made it a part of the machine it tends the weary live-long day. Away from the sun, air, and flowers, it grows up bloodless, deformed, your crippled victim, your brother or sister.

Down they go into the bowels of the earth, kicked and beaten by naked, brutalized men, the naked child and naked mother chained to the wagons, hauling them on all fours through the narrow passages that lead to the light.

Into the tumble-down, murderous fire-traps of our great cities, with-

out light or air, suffocating with sickening and poisonous odors, you crowded old age and infancy, sodden indecency with inquiring innocence.

Up into the tenement, fifty families together, six to sixteen in a family, six to eight persons of both sexes in sleeping-rooms eight by eight feet. Two hundred human souls in a space fourteen by forty feet. Then force in upon this congested mass of humanity the poisonous tobacco weed, and the cloth for vests, coats, and pants, and have these poor wretches fold and stitch into these things their own bodies and souls, and the germs of the filthiest disease, and place these goods on the backs and the cigars in the mouths of the innocent multitude.

Pay the girl so meanly that she must barter honor for the needed loaf of bread, terrify her with the fear of discharge or refusal of work, so that she submits to your animal embrace, or to that of your manager or foreman.

Give the child worker ten cents per day and the father five cents per hour for the wealth they thus bring you, and, flushed with your sense of masterful power, bid your hireling dress himself as a flunky, shaped and colored to suit your cultivated taste; dress her so none will mistake the servant for the mistress; order him to shave off his whiskers or moustache as your fancy suggests; bid him when, where, and what he shall drink; put your sign on his forehead, on his breast and body, so that all men shall know the thing belongs to you; deny him the right to vote or to permit any one to nominate him for political position or to vote for him; refuse him the chance to labor for bread; send him adrift a homeless tramp;—then turn, and count your gains by thousands and millions, then in the house of God bend your knees in humble thanks for these blessed gifts of wealth and power, and ask for rest and mercy for yourself and for yours.

The socialist sees all this, and listens to your prattle about brotherly love and patriotism; sees you do honor to the memory of the Revolutionary heroes whose sacrifices and swords carved out this republic; sees you, wrapped in the folds of "Old Glory," lift into the eyes of the czars, Cæsars, emperors, kings, and potentates of the earth, the legend, "All men are born equal," "A government of, by, and for the people."

They laugh, and we groan, at the mockery. They review their armies. We turn the page of American history, and hear the crack of the slave-driver's whip, the protest of Garrison, the howl of rage that followed it, the murder of Lovejoy and Brown, the slave-owner's blow on the head of Charles Sumner, the cannon shot at Fort Sumter, the funeral dirge on Decoration Day; and from these records of yesterday we look into the to-morrow, and we see in the east and west, north and south, the toilers come from the mine, field, factory, and shop, urged by injustice to madness, and high above them, right in the center, you stand, owners of all the fields and mines, factories and shops. All is yours, even the laborers. You offer praise to Him above, so that all below may hear you, and think

that his is the glory and his the shame. You bid them trust in Him, but you trust Him not, for in between you and the masses you have created swamps and morasses of ignorance, planted the higher ground with the prickly cactus of superstition, and nearer again to you are the clubs and revolvers of the police, the terrors of your laws, and nearer yet the modern military, volcanoes, ready to vomit destruction, should the masses ever come so far; and so you rest as peacefully as you can, eat, drink, and are merry as can be.

And so lived the barons of old. But the day came to them. Out of the valleys, over deeper ignorance and superstition, over the mail-clad bodies of mercenaries, came the wave of simple workers, so low and despised that their masters bid them eat grass; up and over the heights they came, and when they returned to their lowly homes, the baron's headless trunk was in the ditch, the roof of his grand castle was in fragments in the valley below, and only the frowning and gaping walls were left to tell the story of vengeance.

The smoke of battle still hangs over the valleys of the Sunny South; the tears of the widow are not yet dry; the shattered body of the veteran is still in our public places, and you are making ready for a more frightful conflict with your brothers than the world has ever seen. You laugh at the Socialist who comes with the palm of common sense, asking you to aid in bringing into the everyday life of man the recognition of equality and humanity, a simple manhood, that would bring the science that can count and measure the stars, that can weigh worlds, and harness the giant forces of nature to man's use, down to the simple problem of the organization of labor and the equitable distribution of its products, so that, so long as the sun shines, and the rain falls, and the earth yields its treasures to man's labor, no one shall be hungry, none lacking in the opportunity for the fullest development of his manhood. That in place of the sordid spirit of Mammon and greed for the power of individual wealth, we shall lift above all the love of man for man; the love that on the sinking ship saves the children, saves the mothers, saves the passengers, saves the crew, and last of all turns to save self.

Again you smile and turn to your text of everyday life, which plainly reads, "Everyone for himself, and the devil take the hindmost." The captain first into the life-boat.

"Let him take who hath the chance,
Let him keep who can."

You set this forth as the great and inseparable element in human nature, and then, on your knees, you murmur, "Thy kingdom come, Thy will be done in earth, as it is in heaven."

THOMAS J. MORGAN.

CHICAGO, ILL.

INDEX.

A

Acts, The Book of, and the Historical Method of Interpretation, article on, by James Brand, 259; Peter's visit to Cornelius, 259; appeals to reason in the interpretation of Scripture, increasing, 260; Paul on the silence of women in the churches, 261; religion and science, 262; the council at Jerusalem, 264; true conservatism and progress, compatible with each other 266; true method of Bible study, 267; true conception of our duty to the heathen, 267; interpretation and Christian experience, 268; the gradual unfolding of Scripture meaning, 269.

Agnosticism, The Passing of, article on, by A. A. Berle, 505; Athenagoras on the presence of God in nature, 505; the duty of verification, 506; the failure of materialism, 508; strife or order, the world's law, 509; the struggle for existence, 511; revelation and knowledge, 513; the rise of "Christian science," 514; investigations into psychic phenomena, 515; the ineradicable belief of men in revelation, 517; interest of scientific men in theological discussions, 521; Mr. Huxley as a theologian, 518; Balfour on the foundations of faith, 519, 522; increasing influence of Christ, 523; the central feature of human history, 524; Romanes' "Thoughts on Religion," 525; the reaffirmation of the supernatural, 528; the reaffirmation of a supernatural Bible, 529.

Anti-Semitism, The Persistence of, note on, 756.

Assassins, The Order of the, article on, by Harvey Porter, 113; origin of the term, 113; the heretical Mohammedan sects preced-

ing it, 114; the founder of the order, 117; its early history, 118; its development, 119; the reign of terror in Persia, 121; in Syria, 122; conflict with the Governor of Damascus, 124; later full development, 126; conflict with the Crusaders, 129; internal dissensions, 131; their final destruction, 133.

Assyriology, Triumph of, note on, 754.

B

Bad Philosophy Going to Seed, note on, 559.

Balfour's, James Arthur James, The Foundations of Belief, noticed, 569.

Barnes', W. E., Canonical and Un-canonical Gospels, noticed, 372.

Barton, W. E., article by, 29.

Bennett's, W. H., The Book of Chronicles, noticed, 375.

Berle, A. A., Semitic and Oriental Notes by, 168, 342, 754; article by, 505.

Books Received, 238, 384, 586.

Brand, James, article by, 259.

Briggs', Charles Augustus, The Messiah of the Apostles, noticed, 578.

Broadus, John Albert, note on, 553.

Brooklyn Trolley Strike, The, note on, 364.

Brünnow's, R., Chrestomathy of Arabic Prose Pieces, noticed, 368.

Buckley's, J. M., Travels in Three Continents, noticed, 379.

C

Cairns', Christ the Central Evidence of Christianity, noticed, 373.

Calvinism: The Origin and Safeguard of Our Constitutional Liberties, articles on, by Abraham Kuyper, 385; the geographical seat of constitutional liberty, 386;

- Rome, inimical to liberty, 387; prominence of the Reformed churches in promoting liberty, 389; failure of the French Revolution, 390; religious basis of American liberty, 391; limitation of French influence in America, 395; pervasive influence of religion in America, 396; influence of the Puritans and Independents in England, 399; influence of Henry VIII., 401; the conflict in England, 403; the influence of Cromwell, 406; the weakness of the episcopacy, 407; the revolution of 1688, 408; the Reformed church saved by the War of the Independents, 409; clearly outlined traits of resemblance between the Huguenots and Independents in their plan of colonization, 646; on the question of toleration, 648; in their morals, 649; in their fundamentals in politics, 649; points of difference: representatives of different phases of Calvinism, 651; one aristocratic, the other democratic, 653; the *magistratus inferiores*, 655; Beza van Vezelay, 657; Calvin's position on the liberty of conscience, 658; on sovereignty, 659; on non-intervention, 660; on the form of the church, 661; the absolute sovereignty of God, the fundamental doctrine of the Calvinists, 662; from this comes the sovereign authority of God's word, 667; the forces at work before Calvin's appearance, 668; the French Revolution and its fruits, 670; the platform of the anti-revolutionists, 673.
- Candlish's, J. S., *The Biblical Doctrine of Sin*, noticed, 367.
- Capital and Labor, *Relations of*, article on, by L. C. Warner, 411; the workman's ideal, 411; ignorance of the risks of business, 412; profits in business, dependent on good management, 413; coöperative enterprises find it difficult to secure best management, 414; risks of profit-sharing, 415; economical advantage of large corporations, 415; importance of thrift on the part of the workman, 418; and of enlarging his mental horizon by education, 419; honesty, the best policy, 420; this applies to workmen as well as to capitalists, 421.
- Carver, T. N., book review by, 203.
- Caverno, C., note by, 347.
- Chautauqua Books for 1894-95, noticed, 383.
- Charity, notes on, 564, 750.
- China, *The Three Religions of*, note on, 170.
- Christian Sociology, Oberlin Institute of, 186; Summer School of, 773.
- Christology, *Studies in*, article on, by F. H. Foster, 531; development of the doctrine before Chalcedon, 532; the solution by Arius, 533; by Apollinaris, 534; the schools of Alexandria and Antioch, 537; of Nestorius and Cyril, 538; result of the Council of Chalcedon, 540; Luther's christology, 541; the Lutheran view of consubstantiation, 545; failure of the Lutheran view, 546; Calvinistic christology, 548.
- Close Communion, article on, by a Baptist Divine, 97; nature of the practice, 97; logical weakness of the position, 101; weak in its facts, 104; church fellowship and Christian fellowship, not distinct, 105; fundamental error in close communion, 107; church communion, not a general indorsement of conduct, 108; pedobaptists, not disobedient, 108; should not fellowship the disobedient, 109; the two proper alternatives, 111.
- Commons', John R., *The Distribution of Wealth*, noticed, 203; *Social Reform and the Church*, noticed, 204.
- Comprehensive Teachers' Bible, *The*, noticed, 371.
- Conway's, Moncure Daniel, *The Writings of Thomas Paine*, noticed, 772.
- Corporations, *The Relation of, to Public Morals*, article on, by Washington Gladden, 607; corporation defined, 607; curiosities respecting, 609; different kinds of corporations, 610; the occa-

sions of immorality, 613; the permanence of the evil in a corporation, 615; the aims of socialism, 617; large price paid for the advantages of corporations, 619; regulation of corporations by law, 620; importance of publicity in the affairs of corporations, 621; the right of laborers as well as of capitalists to combine, 622; the dangers of such combinations, 623; analysis of the subject, 625; specific instances of wrong doing, 626; the duty of the nation, 627.
 Critical Notes, General and, 176, 347, 559, 741.

D

Dana, James Dwight, note on, 557.
 Dana's, James D., *Manual of Geology*, noticed, 369.
 Davis's, John D., *Genesis and Semitic Tradition*, noticed, 371.
 Debs Insurrection, *The American Republic and the*, article on, by Z. S. Holbrook, 135; character of the early New England settlers, 135; the Pilgrims and the Puritans, 137; the compact in the *Mayflower*, 138; the Puritan's notion of liberty, 139; Dr. Poole's opinions of the rise of Congregationalism, 140; influence of Rev. Thomas Hooker, 141; sermon before the General Court of Massachusetts in 1638, 142; Nathaniel Ward of Ipswich, 144; the Ordinance of 1787, 145; written by Rev. Manasseh Cutler, of Ipswich, 147; influence of Congregationalism in promoting the spirit of liberty, 148; defense of Puritanism, 150; the times have changed, 209; the growth of foreignism, 211; the danger of demagogism, 213; unreasonable demands of labor organizations, 215; corruptions of politics, 217; majorities cannot change the nature of things, 220; the originating causes of the Debs insurrection, 223; nature of Debs' crime, 225; fallacies of labor unions, 227; recipe for producing insurrections in a free re-

public, 228; true sources of hope for the masses, 230.
 Denney's, James, *The Second Epistle to the Corinthians*, noticed, 375; *Studies in Theology*, noticed, 766.
 Dickinson, Edward, article by, 676.
 Doctrine of the Mass at the Council of Trent, Formulation of the, article on, by C. Walker, 629; importance of the doctrine, 629; differences of opinion in regard to it, 630; inconsistencies in, 631; outside pressure in regard to, 631; was the last supper a sacrificial act? 633; institution and character of the Eucharist as set forth by the Council, 636; agreement with Scripture, 637; differences between sacrifices of the Mass and of the cross, 638; word "represent" as used in regard to the Mass, 639; difficulties in regard to, 641; the doctrine derogates from sacrifice on the cross, 644; not the same as the English communion service, 644.
 Dodge's, Harriet Waters Preston and Louise, *The Private Life of the Romans*, noticed, 383.
 Dorchester's, Daniel, *The Problem of Religious Progress*, noticed, 575.
 Driver's, S. R., *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Deuteronomy*, note on, 741.
 Drummond's, Henry, *The Ascent of Man*, note on, 351.

E

Eaton, T. T., note by, 553.
 Egyptian Book of the Dead, *The*, noticed, 196.
 Ely's, Richard T., *Socialism and Social Reform*, noticed, 204.
 E. man's, Adolf, *Life in Ancient Egypt*, noticed, 195.
 English's, William F., *Evolution and the Immanent God*, noticed, 771.
 Expositor's Bible, noticed, 374.

F

Farrar's, F. W., *The Second Book of Kings*, noticed, 374; *The Book of Daniel*, noticed, 576.

Foster, F. H., articles by, 69, 232, 531; book review by, 759.
 Future Life in the Pentateuch, Ideas of the, article on, by T. S. Potwin, 423; origin of misunderstanding respecting, 423; expression in the Pentateuch respecting future life, 424; belief in immortality, prevalent in the ancient world, 425; especially among the Babylonians, 427; intercourse between the Hebrews and their neighbors in Babylonia and Egypt, 431; direct evidence in the Pentateuch for immortality, 433; the meaning of Sheol, 435; later Jewish views, 437.

G

Gates, O. H., book reviews by, 365, 763; article by, 587.
 Gladden, Washington, articles by, 153, 607.
 Giddings, Franklin H., *The Theory of Sociology*, noticed, 204.
 Greenland Christianity, note on, 176.
 Griffiths, William Elliot, *The Religions of Japan*, noticed, 584.
 Gunkel's, Hermann, *Schöpfung und Chaos in Urzeit und Endzeit*, noticed, 763.

H

Harper's Lectures, President, article on, by Howard Osgood, 323; prominent position of President Harper, 323; his own strictures invite criticism, 324; Gen. i.-xii., fundamental portions of Scripture, 325; but not written until after the time of Elijah, 325; the inspiration and history of the record, fundamental, 326; but the objective form of the doctrine of God grossly defective, 327; the revelation of God, clear, 328; but the records, utterly untrustworthy 329; Harper's errors regarding the historical character of Genesis, 330; the creative days, 332; the size of the ark, 333; the province of the author, compiler, and editor, 334; the moral ideas of the writers, 336; the nature of the Word of God, 336; the imperfec-

tions of the New Testament and of Jesus Christ, 338.

Harnack's, Adolf, *Monasticism*, noticed, 586.

Hayman, Henry, article by, 18.

Herron's Impressionism, Professor, note on, 561.

Higher Criticism. (*See President Harper's Lectures*, 323.)

Historical Argument, *The Importance and Limitations of the*, article on, by A. T. Swing, 48; importance of the right method, 48; the difficulty of proving facts, 51; the importance of rightly emphasizing facts, 53; historical character of geological investigation, 55; of biological, 56; historical value of literary and biblical criticism, 59; so-called inductive method of Bible study, 62; influence of religious philosophy upon historical investigation, 65; value of theories and working hypotheses, 67.

Historical Study of Religion, *On the*, note on, 173.

Holbrook, Z. Swift, articles by, 135, 209, 458; sociological notes by, 180, 359, 564; critical note by, 561.

Holland's, Henry Scott, *God's City and the Coming of the Kingdom*, noticed, 377.

Hutchings, Samuel, article by, 708.

Hyde's, William DeWitt, *Outlines of Social Theology*, noticed, 759.

Hymns of Martin Luther: *Their Predecessors and their Place in History*, *The*, article on, by Edward Dickinson, 676; relation of religious art to church history, 676; special interest of the study of hymnology, 678; peculiar importance of the hymns of Luther, 679; Luther not the founder of the German congregational hymn, 680; history of the German popular hymn before the Reformation, 682; poetic and religious qualities of the pre-Reformation German hymn, 686; real nature of Luther's contribution to congregational song, a part of his liturgical reform, 690; Luther as a hymn writer; originality, and use of previous materials, 695; influence

of Luther's hymns on the progress of the Reformation; their literary style and religious teaching, 697; the melodies to which Luther's hymns were sung, 702; Luther not a composer of tunes, 702; threefold origin of the melodies of the early Protestant songs, 703; gradual alteration of these tunes in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 705; literary and historical value of Luther's hymns, 706.

I

Injunctions and Strikes, article on, by W. H. Upson, 549; injunctions employed in the fifth century, 549; interests rendering injunctions necessary, 550; strikes recorded as early as 310 B. C., 550; suppressed by injunctions in the fifth century A. D., 550; wage-earners specially need the protection of the law through injunctions, 552.

Irenicon, An, article on, by G. F. Wright, 1; extent of practical agreement among the parties contending about the inerrancy of the Scriptures, 1; uncertainty respecting the natural and intended sense, 4; inerrancy, professedly limited to the autographs, 5; some theory of accommodation held by all interpreters, 6; no such thing as absolutely literal interpretation, 8; both letter and spirit, to be duly emphasized, 11; charges of wriggling and jugglery, out of place on both sides, 13; reconciliation of Hodge and Finney in the doctrine of original sin, 17.

Isaiah Controversy, The, note on, 347.

Israelitish Monotheism, Early, note on, 168.

Iverach's, James, Christianity and Evolution, noticed, 373.

J

Jacobs', Joseph, Studies in Biblical Archæology, noticed, 372.

Jewett's, Frances Gulick, Luther Halsey Gulick, noticed, 583.

K

Kelsey, Francis D., note by, 351.

Kidd's, Benjamin, Social Evolution, noticed, 200.

Kübel's, D. Robert, Exegetisch-homiletisches Handbuch zum Evangelium des Matthaus, noticed, 580.

Kuyper, Abraham, articles by, 385, 646.

L

Labor, Capital and, article on, by L. C. Warner, 411.

Labor Organizations, Attorney-General Olney and, note on, 185.

Lagarde's, Anna de, Paul de Lagarde, noticed, 365.

Larned's, J. N., History for Ready Reference, noticed, 382.

Lawrence's, Edward A., Modern Missions in the East, noticed, 769.

Love's, William DeLoss, St. Paul and Woman, noticed, 376.

M

MacLean's, J. P. Introduction to the Study of the Gospel of St. John, noticed, 585.

Maclaren's, Alexander, Bible Class Expositions, noticed, 374; The Psalms, noticed, 375.

McCurdy's, James Frederick, History, Prophecy, and the Monuments, noticed, 192.

Magoun, G. F., article by, 439.

Marquette Building Strike, The, note on, 362.

Missions at Home and Abroad, noticed, 771.

Memorial Notes, 553.

Monday Club Sermons, noticed, 375.

Morgan, Thomas, paper by, 779.

Moule's, Handley C. G., The Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans, noticed, 375.

N

New Jerusalem, The Descent of the, article on by W. E. Barton, 29; the Apocalypse, a work of art, 29; refers to the overthrow of Jerusalem, 30; to the downfall of pagan Rome, 31; to the overthrow of all the power of evil, 31; to the continual presence of God with the church, 32; but symbol-

ically the New Jerusalem relates to individual character, 32; and to all social and political improvement, 35; breadth of the spiritual fulfilment, 40; difficulties of literal interpretation, 43.
 New Testament, The Use of Kingdom and Church in the, note on, 747.
 Notices of Recent Publications, 189, 365, 569, 759.
 Nourse, Edward E., book review by, 189.

O

Oberlin Institute of Christian Sociology, note on, 186; Summer School of, 773.
 Old South Leaflets, 772.
 Osgood, Howard, article by, 323.

P

Papers of the American Society of Church History, noticed, 379.
 Paul's Phraseology and Roman Law, article on, by G. F. Magoun, 439; difference between the Old Testament surroundings and those of the New, 439; the Roman use of the word "testament," 440; joint heirs with Christ, 442; of adoption, 445, 448 *et seq.*; of parents and guardians, 446; why this influence has not been sooner discovered, 454.
 Pease's, Theodore C., The Christian Ministry, noticed, 370.
 Pfeiderer's, Otto, Philosophy and Development of Religion, noticed, 376.
 Phillips', Maurice, The Teaching of the Vedas, noticed, 767.
 Porter, Harvey, article by, 113.
 Potwin, L. S., note by, 357.
 Potwin, T. S., article by, 423.
 Prestwich on Some Supposed New Evidence of the Deluge, article on, by G. F. Wright, 724; foremost in glacial investigations for forty years, 724; his theory of a submergence of Western Europe, followed by a series of paroxysmal periods of elevation, since the advent of man, corresponding to the Deluge of Genesis, 725; proved by the distribution of the Rubble-drift of South

England and North France, 725; the ossiferous fissures of the same locality, 729; the loess deposits of Europe, 735.

Priestly Dues, Harmony of the Pentateuch respecting, article on, by Henry Hayman, 18; tithes, not ranked among priestly dues in Deuteronomy, 18; but Num. xviii. 20-21, essential to an understanding of Deut. x. 9; Numbers enumerates what the priests are to receive, Deuteronomy what the people are to bring, 24; Deut. xviii. 3 quoted in 1 Sam. ii. 13, 25; Deuteronomy, incomprehensible without reference to Leviticus-Numbers, 27.
 Pullman's Testimony—An Object Lesson, note on, 180.

R

Raymond's, Bradford Paul, Christianity and the Christ, noticed, 373.
 Record Books, noticed, 379.
 Reed's, David Allen, Outline of the Fundamental Doctrines of the Bible, noticed, 373.
 Religion and Wealth, article on, by Washington Gladden, 153; what is religion, 153; what is wealth, 154; asceticism, not supported by the New Testament, 157; the abuses of wealth, 158; the true nature of wealth, 159; the importance of wealth, 161; the distribution of wealth, imperfect, 153; what the principle of distribution should be, 165.
 Restricted Communion, article on, by J. W. Willmarth, 297; the communion, an ordinance of Christ, 298; and a church ordinance, 299; qualifications for occasional and constant communion, the same, 300; baptism, a prerequisite to communion, 301; orderly walk in the church, a prerequisite, 302; Baptists specially emphasize the spirituality of the church, 304; also that immersion only is baptism, 307; and that Christ is the sole lawgiver for the church, 308; Baptist view of qualifications for communion, 309; danger of the alternatives to

restricted communion, 310; restricted communion, a token of loyalty to Christ, and a testimony to the truth, 312; preserves the true meaning of the ordinance, 314; accentuates the distinction between church fellowship and Christian fellowship, 315; is for the benefit of other Christians, 316; is favorable to Christian union, good for the world, and for Baptists, 317; open communion is Baptist suicide, 318; the perilousness of the present time calls for the emphasis of Baptist principles, 319.

Resurrection Body of Christ, The Nature of the, article on, by Samuel Hutchings, 708; three views have prevailed in the church, 708; the first, that it was wholly spiritual, unsupported, 708; the second, that it was a glorified material body, argued, but not maintained, 708; arguments adduced, are: failure of Mary and the two disciples to recognize Jesus, 709; the manner of Jesus' appearances and disappearances, 711; Jesus' leaving the tomb before it was opened, 713; his ascension in a glorified body renders it necessary for him to have thus risen from the tomb, 714; the assurances that Jesus' resurrection is a pledge of the resurrection of believers, 714; the third view, that he rose in the same body that was laid in the tomb, proved by: Christ's express language, 715; his acts, 718; the necessities of the case, 719; view of some, that his body was gradually changed till his ascension, 722.

Romanes', George John, Thoughts on Religion, noticed, 572.

Romans ix. 3, The True Rendering of, note on, 357.

S

Sabatier's, Paul, Life of St. Francis of Assisi, noticed, 198.

Scriptures, The Authority and Inspiration of the, article on, by F. H. Foster, 69; systematic theology, progressive, 69; personal po-

sition of the author, 71; Christian experience fundamental to the proof of the Bible, 72; answers to objections, 74; other sources of knowledge beside the Bible, 77; faith in the Bible confirmed by the experience of others, 78; such confirmation necessary for the conviction of unbelievers, 79; confirmed, also, by the agreement of general historical facts, 83; relations of this argument in the system, 84; the coherence of the theological system proves the authority of the Bible, 86; so does the correspondence of experience with the promises of the Bible, 88; the Christian system unlocks the mysteries of the world, 89; the natural reason incompetent to prove the existence of God, 90; or the immortality of the soul, 91; or the divine benevolence, 92; or to explain the universality of sin, 92; or the influence of Jesus, 92; or to enforce the doctrine of forgiveness, 93; the true theological system of the Bible confirmed by much independent testimony of the reason, 94; the authority of the Scriptures limited to the final form of teaching, 232; the imprecatory psalms, 233; the authority limited to the moral and religious sphere, 234; historical infallibility not claimed, 235; summary of argument, 236; the nature of revelation, 237; of inspiration, 239; inspiration not necessary to the existence of Scripture, 240; the argument for inspiration, 241; Dr. Warfield criticised, 243; free use of the Old Testament in the New, 244; meaning of 2 Tim. iii. 16, 247; nature of inspiration should be determined inductively, 250; discrepancies in the Bible, 251; inspiration defined, 255; concluding remarks, 255.

Semitic and Oriental Notes, 168, 342, 754.

Semitic Sacrifice, The Real Meaning of, note on, 342.

Sewall, J. S., article by, 271.

Small's, Albion W., An Introduction to the Study of Society, noticed, 204.

- Smith's, George Adam, *The Historical Geography of the Holy Land*, noticed, 574.
- Smith's, Joseph, *The Purpose of God*, noticed, 378.
- Social Ethics of Jesus, article on, by J. S. Sewall, 271; existing conditions at the time of Christ, 271; nature of Jesus, 272; things which he did not do, 273; the spiritual nature of Jesus' work, 275; the sociological power of his great principles, 277; enlargement of the idea of neighbor, 278; the Golden Rule, 279; Jesus' view of the family, 282; the duty of the rich, 284; the danger of the rich, 285; Jesus' friendship for the poor, 286; the superiority of his plane, 287; effects of Jesus' life upon society, 288; the ideal of love, 290; concentrates influence upon the individual, 291; social forces already largely christianized, 292; spread of the principles of peace, 294; progress during the nineteenth century, 295.
- Sociological Notes, 180, 359, 564, 750.
- Sociological Value of the Old Testament, article on, by O. H. Gates, 587; sociological study as old as the murder of Abel, 588; the Israelitish nation regarded in the Old Testament as a unit, 590; the sacrifices involve this idea, 591; Jehovah chose the nation, 592; significance of such a choice, 592; failure of Israel to realize its ideal, 595; sociological influence of the prophets, 596; the sociology of Isaiah, 597; the sociological force of the doctrine of the Messiah, 601; prominence of the individual as a sociological factor, 603; the ideal citizen, 604; the Messiah a servant, 605.
- Sociology, What it is, article on, by Z. Swift Holbrook, 458; symposium on, by over a hundred eminent writers, 458 *et seq.*; the two schools of sociology, 486; speculative sociology, 486; practical sociology, 487; hidden forces in society, 488; sociology, not an exact science, 489; Comte's view of sociology, 490; Spencer's view, 491; fundamental importance of Christian forces in sociological development, 497; sociology as old as the Old Testament, 499; the three main quests of sociology, 501; the practical ends of sociology, 502.
- Stalker's, James, *The Trial and Death of Jesus Christ*, noticed, 372.
- Stiffler's, J. M., *An Introduction to the Study of the Acts of the Apostles*, noticed, 582.
- Strikes, note on, 359.
- Strong's, James, *Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible*, noticed, 196.
- Swing, A. T., article by, 48; book review by, 198.
- T
- Thirty Years' Work in the Holy Land, noticed, 769.
- Thompson's, A. C., *Protestant Missions*, noticed, 378.
- Tischendorf's, C., *Novum Testamentum Græce*, noticed, 189.
- Truth or Pious Fraud, note on, 741.
- Trumbull's, H. Clay, *Studies in Oriental Social Life*, noticed, 379.
- U
- Upham's, Francis W., *The First Words from God*, noticed, 370.
- Upson, W. H., article by, 549.
- V.
- Vries, Hendrik de, translations by, 385, 646.
- W
- Walker's, Cornelius, *Outlines of Christian Theology*, noticed, 585; article by, 629.
- Walker's, J. B. R., *The Comprehensive Concordance*, noticed, 196.
- Warner, L. C., article by, 411.
- Watson's, Robert A., *The Book of Numbers*, noticed, 374.
- Willmarth, J. W., article by, 297.
- Wordsworth's, John, *The One Religion*, noticed, 376.
- Wright, G. F., articles by, 1, 724; notes by, 176, 559.
- Wright's, William Burnet, *Master and Men*, noticed, 376.
- Wright, W. E. C., book review by, 200; note by, 747.

MAR 9 1938

